31. The. 13. Chapter. The ninth Precept; Thou shalt not beare false

The. 13. Chapter. The ninth Precept; Thou shalt not beare false witnesse. And first of Contumelie.

AS touching this place, ¹ I iudge that there be foure things to be considered of; first, what is Contumelie; secondlie, from whence it springeth; thirdlie, whether it be sinne; lastlie, whether it be tollerable. These principall points being examined, we will applie the matter vnto Dauid; to consider, whether he did rightlie, in bearing therewith in Semei. What it is, we shall by this meanes knowe. First, we will note the etymologie of the word; after that, ² we will set foorth the definition. Contumelie (if we giue credit vnto Vlpianus the lawier, in the Digests, in the title De iniurijs, lawe the first) is so called, of Contemnendo, Contemning: and in verie déed it hath his beginning of contempt. Those, whom we reproch, we despise. Touching the definition, we gather out of the second booke of Aristotles Rhetorikes, that this euill hath, ³ for his generall word, ⟨…⟩, that is, Contempt. It is defined what it is; to wit, A certeine action about the opinion; and concerneth that thing, which appeareth vnto vs to be of no value. We in our mind and conceit contemne those things, which séeme to be of no value. Of this contempt he maketh thrée kinds. The first is, ⟨…⟩, that is, ⁴ Despising. The second is, ⟨…⟩, that is, A certeine kind of disprofiting; as if we be so affected against others, that we take pleasure in the hindering of their commodities. There be some loftie minds, which in comparison of themselues, thinke men vnwoorthie of anie good thing. The third is, ⟨…⟩, that is, Contumelie, whereof we now intreate.

The same consisteth in saiengs and dooings, when we vse the bitterer sort of words & déeds, to the defacing of anie mans honour, and doo take pleasure therein. Wherefore Cicero, in his Oration for Marcus Coelius, said: that Shrewd speaches tend to no other end, but to contumelie; which if it be bosted of, after anie insolent maner, is named a reproch; but being doone merilie, it is called iesting. ⁵ To perceiue it the better, thou must vnderstand, that betwéene reproching and honoring there is a contrarietie. They are vnder one kind, and yet, as contraries, are furthest off one from another. They apperteine to the signification of honour. If we honour anie man, we declare that we thinke well of him; if we reproch him, we shew by some signe, words, or déeds, that we thinke euill of him. And therefore it behooueth, that if a man either vse contumelie, or haue it vsed vnto him, this manner of signification is alwaies therein. For if we should doo anie thing against the estimation of anie man, and yet not signifie the ill opinion we haue of him, it would not be properlie called contumelie.

I will shew it by examples. A man breaking open another mans doore, to steale, to commit adulterie, or to kill some man, that breaking in of the gate is heinous; but being not purposelie doone, to dishonest him, it is iniurie: if he breake it open, to reproch him, he dealeth contumeliouslie against him. Absalom abused the wiues of his father. ⁶ If he had doone it of lust, it had béene incest onelie, and not contumelie: but séeing he did these things without hauing delight in their loue and beautie, onelie through the hatred he bare to his father, meaning to dishonour him, it is now called contumelie. When in these contumelies, tawnts are vsed against anie man; those sometimes are sins, and some times no sinnes. ⁷ No sinnes, as if one vpbraid another, that he hath the pox, that he is lame or blind: sinne, as when Semei calleth Dauid, A man of bloud.

2 There is vsed another distinction. These mischéefes are sometimes true, and sometimes false. ⁸ In Dauid they were false; he did not couet the kingdome ambitiouslie, he did not commit wicked murders. Those sinnes are sometimes manifest, and sometimes hidden. Hereof commeth the gréeuousnesse of contumelies. Sometimes they be weighed according to the state of the person: as if he, to whom the contumelie is doone, be no priuate, but a publike person; as a magistrate, or a preacher. And there is alwaies required therin, an intent and purpose of discrediting the fame and estimation of another man. Which I speake; ⁹ bicause, if tawnts be not vsed to this end, but to the intent men may be amended, they be not properlie contumelies. Wherefore, if anie gouernours of a schoole, or ministers of the church, vse sharp words to reuoke men from their sinnes; they cannot be called contumelious. Sometimes it is lawfull to handle men so for discipline sake. This is gathered by an argument from the greater; If it be lawfull to vse stripes, it is also lawfull to vse sharp spéeches. So Paule called the Galathians, Fooles. And Christ; O ye fooles, and flowe to beleeue. ¹⁰ There was a respect vnto amendement, and it was no contumelie.

Also the prophets doo so deale, ¹¹ sometimes they speake verie bitterlie against Israel, calling hir harlot and Sodom; not to the intent they would defame the people of God, but to reuoke them from idolatrie and wickednesse. Paule also, ¹² in the first chapter vnto Titus, séemeth to inueigh sharplie against the Cretians, when he bringeth a verse of Epimenides; The Cretians are alwaies liers, euill beasts, and slowe bellies. It might séeme to be hardlie doone, to note the whole nation of the Cretians with so great an infamie. Howbeit, the apostles speach was not to this end; but he gaue admonition vnto Titus, whereby he might vnderstand, how earnestlie he ought to vrge that people. Neuertheles, pastors & schoolemaisters must take héed, that they vse not contumelies without iudgement: for if they often vse the sharper speaches, they which be reprehended, begin to hate them, whom they ought to loue; and by this meanes, admonitions doo but smallie preuaile. Or else another thing followeth; to wit, that they are not mooued therewith, but are hardened, if they often heare bitter words. Wherefore Augustine, vpon the sermon of the Lord in the mount, saith; that This must be doone sildome, and with iudgement. Like vnto this is that, which is woont to be doone with biting speaches, wherein is more bitternesse than fauour. They, which vse them, be of the number of those, which had rather fo⟨…⟩go their fréend, than a fine saieng. There must be héed taken, that men be not hurt rashlie. Thus much of the nature, definition, propertie, & vse of contumelie.

3 Now in the second place let vs speake a few words of the causes: ¹³ they procéed for the most part of anger, and are a certeine kind of reuenge, which is euer at hand. For so men easilie reuenge themselues; especiallie they of the common sort, and also women: and generallie those, which are not able to make their part good with strength and weapons, doo vse contumelies. In a certeine anger, Semei cur⟨…⟩ed Dauid; he would reuenge the iniuries, ¹⁴ which he supposed that he had brought vpon the familie of Saule. They also procéed of a certeine anger. Some there be, which in comparison of themselues, make no reckoning of other men, ¹⁵ and therefore they be readie bent to contumelies. therefore rightlie said Salomon; ¹⁶ Where pride is, there is reproch. The blasphemous speaches, ¹⁷ which Rabsaches cast out against God, sproong from no other fountaine. ¹⁸ Also they doo growe of a certeine foolishnesse. So Nabal the Carmelite curssed Dauid. Salomon saith; ¹⁹ It is a mans honour to keepe himselfe from strife, but a foole medleth with reprodies. Thirdlie, we are to consider, whether it be sinne. ²⁰ Herein there must be a distinction vsed. If it haue respect vnto correction, it is no sinne. But if we doo it onelie to defame the honour and dignitie of our neighbour, we must confesse it to be sinne: for it is against the rule of charitie. Salomon saith; Hatred stirreth vp contentions, ²¹ but charitie couereth the multitude of sinnes. It taketh all things in good part, it studieth to amend by iust meanes; it hath not recourse vnto contumelies.

