The times are busy, and we must be brief. Prefaces for the most part are at all times needless, — in these, troublesome. Mine shall only be, that ἄνευ προοιμίων καὶ παθῶν, “without either preface or solemnity,” I will fall to the business in hand. The thing about which I am to deal is commonly called Toleration in Religion, or toleration of several religions. The way wherein I shall proceed is not by contest, thereby to give occasion for the reciprocation of a saw of debate with any; but by the laying down of such positive observations, as being either not apprehended or not rightly improved by the most, yet lie at the bottom of the whole difference between men about this business, and tend in themselves to give light unto a righteous and equitable determination of the main thing contended about.
And lastly, herein for method I shall first consider the grounds upon which that non-toleration whereunto I cannot consent has been, and is still, endeavoured to be supported; which I shall be necessitated to remove —
I. By considering the arguments brought from holy writ;
II. From some other general observations. And then in order;
III. I shall assert the positive truth, as to the substance of the business under contest.
All in these ensuing observations.
I. As to the first of these —
1. Although the expressions of “toleration,” and “non-toleration,” wherewith the thing in controversy is vested, do seem to cast the affirmative upon them who plead for a forbearance in things of religion towards dissenting persons, yet the truth is, they are purely upon the negation, and the affirmative lies fully on the other part; and so the weight of proving, which ofttimes is heavy, lies on their shoulders Though non-toleration sound like a negation, yet punishment (which terms in this matter are ἰσοδυναμοῦντα is a deep affirmation. And, therefore, it sufficeth not men to say that they have consulted the mind of God, and cannot find that he ever spake to any of his saints or people to establish a toleration of error; and yet this is the first argument to oppose it produced in the late Testimony of the reverend and learned Assembly of the Church of Scotland.1 Affirmative precepts must be produced for a non-toleration; that is, the punishing of erring persona For actings of such high concernment, men do generally desire a better warrant than this — “There is nothing in the word against them.” Clear light is needful for men who walk in paths which lead directly to houses of blood. God hath not spoken of non-toleration, is a certain rule of forbearance; but God hath not spoken of toleration, is no rule of acting in opposition thereunto. What he hath spoken, one way or other, shall be afterward considered. Positive actings must have positive precepts and rules for them, as conscience is its own guide. If, then, you will have persons deviating in their apprehensions from the truth of the gospel civilly punished, you must bring better warrant than this, that God hath not spoken against it; or I shall not walk in your ways, but refrain my foot from your path.
2. That undoubtedly there are very many things under the command of the Lord, so becoming our duty, and within his promise, so made our privilege, which yet, if not performed, or not enjoyed, are not of human cognizance — as faith itself; yet because the knowledge of the truth is in that rank of things, this also is urged as of weight, by the same learned persons, to the business at hand.
3. Errors, though never so impious, are yet distinguished from peace-disturbing enormities. If opinions in their own nature tend to the disturbance of the public peace, either that public tranquility is not of God, or God alloweth a penal restraint of those opinions. It is a mistake, to affirm that those who plead for toleration do allow of punishment for offences against the second table — not against the first. The case is the same both in respect of the one and the other. What offences against the second table are punishable? Doubtless not all, but only such as, by a disorderly eruption, pervert the course of public quiet and society; yea, none but such fall under human cognizance. The warrant of exercising vindictive power amongst men is from the reference of offences to their common tranquillity. “Delicta puniri publicè interest.” Where punishment is the debt, “Bonum totius” the creditor to exact it. And this is allowed as to the offences against the first table. If any of them in their own nature (not some men’s apprehensions) are disturbances of public peace, they also are punishable. Only, let not this be measured by disputable consequences, no more than the other are. Let the evidence be in the things themselves, and “Actum est,” let who will plead for them. Hence —
Popish religion, warming in its very bowels a fatal engine against all magistracy amongst us, cannot upon our concessions plead for forbearance; it being a known and received maxim, that the gospel of Christ clashes against no righteous ordinance of man.