(1) Now that we have set out the divisions that can belong both to terms signifying naturally and also to terms instituted by convention, we have to talk about certain divisions that belong [only] to terms instituted by convention.
(2) The first such division is: Some names signifying by convention are names of first imposition, and others are names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are names imposed to signify (a) signs instituted by convention and (b) the [things] that follow on such signs — but only while they are signs.
(3) Nevertheless, the common [term] ‘name of second imposition’ can be taken in two senses. [In the first sense, it is taken] broadly. In that sense everything that signifies utterances instituted by convention, but only when they are instituted by convention, is a name of second imposition, whether that name is also common to intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, or not. Names like ‘name’, ‘pronoun’, ‘conjunction’, ‘verb’, ‘case’, ‘number’, ‘mood’, ‘tense’, and the like, are like this — taking these words in the way the grammarian uses them. These names are called “names of names”, because they are imposed to signify only parts of speech, and this only while these parts [of speech] are significative. For names that are predicated of utterances just as much when they are not significative as when they are significative are not called names of second imposition. Therefore, names such as ‘quality’, ‘pronounced’, ‘utterance’, and the like, even though they signify utterances instituted by convention and are verified of them, nevertheless because they would signify those [utterances] just as much if they were not significative as they do now, therefore they are not names of second imposition. But ‘name’ is a name of second imposition, because the utterance ‘man’ (or any other) was not a name before it was imposed to signify. Likewise, ‘man’s’, before it was imposed to signify, had no case.1 And so on.
(4) But in the strict sense, what signifies only signs instituted by convention, in such a way that it cannot be applied to intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, is called a “name of second imposition”. ‘Inflection’,2 ‘conjugation’, and such, are like this.
(5) All names other than these, namely, those that are not names of second imposition either in the one sense or the other, are called “names of first imposition.”
(6) Nevertheless, ‘name of first imposition’ can be taken in two senses. [In the first sense, it is taken] broadly, and in that sense all names that are not names of second imposition are names of first imposition. In this sense, syncategorematic signs like ‘every’, ‘no’,3 ‘some’, ‘any’, and the like, are names of first imposition. [‘Name of first imposition’] can be taken in another sense [too], and in that sense only categorematic names that are not names of second imposition are called names of first imposition, and syncategorematic names [are] not.
(7) Now names of first imposition, taking ‘name of first imposition’ strictly, are of two kinds. Some [of them] are names of first intention, and others are names of second intention. The names that are precisely imposed to signify (a) intentions of the soul, or precisely (b) intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, and [also] other signs instituted by convention, or the [things] that follow on such signs, are called “names of second intention”. All [names] like ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘universal’, ‘predicable’,4 and so on, are such names. For these names signify only (a) intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, or else (b) signs voluntarily instituted [to signify].
(8) Thus, it can be said that the common [term] ‘name of second intention’ can be taken in a strict sense and in a broad sense. In the broad sense, what signifies intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, whether or not it also signifies signs instituted by convention ([but] only while they are signs), is called a “name of second intention”. In this sense, some name of second intention and of first imposition is also a name of second imposition. But in the strict sense, only what precisely signifies intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, is called a “name of second intention”. Taken [in] in that sense, no name of second intention is a name of second imposition.
(9) All other names than those mentioned are called “names of first imposition”, namely, those that signify some things that are not signs or the [things] that follow on such signs. All [names] like ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, ‘whiteness’, ‘white’, ‘being’, ‘true’, ‘good’, and such, are like this. Some of these signify precisely things that are not signs apt to supposit for other [things], [and] others signify such signs and other things along with that.
(10) From all these [distinctions], it can be gathered that certain names signify precisely signs instituted by convention, and only while they are signs. But others precisely signify things that are not such signs [and] that are parts of a proposition. Some indifferently signify such things as are not parts of a proposition or of an expression, and also [signify] such signs [too]. Names like ‘thing’, ‘being’, ‘something’, and such, are like this.
Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).
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