When Ecclesiastical Superiors Are to Be Obeyed
It having been stated what the apostolic seat is, it is now to be stated in what cases obedience is to be rendered to this apostolic seat. And the aforesaid doctors say, that “it is to be obeyed by inferiors in all things— when the absolutely good is not forbidden or the absolutely evil is not ” commanded [but the intermediate also]1 which in place, way, time or person may be either good or bad.
This they prove by four pertinent witnesses, the Saviour, Bernard, Augustine and Jerome. And because the doctors took the distinction from Bernard, Ep. ad Adam monachum [Migne’s ed., 182 : 95 sq.], about the absolutely good and the absolutely evil, so it is to be noted that after St. Bernard shows that no one is to be obeyed in that which is evil and concludes, saying: “Therefore, to do evil, even when any one whosoever commands, certainly is not obedience but rather disobedience. This deserves soberly to be said, that some things are absolutely good, some absolutely evil, and in these latter no man owes obedience, just as the former are not to be left undone, even when forbidden. Nor are the latter to be performed, even though they be enjoined. Further, between these two are the things that are intermediate, which may be good or evil according to the place, time, mode or person involved. And in these things the law of obedience is fixed as in the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which was in the
^The printed text of the original ed. as well as of the reprint omits the words in brackets and ” not ” before commanded.
midst of Paradise. In these things, certainly, it is not right to prefer our thoughts to the sentence of the teachers. In these things neither the command of prelates nor their prohibition is to be in all cases spurned.” And further on, Bernard says: “Faith, hope and love are absolutely good, and other things of this kind; and they may not be either forbidden or not kept. Absolutely evil are sacrilege, adultery, theft, and such like, which certainly may neither be properly enjoined nor done, and they may not be improperly not 1 forbidden and not done. For no one’s prohibition is valid to set aside precepts, and no one’s commandments are valid to prejudice in favor of things forbidden.
“Then there are the things intermediate, which indeed of themselves are not known to be either good or evil. They may, however, indifferently be either good or bad; they may be commanded or forbidden, but under no circumstances are they to be obeyed by inferiors, when they are evil. Among these are, by way of example, fasting, vigils, reading and such like. But it should be known that certain things intermediate go beyond the reason of things impure or evil. For since marriage may occur or not occur, but when once entered into it is not permissible to undo it, what, therefore, before marriage was permitted to be, as a thing indifferent, obtains in those already married the force of the absolutely good. Likewise, it is a matter indifferent for a secular man to possess private property, because he has the option of not possessing. But for a monk, because he is not permitted to have possessions, to possess goods is an absolute evil.” Thus much Bernard.
Also it is to be noted that, so far as the sense of those speaking about human actions goes, a certain work is called neutral among them which, in its primary intent, cannot be said to be a good of morals or an evil of vice, as, for example, to build or to weave. But works are called good or evil
1 Huss has improperly inserted this “not” which is not found in Migne.
ECCLESIASTICAL SUPERIORS by the standard of their class — de genere — which words designate from a moral standpoint the substance or nature of a good work or an evil. Nevertheless, they do not involve the circumstances which of themselves fix the natures of such acts as in the class of virtue or vice, as, for example, giving alms or putting a man to death. For both of these can become good or evil according to the diversity of their causes or the purpose of the doer. For to give alms for vainglory is evil, just as to kill a man by the authority of God, lest he infect the church, is good.1 But of another kind are collective works, which from a moral standpoint are called purely good or bad, such as committing adultery and thieving, which are of vice, and loving God and our neighbor heartily, which are virtuous. Briefly, as one act is purely good, such as loving God with the heart, so another act is purely evil, as is hating God.
Likewise, a thing is good generically which, as it were, disposes a man to judge and discover that it is good more than to judge that it is evil, as fasting and giving alms. A thing is evil generically which, as it were, disposes a man to judge and discover what may be evil rather than what may be good. Howbeit, the thing may be well done, as the putting a man to death. But a neutral work is such a work which does not dispose a man to judge and discover what is good rather than what is evil, as weaving, eating, ploughing, or running.