Charitie is a vertue, therefore contumelie must néeds be a sinne. Contumelies or reproches bring sorrowe vnto our neighbour, and take awaie his good name: these be euill. So Christ said in the fift chapter of Matthew; ²² Whosoeuer shall saie vnto his brother (Racha) shall be guiltie of a councell; and whosoeuer shall saie, Foole, shall be guiltie of hell fire. Reproch is an euill, ²³ woorse than theft it selfe: for the weightinesse of sinnes is considered in respect of their obiects. Theft is about the goods of fortune; but among these goods, a good name is the most excellent thing. Séeing therefore the contumelious persons take awaie the good name, they offend more gréeuouslie than théeues. Better is a good name (saith the wise man) than great riches. ²⁴ But honour standeth most of all in the excellencie of vertue: wherefore they, which take awaie vertues, as much as in them lieth, (and in their roome substitute vices, and oftentimes faine lies,) doo sinne. Herevnto adde, that a good name is scarselie recompensed at anie time, with full restitution, of so much as was taken awaie from it. Some, for the regard they haue to a mans honour, maie saie, that the matter is not so: howbeit, there is euermore some blemish remaining.

4 The fourth point to be considered of, is, whether reproches are to be suffered; ²⁵ or else presentlie to be repressed. This first of all I saie, that the iudgement of suffering contumelies and iniuries is all one. That which we speake generallie, we vnderstand speciallie. In the Gospell, Christ commanded that we should suffer iniuries; If anie strike thee on the right cheeke, ²⁶ turne thou also the other; and he that will sue thee at the lawe, and take thy cote from thee, let him also take thy cloke; and he that will compell thee to go one mile, go with him twain. These precepts otherwhiles haue greatlie offended some, which did not rightlie vnderstand them. Hereby it was obiected to Augustine, that christian religion did smallie profit the common-weale: that the common-weale of Rome was by this meanes greatlie diminished. Augustine answereth, that as concerning the preparation of the mind, godlie men ought so to be affected, as that for the name of Christ, they be content to suffer all kind of iniuries, so they perceiue it to be expedient for the honour of God, and for the safetie of their neighbours. But if it tend not to the glorie of God, and is hurtfull to him that dooth the iniurie, there is no necessitie that we beare with the act.

Hereof we haue an example in Christ: ²⁷ when he was striken by the seruant of the high priest, he offered not immediatlie his other chéeke, but put him backe; bicause he sawe it was not expedient for the glorie of God, that he should séeme to be ill spoken of. Further, it was not profitable for that seruant to be mainteined in his sinne. They that in such wise suffer reproches, giue stomach vnto the wicked, that they dare do greater things, & to perseuere in their sinnes, which we must not commit; we ought rather to cut off sinnes. Wherefore Salomon saith; He that putteth a foole to silence, dooth pacifie wrath. ²⁸ Sinne may be diminished by repressing thereof. According to which sentence, the same Salomon said; ²⁹ Answer thou a foole according to his foolishnes, least he should seeme to be wise. This is for his benefit. But if thou saie anie thing to him, he will perseuere in his naughtinesse. Furthermore, if we ought not to suffer contumelies to be doone against our neighbour; no more ought we suffer them to be spoken against our selues: for we must loue our neighbours euen as our selues. And he that contemneth his owne good name, is cruell.

So that reproches must be repressed, ³⁰ for his sake that dooth them; that he maie acknowledge his fault, and doo so no more. Further, for their sakes, which be iniuried, and for owne cause; lest we should forgo that authoritie, which is profitable to the church and common-weale. For he that holdeth his peace, séemeth to consent. They that stand by, will iudge thée to be such a one. Thy function in the church and common-weale after that, will be more contemptible. The estimation of publike persons is profitable to be kept. In these cases therefore, it is lawfull to represse contumelies. But sometimes we ought to suffer them, ³¹ neither must we requite againe with the like; namelie, when we perceiue that we can nothing preuaile; and that perhaps that man is so euill, as by stopping him of his will, he becommeth the woorse; and when of a small sparkle will be kindled a great fire. For which cause Ezechias willed, that nothing should be answered to Rabsaches: sith he could haue profited nothing by anie answer.

Contumelies also are borne withall for our owne sakes, if we féele our selues mooued, and that by rebuking we shall passe our bounds. So must that be vnderstood, which Salomon saith; ³² Answer not a foole according to his foolishnesse, least thou also be like vnto him. Some there be, that while they would represse the furie of another man, become more frantike themselues. If they sée them prone herevnto, they ought to absteine, least they offend God. Which we also shall doo, if we perceiue that we be not therefore lead vnto it, bicause it grieueth vs that the name of God should be dishonored; but onlie for that we séeke to followe our owne appetites. Also we must take héed, that we suffer not such kind of contumelie in this respect, ³³ that we would ver our aduersarie the more. There be some, who thinke it a noble kind of reuenge, if they vtterlie contemne those things that be spoken against them; to the intent he might sée, that there is no account at all made of him. There be some, which kéepe silence & beare; bicause they thinke it will redound to their praise. Seneca said, that; To be despised of the wicked, is to be praised. And lastlie, we must take héed, that the dissembling of reproch, procéed not of cowardlinesse. There be manie, which make so much of quietnesse, as they will take nothing in hand, which maie be troublesome and ioined with danger. This also is to be added, that reproches must be abidden, when we cannot otherwise choose.

³⁴ 5 But if we shall iudge, that contumelie is not to be borne withall, there is two waies to deale. Either it is priuate; namelie, that we our selues rebuke him; or else by sute in lawe. We maie go to the iudges (for this is lawfull) and prouide that our office be not in danger of suspicion. If we deale priuatlie, it is méet to vse courteous speach: which the apostle taught vnto the Galathians; Brethren (saith he) if a man bee suddenlie taken with anie offense, ³⁵ ye that be spirituall restore such a one with the spirit of meekenesse, &c. Not but that we maie somtimes deale sharplie, when we are in hand with opinions & doctrine, when the honour of God, and the true catholike faith is in hazard; or else, when men be so inflexible, as they cannot be reformed with courteous words, then more seuere speach must be vsed. Howbeit, we must take héed, that we alledge no false crime against him, which is the author of the contumelies: for then it were a lie. The thing, which is iust, must iustlie be doone. But thou saiest, that he himselfe dooth lie: thou must not become like vnto him. If in those cases, which I haue expressed, reproch be not repressed; at the least wise we shall declare by liuing well, & by the déeds themselues, which in words we cannot, that he hath made a lie. Manie haue béene content to vse a generall reason; namelie, that the spirit will teach vs when iniurie is to be suffered, and when not: and that euen at the verie push, we should take counsell. The Ethniks would saie, that we ought to followe wisedome and reason. Howbeit, I thought good to open these points somewhat more particularlie.

