1. Of the ends of good and euill among the Christians. The first Ch

Of the ends of good and euill among the Christians. The first Chapter.

¹ AVGVSTINE in his 19. booke De Ciuitate Dei, the fourth Chapter, very wel declareth, how Christian hope is caried vnto those good things, ² which cannot be séen. For if thou askest (saith hée) a faithfull man, what he maketh to be the end of good and euill things, he will answere; Life and death euerlasting: ³ which things can not be séene, nor comprehended by mans reason. And therefore the wise men among the Ethnikes being puffed vp with pride, would not settle their hope vpon those things. For which cause, some held, that the ends of good things, are the goods of the mind; some the goods of the bodie, and some, either vertue, pleasure, or both ioined togither. But GOD laughed them to scorne, and sawe how vaine their cogitations were. For they would rather account those things for the chéefe good, which be tempered with manie miseries and calamities, than to receiue those sincere, perfect, and most firme things, which are offered by the word of God. For who can woorthilie expresse, vnto what miserable and horrible mischances this bodie of ours is cast out? It is sicke, it is wounded, it is dissolued, made crooked, torne, and maimed. Oftentimes men become blind, oftentimes deafe. And as touching the mind, they are oftentimes mad, oftentimes frantike, and they that most labour about the truth, can not attaine to the knowledge of the same, without intermingling of infinite errours. How could the Ethnikes boast of vertues, ⁴ as the chéefe good things, séeing we haue them as witnesses of our calamities? To what purpose serueth temperance, which is therefore giuen, to bridle drunkennes, gluttonie, lusts, and the foule and shamefull motions of the mind? For these things declare, that it hath no place, but in minds, which be yet subiect to corruption. The which corruption, the more inward it is, the more miserable it maketh vs: and, as a domesticall enimie, violentlie assaileth the secret parts of our harts. These affections (saith Augustine ) are vices: ⁵ bicause (as Paule saith) they hinder vs, that we cannot doo those things which we would. Besides, ⁶ what is the part of wisedome, but to foresée, that by errour we be not deceiued in the choise of good things, and auoiding of euill? Certainlie, if we were not bewrapped in errours and darknes, we should not néed of this remedie. But séeing it is vsed, it argueth, that men are not yet happie; but are folded in great and gréeuous errours, vnlesse wisedome doo helpe on euerie side. Also iustice, ⁷ whereby euerie man commeth by his owne, is necessarie for none other cause, but to suppresse robberies, extortions, and violent dealings. And yet, neither can that so preuaile among men, but that iust and honest men oftentimes suffer manie things, both shamefullie and vniustlie. ⁸ Now what shall we speake of fortitude? The same doubtlesse armeth men patientlie to abide all sorrowes, dangers, torments; yea and death it selfe, if necessitie shall require. Among those so great euils, these wise fellowes durst appoint the chéefe goodnes. Which euils neuertheles, they said might sometime be so increased, as a man may kill himselfe. Oh happie life (crieth Augustine ) that séeketh the helpe of death to finish it! For if it be happie, why doo they cut it off, and shun it? But if it be miserable, why doo they place in it the chéefe goodnes? Thus are they derided of God, bicause they despised that hope, which is neither séene, nor attained vnto by mans reason. And bicause they mocked it, when they heard it preached in the woord, therfore hath God, by his heauenlie doctrine, condemned them, as fooles & ridiculous persons.

⁹ 2 Another sort doubtlesse, perceiuing the often fallings into wickednesse, and that of verie excellent men, thought by their religious procurements; yea rather by their superstitions, and worshippings deuised of themselues, to cause God to be fauourable vnto them; of whom afterward they might obtaine all good things. ¹⁰ And this for the most part was the opinion of the common people: who after a sort iudged not so euill as did the Philosophers. For these men were so puffed vp in the pride of their vertues, and ciuill duties, and with the knowleges of natural things, that they thought these things to be sufficient vnto themselues for the obteining of felicitie. But the common people were not ignorant both of the filthines of sinnes, and of the dailie offendings of the Maiestie of God. Wherefore they thought it good to flie vnto religions, the which since they had them not pure and vncorrupt, they fell into idolatrie. ¹¹ And here came in the Hebrue people among them, and tooke part with both. For by reason of the ten commandements, they boasted that they had the summe of all vertues among them: and that if they fell at anie time from them, they had ceremonies prepared for them, whereby they might make satisfaction. Against these things Paule disputeth in his Epistle to the Romanes, ¹² and sheweth, that it cannot be, that we should obtaine righteousnes by morall or naturall duties: bicause as well the Iewes, as the Gentiles, doo not in their life and maners expresse so much, as they acknowledge that the lawe of nature, or Moses lawe requireth. Neither must we grant, that we can fullie and perfectlie obserue the lawe. For then might we attaine vnto perfect righteousnes by woorks: which would be a plaine absurditie. For herein standeth our righteousnes, that our sinnes shall not be imputed vnto vs; but the righteousnes of Christ shall be imputed to the beléeuers. No doubt but there happeneth some renewing, when we being iustified doo worke rightlie: but yet this is not through perfect. Also grace is giuen to the regenerate, but yet not such, as remooueth all the lets which doo hinder the perfect kéeping of Gods lawe. Neither doo wée, in the teaching herof affirme paradoxes or strange opinions, or set forth things that be contrarie vnto Paul; but wée chéeflie maintaine those things which are most agréeable to the apostolicall doctrine. But as for the rites and ceremonies, which on the other side the Iewes brag of, when they be without Christ and faith, they are accounted detestable before God: as Ieremie, Esaie, and the prophets, which were interpreters of the lawe, haue most plainelie taught. By all these things it is easilie gathered, that whereas all men, of all ages, professed themselues to séeke for the chéefest good, yet that they which wanted the true and perfect knowledge of God, did as it were, but grope after it in the déepe darknes, and weried themselues in booteles labors.

