First, Their doctrine of the mutability of God’s decrees, on whose firmness is founded the infallibility of this prescience, doth quite overthrow it. God thus foreknowing only what he hath so decreed shall come to pass, if that be no firmer settled but that it may [be] and is often altered, according to the divers inclinations of men’s wills, which I showed before they affirm, he can have at best but a conjectural foreknowledge of what is yet for to come, not founded on his own unchangeable purpose, but upon a guess at the free inclination of men’s wills. For instance, ¹¹God willeth that all men should be saved. This act of his will, according to the Arminian doctrine, is his conditionate decree to save all men if they will believe. Well, among these is Judas, as ¹²equal a sharer in the benefit of this decree as Peter. God, then, will have him to be saved, and to this end allows him all those means which are necessary to beget faith in him, and are every way sufficient to that purpose, and do produce that effect in others; what can God foresee, then, but that Judas as well as Peter will believe? He intendeth he should, he hath determined nothing to the contrary. Let him come, then, and act his own part. Why, he proves so obstinately malicious, ¹³that God, with all his omnipotency, as they speak, by any way that becomes him, which must not be by any irresistible efficacy, cannot change his obdurate heart. Well, then, he determineth, according to the exigence of his justice, that he shall be damned for his impenitency, and foreseeth that accordingly. But now, suppose this wretch, even at his last moment, should bethink himself and return to the Lord, which in their conceit he may, notwithstanding his former reprobation (which, ¹⁴as they state it, seems a great act of mercy), ¹⁵God must keep to the rules of his justice, and elect or determine to save him; by which the varlet hath twice or thrice deceived his expectation.

Secondly, ¹⁶They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. “We grant,” saith Corvinus, “that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled.” Now, surely, to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel; and, therefore, they must grant that before he did not know but perhaps so it might be. “God wisheth and desireth some good things, which yet come not to pass,”¹⁷ say they, in their Confession; whence one of these two things must needs follow, — either, first, that there is a great deal of imperfection in his nature, to desire and expect what he knows shall never come to pass; or else he did not know but it might, which overthrows his prescience. Yea, and say they expressly, ¹⁸“That the hope and expectation of God is deceived by man;” and confess, “that the strength of their strongest argument lies in this, that God hoped and expected obedience from Israel.” Secondly, That he complaineth that his hope is deluded, which, being taken properly, and as they urge it, cannot consist with his eternal prescience; for they disesteem the usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which include in them any imperfection, are ascribed unto God per ἀνθρωποπάθειαν, — in regard of that analogy his actions hold with such of ours as we perform having those passions.

Thirdly, ¹⁹They teach that God hath determined nothing concerning such things as these in question. “That God hath determined future contingent things unto either part (I mean such as issue from the free-will of the creature), I abominate, hate, and curse, as false, absurd, and leading us on unto blasphemy,” saith Arminius. To determine of them to either part is to determine and ordain whether they shall be, or whether they shall not be; as, that David shall or shall not go up tomorrow against the Philistines, and prevail. Now, the infallibility of God’s foreknowing of such things depending on the certainty of his decree and determination, if there be no such thing as this, that also must needs fall to the ground.

Fourthly, ²⁰See what positively they write concerning this everlasting foreknowledge of God:— First, They call it a troublesome question; secondly, They make it a thing disputable whether there be any such thing or no; and though haply it may be ascribed unto God, yet, thirdly, They think it no motive to the worship of him; fourthly, They say, better it were quite exploded, because the difficulties that attend it can scarcely be reconciled with man’s liberty, God’s threatenings and promises; yea, fifthly, It seems rather to be invented to crucify poor mortals than to be of any moment in religion. So Episcopius. It may be excepted that this is but one doctor’s opinion. It is true, they are one man’s words; but the thing itself is countenanced by the whole sect. As, first, in the large prolix declaration of their opinions, they speak not one word of it; and being taxed for this omission by the professors of Leyden, they vindicate themselves so coldly in their Apology, that some learned men do from hence conclude,²¹ that certainly, in their most secret judgments, all the Arminians do consent with Socinus in ascribing unto God only a conjectural foreknowledge. And one great prophet of their own affirms roundly, ²²“That God, after his manner, oftentimes feareth, that is, suspecteth, and that not without cause, and prudently conjectureth, that this or that evil may arise,” Vorstius. And their chiefest patriarchs, ²³“That God doth often intend what he doth not foresee will come to pass,” Armin., Corv. Now, whether this kind of atheism be tolerable among Christians or no, let all men judge who have their senses exercised in the word of God; which, I am sure, teaches us another lesson. For, —

