The eleuenth Chapter. Of a good intent, zeale, prescription, and custome; all which the superstitious sort are woont to alledge against the word.
AS touching the signification of the word intent, 1 it signifieth a motion of the mind, whereby we indeuour vnto an end by som meanes; as if a man indeuour by liberall expense or by flatterie to attaine vnto some honors: for such is the nature of things, that manie of them are so knit togither betwéene themselues, that by one there is a step vnto an other. For by medicines and potions we come to health; by studies, reading, and maisters, vnto wisedome. Wherefore intent is an act of the will; for the propertie thereof is to mooue and stirre vp the mind. And séeing the will perceiueth not the thing that it desireth, before it haue a knowledge therof; it dooth neither mooue nor force the mind before knowledge, which reigneth in the power of intelligence or vnderstanding. The same perceiueth both the end, and those things which further thervnto, and presenteth them to the will. Therfore, intent, stirreth vp vnto an end, as vnto a marke, by those things which are directed vnto it. Let this be the definition thereof. 2 It is a will tending vnto an end by some meanes; and will, which is the generall word thereof, is an act of the power that willeth. The difference is taken of the obiect, that is, of the end, and of those things which are ordeined vnto it. 3 As in the historie of Iudges, Gedeons intent was a motion of his will, to kéepe in remembrance, by an ephod which he had made, the victorie which he obtained. Therefore in his will he comprehended both togither, as well the end as the meane.
4 Intent is diuided, into a good intent, and an ill intent: and to a good intent this is chéeflie required, that the end it selfe should be a iust and good thing: yet is not this sufficient. For if one should steale, to the intent he would giue almes, he doubtles should purpose a good thing: but bicause the meanes is naught, therefore the intent cannot be accounted good: but if the end be both vnlawfull and euill, then shall also the intent be euill. Wherefore that the intent may be good, it behooueth both the end and the meanes to be honest and iust. Howbeit, certeine things are of their owne nature so euill, as we can neuer vse them rightlie. Such are theft, periurie, adulterie, and other like; so that the apostles rule must alwaies be firme; 5 that We must neuer doo euill, to the intent that good may come thereof. Wherfore an intent is euill two maner of waies; to wit, either by the naughtines of the end, or else of the meanes. But the intent can neuer be good, vnles both the end, and the means be good. Thus far the philosophers & schoole-diuines agrée with vs. Now let vs sée how they differ from vs.
2 The philosophers thinke, that the rightnes of the end and meanes, dependeth of mans reason, or naturall vnderstanding; as though that should suffice, to knowe the difference betwéene things iust and vniust. But this we denie, and in anie wise require faith, and the word of God, as sure rules: 6 which Augustine in manie places testifieth, and especiallie in his treatise vpon the 31. psalme, where he saith; Account not thy works good before faith, which (me thinketh) are nothing else, 7 but great strength and hastie spéed out of the waie: and he which maketh such haste, runneth headlong into destruction. Wherefore a good intent maketh a good action, but faith directeth that intent; so that when we purpose anie worke, we must take héed that our hart haue regard vnto faith, whereby it may direct his indeuors. 8 The schoole-diuines will easilie grant, that faith gouerneth the intent, and maketh it good. But we differ from them in thrée respects; first, bicause we affirme that faith dependeth onlie of the word of God: 9 but they will haue it depend both vpon the fathers and councels, which may in no wise be granted them; forsomuch as faith must be constant, & altogither void of error: which two things are not found in the fathers and councels, for they speake one contrarie vnto another. Fathers doo verie oftentimes differ from fathers, and councels from councels. And few are the fathers, yea almost none, which haue not sometimes erred, and that in most weightie matters. And verie manie of the councels haue néed of correction. Dooth not the holie scripture in expresse words testifie, 10 that All men are liers. The second thing, wherein we cannot assent vnto the Schoolemen is, bicause they affirme, that by a good intent our works are made meritorious, yea and that of eternall life. 11 But how contrarie this is vnto truth, the nature of merit may teach; of the which I mind not at this present to intreate. Thirdlie, we disagrée from the Schoolemen, in that they affirme, that the worke is made good (as they speake) by an habituall good intent; that is to saie, 12 doone without anie good motion of the hart. They feigne that our actions, such as be praiers, reading of psalmes, and giuing of almes, doo please God, although indéed we thinke nothing vpon God at all: and they suppose that this habituall intent, which they place in him, is sufficient enough. So that if thou shalt aske of him that worketh, why he dooth so, he may be readie to answere, that he dooth them to the glorie of God: especiallie, when in the dooing, he hath not a contrarie mind, or will repugnant. But this doubtles we may not grant them, séeing that in this carelesnes, wherby we in working thinke not of God, nor of his glorie, the commandement of God is broken, 13 which commandeth vs to loue God with all our hart, with all our mind, & with all our strength. Wherefore we counsell rather, that this bée acknowledged a sinne, than to be accounted a good worke.