6 Come we then vnto Dauid. He vsed thrée reasons, ³⁶ the which must onlie take place in those cases, wherein iniurie and reproch ought to be suffered, and not generallie: for sometimes they are to be suffered. The first reason was; Hinder ye not the counsell of God, God hath commanded him to curse me, &c. To this we saie, that in that case the reason is good; not that we should conclude generallie: then there should be no wickednesse punished. We would alwaies saie; It is the counsell of God, he will take it awaie, when it shall séeme good vnto him. The second reason is; I abide greater things at the hand of my sonne, and shall I not beare these things? This is a good reason to comfort our selues in affliction, and to make vs circumspect what we doo: but generallie it is not of force. If the magistrate saie; I haue borne this, by reason of the necessitie of the time, therefore I can the easilier beare euilles: he shall leaue wickednesse vnpunished. The third reason also is not vniuersall; God seeth this affliction, and laieth vp good for me in store. This in verie déed we ought to thinke, if we be compelled to suffer contumelie; yet are we not alwaies bound to suffer it.

These things haue we spoken concerning the reasons of Dauid. ³⁷ Now must we shew wherfore he dissembled, & whether he did well therein. In my iudgement he did well; and his purpose was allowed vnto the souldiers, and nobilitie, which he had with him. He was busied about other matters, he was scaping awaie, he then thought vpon his sinne, and imputed it to the reuenge, which God had foreshewed by the prophet that he should suffer. Doubtlesse he did not vtterlie pardon the offense, but deferred the punishment. All things haue their time. It was now néedfull for him to repent, he wept and lamented. Another cause, which might persuade him, was herein; least he should be suddenlie drawne to furie, and ouer-much mooued with crueltie: and it was then sufficient for him to kéepe within his bounds. A third reason: he sawe in spirit (for he was a prophet) that GOD would haue him, euen at this instant, to suffer this reproch. Thus farre haue we spoken hereof.

7 Now let vs consider, ³⁸ after what sort Paule forbiddeth iudgement; séeing we must verie oftentimes iudge, while we be in this life. For it behooueth, that euerie man doo iudge and examine himselfe, yea and others also, when néed shall be; to the intent they ma⟨…⟩e be warned and amended. ³⁹ The church pronounceth sentence of iudgement, against those, which are to be excommunicated. There be also politicall or ciuill iudgements. And in houshold affaires, we choose vnto vs wiues, maidens, & seruants. And in the church there be chosen deacons, curats, & bishops; which kind of election cannot procéed without iudgement. Wherefore we answer, that iudgements are of two sorts; ⁴⁰ either priuate, or publike. And those which be publike, perteine either to policie, or else vnto the church. Ciuill iudgements are not taken awaie by the Gospell, ⁴¹ but rather amended and corrected; as hereafter we shall perceiue, when the place serueth. But ecclesiasticall iudgements cannot be remooued by mans authoritie. For Christ, when he spake of brotherlie correction, gaue commandement thereof. ⁴² Priuate iudgements doo either spring of charitie, and right consideration; or else of ill affections, which are enuie and pride: as Augustine hath in his second booke De sermone Domini in monte, while he intreated of those words, which are read in Mathew; Iudge ye not, that ye be not iudged. By which saieng of Christ, the sentence of Paule must be measured.

And in these iudgements, which we exercise by charitie, ⁴³ we must take speciall héed, that the sinnes, which either we iudge or reprooue, be throughlie knowne to vs, that we doo not rashlie giue credit to rumors or slanders. Further, we must not iudge without compassion and pitie. Awaie with triumphing, mocking, reproches. The which shall best be doone, if we remember that we our selues be men, and prone by nature vnto those vices: and not yet assured, but that we maie at sometime fall into the verie same offenses. Therefore Paule said vnto the Galathians; ⁴⁴ Considering thy selfe, least thou also be tempted. And Augustine in his booke of Confessions wrote, ⁴⁵ that we should not onelie giue thanks vnto GOD, for the sinnes that he hath forgiuen; but also for those, which by the assistance of God we haue not committed. Ouer and besides, in his 15. epistle to Ierom, when he had lamented for the contentions which had happened betwéene him and Ruffinus, he saith; that he knew not what he himselfe would haue doone, if the same things that were written against Ierom, had béen written against him. And moreouer, in iudging there must neuer be so firme a determination, as though he which is fallen, can not be restored againe.

8 And touching those things, which ought to withdrawe vs from a light, rash, and hastie iudgement, ⁴⁶ Chrysostome dooth make mention. First, séeing our owne state is verie much vnknowne to our owne selues; ⁴⁷ we ought to know, that the state of other men is verie hardlie to be knowne. Furthermore, there be manie circumstances, wherby mens actions are defined; which we cannot alwaies perceiue, although we haue set before our eies the thing which is doone: so as it is not easie to giue iudgment of it. Againe, the verie things that we sée be otherwhiles so doubtfull, as we maie vnderstand them, as well in the good part as in the ill. Then it is better to suspend our iudgement in a thing that is doubtfull. To conclude, he that iudgeth, must be spirituall; séeing in the epistle to the Corinthians it is written; The spirituall man iudgeth all things. ⁴⁸ Séeing then we be not led oftentimes by the spirit, but by our owne naughtie affections; we haue more néed to be iudged, than to vse iudgement against others.

⁴⁹ Augustine, in his tenth booke of Confessions, the 23. chapter, excepteth thrée things, whereof we ought not to iudge, although we be spirituall, and so be accounted. The first is; the hidden mysterie of Gods prouidence and predestination, togither with the counselles of GOD, touching those same things which we sée doo happen dailie, otherwise than either iustice or reason might séeme to suffer. Esaie said; ⁵⁰ It is not conuenient that a potters vessel should dispute against the maker therof, whie it was made of this or that fashion. Also it is not meet that one pot should dispute with another, whether the potter haue doon wiselie or vnaduisedlie. Out of which places Paule tooke that, which he hath to the Romans; ⁵¹ Hath not the potter power ouer his claie, to make one vessell vnto honour, and another to dishonour?

Another thing that Augustine taketh awaie from our iudgement, is the booke of the holie scripture; the which we must not therefore read, to condemne anie thing therin, or to wrest it to our mind and desire; but rather to submit our selues therevnto. Wherefore, he writing in the 19. epistle vnto Ierom, saith; If there be anie thing in the scriptures that displease vs, ⁵² we impute that vnto the volume of the booke, as being slenderlie corrected; or vnto the interpretor that hath not so sincerelie and profitablie translated it, according to the proper forme of speach; or else we ascribe it to our owne ignorance. Lastlie, he excepteth from our iudgement, those men which be without, that we should not iudge them to be so farre past hope of saluation, as they may not returne vnto it. And least he should séeme to be against that he had said; he in the 22. chapter of the same booke, expoundeth the saieng of Paule; that A spirituall man iudgeth all things: He iudgeth all things (saith he) that ought to be iudged. The which we haue expounded generallie to be such, as make for edifieng; or else, which maie be hurtfull for our saluation.

