Chapter XII.
The conception of sin through its deceit — Wherein it consisteth — The consent of the will unto sin — The nature thereof — Ways and means whereby it is obtained — Other advantages made use of by the deceit of sin — Ignorance — Error.
The third success of the deceit of sin in its progressive work is the conception of actual sin. When it hath drawn the mind off from its duty, and entangled the affections, it proceeds to conceive sin in order to the bringing of it forth: “Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin.” Now, the conception of sin, in order unto its perpetration, can be nothing but the consent of the will; for as without the consent of the will sin cannot be committed, so where the will hath consented unto it, there is nothing in the soul to hinder its actual accomplishment. God doth, indeed, by various ways and means, frustrate the bringing forth of these adulterate conceptions, causing them to melt away in the womb, or one way or other prove abortive, so that not the least part of that sin is committed which is willed or conceived; yet there is nothing in the soul itself that remains to give check unto it when once the will hath given its consent. Ofttimes, when a cloud is full of rain and ready to fall, a wind comes and drives it away; and when the will is ready to bring forth its sin, God diverts it by one wind or other: but yet the cloud was as full of rain as if it had fallen, and the soul as full of sin as if it had been committed.
This conceiving of lust or sin, then, is its prevalency in obtaining the consent of the will unto its solicitations. And hereby the soul is deflowered of its chastity towards God in Christ, as the apostle intimates, 2 Cor. xi. 2, 3. To clear up this matter we must observe, —
1. That the will is the principle, the next seat and cause, of obedience and disobedience. Moral actions are unto us or in us so far good or evil as they partake of the consent of the will. He spake truth of old who said, “Omne peccatum est adeo voluntarium, ut non sit peccatum nisi sit voluntarium;” — “Every sin is so voluntary, that if it be not voluntary it is not sin.” It is most true of actual sins. The formality of their iniquity ariseth from the acts of the will in them and concerning them, — I mean, as to the persons that commit them; otherwise in itself the formal reason of sin is its aberration from the law of God.
2. There is a twofold consent of the will unto sin:—
(1.) That which is full, absolute, complete, and upon deliberation, — a prevailing consent; the convictions of the mind being conquered, and no principle of grace in the will to weaken it. With this consent the soul goes into sin as a ship before the wind with all its sails displayed, without any check or stop. It rusheth into sin like the horse into the battle; men thereby, as the apostle speaks, “giving themselves over to sin with greediness,” Eph. iv. 19. Thus Ahab’s will was in the murdering of Naboth. He did it upon deliberation, by contrivance, with a full consent; the doing of it gave him such satisfaction as that it cured his malady or the distemper of his mind. This is that consent of the will which is acted in the finishing and completing of sin in unregenerate persons, and is not required to the single bringing forth of sin, whereof we speak.
(2.) There is a consent of the will which is attended with a secret renitency and volition of the contrary. Thus Peter’s will was in the denying of his Master. His will was in it, or he had not done it. It was a voluntary action, that which he chose to do at that season. Sin had not been brought forth if it had not been thus conceived. But yet, at this very time, there was resident in his will a contrary principle of love to Christ, yea, and faith in him, which utterly failed not. The efficacy of it was intercepted, and its operations suspended actually, through the violent urging of the temptation that he was under; but yet it was in his will, and weakened his consent unto sin. Though it consented, it was not done with self-pleasing, which such full acts of the will do produce.
3. Although there may be a predominant consent in the will, which may suffice for the conception of particular sins, yet there cannot be an absolute, total, full consent of the will of a believer unto any sin; for, —
(1.) There is in his will a principle fixed on good, on all good: Rom. vii. 21, “He would do good.” The principle of grace in the will inclines him to all good. And this, in general, is prevalent against the principle of sin, so that the will is denominated from thence. Grace hath the rule and dominion, and not sin, in the will of every believer. Now, that consent unto sin in the will which is contrary to the inclination and generally prevailing principle in the same will, is not, cannot be, total, absolute, and complete.