(13) Yet it must be understood that this distinction does not fall on the part of the predicate, but only on the part of the subject. Thus, ‘Socrates was white’ [or] ‘Socrates can be white’ does not have to be distinguished. This [is] because “the predicate appellates its form”.¹¹ This is to be understood not in the sense that [the predicate] supposits for itself or for a concept, but [in the sense] that by such a proposition [P] it is denoted that [another] proposition [Q] in which the very same predicate, under its own form (that is, it itself and none other), is predicated of that for which the subject [of P] supposits, or of a pronoun pointing precisely to that for which the subject [of P] supposits, was true if the proposition [P] is about the past, or that it will be true if the proposition [P] is about the future, or that it is possible if the first proposition [P] is about the possible, or [that it is] necessary if the first proposition [P] is about the necessary, or per se¹² if the first proposition [P] is about [what is] per se, or accidental if the first proposition [P] is about [what is] accidental, and so on for the other [kinds of] modal propositions.

(14) For example, for the truth of ‘A white was black’ it is not required that ‘A white is black’ was ever true. Rather, it is required that ‘This is black’ was true, pointing to something the subject supposits for in ‘A white was black’. Likewise, for the truth of ‘The true will be impossible’ it is not required that ‘The true is impossible’ ever be true. Rather, it is required that ‘This is impossible’ will be true (if it is formed¹³), pointing to something the subject supposits for in ‘The true will be impossible’. Likewise for the others. But these cases will be discussed more fully in the treatise on propositions and on consequences.¹⁴

(15) In the present case, I say that in ‘Socrates was white’ the predicate supposits for Socrates. Similarly, it is the case for all [propositions] about the past and about the future and about a mode that [their] terms suppositing personally supposit for what are or were or will be or can be [their] supposita. And if there is no sign¹⁵ or negation or any other obstacle, they supposit determinately.

(16) But then, as for the reasoning to the contrary,¹⁶ it must be said that it was correctly stated that a term never supposits for anything except [for that] of which it is verified. Nevertheless, it was not said that [a term] never supposits for anything except [for that] of which it is verified by a verb about the present. Instead it is enough that sometimes it be verified [of that thing] by a verb about the past when it supposits for it with respect to a verb about the past, or by a verb about the future when it supposits with respect to a verb about the future, and so on. This is clear for ‘A white was a man’, assuming that no man is now white but that Socrates was white. In that case ‘white’ supposits for Socrates, if it is taken for [things] that were. Therefore, ‘white’ is verified of Socrates not by a verb about the present but by a verb about the past. For ‘Socrates was white’ is true.

(17) But a doubt still remains. What does the predicate supposit for in ‘Socrates was white’? If [it supposits] for [things] that are, [the proposition] is false.

(18) It must be said that the predicate supposits for [things] that were, whether or not the same [things] were as are [now]. Therefore, in this case there is an exception to the rule I stated elsewhere,¹⁷ namely, that a term, no matter where it occurs, always supposits for [things] that are, or can supposit for them. For I understood that rule [as applying] to a term occurring on the part of the subject. But when [the term] occurs on the part of the predicate, [the rule] is not true in every case. Thus, assuming that no man is now white, but that there were many white men earlier, in that case in ‘A man was white’ the predicate does not supposit for [things] that are but only for [things] that were. Hence in general the predicate in [a proposition] about the past does not supposit for anything other than for what was, and in [a proposition] about the future [it does not supposit for anything other than] for what will be, and in [a proposition] about the possible [it does not supposit for anything other than] for what can be. Nevertheless, along with this it is required that the very same predicate be predicated of what the subject supposits for, in the way stated above.¹⁸

(19) To (b) the second doubt, it must be said that if no man is white and if no man is singing the Mass and if God is not creating, [then] literally it must be granted that in the propositions mentioned the subjects supposit for nothing. Yet they are taken significatively, because being taken significatively or suppositing personally can come about in two ways: either (i) because the term supposits for some significate or (ii) because it is denoted to supposit for something or because it is denoted not to supposit for anything. For in such affirmative propositions, the term is always denoted to supposit for something, and therefore if it supposits for nothing the proposition is false. But in negative propositions, the term is denoted not to supposit for anything, or to supposit for something of which the predicate is truly denied, and therefore such a negative has two causes of [its] truth.¹⁹ For example, ‘A white man does not exist’ has two causes of truth: either (i) because a man does not exist and therefore is not white, or (ii) because a man does exist and yet he is not white.²⁰ But in the proposition ‘A white man is a man’, if no man is white, the subject is taken significatively and personally, not because it supposits for something, but because it is denoted to supposit for something. Therefore, because [in fact] it supposits for nothing, although it is denoted to supposit for something, [therefore] the proposition is simply false.

