Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II. 101 chapters. Translated by James F. Anderson.
Up: Summa Contra Gentiles · Thomas Aquinas
Chapters
- The Connection Between the Following Considerations and the Preceding Ones
- That the Consideration of Creatures is Useful for Instruction of Faith
- That Knowledge of the Nature of Creatures Serves to Destroy Errors Concerning God
- That the Philosopher and the Theologian Consider Creatures in Different Ways
- Order of Procedure
- That it is Proper to God to be the Source of the Being of Other Things
- That Active Power Exists in God
- That God’s Power is His Substance
- That God’s Power is His Action
- How Power is Attributed to God
- That Something is Said of God in Relation to Creatures
- That Relations Predicated of God in Reference to Creatures Do not Really Exist in Him
- Chapters 13 and 14
- Chapter 14
- That God is to All Things the Cause of Being
- That God Brought Things into Being from Nothing
- That Creation is Neither Motion nor Change
- How Objections Against Creation are Solved
- That in Creation no Succession Exists
- That no Body is Capable of Creative Action
- That the Act of Creating Belongs to God Alone
- That God is Omnipotent
- That God Does not Act by Natural Necessity
- That God Acts Conformably to His Wisdom
- How the Omnipotent God is Said to be Incapable of Certain Things
- That the Divine Intellect is not Confined to Limited Effects
- That the Divine Will is not Restricted to Certain Effects
- Chapters 28 and 29
- Chapter 29
- How Absolute Necessity Can Exist in Created Things
- That it is not Necessary for Creatures to Have Always Existed
- Arguments of Those Who Wish to Demonstrate the World’s Eternity from the Point of View of God
- Arguments of Those Who Wish to Prove the Eternity of the World from the Standpoint of Creatures
- Arguments to Prove the Eternity of the World from the Point of View of the Making [of Things]
- Solution of the Foregoing Arguments, and First of Those Taken from the Standpoint of God
- Solution of the Arguments Proposed from the Point of View of the Things Made
- Solution of the Arguments Taken from the Point of View of the Making of Things
- Arguments by which Some Try to Show that the World is not Eternal
- That the Distinction of Things is not the Result of Chance
- That Matter is not the First Cause of the Distinction of Things
- That a Contrariety of Agents Does not Account for the Distinction of Things
- That the First Cause of the Distinction of Things is not the World of Secondary Agents
- That the Distinction of Things is not Caused by Some Secondary Agent Introducing Diverse Forms into Matter
- That the Distinction of Things Does not Have Its Source in the Diversity of Merits or Demerits
- The True First Cause of the Distinction of Things
- That the Perfection of the Universe Required the Existence of Some Intellectual Creatures
- That Intellectual Substances are Endowed with Will
- That Intellectual Substances Have Freedom of Choice in Acting
- That the Intellectual Substance is not a Body
- That Intellectual Substances are Immaterial
- That the Intellectual Substance is not a Material Form
- That in Created Intellectual Substances, Being and What is Differ
- That in Created Intellectual Substances There is Act and Potentiality
- That the Composition of Substance and Being is not the Same as the Composition of Matter and Form
- That Intellectual Substances are Incorruptible
- In What Way an Intellectual Substance Can be United to the Body
- Tire Position of Plato Concerning the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body
- That in Man There are not Three Souls, Nutritive, Sensitive, and Intellective
- That Man’s Possible Intellect is not a Separate Substance
- That Man Derives His Specific Nature, not from the Passive, but from the Possible, Intellect
- That this Theory is Contrary to the Teaching of Aristotle
- Against Alexander’s Opinion Concerning the Possible Intellect
- That the Soul is not a Temperament, as Galen Maintained
- That the Soul is not a Harmony
- That the Soul is not a Body
- Against Those Who Maintain that Intellect and Sense are the Same
- Against Those Who Hold that the Possible Intellect is the Imagination
- How an Intellectual Substance Can be the Form of the Body
- Solution of the Arguments Advanced Above in Order to Show that an Intellectual Substance Cannot be United to the Body as Its Form
- That According to the Words of Aristotle the Intellect Must be Said to be United to the Body as Its Form
- That the Soul is United to the Body Without Intermediation
- That the Whole Soul is in the Whole Body and in Each of Its Parts
- That There is not One Possible Intellect in All Men
- Concerning the Theory of Avicenna, Who Said that Intelligible Forms are not Preserved in the Possible Intellect
- Solution of the Seemingly Demonstrative Arguments for the Unity of the Possible Intellect
- That the Agent Intellect is not a Separate Substance, but Part of the Soul
- That it is not Impossible for the Possible and Agent Intellect to Exist Together in the One Substance of the Soul
- That Aristotle Held not that the Agent Intellect is a Separate Substance, but that it is a Part of the Soul
- That the Human Soul Does not Perish When the Body is Corrupted
- Chapters 80 and 81
- Chapter 81
- That the Souls of Brute Animals are not Immortal
- That the Human Soul Begins to Exist When the Body Does
- Solution of the Preceding Arguments
- That the Soul is not Made of God’s Substance
- That the Human Soul is not Transmitted with the Semen
- That the Human Soul is Brought into Being Through the Creative Action of God
- Arguments Designed to Prove that the Human Soul is Formed from the Semen
- Solution of the Preceding Arguments
- That an Intellectual Substance is United Only to a Human Body as Its Form
- That There are Some Intellectual Substances which are not United to Bodies
- Concerning the Great Number of Separate Substances
- On the Non-existence of a Plurality of Separate Substances of One Species
- That the Separate Substance and the Soul are not of the Same Species
- How in Separate Substances Genus and Species are to be Taken
- That Separate Substances Do not Receive Their Knowledge from Sensible Things
- That the Intellect of a Separate Substance is Always in Act of Understanding
- How One Separate Substance Understands Another
- That Separate Substances Know Material Things
- That Separate Substances Know Singulars
- Whether Separate Substances Have Natural Knowledge of All Things at the Same Time