First, It is laid down as a firm foundation, that “known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world,” Acts xv. 18. Every thing, then, that in any respect may be called his work, is known unto him from all eternity. Now, what in the world, if we may speak as he hath taught us, can be exempted from this denomination? Even actions in themselves sinful are not; though not as sinful, yet in some other regard, as punishments of others. “Behold,” saith Nathan to David, in the name of God, “I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun; for thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel,” 2 Sam. xii. 11, 12. So, also, when wicked robbers had nefariously spoiled Job of all his substance, the holy man concludeth, “The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away,” chap. i. 21. Now, if the working of God’s providence be so mighty and effectual, even in and over those actions wherein the devil and men do most maliciously offend, as did Absalom and the Sabean with the Chaldean thieves, that it may be said to be his work, and he may be said to “do it” (I crave liberty to use the Scripture phrase), then certainly nothing in the world, in some respect or other, is independent of his all-disposing hand; yea, Judas himself betraying our Saviour did nothing but “what his hand and counsel determined before should be done,”²⁴ Acts iv. 28, in respect of the event of the thing itself. And if these actions, notwithstanding these two hindrances, — first, that they were contingent, wrought by free agents, working according to election and choice; secondly, that they were sinful and wicked in the agents, — had yet their dependence on his purpose and determinate counsel, surely he hath an interest of operation in the acts of every creature. But his works, as it appears before, are all known unto him from the beginning, for he worketh nothing by chance or accidentally, but all things determinately, according to his own decree, or “the counsel of his own will,” Eph. i. 11.

Secondly, The manner of God’s knowing of things doth evidently show that nothing that is, or may be, can be hid from him; ²⁵which is not by discourse and collection of one thing out of another, conclusions out of principles, but altogether and at once, evidently, clearly, and distinctly, both in respect τοῦ ὅτι, and τοῦ διότι. By one most pure act of his own essence he discerneth all things: for there is “no creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all are naked and opened unto his eyes,” Heb. iv. 13. So that those things concerning which we treat ²⁶he knoweth three ways:— First, In himself and his own decree, as the first cause; in which respect they may be said to be necessary, in respect of the certainty of their event. Secondly, In their immediate causes, wherein their contingency doth properly consist. Thirdly, In their own nature as future, but to his infinite knowledge ever present.

Thirdly, The Scripture²⁷ is full of expressions to this purpose, — to wit, “That God knoweth all secrets, and revealeth hidden things: he searcheth the reins and the heart: he knoweth the number of the stars, and the birds of the air, the lilies of the field, the falling of sparrows, the number of the hairs of our heads.” Some places are most remarkable, as that of the Psalmist, “He knoweth my thoughts long before;” even before ever they come into our minds, before their first rising. And yet many actions that are most contingent depend upon those thoughts known unto God from eternity; nay, — which breaketh the very neck of the goddess contingency, — those things wherein her greatest power is imagined to consist are directly ascribed unto God, as our words, “the answer of the tongue,” Prov. xvi. 1; and the directing of an arrow, shot by chance, to a mark not aimed at, 1 Kings xxii. 34. Surely God must needs foreknow the event of that contingent action; he must needs know the man would so shoot who had determined his arrow should be the death of a king. He maketh men poor and rich, Prov. xxii. 2; He lifteth up one, and pulleth down another, Ps. lxxv. 7. How many contingencies did γοργὸν ὄμμα τοῦ δεσπότου, his piercing eye run through to foresee the crowning of Esther for the deliverance of his people! In a word, “Known unto God are all his works.” Now, what can possibly be imagined to be more contingent than the killing of a man by the fall of an axe from out of his hand who intended no such thing? Yet this God assumeth as his own work, Deut. xix. 5, Exod. xxi. 13; and so surely was by him foreknown.