(20) Therefore, if anything said above seems to be inconsistent with this, it must be understood [as applying only] in the case of an affirmative and true proposition. For in an affirmative and true proposition, if the term stands personally, it always supposits for some significate, in the manner explained earlier.²¹

(21) Suppose someone says, “‘It supposits’ and ‘It supposits for nothing’ do not go together, because it follows: ‘It supposits; therefore, it supposits for something’.” It must be said that [this] does not follow. Instead it follows: “It supposits; therefore, it is denoted to supposit for something or denoted to supposit for nothing.”

(22) To (c) the third [doubt], it has to be said that such propositions [as] ‘A horse is promised to you’ [and] ‘Twenty pounds are owed to you’ are literally false, because each [of their] singulars is false, as is clear by induction. Yet if such terms occur on the part of the predicate,²² [the propositions] can be granted after a fashion. In that case, one must say that terms following such verbs have, by virtue of those verbs, merely confused supposition. Therefore, one cannot descend disjunctively to singulars, but only by a disjunctive predicate, counting not only present [things] but also future [ones]. Thus, it does not follow: “I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse,” and so on for present singulars. But it does correctly follow: “I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or that one or that one”, and so on, counting all [horses], both present ones and future ones. This is because such verbs equivalently include verbs about the future. Thus ‘I promise you a horse’ amounts to ‘You will have a horse by my gift’.

(23) But does ‘horse’ supposit merely confusedly in ‘I promise you a horse’, speaking literally? It must be said that, strictly speaking, ‘horse’ does not supposit merely confusedly [there], because it does not supposit [at all], since it is a part of an extreme. The rule given about determinate supposition above²³ is about [terms] that strictly speaking supposit, because they are the extremes of propositions and not merely the parts of extremes. Nevertheless, extending the name, it can be said that ‘horse’ supposits merely confusedly. This is because it follows such a verb. And so, in general, a common term that follows such a verb so that it is not merely a part of the extreme always supposits merely confusedly and not determinately. But [it does supposit] personally.

(24) Thus, you have to know that whenever in any such proposition about the present or about the past or about the future there occurs a verb by virtue of which it is denoted that some [other] proposition will be true, or ought to be true, in which a common term appears on the part of the predicate, and it is not denoted for any proposition in which a singular [term] contained under that common [term] occurs on the part of the predicate that it will be true, then (taking ‘supposit’ in the sense in which a part of an extreme can supposit) the common term does not supposit determinately. That is, one cannot descend to singulars by a disjunctive [proposition] but only by a proposition with a disjoint extreme or with a disjoint part of an extreme. But now it is denoted by ‘I promise you a horse’, in virtue of the verb ‘promise’, that ‘I give you a horse’ or something like that will be true, or that it ought to be true sometime. And it is not denoted that any [proposition] like ‘I give you this horse’ — pointing to any horse whatever — will be or ought to be true. Therefore, it does not follow: “I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse.” The case is similar for such [propositions] as ‘I owe you twenty pounds’, ‘He is indebted to Socrates to the extent of twenty marks’.

(25) So then it is clear that ‘I promise you a horse’ can be granted, and yet ‘A horse to you is promised’ should not in any way be granted literally. The reason for this is that in ‘A horse to you is promised’, ‘horse’ is the subject and not a part of the subject. Therefore, it has to supposit determinately, since neither a sign²⁴ nor a negation nor anything that includes anything like that precedes [the term ‘horse’]. Therefore, one has to be able to descend to singulars. But in ‘I promise you a horse’, ‘horse’ is not an extreme but a part of an extreme. For the whole ‘promising you a horse’ is the predicate, because ‘I promise you a horse’ and ‘I am promising you a horse’ are equivalent. So ‘horse’ is a part of an extreme. Therefore, just as it does not have to supposit, properly speaking, so [too] it does not have to supposit determinately. Consequently, one does not have to be able to descend to a disjunctive [proposition].