Moreouer, it must be considered, that great diligence and discréetnesse be vsed in giuing of iudgement, least we condemne those things, whereof as yet we haue no perfect knowledge and triall. In the booke of Genesis it is written; that God himselfe came downe to looke vpon the citie and towre which they had builded. ⁵³ And it is declared, that he went vnto Sodom, to sée whether they behaued themselues, ⁵⁴ according to the report, which had béene made vnto him. And these things are in such wise shewed, to the intent we maie be instructed, what diligent examination ought to be there had of the matter, before that sentence be giuen vpon the same.

⁵⁵ 9 Augustine also, in the second booke De sermone Domini in monte, reduceth the kinds of actions into two parts. Some be of that nature, that they may be done as well with a good mind, as with a bad; and of these (saith he) it is commanded vs, that we should not take them in the ill part. And there be others, which cannot be doone with a good mind; as are whoredoms, adulteries, and such like. And in these things we must take héed, that we iudge not ill of the author, by determining with our selues, that he cannot be changed. But he referreth the words of Christ, ⁵⁶ & of Paule, (wherein iudgement is forbidden) vnto the first kind of works, which may be doone either of good purpose or of bad. And to prooue his distinction, which he brought of two kind of actions, he alledgeth the place out of the epistle to Timothie, where it is said; that There be some sinnes manifest, ⁵⁷ and which go before to iudgement; but others, which follow after. For there be some so euident, as thou maist perceiue them without triall or examination: and some be therefore said to follow, because they be more secret, and are not tried out, vnlesse it be in examination of iudgement.

Albeit the Gréeke scholies would haue the same to be referred to the ordeining of ministers: for the apostle had said; Lay not hands suddenlie vpon anie man, ⁵⁸ neither be partakers of other mens sinnes. But if so be his disciple had said; Séeing there be manie mens sinnes, which are hidden from me, how can I beware of them? Furthermore, I cannot shun those, which perhaps will be committed by them after they be ordeined. The apostle answereth; Some sinnes go before, which vnlesse thou weigh and consider with a iust iudgement, and committest nothing vnwoorthie of the holie orders, thou shalt defile thy selfe with other mens sinnes. And there be other sinnes that followe: for if thou promote anie man to orders, whom in thy iudgement thou foundest fit; if afterward he happen to fall, that cannot be imputed by right vnto thée.

10 Neither must we omit, that Christ, to the intent he might restraine vs from rash iudgement, added a commination; Iudge not (saith he) least ye be iudged, ⁵⁹ for with the same iudgement that you iudge, ye shall be iudged. Which must not be so vnderstood, as though we should be rashlie iudged by God, if we our selues iudge rashlie. ⁶⁰ For (as Augustine, in the same place, saith;) The meaning of Christs words is, that when a man shall iudge another man by vniust iudgement: he himselfe shall be condemned by God, and shall therefore suffer punishment, bicause he iudged rashlie, and vnrighteouslie. But séeing there be some godlie men, which altogither temper themselues in this kind of sinne; and notwithstanding that they iudge not rashlie of others, yet men doo verie vniustlie iudge of them: the same father answereth; that For the most part it dooth not so happen; bicause men are woont to be sore prouoked against them, whom they know haue a sinister iudgement of them, and doo indeuor likewise to iudge hardlie, and to speake ill of them. Wherefore that is woont to be vsed against them, which is written of Ismael; His hand against all men, and all mens hands against him. Howbeit, ⁶¹ the answer is more firme, to saie; that godlie men, which do not rashlie iudge of others, though they obteine not like right and recompense of men, yet without dout they obteine it of God, who not onelie iudgeth rightlie of them, but also correcteth the ill iudgements, which are doone vnto him by men.

Of suspicions.

12 But here also we maie for good cause demand, how farre foorth we are to fauour suspicions. ⁶² Suspicions doo depend of coniectures, through which we inquire, either what is doone, or what maie come to passe. And suspicion is an obscure knowledge of some euill at hand, from whence springeth feare. And malicious men, and old men, and those which are often hurt, and enimies, are soone brought into suspicion. And sometimes the causes of suspicious are iust: as in the Digests De suspectis tutoribus, & curatoribus; He is suspected, who is such in manners. And albeit that he be not such a one indéed, yet it sufficeth, if he séeme to be such a one. For though that Dauid were no traitour, yet by that report, ⁶³ which commonlie went of him; to wit, that he was a traitour, and desired the kingdome, the Philistines did wiselie; who thought good to beware of him. In déed, we cannot auoid it, but but that suspicions will sometimes arise in our minds; séeing they be not in our power: ⁶⁴ but we must not rashlie assent vnto them, or iudge by them. Augustine, in the 54. epistle to Macedonius: Men (saith he) of a certeine selfe-loue, are easilie lead to iudge; insomuch as euerie man is a friend to his owne cogitations, and thinketh that he dooth suspect wisely. Yet (saith he) nothing must héerein be doone rashlie, though the cause maie séeme neuer so probable: for euen manie things are credible, and yet false; and againe, manie things are incredible, and yet true. But thou wilt saie; What if a man be a gouernour of a church, or of the common-weale; shall he not prouide in time, if he suspect anie euill to be at hand? ⁶⁵ He ought no doubt: but yet without hatred or harme of another man. So iudges must beware, that vpon light suspicion they disturbe no man: for poore wretches, being oftentimes ouercome with griefe in punishments, doo confesse those things, which they neuer thought. The suspicions of the Philistines arose not of weightie, but euen of probable causes; therefore they commanded not Dauid either to be troubled or put to death, but onelie to be sent awaie. And this Dauid gained by fléeing vnto Achis, that although he were had in honour, yet he came into suspicion of treason. Wherefore we must neuer depart to the enimies of the faith; sith that had neuer good successe. For admit thou canst persuade the prince, that thou art a good man; yet shalt thou neuer persuade the multitude. And thus much by the waie.

Of mocking and tawnting.

