Chapter II.
The nature of schism to be determined from Scripture only — This principle by some opposed — Necessity of abiding in it — Parity of reason allowed — Of the name of schism — Its constant use in Scripture — In things civil and religious — The whole doctrine of schism in the epistles to the Corinthians — The case of that church proposed to consideration — Schism entirely in one church; not in the separation of any from a church; nor in subtraction of obedience from governors — Of the second schism in the church of Corinth — Of Clement’s epistle. — The state of the church of Corinth in those days: Ἐκκλησία παροικοῦσα Κόρινθον, — Πάροικος, who; παροικία, what — Πάροχος, “parœcia” — To whom the epistle of Clement was precisely written — Corinth not a metropolitical church — Allowance of what by parity of reason may be deduced from what is of schism affirmed — Things required to make a man guilty of schism — Arbitrary definitions of schism rejected — That of Austin considered; as also that of Basil — The common use and acceptation of it in these days — Separation from any church in its own nature not schism — Aggravations of the evil of schism ungrounded — The evil of it from its proper nature and consequences evinced — Inferences from the whole of this discourse — The church of Rome, if a church, the most schismatical church in the world — The church of Rome no church of Christ; a complete image of the empire — Final acquitment of Protestants from schism on the principle evinced, peculiarly of them of the late reformation in England — False notions of schism the ground of sin and disorder.
The thing whereof we treat being a disorder in the instituted worship of God, and that which is of pure revelation, I suppose it a modest request, to desire that we may abide solely by that discovery and description which is made of it in Scripture, — that that alone shall be esteemed schism which is there so called, or which hath the entire nature of that which is there so called. Other things may be other crimes; schism they are not, if in the Scripture they have neither the name nor nature of it attributed to them.
He that shall consider the irreconcilable differences that are among Christians all the world over about this matter, as also what hath passed concerning it in former ages, and shall weigh what prejudices the several parties at variance are entangled with in reference hereunto, will be ready to think that this naked appeal to the only common principle amongst us all is so just, necessary, and reasonable, that it will be readily on all hands condescended unto. But as this is openly opposed by the Papists, as a most destructive way of procedure, so I fear that when the tendency of it is discovered, it will meet with reluctancy from others. But let the reader know that as I have determined προτιμᾷν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, so to take the measure of it from the Scripture only. “Consuetudo sine veritate est vetustas erroris,” Cyp. Ep. ad Pomp.; and the sole measure of evangelical truth is His word of whom it was said, Ὁ λόγος ὁ σὸς ἀλήθειά ἐστι. “Id verius quod prius, id prius quod ab initio, id ab initio quod ab apostolis,” says Tertullian. It is to me a sufficient answer to that fond question, “Where was your religion before Luther? where was your religion in the days of Christ and his apostles?” My thoughts as to this particular are the same with Chrysostom’s on the general account of truth, Ἔρχεται Ἕλλην καὶ λέγει, ὅτι βούλομαι γενέσθαι Χριστιανὸς ἀλλὰ οὐκ οἶδα τίνι προσθῶμαι· μάχη παρ’ ὑμῖν πολλὴ καὶ στάσις, πολὺς θόρυβος, ποῖον ἕλομαι δόγμα; τί αἱρήσομαι; ἕκαστος λέγει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθεύω, τίνι πειθῶ μηδὲν ὅλως εἰδὼς ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς; κᾳκεῖνοι τὸ αὐτὸ προβάλλονται πάνυ γε τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, εἰ μὲν γὰρ λογισμοῖς ἐλέγομεν πείθεσθαι εἰκότως ἐθορύβου, εἰ δὲ ταῖς γραφαῖς λέγομεν πιστεύειν, αὐταὶ δὲ ἀπλαὶ καὶ ἀληθεῖς, εὔκολόν σοι τὸ κρινόμενον, εἴτις ἐκείναις συμφωνεῖ οὗτος Χριστιανός· εἴτις μάχεται οὗτος πόῤῥω τοῦ κανόνος τούτου. Homil. iii. in Acta.1
But yet, lest this should seem too strait, as being, at first view, exclusive of the learned debates and disputes which we have had about this matter, I shall, after the consideration of the precise Scripture notion of the name and thing, wherein the conscience of a believer is alone concerned, — propose and argue also what by a parity of reason may thence be deduced as to the ecclesiastical common use of them, and our concernment in the one and the other.
The word, which is metaphorical, as to the business we have in hand, is used in the Scripture both in its primitive native sense, in reference to things natural, as also in the tralatitious use of it, about things politic and spiritual, or moral. In its first sense we have the noun, Matt. ix. 16, Καὶ χεῖρον σχίσμα γίνεται, “And the rent” (in the cloth) “is made worse;” — and the verb, Matt. xxvii. 51, Καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ ἐσχίσθη, “The vail of the temple was rent;” Καὶ αἱ πέτραι ἐσχίσθησαν, “And the rocks were rent:” both denoting an interruption of continuity by an external power in things merely passive. And this is the first sense of the word, — a scissure or division of parts before continued, by force or violent dissolution. The use of the word in a political sense is also frequent: John vii. 43, Σχίσμα οὖν ἐν τῷ ὄχλῳ, “There was a division among the people,” some being of one mind, some of another; John ix. 16, Καὶ σχίσμα ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς, “There was a division among them;” and chap. x. 19 likewise. So Acts xiv. 4 Ἐσχίσθη δε τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, “The multitude of the city was divided;” and chap. xxiii. 7, “There arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees,” καὶ ἐσχίσθη τὸ πλῆθος, “and the multitude was divided,” some following one, some another of their leaders in that dissension. The same thing is expressed by a word answering unto it in Latin:— “Scinditur incertum studia in contraria vulgus.” And in this sense, relating things, it is often used.2