(26) But can one descend [at all] under a part of an extreme? It must be said that sometimes one can descend. For example, it correctly follows: “He gives Socrates a horse; therefore, he gives him this horse or he gives him that one,” and so on. But sometimes one cannot descend, on account of some special reason like the one stated in the present case. And so, even though ‘I promise you a horse’ is granted, nevertheless ‘A horse to you is promised’ is not to be granted literally. Yet it is granted [anyway], because it is generally taken for ‘Someone promises you a horse’. Now it will be explained in the treatise on the proposition why the inference “Someone promises you a horse; therefore, a horse is promised to you” is not valid.²⁵

(27) To (d) the fourth [doubt], it must be said that in [propositions] like ‘He is deprived of sight’, [the term] ‘sight’, which is part of an extreme, does not properly supposit. Nevertheless, in the sense in which it can supposit, it supposits confusedly and distributively. For [the proposition] is equivalent to ‘He has no sight’, where ‘sight’ is confused negatively confusedly and distributively. But [the term ‘sight’] does not supposit confusedly and distributively in every proposition expounding²⁶ [‘He is deprived of sight’]. For [it does] not [supposit confusedly and distributively] in the affirmative [exponent], namely, in ‘He is by nature apt to have sight’. Rather, in this [affirmative exponent the term] supposits in a way determinately, that is, [determinately] for [things²⁷] that were sometime possible — although not for all of them, but [only] for those were able to inhere in him.

(28) To (e) the fifth [doubt], it must be said that literally ‘Genera and species are substances’ is false. But ‘Genera and species are second substances’ can be granted. In that case, ‘second substances’ supposits personally and determinately, because the name ‘second substance’ is imposed to signify second intentions that convey true substances.

(29) Therefore, the opinion is false that says that ‘substance’ can have simple supposition and yet supposit for species and genera. But if sometimes you find in some author [the statement] that genera and species are substances, [those] authoritative [statements] should be expounded²⁸ either (i) [so] that a signate act is understood by an exercised act. Thus, by ‘Genera and species are substances’ there is understood ‘Of genera and species there is predicated substance’. And [that act] should be exercised as ‘A man is a substance’, ‘An animal is a substance’, and so on. Or (ii) the authoritative [statement] should be expounded [so] that ‘substance’ is equivocal. For sometimes it signifies true things that are substances really distinct from every real accident and from every second intention. ‘Substance’ is taken properly then. [But] sometimes it signifies the intentions that convey substances in the first sense. And then, under that understanding, ‘Genera and species are substances’ would be granted, taking the predicate personally. But in that case [‘substance’] would not be taken properly, but rather improperly and transumptively.

(30) To (f) the sixth [doubt], it must be said that different [people] use such abstract [terms] in different ways. For sometimes they use them for things, [and] sometimes they use them for names. If [they are used] in the first way, then it should be said that they supposit for [the things] for which their [corresponding] concrete [forms] supposit, according to Aristotle’s view.²⁹ In that case, ‘Fire is calefactive³⁰’ and ‘Fire is calefaction’ are equipollent, [and] likewise ‘A man is a father’ and ‘A man is paternity’. Indeed properly speaking such concrete and abstract [terms], if the abstract [forms] are imposed to signify precisely things, are synonymous names according to the view of Aristotle and of many philosophers.

(31) This is not so surprising, as can be convincingly shown. For I take the proposition ‘Creation is a true thing’, and I ask: Does ‘creation’ supposit [there] for something or for nothing? If [it supposits] for nothing, [then] either [‘Creation is a true thing’] will not be a proposition or else it will be a false proposition. If [‘creation’] does supposit for something, [then it supposits] either for an external thing, or for a thing in the soul, or for an aggregate [of the two].³¹ If [it supposits] for an external thing, [then] I ask: For which one? Only God can be given [as an answer]. Therefore, ‘creation’ supposits for God just as much as ‘creating’ does. And this can just as easily be said about every other [example].

(32) If [‘creation’] supposits for something in the soul (for example, according to some [people],³² it supposits for a relation of reason), that is impossible, because in that case ‘Creation is a true thing’ is impossible. Likewise, there would never be creation except in the soul, and God would not be creative except by means of an act of a soul that forms such a relation of reason. Similarly, it could just as easily be said that ‘calefaction’ supposits for such a being or relation of reason. And no argument can be given to prove that this is a relation in a created agent any more than in the uncreated one. Therefore, according to the Philosopher’s view, there is no thing that can be signified or connoted by such a concrete [term] unless in the same way it is signified or connoted by the [corresponding] abstract [term]. Therefore, according to him, if both are imposed to signify a thing, they will be synonymous names.

