Reader,
If thy inquiry be only after the substance of the truth in the ensuing treatise contended for, I desire thee not to stay at all upon this preliminary discourse, but to proceed thither where it is expressly handled from the Scriptures, without the intermixture of any human testimonies or other less necessary circumstances, wherein perhaps many of them may not be concerned whose interest yet lies in the truth itself, and it is precious to their souls. That which now I intend and aim at is, to give an account to the learned reader of some things nearly relating to the doctrine whose protection, in the strength of Him who gives to his [servants] suitable helps for the works and employments he calls them to, I have undertaken, and what entertainment it hath formerly found and received in the church, and among the saints of God. For the accomplishment of this intendment a brief mention of the doctrine itself will make way. Whom in this controversy we intend by the names of “saints” and “believers,” the treatise following will abundantly manifest. The word perseverantia is of most known use in ecclesiastical writers: Austin hath a book with the inscription of it on its forehead. The word in the New Testament signifying the same thing is ἐπιμονή. Of them that followed Paul, it is said that he “persuaded them ἐπιμένειν τῇ χάριτι τοῦ Θεοῦ,” Acts xiii. 43; that is, “to persevere.” Ὑπομονή is of the same import: Ὁ δὲ ὑπομείνας εἰς τέλος οὗτος σωθήσεται, Matt. x. 22, — “He that persevereth to the end.” The Vulgar Latin renders that word almost constantly by persevero. Καρτερία is a word also of the same signification, and which the Scripture useth to express the same thing. Κράτος is sometimes by a metathesis expressed κάρτος· thence is κάρτα, valde; and καρτερέω, spoken of him who is of a valiant, resolved mind. “By faith Moses left Egypt, not fearing the wrath of the king, τὸν γὰρ ἀόρατον ὡς ὁρῶν ἐκαρτέρησε,” Heb. xi. 27; — “As eyeing the Invisible, he endured (his trial) with a constant, valiant mind.” Προσκαρτερέω from thence is most frequently to persevere, Acts i. 14; and Ἦσαν δὲ προσκαρτεροῦντες τῇ διδαχῇ τῶν ἀποστόλων, Acts ii. 42, — “They persevered in the doctrine of the apostles.” Προσκαρτέρησις, once used in the New Testament, is rendered by our translators, “perseverance,” Eph. vi. 18. In what variety of expression the thing is revealed in the Scripture is in the treatise itself abundantly declared. The Latin word is classical: persevero is constanter sum severus. In that sense, as Seneca says, “Res severa est verum gaudium.” Its extreme in excess is pertinacy, if these are not rather distinguished from their objects than in themselves. Varro, lib. iv. De Ling. Lat., tells us that pertinacia is a continuance or going on in that wherein one ought not to continue or proceed; perseverantia is that whereby any one continues in that wherein he ought so to do. Hence is that definition of it commonly given by the schoolmen from Austin, lib. lxxxiii. qu. 31, who took it from Cicero (one they little acquainted themselves withal), lib. ii. De Invent. cap. liv. It is, say they, “In ratione bene consideratâ stabilis et perpetua permansio.”
And this at present may pass for a general description of it that is used in an ethical and evangelical sense. Perseverance was accounted a commendable thing among philosophers. Morally, perseverance is that part of fortitude whereby the mind is established in the performance of any good and necessary work, notwithstanding the assaults and opposition it meets withal, with that tediousness and wearisomeness which the protraction of time in the pursuit of any affairs is attended withal. Aristotle informs us that it is exercised about things troublesome, lib. vii. cap. vi., Eth. Nicom., giving a difference between continence with its opposite vice, and forbearance or perseverance: Τούτων δ’ ὁ μεν περὶ ἡδονὰς, ἀκρατὴς, ὁ δ’ ἐγκρατής. Ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς, ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. He that abides in his undertaken work, so it be good and honest, notwithstanding that trouble and perplexity he may meet withal, is καρτερικός. Hence he tells us that καρτερικῶς ζῇν, as well as σωφρόνως, is not pleasant to many, lib. x. cap. ix.; and that because so to live implies difficulty and opposition. And he also, as Varro in the place above mentioned, distinguishes it from pertinacy. And of men infected with that depraved habit of mind he says there are three sorts, ἰδιογνώμονες, ἀμαθεῖς, and ἄγροικοι. All these are, in his judgment, ἰσχυρογνώμονες, Nicom., lib. vii. cap. ix.; which perverse disposition of spirit he there dearly manifests to be sufficiently differenced from a stable, resolved frame of mind, whatever it may resemble it in. Now, though there is no question but that of two persons continuing in the same work or opinion, one may do it out of pertinacy, the other out of perseverance, yet amongst men, who judge of the minds of others by their fruits, and of the acts of their minds by their objects, these two dispositions or habits are universally distinguished, as before by Varro. Hence the terms of “pertinacy” and “obstinacy” being thrust into the definition of heresy by them who renounce any infallible living judge and determiner in matters of faith, to make way for the inflicting of punishment on the entertainers and maintainers thereof. They take no thought of proving it such, but only because it is found in persons embracing such errors. The same affection of mind, with the same fruits and demonstrations of it, in persons embracing the truth, would by the same men he termed perseverance. But this is not that whereof I treat.