The ninth Chapter. Wherein is treated vpon the sixt precept; and first of Friendship.
THis woord Amicitia, 1 that is, Friendship, is so called, of Amor, that is, Loue: as saith Augustine against an epistle of Parmenianus, the first booke and first chapter. And this is faithfull and continuall in Christ onelie. It behooueth, that the bond of friendship be stedfast and durable. But it behooueth that there be a reconciler of friends, to lead them vnto felicitie; and that an eternall and true felicitie: for other felicities are vncerteine and transitorie. Howbeit, these things can no man performe, but Christ. Now let vs sée, what is properlie, To loue. Aristotle saith, that, To loue, is, To will well, 2 and (if thou canst) to doo well vnto anie man for his sake, not for thine owne. This definition, although it may séeme probable, yet must it be amended: for we ought to will well to no man for his owne sake, but for Gods. But the philosophers staied vpon the second causes: as if so be that they sawe a man godlie and good, they said that he ought to be beloued for his owne sake. But it behooueth vs to ascend higher, and to place the causes of things in God. 3 Cicero defineth friendship to be an agréement of diuine and humane things, through good will and charitie. But Aristotle in his Ethiks speaketh somewhat more distinctlie: for he saith, that friendship is a goodwill. But it happeneth oftentimes, that some man loueth an vngratefull person, and is not loued againe: and for that cause, he addeth, Mutuall. Howbeit, some men doo mutuallie loue one an other, who neuerthelesse knowe not that they are mutuallie loued againe. Wherefore it behooueth, that either of them doo reueale their friendship one to an other.
Furthermore it is requisite, 4 that this goodwill be stirred vp in respect of some good thing. For we doo not loue, without it be for some certeine cause: and the good things are referred either vnto profit, or vnto pleasure, or vnto honestie. But they which are induced to loue, either of pleasure, or of profit; they loue vnaduisedlie, and accidentallie. For if the cause of pleasure, or of gaine, should cease; the friendship would straitwaie be loosed. But the friendship, which vertue hath ioined togither, is stedfast, & neuer dissolued: for vertue is an habit gotten by long custome, which cannot be remooued. Such a constant amitie was betwéen Dauid and Ionathas. Seneca, 5 in his ninth epistle vnto Lucillus reprooueth Epicurus; bicause he had said, that A friend must be sought, to the intent that if thou haue néed, thou maist haue one to helpe thée; if thou be sicke, thou maist haue one to sit by thée. For a far more swéet friendship is it (saith Seneca ) which dooth helpe another, than that which is holpen of another. Wherefore (saith he) a friend must be sought, that thou maist haue whom to help, & whom to sit by, if thou be sicke. For Apelles (saith he) and Praxiteles tooke greater pleasure of their owne works, when they were working them, and had them in hand; than afterward, when they had them made and finished in their chamber: euen so a true friend is more delited, if he himselfe doo anie good turne to another, than if he receiue a benefit of another. So did Ionathas not refuse anie danger that was to be taken in hand for Dauids sake. Saule also loued Dauid, but far otherwise than did Ionathas. Neither vndoubtedlie did Ionathas loue Dauid onelie in respect of that generall commandement; 6 Thou shalt loue thy neighbour as thy selfe: but bicause of that notable indeuour, which he found in him towards the Common-weale and godlinesse. Further, he sawe that the kingdome should be plucked awaie from Saule, and be giuen to one better than he: and he suspected, that the same other man should be Dauid, as we may gather by the historie. Yet did he loue him so feruentlie, as he did not for this cause hate him anie thing at all.