⁶⁶ 13 By the mocking, wherewith Elias mocked the worshippers of Baal, it appeareth, that godlie and sincere men maie vse pleasant dissimulation, ⁶⁷ wittie conceits, proper nips, and merie speaches; so they vse them not to satisfie reuenge and hatred against their enimies, but for the condemning and disallowing of wicked religion. The sense of these signes is perceiued rather by pronuntiation, than by words. The imitation of this kind did Paule vse, when in the epistle to the Colossians, he saith vnder the person of the false prophets; Touch not, taste not, handle not. ⁶⁸ How pleasantlie dooth Esaie, in the 44. chapter, deride the idoll-maker; bicause of the one halfe of a trée he maketh a fire to warme himselfe, and to séeth his meate; and with the rest of the blocke he frameth an image, before which he afterward falleth downe, giueth honour vnto it, worshippeth it, calleth vpon it, and serueth it. ⁶⁹ The same did Baruch the scribe of Ieremie, in the sixt chapter: he pleasantlie mocked the idols. Elias, by that wittie mirth of his, taught that Baal was no god, that he heard not, felt not, nor regarded anie maner of thing. So then, scornings & mockings may sometimes serue, verie fitlie, for the prophets and ministers of the word of God. For how could men be more plainlie taught, that they lost their labor in worshipping of Baal? Howbeit, Paule, in writing to the Ephestians, séemeth to forbid this kind of talke in Christians; Let there not be in you (saith he) ⟨…⟩; that is, ⁷⁰ filthie and fowle communication; ⟨…⟩, fond & foolish words; and ⟨…⟩, that is, Vrbanitie and pleasant iesting, which otherwise is counted a vertue, wherby those that he sad, & in sicknesse, are some times chéered vp: bicause it must not be taken for sin, when it perteines to charitie. But it must be vnderstood, that Paule, in that place, by the word ⟨…⟩, dooth note ⟨…⟩; that is, scurrilitie, whereby scoffes and railing speaches be rashlie cast out against others, rather with offense vnto the godlie hearers, than with anie edifieng. It is not lawfull for Christians to trifle vnaduisedlie.

Of Deceipt or Guile.

14 To speake first of the word. ⁷¹ That which among the Latins is Dolus; that is Deceipt, the Graecians call ⟨…⟩: so that their word and ours is almost all one: but the Hebrues call it Mirmah, or Remijah. Further, let vs vnderstand that guile is there forbidden, where anie thing lieth secret, which is hidden, least the fraud appeare, or be easilie séene. Wherefore Plautus said; ⁷² Guiles, vnlesse they be couered by craft, they be no guiles. Thus much as touching the name. Now let vs come to the definition. ⁷³ In the Digests, De dolo malo, in the first lawe, Seruius the lawier thus defined ill guile, or collusion; namelie, to be a subtill inuention or deuise to deceiue another, when as one thing is doone, and another feigned. Wheresoeuer therefore there is guile, there is deceit by some dissimulation. It is true in déed, that Labeo, an interpretor of the lawe, ⁷⁴ reprooued the definition brought by Seruius, and that by two reasons. Whereof one is, that sometime it may happen, that a man shall be beguiled without dissimulation or collusion. Wherfore the definition should be more strict, than that which is defined. But this all men account as a fault. The other is; bicause otherwhiles some by dissimulation doo saue and defend their owne, or other mens, and yet therby doo beguile no man; neither doo they hurt anie man. So then, the definition must be applied vnto other things, besides that which is defined; which also is culpable. For which cause he thus defineth it; ⁷⁵ Ill guile, or collusion, is all maner of craft, deceit, or subtiltie doone to beguile, delude, and deceiue others.

Vlpian, in the same place, ⁷⁶ alloweth the opinion of Labeo. But hauing the authoritie of so great a clarke, I would saie that Labeo did not well, in remoouing dissimulation from the nature of fraud. And as touching the first argument, which he hath, I denie that which he affirmeth; namelie, that men can be circumuented without dissimulation. For vnlesse they were wholie without sense, they would not easilie be led to take and receiue that, which they manifestlie sée will be hurtfull vnto them. Wherefore it is necessarie, that there be some shew and colour added; which can by no meanes be doone without dissimulation. Then, whereas he saith, that there be manie, which defend either their owne, or else other mens, by dissimulation: I grant that; but yet I affirme, that the same is guile, although it be honest dealing: as afterward I will shew more plainlie. As touching the nature therefore of guile, it séemeth, that faining or dissimulation is alwaies ioined with it: and for that cause, the definition of Seruius pleaseth me better. Which definition, I my selfe neuerthelesse would rather applie vnto guile in generall, & not to ill guile or collusion, as he did, perhaps being led by that reason; bicause he vnderstood that deceipt, which should be hurtfull.

⁷⁷ 15 Cicero, in his first booke of Offices, affirmeth; that Dissimulation or faining perteineth chéefelie to the nature of guile. For he writeth that Aquilius, his familiar friend, being demanded what was guile, answered; Where one thing is doone, and another thing feigned. Of this mind is Augustine, ⁷⁸ who in his seuenth treatise vpon Iohn, expounding these words which Christ pronounced of Nathaniel, ⁷⁹ (Behold a true Israelite, in whom there is no guile) saith; It is then guile, when one thing is doone, and another feigned, &c. And to speake this by the waie, it is easilie gathered by this place, that Augustine preached his sermon to the people in Latine; bicause the Aphricans vsed the Romane toong, although it were not pure, but in some words corrupt. For there Augustine admonished the people, that Dolus, which is guile, signified not Dolor; that is, Paine: as manie doo corruptlie speake, saieng; Dolus illum torquet, that is (as they meant) Griefe dooth vex him: when as they should haue said Dolor. To take awaie therfore the ambiguitie of the word, he saith, that Dolus, which is guile, signifieth faining, and dissimulation.

And in the same place, to expresse what guilefull faining signifieth; ⁸⁰ he addeth, that it commeth of a doublenesse of the heart. He alledgeth the 12. psalme, in the which place, when mention is made of guilefull men; Dauid saith, that they speake dissemblinglie in their double heart: that is (as he interpreteth it;) In one part of their hart they doo sée the truth, and perceiue the thing how it is; & in the other they worke dissimulation, and deceit. But in those (saith he) is no guile, who perceiuing themselues to be sinners, doo so repute themselues, and doo not dissemble or bost of righteousnesse; as did the Pharisie, when he praied néere vnto the Publicane; and as other hypocrites also doo. Nathaniel had no guile in him: but not generallie. For euerie man is a lier, ⁸¹ and (as Paule writeth) There dwelleth no good thing in our flesh; séeing it is altogither full of fraud and guile. It might onelie be said of Christ absolutelie, ⁸² that He alone was without guile. But (as Dauid saith;) They are blessed, ⁸³ to whom the Lord hath not imputed sinne, and in whose spirit there is no guile. For in as much as they be regenerate, (especiallie concerning the spirit) that which they doo, they doo it vprightlie and simplie: and such a one Christ affirmeth that Nathaniel was.

The same Augustine, in the tenth tome, ⁸⁴ in his booke of fiftie homilies, the first homilie, expoundeth that which is written by Dauid, in the 34. psalme; What man is he that listeth to liue, ⁸⁵ and loueth to see good daies? Keepe thy toong from euill, and thy lips that they speake no guile: Then (saith he) it is guile, when one thing is close shut vp in the brest, and another is expressed, either by word or by déed. As flatterers vse to doo, which commend some, contrarie to that they thinke; thereby either to eate their meate, and drinke their drinke; or else, to get some other benefit at their hands. And that, ⁸⁶ which he speaketh of flatterers, may also be vnderstood of enimies & backbiters. But that it becommeth men to deale plainlie and vprightlie, the verie Ethniks sawe. Wherefore Achilles, in Homer, saith; ⁸⁷ that he hateth those men, as he hateth death, which speake one thing and thinke another. So then, we thinke, that for the generall definition of guile, there ought to be put, and that not amisse, a deuise to deceiue a man (when one thing is doone, and another dissembled.)