(33) It does no good to say that the mode of signifying blocks [their] synonymy. For a difference in mode of signifying does not block synonymy except when on account of the different mode of signifying something is signified or connoted by the one [name] that is not connoted or not signified by the other one in the same way. This is clear, for example, in ‘man’, ‘man’s’, ‘men’.³³ Likewise, ‘man’, [and] ‘risible’. Likewise, ‘intellect’, ‘will’ and ‘soul’.³⁴ Likewise ‘creating’, ‘governing’,³⁵ ‘damning’, ‘beatifying’, and so on for all the others. These are verified of the same [thing], and yet they are not synonymous. If a mere difference in the mode signifying of affected synonymy, I would just as easily say that ‘tunic’ and ‘cloak’ are not synonyms because ‘tunic’ ends in ‘c’ and ‘cloak’ does not. So too for many other cases.

(34) So synonymy is not blocked by such a difference [in mode of signifying], either with respect to the ending or with respect to accidents like gender and such, or with respect to other [features], like [being] an adjective and [being] a substantive and so on. Yet when there is a different mode of signifying properly speaking, there is no synonymy. But this does not happen in the present case, as is plainly clear, because a concrete [term] and the [corresponding] abstract [term] can have exactly the same mode of signifying when the concrete and the abstract are not like the ones that belong to the first mode,³⁶ as was said in the beginning of this treatise.³⁷

(35) So, then, such abstract [terms], when they are taken significatively for things, are names synonymous with [their] concrete [forms], according to Aristotle’s meaning. But according to the theologians, one perhaps has to say something else in certain cases, although not in all.³⁸

(36) Sometimes, however, men use such abstract [terms] in the way the [corresponding] concrete [terms] signify. For example, they do this for ‘privation’, ‘negation’, ‘contradiction’, and the like. So in ‘A man is a relation’, ‘relation’ supposits significatively and for relative names.³⁹ Likewise, ‘similitude’ sometimes supposits for a relative name, that is, for the name ‘similar’. Likewise, ‘creation’ [sometimes supposits] for the name ‘creating’, and ‘quantity’ for the name ‘quantum’, and so [too] for many such abstract [names] that do not have concrete [forms] corresponding to them [and that] supposit for things distinct from the things that are signified by the abstract [forms], according to Aristotle’s meaning.

(37) Therefore, for all such abstract [terms], in the same way it is granted that the predicate ‘thing outside the soul’ is predicated of them, it should be granted that their concrete [form is predicated] of them, and the same [thing] for which their concrete form supposits.⁴⁰ For as has often been said, if such abstract [terms] are precisely names of first intention, they will be names synonymous with their concrete [forms], according to Aristotle’s opinion, as it seems to me.

(38) This is the reason why few such abstract [names] are found [to be used] by Aristotle. For he regarded all such [pairs as] ‘man/humanity’, ‘horse/horsehood’, ‘animal/animality’, ‘ass/asininity’, ‘cow/cowship’, ‘quantum/quantity’, ‘relative/relation’, ‘similar/similitude’, ‘calefactive/ calefaction’, ‘father/fatherhood’, ‘ternary/trinity’, ‘dual/duality’, and the like as synonyms when they are names precisely of first intention.

(39) But according to the speakers’ usage, abstract [terms] are sometimes names of second intention or second imposition, and in that case they are not synonymous [with their corresponding concrete terms].

(40) Other [people], however, say that all such abstract names signify distinct things, or relations of reason, and supposit for them.

(41) To (g) the seventh doubt, it must be said that in ‘Socrates twice was white’ there occurs a word that equivalently includes a negation, namely, the word ‘twice’. Thus, in virtue of this word, [the proposition] ‘Socrates twice was white’ has a negative exponent. For it is equivalent to ‘Socrates first was white, and at some time afterwards he was not white, and after that he was white’.⁴¹ Because of the negative [exponent that is] equivalently included, [the term ‘white’] does not stand merely determinately so that one can descend by a disjunctive [proposition] to pronouns or proper names expressing the [things] for which the predicate supposits.

