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Yet fifthly, We may hold truly some antecedaneous works upon the heart, before those graces be bestowed on us. This take to antidote8 against the Antinomian, who speaks constantly of the soul taking Christ, even while it’s a grievous polluted soul; as if there were no polishing of this crooked timber and rough stone, but even taken out of the quarry, and so immediately put into the building. Those in the Acts that were pricked in heart, were yet bid to repent; and so they cried out, What shall we doe to be saved? The sick feeleth his burden before he cometh for ease, so that a grosse sinner is not immediately put out of his vile wayes into Christ; onely these limitations you must take:

  1. That all these things, sight of sin, trembling for fear, confused desires, they are the works of Gods grace moving us, they do not come from our own naturall strength.

  2. These are not absolutely necessary in every one. We know how Matthew and Lydia did follow Christ; and God saith, he was found of some that did not seek him. Paul was in a most cursed indisposition when the Lord called him: but generally God takes this way.

  3. These are not necessary antecedents, so as the grace of conversion doth necessarily follow. Wee reade of Cain and Judas troubled for sin. These are a wildernesse that a man may dye in, and never goe into Canaan: There may be throes and pangs, when yet no childe, but wind is to be delivered. Hence a people that have been civill, have not been called: but Publicans and Harlots. The object of election is for the most part few for number, infirme for power, and sinfull for conversation: though in the godly these are needles that will draw in the threed, yet this state must not be called a third middle estate between regenerate and unregenerate, as some feigne.

Lastly, none of these workings can be called so properly preparations, or dispositions in themselves, but onely intentionally in God. Our Saviour looked on a young man, and loved him, and said, hee was not farre from the Kingdome of heaven: that is, the life hee lived was not farre from the Kingdome of heaven; yet this was no preparation in it selfe to it: nay, he may be further off, as two high hills may be neer in the tops to one another, but the bottomes some miles asunder. And this is so great a matter, that great sins are made by God a preparation to some mans conversion, which yet of themselves they could never be: As a childe, whose coat is a little dirty, hath it not presently washed; but when he falls wholly all over in the dirt, this may be the cause of the washing of it: so that they are preparations only so far as God intendeth them.

  1. All determination to one doth not take away that naturall liberty.9 This will further cleere the truth: for it may be thought strange, that there should be this freedome of will in a man, and yet thus determined to one sin onely; whereas it’s plaine, a determination to one kind of acts, good or evill, doth not take away liberty. God can onely will that which is good, and so the Angels and Saints confirmed in happinesse; yet they doe this freely: and so the Divels will that which is wicked onely. It’s true, some exclaime at such passages, but that is onely because they are prepossessed with a false opinion about liberty; for a determination to one may arise from perfection, as well as naturall imperfection. It is from Gods absolute perfection that hee is determined to will onely good; and when Adam did will to sin against God, it did not arise from the liberty of his will, but his mutability. There is a naturall necessity, such which determineth a thing to one; and that is imperfection: but a necessity of immutability in that which is good, is a glorious perfection. The Learned speak of a three-fold liberty: 1. From misery, such as the Saints shall have in heaven. 2. From sin, to which10 is opposed that freedome to righteousnesse, of which our Saviour speaketh, Then are yee free indeed, when the Son hath made you free; and of which Austine, Tunc est liberum, quando liberatum. 3. From naturall necessity, and thus also man, though hee be necessarily carried on to sin, yet it is not by a naturall necessity, as beasts are, but there is Reason and Will in him when he doth thus transgresse: onely you must take notice, that this determination of our Will onely to sin, is the losse of that perfection we had in Adam, and doth not arise from the primaeve constitution of the will, but by Adams fall, and so is meerly accidentall to it.

  2. Nor doth it take away that willingnesse or delight in sin, which11 we are inevitably carried out unto: For now, if man were carried out to sin against his will and his delight, then there might be some shew of pleading for him; but it is not so, he sinneth as willingly, and as electively in respect of his corrupt heart, as if there were no necessity brought upon him. Therefore that is good of Bernards, The necessity takes not away the willingnesse of it, nor the willingnesse of it the necessity. It’s both an hand-maid, and so free, and, which is to be wondered, eoque magis ancilla, quò magis libera. Hence therefore no wicked or ungodly man can have any excuse for himselfe, to say the fates or necessity drove him: for, besides that by his fault he hath cast himselfe into this necessity, and so is, as if a man in debt, who was once able to pay, but by his wilfull prodigall courses hath spent all, should think to be excused because he cannot pay. Besides (I say, this just and full answer) this also is to be said, that no man sins constrainedly, but every one is carried on with that delight to sin, as if he were independent upon any providence, or predefinitive permissive decrees of God, or any such corrupt necessity within him. Hereby he pitieth not himselfe, hee seeth not his undone estate, & nihil miserius misero non miserante scipsum. Hence it is, that a mans whole damnation is to be ascribed to himselfe. Wee ourselves have destroyed our owne soules, wee cannot cast it upon Gods decrees. And this is necessarily to be urged, because of that naturall corruption in us with Adam, to cast our sinne upon God.

