The arguments of Socinus against punitory justice weighed — A false hypothesis of his — Sins, in what sense they are debts — The first argument of Socinus, in which he takes for granted what ought to have been proved — A trifling supposition substituted for a proof — Whether that excellence by virtue of which God punishes sins be called justice in the Scriptures — The severity of God, what — Our opponent’s second argument — It labours under the same deficiency as the first — It is not opposite to mercy to punish the guilty — The mercy of God, what — There is a distinction between acts and habits — Our opponent confounds them — The mercy of God infinite, so also his justice — A distinction of the divine attributes — In pardoning sins through Jesus Christ, God hath exercised infinite justice and infinite mercy — The conclusion of the contest with Socinus.
In the third part and first chapter of his treatise, being determined to contend to his utmost against the satisfaction of Christ, he maintains “That God, consistently with his right, could pardon our sins without any real satisfaction received for them;” and he endeavours to support the assertion chiefly by the following argument, — namely, “That God is our creditor, that our sins are debts which we have contracted with him, but that every one may yield up his right, and more especially God, who is the supreme Lord of all, and extolled in the Scriptures for his liberality and goodness.” Hence, then, it is evident that God can pardon sins without any satisfaction received; and that he is inclined to do so, he uses his best endeavours afterward to prove.
But because he foresaw that his first supposition, the foundation of his whole future reasoning, was too much exposed and obnoxious to the divine justice, he labours hard in the first chapter to remove that out of the way entirely. Let us attend, then, to his reasoning, and follow him step by step: for if he have not insuperably, and beyond all confutation, proved that God can forgive sins without a satisfaction, what he afterward argues concerning the will, liberality, and mercy of God will become of no weight or consideration; yea, the foundation being destroyed, the whole edifice or Babylonish tower must instantly tumble to the ground. He thus proceeds:—
“But you will say, ‘It is necessary that God should take care to satisfy his justice, which he cannot even himself renounce, unless he in a manner deny himself.’ ”
Ans. You are right, Socinus. We do affirm, agreeably to the holy Scriptures, that the justice of God is in such a manner natural to him, that if it be necessary that he should preserve the glory of his essential attributes undiminished, he cannot but indispensably exact the punishment of every sin and transgression of his law, and render a just recompense of reward to all sinners, or to their surety; and, therefore, we contend that without a satisfaction made no one could obtain the remission of sins and eternal salvation. Let us see, Socinus, what you have to oppose to this.
“All along, from the beginning of this answer,” says he, “I have sufficiently shown that that justice which you contend ought at all events to be satisfied is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his own will; for when God punishes sinners, that we may call this work of his by some worthy name, we say that he then exerciseth justice: wherefore, there is no need that God should either provide for the satisfaction of that justice or renounce it.”
Ans. We have already considered what Socinus says in the beginning of his treatise against the justice of God. If I mistake not, we have shown that the heretic has lost his labour, and that it is far beyond his power to dethrone the Deity; for “he sitteth in the throne judging righteously.”1 But we, diminutive beings, have not first, or of our own accord, maintained that God is just, and that he exerciseth justice in the punishment of sinners, “that we might call his work by some worthy name.” But the Judge of all the earth himself, the God of truth, in almost innumerable places, gives this testimony of himself in the sacred records; and these ought always to be the only, as they are the infallible, guide of our judgments.
Distrusting, then, what he had formerly asserted (or it being manifestly of no weight), he attempts again by other sophisms to establish the reasoning which he had formerly begun. And he thus proceeds:—
“But besides the arguments which I have already used to prove that that justice is not inherent in God, it chiefly appears from this, that were it naturally resident in God, he could never pardon not even the least transgression to any one; for God never doth any thing, nor can do any thing, that is opposite to the qualities inherent in him. As, for instance, as wisdom and equity are naturally inherent in God, that justice never doth or can do any thing contrary to wisdom and equity, as we have seen above,” etc.