These things being on this wise declared, I will now more largelie and particularlie treat of humane ends, following speciallie the course of Aristotle: and will shew betweene-whiles wherein he, as touching this matter agreeth, or disagreeth with the holie scriptures.

3 Aristotle in his first booke of Ethicks, ¹³ indeuoreth to prooue, that before humane things there is set foorth some certeine end, bicause all humane things desire some good thing: and that good thing wherevnto they tend, hath the consideration of an end, and so humane things haue a prescribed end. And therefore doth he make mention of good, bicause it is the chéefest thing whereof felicitie hath his name, and bicause the respects of good and end be verie néer alike: in so much as some haue thought that good and end are all one. And therfore Aristotle commendeth the old prouerbe, that All things doo couet good: which may not be vnderstood of anie one thing; for it can not be, that there should be some one certeine end of all things, but euerie thing requires his owne proper end. ¹⁴ For a horse desireth not the chéefest good of a man; neither dooth a dog wish for the perfection of a horse, but euerie one his owne perfection. To bring the reason of Aristotle to a plaine syllogisme, thus it is. What soeuer things desire good, they haue an end set before them: Humane things desire good, Therefore they haue an end set before them. The Maior proposition is manifest: for in desiring of good, they rest when they are come vnto the same. And seing the motion and action is there finished, there we saie is the end. The Minor is prooued, bicause all humane things are comprehended vnder art, method, action, & choise. And I woonder much at them, ¹⁵ which by the good that Aristotle speaketh of, doo here vnderstand, not onlie the chéefest good, but also thinke that God him selfe is described, which onelie good they saie is desired of all things. And this reason they bring; that it is God him selfe which offereth all the good things of anie thing desired, and all those things are most perfectlie conteined in God, therefore no man can desire them, but he desireth God him selfe. But who séeth not that this is accidentallie, which is vtterlie remoued from sciences, seing they doo not teach the things that happen accidentallie. And if this reason were of force, wée should by this meanes prooue, that vnchast men, when they be delighted with anie fourme or beautie, should wish for God: which thing would be ridiculous. We grant in déed willinglie, that in God are most perfectlie comprehended all good things, euen as the number of seuen comprehendeth all the former numbers: which also the holie scriptures doo testifie. For in Exodus, God saith vnto Moses, which desired the sight of Gods countenance: I will shew thee all my good. ¹⁶ But Aristotle had no desires of this coniunction with God: the prophet Dauid knew them, ¹⁷ who said in the Psalmes, It is good for me to cleaue vnto God. But that this is the sense of this place; which we haue expressed, the sequele dooth shew. For the philosopher treateth of blessednesse, which although that all men wish for, yet for so much as they haue placed the same in diuers things; to wit, in riches, honors, pleasures, & vertues, hereof it commeth, that diuers men desire diuers kinds of good things, all which things neuertheles would participate with the nature and forme of a generall good. Yea, and the philosophers hauing respect to the verie same thing, wrote sometimes of the ends of good and euill.

¹⁸ 4 But let vs weigh how those things agrée with the holie scriptures. First, that all things doo desire good, it séemes to be a certeine imitation of God almightie the author of creatures. For he while he made euerie particular thing, had respect vnto a good end. According as it is said in the booke of Genesis, that God sawe the light, ¹⁹ the great lights of heauen, the stars, herbs, and plants, and other things, that they were good. Finallie, he rested the seuenth daie, perceiuing that all things, which he had made were excéeding good. Wherefore this indeuor of good things, is in all things the steppe and impression of the diuine propertie. As touching arts and doctrines, we will easilie grant that they desire good by them selues, & of their owne nature, albeit that the same turne to euill and some vnto them which be not regenerate in Christ: and therefore it comes oftentimes to passe, that the secrets of saluation are hidden from men, which be furnished and adorned with good arts and sciences, and are open to them that be simple, according to that saieng: Thou hast hidden these things from the wise, and hast reuealed them vnto babes. ²⁰ And Paule vnto the Corinthians the first Epistle: Take heede to your calling (my brethren) how that God hath chosen not manie wise men, ²¹ but the foolish things of the world, that he might make the wise men ashamed. Which words would haue no place, if arts & doctrine might attaine to the leue good things, and vnto that which might make vs acceptable vnto God. Howbeit these things, although they be good in their owne kind and nature, yet to vs, if we be vnbeléeuers and arrogant, they are turned to euill. As touching choises and actions, the scripture saith in the booke of Genesis, that The hart of man is inclined to wickednes, ²² euen from his first childhood. And Paule welnéere in the same sense said vnto the Romanes; For I knowe, that in me, that is in my flesh, ²³ dwelleth no good thing. Wherefore we must saie, that it is a fault of nature procured by Adam, that men not regenerate by Christ, are prone vnto those things, which are in verie déede wicked, vniust, and filthie, and which are excéedinglie repugnant to the lawe of God: and that if afterward they be instructed by the discipline of precepts, & by morall vertues, or else that they be indued with an excellent wit, true it is that they ouercome the fouler sort of appetites, and of their owne choise are caried vnto certeine ciuill and morall things; but yet vnto those (as we said before) which both be sinnes, and turne to destruction. Wherefore we must constantlie affirme, that the choises and actions of them which be not regenerate, are prone vnto euill, as it is written in Genesis. Which neuertheles is not against Aristotle, bicause those euils are apprehended vnder the consideration of good things. Yea, and we that be regenerate, are in a maner perpetuallie, whether we will or no, drawne vnto sinnes, and those we most earnestlie desire; yet by grace & the spirit we resist those desires, that at the length through faith in Christ we may become conquerours. But as for the rest of the creatures of God, we doubt not but that they séeke for good, bicause they are gouerned by the lawes of God, and whatsoeuer they doo, they doo it by the lawe of nature: albeit that euen they, for the sinne of man, are compelled to be subiect vnto vanitie. But of faith, hope, and charitie, and e⟨…⟩e of the grace and impulsion of the spirit of God, Aristotle made no mention, bicause he knew not those things, which neuertheles doo desire the most true good things.

