(1) But, setting aside the other parts of speech, we must talk about names. First, we have to discuss the division of the name into concrete and abstract.
(2) You must observe that a concrete [name] and its [corresponding] abstract [form] are names that have a similar beginning vocally, but do not have similar endings. For example, it is plain that ‘just’ and ‘justice’, ‘strong’ and ‘strength’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ begin with a similar letter or syllable, but do not end alike. The abstract [form] always, or [at least] frequently, has more syllables than [does] the concrete [form], as is apparent in the above examples. Also, in many cases the concrete [form] is an adjective and the abstract [form] a substantive.
(3) Now there are many kinds of concrete and abstract [names]. Sometimes the concrete [form] signifies some thing (or connotes it or conveys [it] or gives [one] to understand it), and even supposits for it, which the abstract [form] in no way signifies or consequently supposits for in any way. ‘Just’ and ‘justice’, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and the like are related in this way. For ‘just’ truly1 supposits for a man when someone says ‘The just2 is virtuous’. It cannot supposit for justice, because justice, even though it is a virtue, is nevertheless not virtuous. But the name ‘justice’ supposits for the quality and not for a man. It is for this reason that it is impossible to predicate such a concrete [term] of the [corresponding] abstract [term]. For such a concrete [term] and the [corresponding] abstract [term] always supposit for distinct things.
(4) For present purposes, there are three kinds of such names, three inferior species as it were.3 The first [kind] occurs when (a) the abstract supposits for an accident or [for] any form whatever that really inheres in a subject, and the concrete supposits for the subject of the same accident or form, or (b) conversely. The first way (a) holds for ‘whiteness/white’, ‘heat/hot’, ‘knowing/knowledge’ (speaking about creatures4), and so on for other cases. In all such cases, the abstract supposits for an accident inhering in a subject, and the concrete supposits for the subject of the same accident. But (b) it happens the other way around in ‘fire/fiery’. For ‘fire’ supposits for the subject, and ‘fiery’, which is the concrete [form, supposits] for its accident. For we say that heat is fiery, and not [that it is] fire. Similarly, we say that knowledge is human and not [that knowledge is] a man.
(5) The second [kind] of such names occurs when the concrete supposits for a part and the abstract [supposits] for the whole, or conversely. For example, in ‘soul/besouled’5. For man is besouled and not a soul. So ‘besouled’ supposits for a man, and ‘soul’ [supposits] for a part of him. But in ‘A soul is human’ and ‘A soul is not a man’, ‘man’, which is the abstract,6 supposits for the whole, and ‘human’ for the soul, which is a part.
(6) Now notice that sometimes the same concrete [name] is taken equivocally. For sometimes it belongs to the first as well as [to] the second kind. For example, the name ‘besouled’ can supposit for a whole, because we say that a man is besouled.7 It can also supposit for a subject that receives a soul, because we say that a body, which is the other part of the [human] composite, is besouled.8 And just as with this name, so with many other [names] that can be taken equivocally [in this way].
(7) The third kind of such [concrete and abstract] names arises when the concrete and the abstract supposit for different things, neither of which is the subject or a part of the other. This can happen in many ways. For such things are sometimes related as cause and effect (for example, we say that this work is human, and not [that it is] a man), sometimes as sign and signified (for example, we say that the [specific] difference of man is an essential difference,9 not because it is an essence but because it is a sign of some part of the essence10), sometimes as location and located (for example, we say that he is English, and not [that he is] England). This can also happen in many other way, which I leave it to clever people to discuss.
(8) Just as, in the first two cases, some concrete [term] supposits for a part or for a form and the abstract [form supposits] for the whole or the subject, and sometimes it happens the other way around, so [too] in the present case. For sometimes the concrete [form] supposits for the effect or the significate and the abstract [form] for the cause or the sign, and sometimes the other way around. So [too] for the other [subdivisions] under this mode.
(9) Just as it can happen that the same name is a concrete [form] in [each of] the first two modes, but then it is taken equivocally,11 so it can happen that the same concrete [term] is concrete in the first mode and the third. Indeed, it can be concrete in all three modes. Therefore, these three modes inferior to the first principal mode12 are not distinguished in such a way that the one of them is universally denied of the other, but in such a way that each of them is separated from the other by particular cases. This suffices for the distinction among such modes. Similarly, there is nothing wrong with the same name’s being [both] concrete and abstract, with respect to different things.
(10) You should know that sometimes we have the equivalent of a concrete [term], for which there is nevertheless no corresponding abstract [form] because of the poverty of names. This is the case for the name ‘zealous’, when it is taken for the virtuous.13
Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).
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Footnotes
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‘Truly’ here does not imply that the proposition is true, but that, in that proposition, the term really does supposit for a man. ↩
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That is, someone who is just. ↩
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The species are inferior to the first main subdivision of concrete and abstract names, described in para. 3. The second, third and fourth main subdivisions are treated in Chs. 6–7, 8 and 9, respectively. ↩
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In the case of God, the “knowing” one (= the knower) and the knowledge are identical, since God is simple and does not consist of metaphysically distinct ingredients. ↩
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‘besouled’ = animatum = animate. ↩
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Note that ‘man’ may be an abstract form with respect to ‘human’, but it is a concrete form with respect to ‘humanity’ (see Ch. 6, below). (‘Humanity’ is presumably also an abstract form with respect to the concrete ‘human’.) So the same term may be both abstract and concrete, but with respect to different other terms. See the end of para. 9 below. ↩
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In this case, it belongs to the first kind, as in para. 4. ↩
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In this case, it belongs to the second kind, as in para. 5. ↩
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This is a reference to the classical notion of species as being defined by genus + difference. Thus, man = animal + rational. ↩
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Ockham is here thinking of the term ‘rational’, which signifies part of the essence. ↩
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See para. 6. ↩
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The first principal mode is described in para. 3. See n. 65 above. ↩
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Just take Ockham’s word for it that you can do this in Latin. The word is ‘studiosus’. The point us that ‘studiosus’ can mean “virtuous,” but the abstract form ‘studium’ cannot mean “virtue.” Neither of these is included among the range of meanings given by my dictionaries, but Ockham knew the Latin of his day better than I do. ↩