16 Now, after this definition, ⁸⁸ we must adde a distinction. For some guile is good, and some is euill. That we call good, which is not harmefull; & when as it hurteth none, but sometime profiteth: but euill guile is harmefull, and alwaies hurteth one or other. These parts maie easilie be made plaine by examples. Nursses doo continuallie vse good guile towards their little ones, thereby to please and still them: for with them they both faine and dissemble manie things. Physicians also doo after the same sort deceiue them that be sicke, bicause they would recouer them. Yea and Chrysostome, in his first booke De sacerdotio, ⁸⁹ writeth, that a certeine Physician ⟨…⟩o beguiled one that was sicke of an ague, as in drinking water, he thought he droonke wine. And the sa⟨…⟩e Chrysostome, in the same place affirmeth, that he himselfe vsed a good guile, to deceiue Basilius, for the taking of a bishoprike vpon him; when in no case he was minded that waie. ⁹⁰ Dauid by this kind of guile escaped the hands of the king of the Philistines: for he feined himselfe to be a foole, whereby the king iudged him vnwoorthie to be punished.

But of ill guile there be verie manie examples in the holie scriptures: among which is the act of Ehud, which in the booke of Iudges we haue interpreted. And that is another also, ⁹¹ which the Hebrues did, who at their going foorth of Aegypt, desired to borrowe, both of their neighbours, and also of their feiends, pretious garments, golden and siluer vesselles: and yet they minded altogither to rob them of the same. To this kind also belonged that, ⁹² which Chusaie the Arachite did, in deceiuing of Absalom. And among these maie be reckoned that, ⁹³ which Simeon and Leui committed against Hemor, and against the Sichemits. I might bring a great manie of examples more, if I would vse néedlesse labour in a manifest matter.

17 Touching the first kind of guile, which is called good and harmelesse, no man will contend, but that it is lawfull to vse the same. But of the other kind there is a doubt, whereof if my iudgement should be asked, I would thinke it best to make this answer; that We may not vse euill guile with our fréends. ⁹⁴ Notwithstanding, against our enimies it is not forbidden; bicause it may be in the stéed of armour. Wherefore, if it be lawfull to take armes against them iustlie, it is lawfull also to vse guile, according to the saieng of the poet; What matter is it against an enimie, whether a man vse fraud or force? Howbeit, this must be considered, that we speake onelie of those enimies, which either God himselfe, ⁹⁵ or the publike weale, or a iust magistrate declareth to be enimies; and not of those, which euerie priuate man hateth. Moreouer, I doubt not, but séeing it is lawfull to repell violence with violence, when there is no other waie to escape; it is also lawfull to set guile against guile. For he, which repelleth violence with violence, as the lawes doo permit, the same man is not to be counted a priuate person: forsomuch as he is armed by the magistrate. So as it is manifest, that he dooth not against the lawes; but with the lawe. Euen so, he that is suddenlie oppressed, may lawfullie escape by euill guile, if he can.

Moreouer, the scriptures teach, that this kind of guile is iust. ⁹⁶ For Ierom saith; and it is written in the Decrées, the 22. cause, the second question, ⁹⁷ the chapter Vtilem, that Iehu did dissemble honestlie with the priests of Baal; bicause he had not béene able to haue killed them all, if he had begoon to put some of them to death. Wherefore, to the end that he might gather them all togither, he feined himselfe to be much more desirous to worship Baal, than Achab was; and by that means he slue them all. But this we ought to regard, that they, which are so destroied by guile, be woorthie of punishment, and (as they be commonlie called) are notorious offenders, and such as cannot be punished by ordinarie means. For which cause the king of Denmarke is by some commended, who through guile destroied most pernicious théeues, which he could not take. For he fained a warre, and made a proclamation, that as manie as would come, ⁹⁸ should receiue wages of him; and promised pardon vnto the théeues, for the wicked acts which they had before committed. But I (for my part) as I shall afterward declare, would not so absolutelie allow these kind of examples. Augustine (as may be read in the 14. cause, question the fift, in the chapter Dixit, and it is a place in his questions vpon Exodus) sheweth, that the Israelits deceiued the Aegyptians, ⁹⁹ when they borrowed of them gold and siluer vesselles. And yet the same was not to be counted a fault in them, when as yet no man doubted, but that they did it by euill guile.

The same father, in the 23. Cause, question second, in the chapter Dominus, which is taken out of his questions vpon the booke of Iosua, ¹⁰⁰ rehearseth the place, wherein it is said, that GOD co~manded the Hebrues to fight against the citie of Haie, by lieng in wait: which without doubt belongeth to guile. Ierom, ¹⁰¹ vpon the 17. chapter of Ezechiel, alledgeth this sentence, as a worldlie saieng; namelie, What matter is it against an enimie, whether a man vse fraud or force? Howbeit, he agréeth therevnto, although he denie, that it can take anie place where an oth is made before. But this I will anon discusse. Ambrose, in the 14. Cause, question the fourth, permitteth guile or gainefull fraud against enimies. And after this manner he interpreteth the place of Deuteronomie, where God gaue the Iewes libertie, to put their monie in vsurie to strangers; ¹⁰² namelie, that where the warre is iust, there also vsurie maie take place. For the goods of the enimies are ours, and they maie be lawfullie taken from them: and whether it be by fraud, or by violence, it forceth not. There be some, which alledge that which is written in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, the 12. chapter; ¹⁰³ When I was craftie, I tooke you with guile. But that maketh nothing to the purpose, séeing the apostle in that place dooth verie manifestlie vse the figure ¹⁰⁴ Ironia. For he was accused, as though he had receiued monie of the Corinthians, by the hands of other, which by himselfe he refused to receiue. Which he straitwaie disprooued.

But those examples, which we brought first, doo manifestlie prooue, that it is lawfull to vse guile, yea & euill guile against enimies; namelie, kéeping close our counselles and actions, and vsing tollerable works and words. ¹⁰⁵ Neither doo the ciuill lawes teach otherwise. In the Code De commercijs & mercatoribus, in the lawe Non solùm: The emperor decréed, not onelie that no gold should be transported vnto the barbarous nations, which were enimies vnto the state; but also, that such gold, as they had, should be taken from them by subtill guile or policie. And in the Digests De captiuis postliminio reuersis, in the lawe Nihil interest; It is decréed, that captiues, howsoeuer they returned into their countrie againe, should recouer their owne goods and old estate, whether they were sent home againe, or whether they escaped by violence or by guile. Although afterward, in the lawe Postliminij, in the Paraph Captinus, it is restreined vpon condition; that If they returne with a mind to tarie at home. For if they should either promise, or sweare vnto their enimies to returne, they should not enioie the right of returning. Wherefore Attilius Regulus enioied not the benefit, ¹⁰⁶ bicause he was sent to Rome, to persuade the Senate about the exchange of prisoners. Then, forsomuch as he had promised, & was minded to returne, he by the lawes might not vse euill guile.