²⁴ 5 Also humane things haue not onelie a prescribed end, as we haue taught, but that end is manifold, and in that diuersitie of ends some be more excellent than others, for so much as this manifoldnes is of those kind of things which haue an order in themselues. And Aristotle speaketh of them for no other cause, but that he would of manie ends choose the most excellent, which hée sheweth to be mans felicitie. Wherefore to this effect doth Aristotle reason: Humane ends are manie, and one is to be preferred aboue an other. A proofe of the former part is: Bicause of ends, some be actions, and others beside actions, are works; and of sundrie arts and doctrines there is not one end: so is the multitude of ends shewed, partlie by their sundrie natures, and partlie by the diuersitie of their beginnings, according as they are desired by other arts and sciences. The other part of the proposition was, that one end is better than another: which is prooued, in that the ends of the principall arts & sciences, which Aristotle calleth ⟨…⟩, be much more noble than the ends of other faculties which be ordeined vnto them. ²⁵ Whervpon may be made two syllogismes: The first; Whatsoeuer things haue a sundry nature, and belong to diuers faculties, be not one and the selfe same things; Humane things haue a sundrie nature, for some of them are actions, and some works, and doo belong vnto diuers faculties (for arts, actions, and sciences are diuers.) Therefore the end is not one. The other syllogisme is conditional: If faculties haue an order among themselues, that one is better than another, the ends also of them must be so ordred, as one is better than another: But faculties are so in themselues, as one is preferred aboue an other; Therfore ends shall haue the same order. Aristotle sheweth that this facultie hath action for hir end, & that an excellent action; and therfore (as Eustrathius saith) would haue it to be vnderstood, that those be not the perfecter sort of actions, which haue a worke remaining when they be ceased, but that verie often-times the contrarie dooth rather happen. And trulie if a man shall rather thinke that the faculties are better which leaue some worke after the actions, than those which are spent onelie in the action; such a one would thinke that the felicitie of man is more vnperfect than his works, séeing it standeth onelie in action. Wherefore yée must vnderstand, that sometime the one happeneth, and sometime the other: to wit, that sometime the worke which remaineth is more excellent, and sometime the action. For the end of the physician is a worke, namelie health, which is remaining in a man when he is cured: which end if it be compared with a daunse, which is the end of the art of daunsing, it is much better. On the other side, the end of the art of building ships, is the ship it selfe, the worke (I meane) which is left after the building: but this end being compared with nauigation, which is the action and end of shipmans craft, is more vnperfect. So that as touching woorthines, it maketh no matter, whether the end be a worke or an action: for sometime one is better, and sometime an other. But this is certeine, as saith Aristotle, that whersoeuer the works are the ends, the actions which go before those works, and for which they are made, are excelled in worthines, and the reason is, bicause they are ordeined to an other thing. And it is no maruell that Aristotle in his booke of Ethicks writeth so diligentlie as touching ends, since that maners, vertues, choises, affections, and other humane things be so plucked a sunder, and be of diuers natures & kinds, that vnlesse they be ioined togither by some science or method, they can not be taught, neither are they ordred and ioined togither by any other thing, than by the ends. And in the foresaid booke of Aristotle we haue onelie one generall & stedfast rule. Euerie worke that remaineth after anie thing brought to passe, is more worthie than the same; wherefore it behooueth that a worke be not imploied to anie other actions, than vnto that onelie action whereby it is brought to passe. And that we may the better perceiue the matter, we must vnderstand, that after the works alreadie brought to passe, doo followe other actions. For when a house is builded, it is inhabited; and when health is restored vnto him that is sicke, he beginneth to be diligentlie occupied according to his nature: so when the worke shall be referred vnto these latter things, it is more vnworthie than they, bicause it is ordeined vnto them. But there be certen most noble actions, which cunning works doo neither go before, nor yet followe: such be the actions of vertues. Vnlesse thou wilt say, that frequented actions, which be right and iust, doo at the length leaue a worke behind them, that is to saie, an habit in the mind, after which doo followe actions of vertues: which if thou saie, I will not much contend; although I knowe that Aristotle hath an other meaning, neither did he at anie time, so farre as I remember, call an habit, a worke.

6 But since we speake so much of ends, it shall be good in my iudgement to define what an end is. ²⁶ The etymologie of the word is shewed two maner of waies, one is of the Gréeke word ⟨…⟩ or ⟨…⟩, which is, I make perfect, or I finish: whereof is deriued ⟨…⟩, which is a certaine perfection of those things, which are referred to it selfe. It is also taken for the terme & vttermost limit of anie thing. Wherefore death also is called an end, not that we wish for the same, or that we be made perfect therby; but bicause it is the terme & vttermost time of our life. The other etymologie is, that it coms of ⟨…⟩, that is to saie, to spring or arise vp, bicause before euerie action or thing brought to passe, it dooth shine foorth like the sunne that ariseth; and it is defined of Aristotle to be that for the which another thing is, and it selfe is not for anie other thing. And Aristotle said bicause there be manie arts, actions, & sciences, there be manie ends. And first hée shewed the diuersitie of ends by their natures, and then in respect that they be of diuers faculties. He saith that riches, according to the vulgar opinion, are the ends of houshold gouernement, whereas in houshold and politike gouernement, he saith that riches are rather an instrument for the obtaining of some other good thing. I might interpret that other part, how ends are so ordered, as one is more excellent than another: but first shall be shewed of certaine doubts, that are against those things which we haue spoken. For if you shall heare these things while the matter is fresh, ye shall sooner vnderstand them, than if we defer them anie further.

