Chapter II.

Containing a removal of some mistakes and false assignations of the end of the death of Christ.

That the death, oblation, and blood-shedding of Jesus Christ is to be considered as the means for the compassing of an appointed end was before abundantly declared; and that such a means as is not in itself any way desirable but for the attaining of that end. Now, because that which is the end of any thing must also be good, for unless it be so it cannot be an end (for bonum et finis convertuntur), it must be either his Father’s good, or his own good, or our good, which was the end proposed.

I. That it was not merely his own is exceedingly apparent. For in his divine nature he was eternally and essentially partaker of all that glory which is proper to the Deity; which though in respect of us it be capable of more or less manifestation, yet in itself it is always alike eternally and absolutely perfect. And in this regard, at the close of all, he desires and requests no other glory but that which he had with his Father “before the world was,” John xvii. 5. And in respect of his human nature, as he was eternally predestinated, without any foresight of doing or suffering, to be personally united, from the instant of his conception, with the second person of the Trinity, so neither while he was in the way did he merit any thing for himself by his death and oblation. He needed not to suffer for himself, being perfectly and legally righteous; and the glory that he aimed at, by “enduring the cross, and despising the shame,” was not so much his own, in respect of possession, by the exaltation of his own nature, as the bringing of many children to glory, even as it was in the promise set before him, as we before at large declared. His own exaltation, indeed, and power over all flesh, and his appointment to be Judge of the quick and the dead, was a consequent of his deep humiliation and suffering; but that it was the effect and product of it, procured meritoriously by it, that it was the end aimed at by him in his making satisfaction for sin, that we deny. Christ hath a power and dominion over all, but the foundation of this dominion is not in his death for all; for he hath dominion over all things, being appointed “heir of them, and upholding them all by the word of his power,” Heb. i. 2, 3. “He is set over the works of God’s hands, and all things are put in subjection under him,” chap. ii. 7, 8. And what are those “all things,” or what are amongst them, you may see in the place of the psalmist from whence the apostle citeth these words, Ps. viii. 5–8. And did he die for all these things? Nay, hath he not power over the angels? are not principalities and powers made subject to him? Shall he not at the last day judge the angels? for with him the saints shall do it, by giving attestation to his righteous judgments, 1 Cor. vi. 2, 3; — and yet, is it not expressly said that the angels have no share in the whole dispensation of God manifested in the flesh, so as to die for them to redeem them from their sins? of which some had no need, and the others are eternally excluded: Heb. ii. 16, “He took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham,” God setting him “king upon his holy hill of Zion,” in despite of his enemies, to bruise them and to rule them “with a rod of iron,” Ps. ii. 6, 9, is not the immediate effect of his death for them, but rather all things are given into his hand out of the immediate love of the Father to his Son, John iii. 35; Matt. xi. 27. That is the foundation of all this sovereignty and dominion over all creatures, with this power of judging that is put into his hand.

Besides, be it granted (which cannot be proved) that Christ by his death did procure this power of judging, would any thing hence follow that might be beneficial to the proving of the general ransom for all? No, doubtless; this dominion and power of judging is a power of condemning as well as saving; it is “all judgment” that is committed to him, John v. 22. “He hath authority given unto him to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man;” that is, at that hour “when all that are in their graves shall hear his voice and come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, to the resurrection of condemnation,” verses 27–29; 2 Cor. v. 10. Now, can it be reasonably asserted that Christ died for men to redeem them, that he might have power to condemn? Nay, do not these two overthrow one another? If he redeemed thee by his death, then he did not aim at the obtaining of any power to condemn thee; if he did the latter, then that former was not in his intention.

II. Nor, secondly, was it his Father’s good. I speak now of the proximate and immediate end and product of the death of Christ, not of the ultimate and remote, knowing that the supreme end of Christ’s oblation, and all the benefits purchased and procured by it, was “the praise of his glorious grace;” but for this other, it doth not directly tend to the obtaining of any thing unto God, but of all good things from God to us. Arminius, with his followers, with the other Universalists of our days, affirm this to be the end proposed, that God might, his justice being satisfied, save sinners, the hinderance being removed by the satisfaction of Christ. He had by his death obtained a right and liberty of pardoning sin upon what condition he pleased: so that, after the satisfaction of Christ yielded and considered, “integrum Deo fuit” (as his words are), it was wholly in God’s free disposal whether he would save any or no; and upon what condition he would, whether of faith or of works “God,” say they, “had a good mind and will to do good to human kind, but could not by reason of sin, his justice lying in the way; whereupon he sent Christ to remove that obstacle, that so he might, upon the prescribing of what condition he pleased, and its being by them fulfilled, have mercy on them,” Now, because in this they place the chief, if not the sole, end of the oblation of Christ, I must a little show the falseness and folly of it; which may be done plainly by these following reasons:—