18 Hereby also that appeareth to be true, which a little before was said; that we maie not vse euill guile against our enimie, if there be an oth made betwéene vs. ¹⁰⁷ And that this maie be the more plainlie vnderstood, we must distinguish an oth, as the lawiers doo; one auowching, another promising: or (as they terme it) the one assertiue, and the other promissorie. For when we sweare, either we doo affirme, or else denie some thing to be, or to haue béene; (which we neuer ought to doo with euill guile, by adding an oth:) or else we promise to performe some thing. And forsomuch as faith is to be kept, euen with our enimie, the same faith also is not to be broken by euill guile. So as, if those things, which we haue sworne vnto our enimie to kéepe and obserue, be temporall goods (such as are monie, honour, and life of the bodie) the name of God for these things ought not to be prophaned. Wherefore, Dauid, ¹⁰⁸ in his 15. psalme, saith; He that sweareth to doo euill, and changeth not. In the Hebrue it is thus written, Nischhab leharah velo iamir. Which place I knowe that D. Kimhi expoundeth of those, which vow vnto God certeine sharpe and hard things, which serue to the subduing of the flesh, & change not that which they haue promised. But the sentence (me thinketh) séemeth more plaine, if it be largelie taken; namelie, of an oth that is hurtfull vnto vs, which a good and godlie man will not breake or change.

¹⁰⁹ Ierom also vpon Ezechiel, the 17. chapter, is of this opinion. For there the Lord saith, that he was verie angrie with Zedechias; ¹¹⁰ bicause he brake the oth which he had made with Nabuchadnezar, king of Babylon. For though the Iewes counted him as an enimie; yet (as Ierom declareth) he was now a friend, when he had by oth promised his faith vnto Zedechias. Séeing it belongeth vnto friends, one to be faithfull vnto another: so as euill guile ought not there to haue béene vsed. ¹¹¹ And Augustine, in the 32. cause, question the first, the chapter Noli existimare, writing vnto Bonifacius, admonished him to kéepe faith euen with his enimie. ¹¹² Ambrose also, in the 22. cause, question the fourth, the chapter Innocens, dooth so aduise. And the same sentence he hath in his booke De officijs, where he bringeth the example of Iosua, ¹¹³ towards the Gabaonites; who, notwithstanding that he ought to haue made the oth void, and of no force; yet, by the consent of God, he caused it to be kept and ratified. Neither suffered he the Gabaonites to be slaine, whom neuerthelesse he punished, bicause of the guile which they vsed.

But if an oth be giuen for fulfilling of an vniust or vngodlie thing, ¹¹⁴ it must wholie be made frustrate; bicause an oth ought not to be a bond of iniquitie. Neither is it necessarie therevnto, that anie man should come before a iudge, to be absolued of this kind of oth. Which I therefore speake, bicause the Pope claimeth this right to himselfe; namelie, to release such kind of oths, and (as they commonlie saie) to dispense with them. As it appéereth in the 15. cause, question the sixt, where Nicholas absolueth the bishop of Triers. ¹¹⁵ And his pride and arrogancie hath now at length brought his lawe and power to that passe, that he not onelie breaketh vnlawfull oths; but also abrogateth iust and lawfull oths, when it séemeth good to himselfe. So Pope Zacharie loosed the French men from their oth, wherein they were bound vnto their king; and he deposed the king from his kingdome, and placed Pipin in his stéed. But this is not to be maruelled at, ¹¹⁶ séeing it is commonlie said at this daie in the Court of Rome; that It is not méet for kings and great personages, but for merchants, to kéepe their oths.

19 So then, if there be an oth made, guile must not be vsed; vnlesse perhaps the one partie, to whom the oth is made, shall first depart from couenants and conditions: for then the common saieng must take place; He that breaketh faith, let faith also be broken with him. Wherefore Ierom to Nepotianus, ¹¹⁷ commendeth the saieng of Domitius the Orator, vnto Philip; Séeing thou accountest not me for a Senator, I also doo not take thée for a Consul. But hereof we haue testimonies also in holie scriptures. For Paule, in the first to the Corinthians, the seuenth chapter (as touching faith giuen in matrimonie) writeth; that If an infidell depart, ¹¹⁸ let him depart, a brother or a sister is not in subiection vnto such: but God hath called vs in peace. And those things, which are alledged of an oth, I vnderstand them to be of like force in promises and couenants. In which promises and couenants I affirme, that iust and godlie men ought both to vse simple and plaine words, ¹¹⁹ and also to liue with a good conscience. The Thracians therfore are iustlie and woorthilie condemned, who (after truce had béene made to continue for the space of thirtie daies) robbed & spoiled by night, excusing their act, in that, that their truce was made for the daie, and not for the night. Neither did the legat of the Romans plainlie, ¹²⁰ but subtilie with Antiochus, who hauing decréed, that she one halfe of the ships should be giuen vnto the Romans, and the other halfe vnto the king, commanded them all in verie déed to be diuided and cut in sunder. But he did it, to the end the king might be vtterlie destitute of a nauie for the warres. Therefore, whatsoeuer a godlie man will promise, he ought déeplie to weigh with him selfe before hand, whether he be able to stand to his words and promises. ¹²¹ Wherefore Ierom hath written vnto Celantia; Whatsoeuer thou speakest, thinke that thou hast sworne it.

20 As touching the end of the question, there remaine certeine doubts to be examined, that the thing maie be the more manifest. First, if a man promise armor and succour to anie man, for the space of thrée or foure yéeres, and in the meane time hée becommeth a traitour to his countrie, and maketh warre against it; whether in this case he ought to performe his faith, or else by euill guile to breake it? I answer, that neither in this case, nor in the like, is faith to be kept; séeing (as it is euident) a mischéeuous act happeneth in the meane time, which with a safe conscience we may not aid. And in verie déed, neither euill guile or periurie is here committed. For he, which hath sworne, is not changed; but he is changed, ¹²² to whom the oth was made. For oths can plucke away or diminish nothing of those bonds, which went before. Séeing then euerie man is bound to the word of God, and to the preseruation of his countrie, before he take any oth; that which afterward is sworne, must be vnderstood conditionallie: that if the first bonds be kept vnuiolate. The same also must take place in vowes, that be vowed. For although a man vow sole life; yet, forsomuch as he was before bound to the word of God, wherein it is said, that It is better to marrie, ¹²³ than to burne: and, They which cannot keepe themselues chast, let them marrie: he dooth not take awaie the first bond for the vow, which followeth. Wherefore, if he can not kéepe himselfe chast, or if he burne, he ought (by the commandement of GOD) to marrie. Neither can any oth or vow that happeneth herein, take awaie the power and force of the commandement of God.