It is called into doubt, by what reason Aristotle appointed two kinds of ends; namelie, action and worke. For he séemeth to leaue out ⟨…⟩, that is, contemplation, which neuertheles in his Topicks he reckoned vp as an end. And Quintilian in diuiding of arts, the second booke, & 19. chapter, assigned thrée sorts of ends; work, action, and contemplation. Yea and Aristotle himselfe in his Ethicks, at the end of the booke treateth of contemplation, and teacheth that the same without doubt is a great part of mans felicitie. Wherefore this distinction shall séeme to be maimed, when the third part is omitted. But herevnto we will answere, that vnder the name of ⟨…⟩, contemplation it selfe is contained. And it is diligentlie to be noted, that Aristotle said not ⟨…⟩, but ⟨…⟩, bicause vnder the name of ⟨…⟩, he had not comprehended contemplation: so as the diuision is not vnperfect, neither Aristotle contrarie to himselfe, nor yet is he against Quintilian: for although these thrée are rehearsed in the end, yet is there two of them comprehended vnder one word.

7 But the holie scriptures are herin more excellent than Philosophie, ²⁷ that of men they appoint two sorts of ends: whereof the one may be obtained while we liue here, but the other is waited for when we shall at the length be loosed from hence: which bicause it is the more perfect, we will declare the same in the first place. And such it is, as we shall sée God present, and shall fullie and most perfectlie enioie his sight, which Paule writing to the Philippians did most earnestlie wish to obtaine; ²⁸ I desire to be loosed from hence, and to bee with Christ. And the same Apostle said: ²⁹ Now we see as through a glasse, and in a darke speech; then shall we see face to face. Againe; ³⁰ Now wee knowe in part, and prophesie in part, but when that which is perfect shall come, then that which is in part shall be abolished. And this excellent reward doo the gospels set foorth vnto vs, which after manie labours and miseries of this life we shall haue laid before vs in heauen. ³¹ But the chéefe end and principall good of this life, is, that we be iustified by Christ, that we be receiued into grace by the eternall Father, vnto whose wrath we were thrall from our natiuitie. Wherefore iustlie said Dauid: ³² Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiuen, and whose sins are couered: blessed is the man vnto whom the Lord hath not imputed sinne. Which place did Paule for good cause cite so diligentlie vnto the Romans. And to conclude, those are here blessed, which haue Iehouah for their God, and doo trust and beléeue in him with all their hart: & those not in vaine did Paule call blessed. Neither is the blessednes of this life altogether distant from the end and principall good, which with a constant faith and inuincible hope we looke for in the world to come. For euen the chéefe good of this life is none other thing, but the selfe-same, which at the length wée shall haue. Onelie a difference of degrées and perfection passeth betwéene them.

8 It is demanded moreouer, that bicause we brought a reason why the worke is more excellent than that workmanship, whereby it is brought to passe; to wit, bicause it is ordained to the worke, whether this be generallie true; ³³ that whatsoeuer is directed to another thing, as to an end, is of lesse estimation than the same, which, as it may séeme, is not to be granted. For it is the dutie of a shepheard to looke to his shéepe, that they may be in good plight. This he endeuoureth to bring to passe by his cunning: where neuertheles he far excelleth his shéepe. For who doubteth whither a man ought to be preferred aboue shéepe. Yea & the angels, as it is said vnto the Hebrues, are ministring spirits, for the saluation of the elect; whereas neuertheles their woorthines and nature excelleth men. And finallie Aristotle writing of generation and corruption said, that the end of the celestiall bodies is, that men should be begotten, whereas yet none of the Peripateticks doubt, but that the heauens are of more excellent nature than men. Some thought to haue escaped the doubt, by saieng that the ends are mentioned to be onlie of actions, but not of those actions that are efficient, to wit, of heauen, of angels, and of a shepherd. Howbeit this auaileth nothing. For things efficient attaine not to their ends, but by actions, wherefore the selfe-same end is to be assigned vnto the thing efficient, and to the worke thereof. But we must vnderstand, that as it is in Aristotles 2. booke De anima, the 35. and 37. chapters: there is two sorts of ends, one end called that, for whose cause the thing is doone; and the other end is called that, to the which a thing is directed.