Fourthly, Do but consider the prophecies in Scripture, especially those concerning our Saviour, how many free and contingent actions did concur for the fulfilling of them; as Isa. vii. 14, ix. 6, liii.; Gen. iii. 15, etc. The like may be said of other predictions; as of the wasting of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, which though, in regard of God’s prescience, it was certainly to come to pass, yet they did it most freely, not only following the counsel of their own wills, but also using divination, or chanceable lots, for their direction, Ezek. xxi. 21. Yet he who made the eye seeth all these things, Ps. xciv. 9.

Divers other reasons and testimonies might be produced to confirm our doctrine of God’s everlasting prescience; which, notwithstanding Episcopius’ blasphemy, that it serves for nought but to cruciate poor mortals, we believe to be a good part of the foundation of all that consolation which God is pleased to afford us in this vale of tears. Amidst all our afflictions and temptations, under whose pressure we should else faint and despair, it is no small comfort to be assured that we do nor can suffer nothing but what his hand and counsel guides unto us, what is open and naked before his eyes, and whose end and issue he knoweth long before; which is a strong motive to patience, a sure anchor of hope, a firm ground of consolation. Now, to present in one view how opposite the opinions of the worshippers of the great goddess contingency are to this sacred truth, take this short antithesis:—

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← Chapter II. Of the eternity and immutability of the decrees of almighty God, denied and overthrown by the Arminians · Contents · Chapter IV. Of the providence of God in governing the world diversely, thrust from this pre-eminence by the Arminian idol of free-will →

Footnotes

1. James iv. 13–15. ↩

2. Διὸς δ’ ετελείετο βουλή, Hom; — “God’s will was done.” ↩

3. “Quæcunque possunt per creaturam fieri, vel cogitari, vel dici, et etiam quæcunque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiamsi neque sunt, neque erunt, neque fuerunt, scientiâ simplicis intelligentiæ.” — Aquin, p. q. 14, a. 9, c. Ex verbis apostoli, Rom. iv., “Qui vocat ea quæ non sunt tanquam ea quæ sunt.” Sic scholastici omnes. Fer. Scholast. Orthod. Speci. cap. iii., alii passim. Vid. Hieron. Zanch. de Scientia Dei, lib. diatrib. iii., cap. 2, q. 5. ↩

4. Vid. Sam. Rhætorfort. Exercit. de Grat., ex. i. cap. 4. ↩

5. “Res ipsæ nullo naturæ momento possibiles esse dicendæ sunt priusquam a Deo intelliguntur, scientiâ quæ dicitur simplicis intelligentiæ, ita etiam scientiâ quæ dicitur visionis, et fertur in res futuras, nullo naturæ momento, posterior statuenda videtur, ista futuritione, rerum; cum scientia,” etc. — Dr Twiss. ad Errat. Vind. Grat. ↩

6. “Scientia visionis dicitur, quia ea quæ videntur, apud nos habent esse distinctum extra videntem.” — Aq. p. q. 14, a. 9, c. ↩

7. “In eo differt præscientia intuitionis, ab ea, quæ approbationis est, quod illa præsciat, quod evenire possibile est; hoc vero quod impossibile est non evenire.” — Ferrius. Orthod. Scholast. Speci. cap. xxiii. Cæterum posterior ista scientia non proprie dicitur a Ferrio scientia approbationis, illa enim est, qua Deus dicitur nosse quæ amat et approbat; ab utraque altera distincta. Matt. vii. 23; Rom. xi. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 19. “Quamvis infinitorum numerorum, nullus sit numerus, non tamen est incomprehensibilis ei, cujus scientiæ non est numerus.” — Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. xii. cap. 18. ↩

8. “Quibusdam effectibus præparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario eveniret, quibusdam vero causas contingentes ut evenirent contingenter, secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.” — Aquin. p. q. 28, a. 4, in Cor. Zanch. de Natur. Dei, lib. v., qu. 4, thes. ↩