(42) The case is similar for ‘Socrates begins to be white’, ‘A man ceases to be literate’, and in general for [all] such [propositions] that have a negative exponent.

(43) The same [thing] holds for (h) the other doubt. ‘Only an animal is a man’ has an exclusive word⁴² on account of which [the proposition] has a negative exponent. Therefore, neither the subject nor the predicate supposits determinately.

(44) To (i) the ninth [doubt], it must be said that if [the proposition] is taken literally, the terms supposit the same way they do in other [propositions]. But according to the speakers’ usage they supposit improperly for other [things].

Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).

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← Chapter 70 · Contents

Footnotes

1. See Ch. 63, para. 6, above. ↩

2. In other words, what about non-denoting subjects? ↩

3. That is, “thing” in the sense of an extramental, non-linguistic entity. ↩

4. That is, for things “contained” under the term. In short, for individuals. ↩

5. This paragraph is missing is several manuscripts. All these examples deal with “improper” supposition. See Ch. 77. ↩

6. See para. 2 above, and the reference in n. 232 there. ↩

7. See Ch. 33, para. 2, above (the second sense of ‘signify’). ↩

8. That is, in the first sense of the word. See Ch. 33, para. 1, above. ↩

9. Some terms will fail this condition. For example, the terms ‘dodo’, ‘passenger pigeon’, etc. ↩

10. That is, every white thing. ↩

11. See Part II, Ch. 7. ↩

12. On this notion, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73a21–74a2. The Oxford translation renders the term as “essential.” ↩

13. Remember, propositions are tokens for Ockham, so that their existence is not guaranteed. ↩

14. See Part II, Ch. 7, and Part III–3, Chs. 10–12. ↩

15. That is, quantifier. ↩

16. See para. 2 above. ↩

17. See William of Ockham, Expositio super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis, Ca. 2, sect. 9, Francesco del Punta, ed., (“Opera philosophica,” vol. 3; St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1979), p. 28 lines 125–135: “For this reason, you have to know that whenever a common term occurring on the part of the subject is matched with a verb about the past, the proposition has to be distinguished insofar as the subject can supposit for [things] that are, that is, for [the things] of which [the subject] is actually verified by a verb about the present, or for [things] of which [the subject] was verified at some time in this way. This is because a term, wherever it occurs, always has to supposit for [the things] of which it is actually verified, but only by reason of [something] adjoined [to it] can it supposit for [the things] of which it was verified at some time.” ↩

18. See para. 13, above. ↩

19. That is, two alternative truth-conditions, either one of which is sufficient. ↩

20. Actually, we have to say more than that. We have to suppose that no other man exists who is white. ↩

21. See para. 11–12, above. ↩

22. As in ‘I promise you a horse’ or ‘He owes you twenty pounds’. ↩

23. At the end of para. 15, above. ↩

24. That is, quantifier. ↩

25. See Part II, Ch. 7. But this example does not occur there. ↩

26. That is, contained in the analysis of. ↩

27. In particular, for “sights” — that is, for visual faculties. ↩

28. See n. 257, above. ↩

29. See Ch. 6, above. ↩

30. That is, it makes things hot. ↩

31. This odd alternative is not discussed any further. ↩

32. For instance, Thomas Aquinas. See his Summa theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 1. ↩

33. The “modes of signifying” here are: nominative singular, genitive singular, and nominative/accusative plural, respectively. Presumably, Ockham intends these names to be synonymous, even though they differ in their “modes of signifying.” But in the examples that follow, there is no synonymy, because different things are “connoted.” ↩

34. Ockham held that there was no real distinction between the soul and its “faculties,” such as the intellect and the will. ↩

35. In the sense in which God “governs” the world. ↩

36. That is, concretes and abstracts of the kind discussed in Ch. 5, above. ↩

37. See Ch. 6, above. ↩

38. See Ch. 7, above. ↩

39. This is badly put. What Ockham means is that it supposits significatively for the same things relative names supposit for. So too in the following sentences. ↩

40. I’ve done the best I can with this sentence, although I suspect there is a corruption of the Latin text here. I cannot make good sense of it as it stands. ↩

41. The three conjuncts here are three “exponents” giving the analysis of the original sentence. Note that the second one, as Ockham says, is negative. ↩

42. Namely, the ‘only’. ↩