(1) After the above, [we must] treat the division of terms instituted by convention into equivocal, univocal and denominative [terms]. Now although Aristotle in the Categories1 treats of equivocals, univocals and denominatives, nevertheless for the present I intend to treat only of univocals and equivocals, because denominatives were discussed above.2
(2) First, you must know that only an utterance or other sign instituted by convention is equivocal or univocal. Therefore, an intention of the soul, or concept, is neither equivocal nor univocal, properly speaking.
(3) Now an utterance is “equivocal” if it signifies several [things and] is not a sign subordinated to one concept, but is instead a sign subordinated to several concepts or intentions of the soul. This is what Aristotle means3 when he says that the common name is the same but the substantial notion is different. That is, the concepts or intentions of the soul (such as descriptions and definitions and even simple concepts) are different, but the utterance is one. This is clear explicitly in the case of a word that belongs to different languages. For in the one language it is imposed to signify the same [thing] that is signified by such and such a concept, and in the other [language] it is imposed to signify the same [thing] that is signified by another concept. And so it is subordinated in signifying to several concepts or passions of the soul.
(4) Now such an equivocal [term] is of two kinds. One kind is equivocal by chance, namely, when an utterance is subordinated to several concepts and [is subordinated] to the one as if it were not subordinated to the other, and signifies one [significate] as if it did not signify the other. This happens with the name ‘Socrates’, which is imposed on several men.
(5) Another kind is equivocal by custom, when an utterance is first imposed on some thing or things and is subordinated to one concept, and later on, on account of some likeness of the first significate to something else or on account of some other reason, it is imposed on that other [thing], in such a way that it would not be imposed on that other [thing] unless because it was first imposed on the former. This is the case with the name ‘man’. For it was first imposed to signify all rational animals in such a way that it was imposed to signify all that is contained under the concept ‘rational animal’. But later on, the users, seeing a likeness between such a man and the image of a man, sometimes used the name ‘man’ for such an image, so that unless the name ‘man’ had first been imposed on men, the name ‘man’ would not be used or imposed to signify or to stand for such an image. For this reason, it is called “equivocal by custom”.
(6) Now everything that is subordinated to one concept is called “univocal”, whether it signifies several [things] or not. Nevertheless, properly speaking, it is not “univocal” unless it signifies, or is apt to signify, several things equally primarily, yet in such a way that it does not signify those several [things] except because one intention of the soul signifies them, so that it is a sign subordinated in signifying to one natural sign that is an intention or concept of the soul.
(7) This division, however, not only belongs to names but also to verbs, and in general to every part of speech. In fact, something can even be equivocal insofar as it can belong to different parts of speech — for example, [it can be] both a name and a verb, or both a name and a participle or an adverb, and so on for the other parts of speech.
(8) Now you have to understand that this division of terms into equivocal and univocal is not simply [a division] into opposites so that ‘Some equivocal is univocal’ is false. Indeed, it is true. For the same utterance is really and truly [both] equivocal and univocal, but not with respect to the same [things], just as the same [man] is [both] a father and a son, but not with respect to the same [man], and the same [thing] is [both] like and unlike, but not [like and unlike] the same thing in the same respect.
(9) Thus, if there is some word that belongs to different languages, it is plain that it can be univocal in both languages. Hence, one who knew only the one language would not [have to] distinguish any proposition in which [the word] occurred. But to one who knows both languages, it is equivocal. Thus, those who know both languages would in many cases distinguish propositions in which such a word occurred. So the same term is univocal to one [person] and equivocal to another.
(10) From the above it can be gathered that a univocal [term] does not always have one definition. For it is not always properly defined [at all]. Therefore, when Aristotle says4 that “univocals are those [things] for which the name is in common and the substantial notion [is] the same”, he is taking ‘notion’5 for the intention of the soul to which the utterance is subordinated as to a primary sign.
(11) Now you have to know that ‘univocal’ is taken in two senses. [In one sense, it is taken] broadly, for every utterance or sign instituted by convention [and] corresponding to one concept. In another sense it is taken strictly, for something like that that is predicable per se in the first mode6 of some [things] to which it is univocal, or [predicable] of a pronoun indicating some thing.
(12) ‘Denominative term’, however, can for present [purposes] be taken in two senses. [In one sense, it is taken] strictly, and in that sense a term that begins as an abstract [term] begins but does not have a similar ending and that signifies an accident is called a “denominative term”. For example, ‘strong’ from ‘strength’, ‘just’ from ‘justice’. In another sense, a term that has beginning like an abstract [term] but not a similar ending, whether it signifies an accident or not, is called [a “denominative term”] in the broad sense. For example, ‘besouled’ is said from ‘soul’.7
(13) Let these [points] suffice for the divisions of terms. Some things omitted in the above will be filled in below.8
Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).
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Footnotes
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Aristotle, Categories, 1, 1a1–15. ↩
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See Chs. 5–10, above. Nevertheless, Ockham does discuss denominatives at the end of the present chapter. See para. 12, below. ↩
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Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a1–2. ↩
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Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a6–7. ↩
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‘notion’ = rationem. The term ‘ratio’ frequently means “definition.” Ockham is claiming that it does not mean that in this Aristotelian passage. ↩
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On the various “modes” of per se predication, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73a34–b24. ↩
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I’m sorry, but in English ‘besouled’ does not begin the same way ‘soul’ does. The words are ‘animatus’ and ‘anima’ in the Latin. Those do begin the same way. ↩
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See Summa logicae III–4, 2–4, on the various kinds of equivocation. ↩