The Grecians thus describe them ⟨…⟩ and ⟨…⟩. That is to saie, whereof, and to which. As for example, ³⁴ a creature which dooth ingender hath the end, Wherfore, to wit, that eternall and diuine end, namelie, perpetuitie, which it would attaine; which since it cannot absolutelie haue, yet at the leastwise it claimeth the same by generation. The end Wherevnto, is the thing which is begotten: & the end of nature which is in plants, is to bring foorth fruits & flowers: and this is the end, Wherefore. But the vse of men is the end Wherevnto. It may then well be, that the end Whervnto is of lesse honor, & so is referred vnto that end, which is Wherefore. And the end which is Wherefore, is the more woorthie, as matter which is directed to the forme. And no man is ignorant of this, that the forme is better than the matter. But it happeneth otherwise, when a thing is directed vnto that which is the end Wherevnto, not that it should be made perfect thereby, but that the same should make it perfect. For then the end Wherevnto is lesse woorthie, bicause it is vnto such an end. So of the angels and of heauen. The end of heauen Wherefore, is to be resembled vnto God, and to make other things perfect, which is the better end. For heauen in the dooing of these things is better than if it did them not. Likewise in angels, the end is to obtaine God, and to kéepe vs: in dooing wherof, they be more woorthie than themselues, if so be they did it not. And the shepheard hath an end Wherefore, euen his owne wealth and increase, wherewith he is better than if he were destitute thereof, and of the wealth of his familie and citie. But the end Whervnto, are the shéepe themselues, ouer whom he is ordained, to kéepe them safe and sound. And that one thing is ordeined for another, ³⁵ that it should preserue the same, and withall be more woorthie than it, we haue an example; When as by kings and monarchs, some are appointed to be chéefe rulers or deputies, and are directed vnto the people, that they should gouerne and take care of them. Vnto which end they are not sent to be lesse honourable than the people, but that they should be obeied and honoured of them: and yet in these rulers, the end is Whervnto. Howbeit, if we haue regard wherfore these things be doon, we will alwaies acknowledge that there is a more excellent end. And by this distinction are dissolued the instances now alledged touching celestiall bodies, the angels, & shepherds. For these things though they be more woorthie than the end Whervnto, yet not more woorthie than the end Wherefore. For the shepherd is more woorthie than the shéepe, but yet not woorthier than his owne selfe, or than his lord, if he be a hired seruant, or than his familie or citie. For he lookes to the shéepe, either for his owne sake, or else for his lord, familie, or cities sake. In like maner doo the angels and celestiall bodies. For they minister vnto vs, not for our sake, but partlie to please God, and partlie to exercise their owne perfection. But the worke when it is referred to the actions which went before, and hath no further respect, is the end Wherefore. Whervpon the actions which went before, are, as Aristotle saith, more vnwoorthie than it; but if afterward a further end be regarded, to wit, the vse of the worke, the same shalbe more woorthie than the worke, as we said before touching the habitation of an house, when it is referred to the dwelling. And the reason is, bicause the dwelling is then the end Wherefore, and the house the end Wherevnto.

9 Also the holie scriptures doo decrée and appoint, that there is a certaine principall end, ³⁶ wherevnto men direct all their actions: wherevpon Salomon, at the end of Ecclesiastes, when he had in manie words treated first of ends, according to the common sort of mens opinions (speaking of the feare of God, which in the Hebrue phrase signifieth true and sound godlines) added; And this toucheth all men: ³⁷ bicause men are herevnto ordeined and made, that they should worship and honor God. And Dauid: One thing haue I desired of the Lord, ³⁸ & this will I seeke for, that I may dwel in the house of God. And Christ saith: This is life eternall, ³⁹ that they knowe thee to be the onlie verie God, & whom thou hast sent Iesus Christ. But that séemes to be repugnant which Salomon said: ⁴⁰ All is most vaine, and but plaine vanitie. But this is not in respect, it is the appointed end; but bicause that men either knowe not the same, or else refuse it, and séeke for the chéef good else where. Wherfore their desires haue an infinite scope, neither doo they at anie time rest. The vngodlie walke their circuit. ⁴¹ Psal. 12. And this is the difference betwéene vs and the Philosophers, that they set foorth their end, as it should be attained by their owne proper strength and industrie: but we decree out of the holie scriptures, that the chéefest good cannot be obteined, vnlesse wée be holpen by the spirit and grace of Christ.

10 Againe it is doubted, when Aristotle saith; bicause there be manie arts, actions, and knowledges, there be manie ends also, whether the proposition may be turned both waies; ⁴² namelie, that wheresoeuer there shall be manie ends, there be manie things also referred vnto the same ends. We answere to the question, that this is not of necessitie: bicause nature hath oftentimes ordeined manie ends of one and the selfe same thing. For example sake: the toong is not onelie directed vnto spéech, but vnto the relish of tasts: also the téeth doo chawe and grind the meat, and doo helpe the spéech. And by the force of Logicke, we not onelie confirme true things, but we also confute false. Wherefore since there be manie faculties and arts, we will grant that there be manie ends; and yet by the number of ends the number of things can not bée gathered. Likewise we doubt, ⁴³ bicause Aristotle saith, that the end of physicke is health; of the art of war, is victorie, &c. (Against which opinion he him selfe writeth in the first booke of his Topicks the 2. chapter, and Quintilian in his 2. booke and 12. chapter) séeing the end of physicke is, not health, but to applie all things, and to omit none of those things which may further vnto health. And if that the sicke man, either by the intemperance of his diet, or by too much weaknes of nature, or by the fierce and intollerable violence of his disease, be not healed, the physician swarueth not from the end of his art. The like is to be said of an orator, whose end is to speake all things which may serue to persuade, & to omit nothing that belongeth thervnto: wherfore though he shall not be able to persuade, yet if he haue a regard thervnto, he doth not straie from his end. The same may we saie of the gouernour of a house, and of a chéefe captaine. Howbeit in dissoluing of this question, we are not to take anie great paine. For Aristotle in bringing of examples sheweth the matter after somwhat a grosse maner, and was not very carefull that examples should alwaies agrée in all points, but alledged them as they are vsed of the common people. Moreouer, although that to heale, to persuade, and to ouercome, doo not alwaies followe the actions of physicians, rhetoritians, and souldiers; yet can it not be denied of anie man, but that these faculties haue respect vnto these things, & indeuor as much as they can to attaine vnto them.

