(1) Now that we have seen the equivocation in the name ‘term’, we must follow up with the division of the non-complex term. Thus, not only is the non-complex term divided into the spoken, written and conceived term. Each branch is also subdivided by similar divisions.1 For, just as some utterances are names, some are verbs, some belong to the other parts of speech (for some are pronouns, some participles, some adverbs, some conjunctions, some prepositions), and the case is similar for written [terms], so [too] some intentions of the soul are names, some [are] verbs, [and] some belong to the other parts of speech (for some are pronouns, some adverbs, some conjunctions, some prepositions).
(2) But a doubt can arise whether there are certain intentions, distinct from [mental] verbs, corresponding in the mind to spoken and written participles. [The doubt arises] insofar as there appears [to be] no great need to maintain such a plurality of mental terms. For a verb and the verb’s participle taken together with the verb ‘is’ always seem to be equivalent in signifying. For this reason, just as we do not find the multiplication of synonymous names because of the needs of signification, but rather for the decoration of speech or [some] other similar accidental cause (for whatever is signified by [several] synonymous names can be expressed well enough by one of them), and therefore a multitude of concepts does not correspond to such a plurality of synonyms, so [too] it seems that we do not find the distinction between spoken verbs and participles because of the needs of expression. For this reason, it seems that there need not be distinct concepts in the mind corresponding to spoken participles.2 A similar doubt could arise about pronouns.3
(3) Now there is a difference between mental and spoken names. For although all the grammatical accidents4 that belong to mental names also belong to spoken names, it does not go the other way around. Rather, some [grammatical accidents] are common to the latter as well as to the former, but others are proper to spoken and written names. (For whatever belongs to spoken [names] also [belongs] written ones, and conversely.)
(4) The accidents common to spoken and mental names are case and number. For, just as the spoken propositions ‘A man is an animal’ [and] ‘A man is not animals’ have distinct predicates, one of which is singular and the other plural, so the [two] mental propositions — by one of which the mind, before [making] any utterance, says that a man is an animal, and by the other it says that a man is not animals — have distinct predicates [too], one of which can be said to be in the singular number, and the other in the plural. Similarly, just as the spoken propositions ‘A man is a man’ and ‘A man is not a man’s’ have distinct predicates that vary in case, so analogously [the same thing] must be said for the corresponding propositions in the mind.
(5) Now the accidents proper to spoken and written names are gender and declension.5 For such accidents do not belong to names on account of the needs of signification. Thus also it sometimes happens that two names are synonyms, and yet are of different genders and sometimes in different declensions. For this reason, one need not attribute such a multiplicity [of genders and declensions] to natural signs.6 Thus, any plurality and variety of such accidents as can belong to synonymous names can be rightly dispensed with in mental [names].
(6) Now as for comparison,7 a difficulty can arise whether it belongs only to names instituted by convention.8 But I pass over that, because it is of no great use. A similar difficulty could arise over quality,9 which I shall treat exhaustively elsewhere.10