  3. A man may acknowledge grace and give much to it, and yet12 not give the totall efficacy unto it. This is a maine particular to consider; for Pelagius, and Arminius, and Papists, all doe acknowledge grace. Pelagius, it’s noted of him, that hee did foure times incrustate his opinion, and held grace in every one of them: Hee did gratiae vocabulo uti ad frangendum invidiam, as you heard before; yea, by this meanes hee deceived all the Easterne Churches, and they acquitted him when he said thus: If any man deny grace to be necessary to every good act wee doe, let him be an anathema. So Papists and Arminians, they all acknowledge grace, but not grace enough; Gratia non est gratia, nisi sit omni modo gratuita: As for example; First, they acknowledge grace to be onely as an universall help, which must be made effectuall by the particular will of man: so that grace is efficacious with them, not by any inward vertue of it self antecedaneous to, and independent upon the Will, but eventually only, because the will doth yeeld; and therefore Bellarmine compareth it to Sol & homo generant hominem: one as the universall cause, the other as the particular cause. Thus grace and free-will produce a good action; grace as the generall cause, and free-will as the particular: but how derogatory is this to grace? how can our actions be said to be the fruit of grace? For, If I should aske, Who is the father of such a man? it would be very hard to say, The Sun in the firmament: so it would be as absurd to say, Grace regenerated and converted this man. Again, they make grace a partiall cause only; so that it stirreth up our naturall strength to work this or that good thing: and therefore we are synergists or co-workers with13 God in the work of conversion; but this supposeth us not dead in sinne.

  4. Men may naturally performe the outward act of a commandement. Now though we be thus corrupt, yet for all that, men by nature may doe that outward act which is commanded by God, or abstaine from the matter prohibited. Thus Alexander abstained from the Virgins hee took captives, which is so much related in stories, and many other famous instances of the Heathens, though some indeed think they had a speciall helpe and aide from God to doe that: but here the Apostle in the Text is cleare, They doe by nature the things of the law. Some doe not like that dictinction, They may doe the substance of the work, but not the manner of a good worke, because they think the substance doth comprehend that indeed which makes a good work; howsoever, they agree that the externall act may be done. Thus Ahab hee externally humbled himselfe, and some think that Uriah, which Esay calls, The faithfull witnesse he took to him, to be the same with him that brought in the Altar of Damascus: so that, though he was an idolater, and an ungodly man, yet hee was reputed a faithfull man in his word. And certainly this is something, to make many men inexcusable. They may forbeare those acts of grosse impiety which they doe, supposing they have not customarily, or by the just judgement of God throwne themselves into the power of such sins; not that this will helpe to save them, onely their punishment will be lesse. Thus Fabricius and Camillus (saith Austin) will be lesse punished then Verres or Cataline, not because these were holy, but because they were lesse wicked, & minora vitia virtutes vocamus. I know it’s a question, Whether a godly man can doe more good then he doth, or lesse evill then he doth: but this may be handled in the controversall part; we speak now of a wicked man, who can doe no good at all, unlesse in the externall act.

Yet 10. All that they doe is a sin before God. This is an antidote14 to the former: Whatsoever they have done, though for the matter glorious, yet they were but glorious sins; for,

  1. They could not come from faith, or one reconciled with God: and the person must be first accepted before the action, Heb. 11. Without faith it’s impossible to please God.

  2. It could not come from a regenerate nature: and therefore the tree not being good, the fruit was also bad. It’s not in Divinity, as in Morall Philosophy, where justa, & justè agendo fimus justi; but we have the esse or being first, and then the operari. It’s a question worth the disputing, Whether the grace of God works the act of beleeving and other graces in us first, and then by them we receive the habits. The Papists, and Arminians, and some others go that way; but it is not consonant to Scripture, as may be shewed hereafter.

  3. They could not be good, if you regard the end: They could do15 nothing for the glory of God. This made Theophylact say, Wee could not instance in one good Heatken; for, that which they did was for their vain-glory, & carnalis cupiditas non aliâ fauatur, one divell did but cast out another: and if they did intend some particular good end, as to relieve the miserable, to help the commonwealth, this was not enough; for the ultimate and chief end ought to be intended by them.

Lastly, There is no promise of God made to any thing a man doth,16 that hath not faith. Ahab indeed, and Nebuchadnezzar had temporall rewards, but in what sense, I shall shew in answering the Objections.

Use. To bewaile the wofull condition of man by nature. How is every bird in the aire, and beast in the field in a better naturall condition then they are? This is worse then to be blind, to be lame; for our soules are all blind, lame, deafe, yea and dead in sin. What a sad thing is it, to be all the day and yeare long damning our soules? If we eat or drink, we sin; if we buy or sell, we sin. And consider, that sin is the greatest evill, and that onely which God loaths and abhorres. Let all thou doest therefore terrifie thee, and make thee to tremble; let this make thee cry for grace, as the poore, blind, and lame did, that they might be healed: And, because you doe not feele this, or are unwilling to be heard, therefore you are the more miserable; Nolunt phrenetici ligari, & lethargici excitari.

Footnotes

  1. There is in man a natural power, by the help of Reason, to chuse or refuse this or that thing. ↩

  2. This naturall power in man not able to performe naturall actions without Gods generall assistance. ↩

  3. Man by the power of nature wholly unable to performe good actions. ↩

    1. Because our natures are full of sin and corruption.
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    1. Because grace and conversion are the work of God.
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    1. Because glory is to be given to God onely, not to our selves.
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  4. Nature of it self cannot dispose for justification, or sanctification: and the reasons why. ↩

  5. There are, and may be some preparatory and antecedaneous works upon the heart before justification or sanctification. ↩

  6. Determination to one kind of acts takes not away liberty. ↩

  7. A threefold liberty. ↩

  8. Determination to sinne, takes not away that delight in sinne which man is inevitably carried out unto. ↩

  9. Much may be ascribed to grace, and yet the totall efficacy not given unto it. ↩

  10. The outward act of a commandement may be preformed by the power of Nature. ↩

  11. Whatsoever meere naturall men doe, is sin before God; because 1. The act wants faith, the person reconciliation with God. 2. It proceeds not from a regenerate nature. ↩

    1. ‘Tis not done in reference to Gods glory.
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  12. 4 There is no promise annexed to any act that wants faith. ↩

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