Lastlie, bicause we are in hand with ends, ⁴⁴ there is a doubt how anie worke is the end of an action, or of an art. For if the thing be considered which is made by the artificer, the same is the effect, & therfore not the cause. For it behooueth that the cause be before the effect, and nothing can be before it self. Here doo some answere, that the thing made, is the end, not in respect it is extant and now perfect, but in that it was first comprehended in the artificers mind. And a thing may be before it selfe in a sundrie respect; for it is first pondered in the mind of the artificer, before it be in act. But I staie not my selfe with this answere: for that same knowne forme which is conuersant in the mind of the artificer, hath a respect of him that is the efficient thereof: for as an obiect it mooueth his mind. Besides this, it is not the artificers desire to haue such a forme as he hath conceiued in his mind, but would haue it to be expressed in the thing, and directeth it therevnto, as to the end. Wherefore the outward thing it selfe is the finall cause, not in that it is extant or brought to passe, but in that it hath a respect of good, and that either the efficient partie, or else his action is made perfect thereby. I grant that these things ought first to be vnderstood and knowen of the efficient partie, but I denie that these things haue the nature of an end, in that they be formes and shapes conceiued in the mind, but in respect of those things which they signifie and represent vnto the vnderstanding of the artificer.

11 Moreouer, ⁴⁵ there be manie arts ioined togither vnto one, and manie ends also vnto one certeine end, that they may reach vnto that, for the which man hath his béeing. And it must bée vnderstood, that as faculties are more excellent among them selues, so are also their ends. The examples of Aristotle are drawne from the art of those that make bits for horses, and of other arts, of trappers & saddles for horses, all which he affirmeth to be conteined vnder the facultie of riding of horses. Also of the same art of riding of horses, and of all other warlike actions, as to ride, to shoote, to throwe a dart, to weare shéelds, there is one architectonicall or principall art. Whervpon he saith, that vnder the art of warre, are conteined all these things: and it is to be vnderstood, that the same principall art, or architectonicall facultie, dooth command and prescribe vnto those inferior sorts which it hath vnder it, and that the end thereof dooth gouerne the ends of them. ⁴⁶ Aristotle in his booke of Ethicks calleth art, power, respecting (saith Eustratius ) the matter. For euen as the matter is power, and by power is knowen: euen so arts are in power to atteine, or not to atteine their end. A physician dooth sometime heale, and sometime he looseth his labour: an orator otherwhile persuadeth, and otherwhile bringeth not this to passe. Also they are in power vnto contraries: as a physician both may heale, and may also hurt the health: an orator may persuade and dissuade: a Logician may prooue and confute.

Againe Aristotle affirmeth, that there is no difference betwéene the woorthines of faculties, whether they haue worke for their end, or whether they haue action. For if a facultie should in that respect be counted more noble, bicause after the act it would leaue a worke: then would carpenters art be better than the art of ciuill profession, whereas felicitie is ordeined to be the end of ciuill profession, which felicitie is no worke, but an action: which would be most absurd, since nothing can bée found better or more happie than felicitie. And this also we shewed before: neither is this doctrine weakened by that former distinction of ends, that otherwhile some are actions, and that other are sometime works.

But herein is a doubt, that when Aristotle gathereth a worthines of euerie end by the noblenes of the facultie, what kind of demonstration this is. And we answere, that it is of the effects, or (as they commonlie call it) of that which followeth. For in verie déede faculties doo drawe their excellencie and worthines from their ends. ⁴⁷ Wherefore since they be made excellent by them, to trie the excellencie of the ends by the worthines of the faculties, is to procéede from the effects to the causes, although this proposition is true, which waie soeuer ye turne it. For as we saie that the end of the better facultie is the better; so likewise we may saie, that it is the nobler facultie which shall haue the worthier end.

12 Now since the matter is on this wise, let vs sée how these things agrée with the holie scriptures. ⁴⁸ First, we will grant, that a Christian man in working hath manie ends. For sometimes he hath herevnto respect, that he may call vpon God him selfe, that he may celebrate his name, that he may giue thanks, and such like, where he hath respect vnto God without anie meane. But sometime he laboreth to restore himselfe, and by vertues and excellent actions to recouer the image of God, wherevnto he was created. Sometimes also, yea, and that verie often, he is occupied in the helping of other men, either by his riches, or by doctrine, or by counsell. Wherfore it is manifest, that euen of a Christian life there be manie ends, which ends neuertheles, as we saie, haue degrées and order among themselues. But whereas Aristotle saith, that where the worke remaineth after the act, ⁴⁹ the worke it selfe is better than the working therof going before, it séemes not to haue place in our ends, if we speake vniuersallie. For when a man being mooued with charitie, shall cloth a poore man, nourish, heale, and instruct him; it is certeine that after the act, he leaueth a worke behind, namelie, health, nourishment, or raiment, or instruction in the poore man: in which kind of works, the action which goeth before, namelie obedience towards God, and the vse of charitie, are farre more pleasing vnto God, and more to be estéemed, than the worke remaining after the act, séeing that is transitorie, and shall perish. ⁵⁰ But how in him that professeth himselfe a Christian, the ends which be many, may haue an order among themselues; it may be perceiued in faith, hope, and charitie. For as the faith is greater, and God more knowen by it, the more is charitie inflamed about the end thereof: in such sort that the end, and as they saie, the obiect of faith dooth prescribe vnto charitie: and so much as the confidence is towards God, so much is the loue towards our neighbour. Wherefore the end of charitie, which is the good of our neighbour, is thus conteined vnder the end of faith, and so it causeth that the power of faith as touching this matter, excelleth and is better than the power of charitie. And thirdlie, as the faith is firme, and the charitie actiue; so the hope is more constant, and with a stronger patience and fortitude, we expect the performance of Gods promises, in how much we apprehend those things with a greater faith, and haue more fruitfullie exercised our selues by charitie. And so these thrée powers, namelie faith, hope, and charitie, should bée sufficient vnto that which we would shew. But when the order of the table of the ten commandements is set before vs, we may manifestlie in them declare the selfe-same thing. For the first table hath respect vnto God without anie meane, but the other is directed vnto our neighbour. And wée must vnderstand that there is a greater dignitie of the first table, and that the end thereof is more noble, bicause it conteineth the other, and hath them vnder it, as it were the chéefe builder, bicause the end of the latter table is ruled and gouerned of the first. Whervpon Luther in his Catechisme did in euerie precept of the later table, most prudentlie repeat the end of the first table. For example: Bicause God is to be loued with all the hart, and with all the soule; therefore thou shalt not kill. Againe, bicause God is to be loued with all the hart, and with all the soule, thou shalt not commit adulterie.