9. “Res et modos rerum” — Aquin. ↩

10. “Cui præscientiam tollis, aufers divinitatem.” — Hieron. ad Pelag., lib. ↩

11. “Deus ita omnium salutem ex æquo vult, ut illam ex æquo optet et desideret.” — Corv. ad Molin., cap. xxxi. sect. 1. ↩

12. “Talis gratia omnibus datur quæ sufficiat ad fidem generandam.” — Idem, ibid, sect. 15. ↩

13. “Pertinaci quorundam malitia compulsus.” — Armin., ubi sup. ↩

14. “Reprobatio populi Judaici fuit actio temporaria et quæ bono ipsorum Judæorum si modo sanabiles adhuc essent, animumque advertere vellent, servire poterat, utque ei fini serviret a Deo facta erat.” — Rem. Apol., cap. xx. p. 221. ↩

15. “Injustum est apud Deum vel non credentem eligere, vel credentem non eligere.” — Rem. Apol. ↩

16. “Concedimus in Deo desideria, quæ nunquam implentur.” — Corv. ad Molin., cap. v. sect. 2. ↩

17. “Bona quædam Deus optat et desiderat.” — Rem. Confes., cap. ii. sect. 9. ↩

18. “Dei spes et expectatio est ab hominibus elusa.” — Rem. Scrip. Syn. in cap. v., Isa. v. 1. “In eo vis argumenti est, quod Deus ab Israele obedientiam et sperarit, et expectarit.” — Idem, ibid. “Quod Deus de elusa spe sua conqueratur.” — Idem, ubi supra. ↩

19. “Deum futura contingentia, decreto suo determinasse ad alterutram partem (intellige quæ a libera creaturæ voluntate patrantur), falsum, absurdum, et multiplicis blasphemiæ prævium abominor et exæcror.” — Armin. Declarat. Senten. ↩

20. “Disquiri permittimus:— 1. Operosam illam quæstionem, de scientia futurorum contingentium absoluta et conditionata; 2. Etsi non negemus Deo illam scientiam attribui posse; 3. Tamen an necessarium saluti sit ad hoc ut Deus recte colatur examinari permittimus; 4. Tum merito facessere debent a scholis et ecclesiis, intricatæ et spinosæ istæ quæstiones quæ de ea agitari solent, — quomodo illa cum libertate arbitrii, cum seriis Dei comminationibus, aliisque actionibus, consistere possit: quæ omnia crucem potius miseris mortalibus fixerunt, quam ad religionem cultumque divinum, momenti aliquid inquisitoribus suis attulerunt.” — Episcopius, Disput. iv. sect. 10.; Rem. Apol., pp. 43, 44. ↩

21. Ames. Antisynod, p. 10. ↩

22. “Deus suo modo aliquando metuit, hoc est, merito suspicatur et prudenter conjicit, hoc vel illud malum oriturum.” — Vorsti. de Deo, p. 451. ↩

23. “Deus non semper ex præscientia finem intendit.” — Armin., Antip., p. 667; Corv. ad Molin., cap. v. sect. 5. ↩

24. “Cum et pater tradiderit filium suum, et ipse Christus corpus suum: et Judas dominum suum: cur in hac traditione Deus est pius, et homo reus, nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt, causa non fuit una propter quam fecerunt.” — Aug., Epist. xlviii. ↩

25. “Deus non particulatim, vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternanter concepta, hinc illuc, inde huc, sed omnia videt simul.” — Aug., lib. xv. de Trinit., cap. 14. “In scientia divina nullus est discursus, sed omnia perfecte intelligit.” — Tho., p. q. 14, a. 7. c. ↩

26. Tilen. Syntag. de Attrib. Dei, thes. 22; Zanch. de Nat. Dei. Unumquodque quod est, dum est, necesse est, ut sit. ↩

27. Ps. xliv. 21; Job xi. 11; Dan. ii. 47; Ps. vii. 9, xxvi. 2, cxlvii. 4; Luke xii. 27; Matt. x. 29, 30; Ps. cxxxix. 2. ↩