A Survey of the Fifth Chapter
[Alleged evils from the free exercise of conscience — Charges of Parker against Nonconformists — Mischief of different sects in a commonwealth — Duties of a prince in regard to divided interests in religion — Principle of toleration asserted.]
The fifth chapter is at such variance with itself and what is elsewhere dictated in the treatise, that it would require no small labour to make any tolerable composition of things between them. This I shall not engage in, as not being of my present concernment. What seems to tend unto the carrying on of the design of the whole may be called unto some account. In the beginning of it he tells us that “a belief of the indifferency, or rather imposture, of all religions is made the most effectual, not to say the most fashionable, argument for liberty of conscience,” For my part, I never read, I never heard of this pretence or argument, to be used to that purpose. It wants no such defence. Nay, the principle itself seems to me to be suited directly to oppose and overthrow it: for if there be no such thing in reality as religion in the world, it is certainly a very foolish thing to have differences perpetuated amongst men upon the account of conscience; which, without a supposition of religion, is nothing but a vain and empty name. But hence our author takes occasion to discourse of the use of religion and conscience in the government of affairs in the world; and proves in many words that “conscience unto God, with a regard to future eternal rewards or punishments, is the great ligament of human society, the security of government, the strongest bond of laws, and only support of rule; without which every man would first and last be guided by mere self-interest, which would reduce all power and authority to mere force and violence.” To this purpose doth he discourse at large in one section of this chapter; and in another, with no less earnestness and elegancy of words, and repetition of various expressions of the same signification, that “the use and exercise of conscience will certainly overthrow all government, and fill the world with confusion”! In like manner, whereas we have been hitherto throughly instructed, as I thought, that men may think what they will in the matters of religion, and be of what persuasion they please, [and] no man can or ought to control them therein, here we are told that “no power nor policy can keep men peaceable until some persuasions are rooted out of their minds by severity of laws and penalties”! p. 145. And whereas heretofore we were informed that “men might believe what they would,” princes were concerned only in their outward practice, now are we assured that “above all things it concerns princes to look to the doctrines and articles of men’s belief”! p. 147. But these things, as was before intimated, are not of our concern.
Nor can I find much of that importance in the third and fourth paragraphs of this declamatory invective. It is evident whom he regards and reflects upon, and with what false, unmanly, unchristian revilings he endeavours to traduce them. He would have the world believe that there is a generation of men whose principles of religion teach them to be proud, peevish, malicious, spiteful, envious, turbulent, boisterous, seditious, and whatever is evil in the world; when others are all for candour, moderation, and ingenuity, — amongst whom, no doubt, he reckons himself for one, and gives in this discourse in evidence thereof. But what are those doctrines and articles of men’s belief, which dispose them inevitably to all the villanies that our author could find names for? A catalogue of them he gives us, pp. 147, 148. Saith he, “What if they believe that princes are but the executioners of the decrees of the presbytery; and that in case of disobedience to their spiritual governors they may be excommunicated, and by consequence deposed? What if they believe that dominion is founded in grace, and therefore all wicked kings forfeit their crowns, and that it is in the power of the people of God to bestow them where they please? And what if others believe that to pursue their successes in villany and rebellion is to follow providence?” All the world knows what it is that hath given him the advantage of providing a covering for these monstrous fictions, and an account thereof hath been given elsewhere. And what, now, if those intended do not believe these things, nor any one of them? What if they do openly disavow every one of them, as, for aught I ever heard or know, they do, and as I do myself? What if some of them are ridiculously framed into articles of faith, from the supposed practices of some individual persons? And what if men be of never so vile opinions about the pursuit of their successes, so they have none to countenance them in any unlawful enterprises; which, I think, must go before successes? What if only the Papists be concerned in these articles of faith, and they only in one of them, about the excommunication and deposition of princes, and that only some of them; and not one of those has any concern in them whom he intends to reproach? I say, if these things are so, we need look no farther for the principles of that religion which hath furnished him with all this candour, moderation, and ingenuity, and hath wrought him to such a quiet and peaceable temper, by teaching him that humility, charity, and meekness, which here bewray themselves.