13. When Aristotle had set downe that there is a certeine principall end prescribed vnto men, he then exhorteth vs to search the knowledge thereof. Then in searching out of the same, he pronounceth that he would treate of two things; namelie, to expound what it is, then, vnto what science or facultie it belongeth. As touching the first, let this be the proposition: The knowledge of the principall end is to be sought for. He bringeth a reason from profitablenes. That which profiteth our life is to be sought for, The knowledge of this end is of great importance vnto life, Therfore we must obtaine the same. He prooueth the Minor proposition by a similitude of archers. Aristotle precéedeth verie artificiallie. For bicause, if there were no such end, who would labour to attaine therevnto? Again⟨…⟩, if there were such an end, and should bring no profit vnto vs, the knowledge thereof would be vnprofitable. Lastlie, if it should profit, and yet not much, we would giue ouer the studie of knowing the same. But now, since there is such an end, and that it profiteth, and is of great importance to the whole life, we are most earnestlie stirred vp to search out the same. The example of archers hath respect vnto this, that euen as they, if they haue not the marke in their eie, doo hit at all aduentures; but hauing the marke fixed, they doo it with effect and artificiallie: so wée likewise, hauing fixed in our mind the principall good, shall not deale by chance, but by reason. And certeinlie he walketh not rightlie in his iournie, which knoweth not the end of his waie.

⁵¹ Neither doo the holy scriptures dissent from this opinion, that the knowledge of the chéefe end is profitable. For why did Christ so long teach in the earth? Why did he send his Apostles into the world to preach? Why did hée hid men to followe him, but that they might at the length knowe the principall end? For the not knowing whereof he complained, that the people did straie like vnto shéepe without a shepheard.

As touching the science or facultie, whereto this principall end belongeth, Aristotle said is the ciuill knowledges, séeing it is that which ruleth other arts, and hath them subiect vnto it; and dooth vse them. Let this be the proposition: It belongeth vnto the ciuill power to take order as touching the last or chéefe end. Wherevpon the argument is framed in this forme. This matter belongeth vnto that science which is most architectonicall, ⁵² Such is the ciuill science, wherfore it belongeth thervnto to treate of the principall end. The Maior proposition was declared before, when it was said, that of the better facultie is the better end. The Minor is prooued, namelie, that the ciuill facultie is the highest and most architectonicall.

14. But (whatsoeuer Aristotle saith) that propertie of principall power, or (as he calleth it) architectonicall, must be assigned to the power of the diuine scriptures; for therein is conteined the chéefe and principall knowledge of the most perfect good. Wherefore God said vnto the Israelites, that the same should be their chéefest wisedome, whereby they should at the length he had in admiration of all nations. Which if it were then true, when they had receiued onelie the lawe, what shall wée afterward iudge, when the writings of the prophets, & volumes of the new testament, were added? Here without doubt is the science and facultie which beareth rule ouer all others, and which hath all others vnder it, how excellent soeuer they be, and vseth all things vnder hir end. For that which was said of the ciuill knowledge, that it may decrée what arts and sciences the common weale should admit, ⁵³ and which it ought to refuse, that we find is most exquisitelie doone in the holie scriptures. For those allow magistrates, they will there should be pastors, bishops, and teachers; also that there should be handie crafts, that poore men might labour, and by their indeuour prouide necessaries, not onelie for them selues, but for others also, whom otherwhile it behooueth to helpe. And contrariwise, they exclude sorcerers, witches, and southsaiers, and also the art of harlots and brothers. And as that ciuill facultie forbad to appoint what arts euerie one should addict them selues vnto, bicause all men are not apt to all things: ⁵⁴ so the holie scriptures command, that wée confound not vocations, and that no one man intrude him selfe into an other mans calling. Let euerie man (saith the apostle) abide in the vocation wherein he was called. For if thou shalt be in matrimonie, ⁵⁵ set not aside houshold affaires, the care I meane of wife, children, and familie, so as thou wouldest preposterouslie take to thy selfe sole life. But if, on the other side, thou liuest a sole life, and therein dooest more promote the glorie of God, and hast strength giuen thée from the holie Ghost, there hold thée. Againe, since that all can not be teachers, prophets, or pastors, let euery man content him selfe with his owne gift, & let him vse the same with all diligence. Also the holie scriptures doo prescribe how far foorth wée should procéed in faculties and functions. ⁵⁶ The primitiue church in déed did grant that christians should vse the old ceremonies, but yet for a litle while onelie. Also it commendeth obedience towards magistrates, but yet so farre foorth as Gods lawe dooth permit. It willeth that a prophet doo instruct the people, but yet no longer than it be reuealed to another, ⁵⁷ Which when it is done (saith Paule) let the former hold his peace. Also it commendeth and alloweth godlie and christian libertie in meats, ⁵⁸ and other outward and ciuill things, but yet so farre foorth as the offences of the weake be auoided. ⁵⁹ It teacheth in like maner a moderation which we should applie to the infirmities of the simple, but yet so farre foorth as by our dissembling we confirme no abuses. Also it prescribeth number, as policie and order: ⁶⁰ for Paule would that there should be two or thrée prophets which should speake by course, and appointed that the gift of toongs should giue place to more profitable gifts. ⁶¹ Also the holie scripture hath vnder it most noble functions; for it commandeth kings, magistrates, gouernors of housholds, & orators. For there is none of all these faculties, which hath not speciall precepts appointed vnto it in the holie scriptures, and dooth vse all these magistrates and princes, for the defence of godlines, and for the true worshipping of God: eloquence, that it may persuade profitable and godlie things: gouernement of houshold, that new ofsprings may alwaies growe vp vnto Christ: and finallie, all Arts, aswell to the glorie of Christ, as to the profit of our neighbours.

