Secunda Secundæ, Question 24 — Summa Theologiae
Article 1. Whether the will is the subject of charity?
Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
Objection 2. Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated above (II-II:23:6). But the reason is the subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
Objection 3. Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1 Corinthians 16:14: “Let all your things be done in charity.” Now the principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
I answer that, Since, as stated in I:80:2, the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
Reply to Objection 1. The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in I:81:2: wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God’s wisdom, and transcends the rule of human reason, according to Ephesians 3:19: “The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Hence it is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated in I:83:4, the free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in the free-will.
Article 2. Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not caused in us by infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the “Divine good”, which is the object of charity, “is for all an object of dilection and love.” Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.
Objection 2. Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good. Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in order to love God.
Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.” Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from infusion.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Romans 5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.”
I answer that, As stated above (II-II:23:1), charity is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, according to Romans 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting”: wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause.
Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (II-II:23:2).
Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2. Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our hearts.
Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that in us charity proceeds from “a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,” this must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): “Fear leads to charity,” and of a gloss on Matthew 1:2: “Faith begets hope, and hope charity.”