⁶² 15 And now, as I thinke, it may appeare, how the ministers of churches which professe these holie scriptures, should behaue themselues towards magistrates, and magistrates towards them. They out of the holie scriptures drawe precepts and rules of the princes function: those precepts ought the magistrate to heare, which also if he otherwhile transgresse, must suffer admonishers, and must not be offended, if modestlie, and with iust reuerence he be corrected. And on the other side, when ministers shall behaue them selues either negligentlie in their office, or against the rules of Gods lawe, they may be kept in their duetie by the magistrate: and if they will not amend their faults, they may be remooued from their place. And thus let the ministerie of the church helpe the ciuill power; and againe, the ciuill power ouersée the ministerie, that it may be pure, and profitable to the christian Commonweale.

And in that wée attribute the chéefe power vnto that wisedome, which we haue in the holie scriptures, it must not be thought that anie thing is plucked awaie or diminished from ciuill administration; for that authoritie remaineth still vnto princes and magistrates: but we would onelie shew, from whence they them selues ought to take the rules and principles of their authoritie, that they should not so estéeme of the doctrines of the philosophers, and lawes of men, as they would straie from the most pure fountaines of iustice and honestie, which flowe in the holie scriptures. And they shall be able to get vnto them selues this knowledge, either be diligent reading of the holie scriptures by them selues, which God commanded kings to doo: or else they may bée instructed by ministers of the church. And whereas it is said, that it belongs to the ciuill power to haue authoritie ouer those professions which are to be reteined in a citie, and ouer those which are to be reiected from thence: let princes & magistrates vnderstand, that the regard of diuine worship belongeth vnto them; namelie, that they preserue, promote, and defend that which is lawfull, and that they prohibit, and vtterlie roote out that which is vnpure & forbidden.

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Contents · 2. The second Chapter. Of the naturall →

Footnotes

1. Out of the Epistle to the Rom. Chap. 8, verse. 25. ↩

2. Hope is caried to inuisible things. ↩

3. The ends that a faithfull man putteth. ↩

4. Naturall vertues are testimonies of our calamities. The end of temperance. ↩

5. Rom. 7, 19. ↩

6. The end of wisedome. ↩

7. The end of iustice. ↩

8. The end of fortitude. ↩

9. Out of the Preface vpon the Epistle to the Romans. ↩

10. The commo~ opinion of the chiefest good. The Philosophers puffed vp thorough their knowledge of naturall things. ↩

11. The Hebrues opinion of the chiefest good. ↩

12. Paules iudgement concerning the chiefest good. ↩

13. In the commentaries vpon Arist. Ethicks. Cap. 1. ↩

14. Euerie thing requires his owne proper end. ↩

15. Whether God be desired of all things. ↩

16. 33. vers. 19.
    ↩

17. Psal. 72, 28. ↩

18. How farre foorth Aristotle agreeth with the holie scriptures. ↩

19. Gen. 1, 18. ↩

20. Mat. 11, 25. ↩

21. 1. Cor. 1, 26.
    ↩

22. Gen. 6, 5. ↩

23. Rom. 7, 18. ↩

24. That the end of humane things is manifold. ↩

25. Two syllogismes. ↩

26. A definition of end. ↩

27. The end of man of two sorts according to the scriptures. ↩

28. Phil. 1, 23. ↩

29. 1. Co. 13, 12
    ↩

30. Ibid. vers. 9, and 10. ↩

31. The cheefe good of this life. ↩

32. Psal. 32, 1. ↩

33. Whether that which is ordained to an end be baser than the end. ↩

34. The end wherefore, and the end whereto. ↩

35. How the more worthie thing is sometime ordeined for the lesse worthie. ↩

36. That the holie scriptures decree of a principall end. ↩

37. Eccl. 12, 13. ↩

38. Psal. 27, 4. ↩

39. Iohn. 17, 3. ↩

40. Eccles. 1, 2. ↩

41. vers. 9. ↩

42. If where there be many ends, manie things be also referred vnto them. ↩

43. Whether the end of physicke be health; and of warfare, victorie, &c. ↩

44. How a worke can be the end of an action, when it is after the action. ↩

45. Why manie ends are referred vnto one. ↩

46. Why art is called power. ↩

47. That the excellencie of ends and faculties, is aswell towards the one as the other. ↩

48. Sundrie ends of christians in working. ↩

49. That the works of Christians are not better than the working thereof. ↩

50. What order the ends of Christians haue. ↩

51. The holie scriptures teach that the knowlege of the end is profitable. ↩

52. The metaphor borrowed of building. ↩

53. The holie scriptures prescribe what arts must be admitted. ↩

54. Also they teach what arts euerie one should learne. ↩

55. 1. Cor. 7, 10.
    ↩

56. Also how farre wee should proceed in those things. ↩

57. 1. Cor. 14, 30
    ↩

58. Rom. 14. ↩

59. Col. 2. ↩

60. 1. Cor. 14, 27
    ↩

61. Also it hath vnder it most noble functions. ↩

62. How magistrates and ministers of the Church must behaue them selues one towards another. ↩