¹²⁴ 21 Another doubt commeth to my remembrance, touching those princes, which haue giuen their publike faith and safe conduct vnto heretikes for their comming vnto Councelles, or to conferences, whether they ought to stand to their promises; or else violating their oth, to kéepe still the heretikes, and to punish them. I answer, that they ought to kéepe entier and perfect the promise made vnto them. But they say; We will easilie grant it to be sinne, when we giue our faith for an euill thing: but if, after we haue giuen it, we kéepe it, and stand to our promises, we fall into another gréeuous sinne; séeing we doo not the dutie committed vnto vs, neither doo we obeie God. For it is our part (as God hath commanded) to punish and to correct heretiks; least they should spoile the church, and procéed in mainteining of their pestiferous doctrine among the godlie. Neither dooth anie man doubt, but that magistrats ought to defend the church. So then it séemeth, that heretikes should not be let go, when wée once haue them in our power.

I answer, ¹²⁵ that this in déed is the office of kings; to represse and kéepe vnder heretikes: but that is, when they haue them in their power. But if they giue them a safe conduct to come vnto them, then can they not saie, that they haue them in their power: for they came vpon trust of the promise, and an oth, otherwise they would not haue come. Wherefore, if there be a promise made, it is not lawfull to breake it. And this is the cause whie I said before, that I cannot easilie allow the act of the king of Denmarke. Neither also would I iudge Iehu to be without sinne, ¹²⁶ when he promised that he would worship Baal, thereby to get all the Baalites togither; vnlesse peraduenture he knew manifestlie, that he was stirred vp by God to doo it. But hereof we will intreate a little after. Let them therefore, which defend the councell of Constance, cease to laie for their pretense, that Iohn Husse, with a safe conscience might not be let go; bicause it is hainous sinne in all princes, if they suffer heretikes to go frée. For this, which they saie, is so long true, as the time lasteth that they shall be in their power; but when they are come by a safe conduct, then are they at libertie: neither are they said to be in the power of those princes, which did call them.

22 Others doubt, ¹²⁷ whether it be lawfull to vse euill guile against théeues; so that, if a man happen into their hands, and by an oth made vnto them, is suffered to go home, vpon condition to gather monie to redéeme himselfe: whether I saie he ought to returne vnto him with the monie, or (if he cannot get it as he hoped to haue doone) to returne without it; especiallie, in case he were almost assured, either to liue in perpetuall seruitude, or else to be put to a most cruell death? I answer, that in my iudgement he ought to returne vnto them; especiallie, séeing in this case there is no danger, but as touching goods of this world; namelie, of monie, of libertie, and of bodilie life, which are not so greatlie to be estéemed, as for their sakes, an oth, or the name of God should be violated. And the verse of Dauid, before brought, serueth well for this purpose. And this sentence is so firme and true, that euen an Ethnike ( M. Attilius Regulus, ¹²⁸ I meane) did acknowledge it. For he returned to Carthage, when he knew certeinlie, that either he should be in continuall bondage, or else loose his life; and that most cruellie.

Tell me not, that he did foolishlie herein. For the Romane lawes (as we haue before said) De captiuis & postliminio reuersis, in the lawe Postliminium, in the Paraph Captiuus, doo ordeine, and religiouslie decrée, that he should not be counted as returned by the lawe Postliminium, which had promised to returne againe. Besides, the nature of man persuadeth the selfe-same thing: for it is ciuill, and delighteth in societie. Wherefore, next vnto God, and godlinesse to him-ward, there is nothing, which men ought more to estéeme than their faithfulnesse, which woonderfullie furthereth the societie of men. For without it, it is vnpossible for men to liue togither. Moreouer, who will not saie, that the monie, libertie, and life of one man, is lesse to be regarded than it is of manie? For if couenants and promises be not kept with those théeues, hence-foorth they will giue credit to no man, whom they apprehend. They would send home none to their owne house, to fetch their ransome; but either they will kill as manie as they take, or else reteine them with them in miserable and perpetuall bondage. Lastlie, I thinke it good to giue this aduertisement; that in taking of oths, no signes that be added of vniuersalitie ought to trouble anie man.

¹²⁹ As if a man promise and sweare to his fréend, that he will be an helper to him in all things: or if a man promise and sweare vnto a schoole or church, that he will doo and obserue all things, that they shall decrée. For all such kind of spéeches (as it appéereth by that, which we haue said) are to be vnderstood with condition, that if the obedience vnto the word of God be kept. And vndoubtedlie, although that clause, through the nature of an oth, be ment alwaies to be added; yet neuerthelesse it is the dutie of godlie men to expresse it, when they be receiued into anie Vniuersitie, colledge, office, corporation, or fellowship: and (according to the custome) are compelled to sweare to the obseruation of statutes, lawes, and decrées. It is the sure waie (I saie) by expresse words to testifie, that they will obserue all those things; vnlesse that they shall find, that anie of the same be against the word of God. And of this matter (I thinke) I haue now spoken sufficientlie. Ehud practised euill guile: I grant, but yet against his enimie. Neither dooth the scripture make mention of anie oth that was made betwéene him and Eglon the king. And though there had béene an oth; yet had he béene quit of it, séeing the motion of God, whereby God opened his will vnto him, had abrogated the same.

VVhether Guile be lawfull for the rooting out of Idolatrie and heresie; In 2. King. 10, verse 17.

23 Iehu by fraud minded to allure the worshippers of Baal, ¹³⁰ that he might bring them into the danger of death. He proclaimed among the people, that he would be a notable worshipper of Baal; and that he would, with all spéed possible, offer a notable sacrifice therevnto. Wherefore he commanded all the Baalites to come togither to the holie assemblie, to the end they might be readie with their seruice, about that sumptuous sacrifice. Some are in doubt, whether Iehu sinned in lieng after that sort. They that defend his cause saie, ¹³¹ that this kind of lie was an officious lie; and therefore not to be condemned. And an officious lie they define to be that, wherewith none are hurt, and some are holpen. But among other things, we must note, that this lie of Iehu, did not rashlie escape from him; séeing in that iournie, it was conceiued in his mind, and fixed in his heart. And in my opinion, it cannot be called an officious lie, bicause it did hurt manie, by giuing an offense. For on the one part, the people thought that they had gotten a godlie and holie king; but on the other side, beholding his proclamation, they suspected that he had destroied Achab and his familie; not for religion sake, but for the desire of the kingdome. Wherefore they iustlie condemned him of hypocrisie. Others defend the lie, which he vttered [in saieng] that it was amended through the good intent of the speaker. But a good intent dooth not make a good action, when the nature thereof is euill; and that Euill things, ¹³² (according to the doctrine of the apostle) ought not to be committed, that good things may come thereof. They procéed further, and saie, that it is inough, that God knoweth the heart of him that speaketh. No, neither is that sufficient; bicause it is not onelie néedfull that we approoue our selues vnto GOD; but we must doo it euen to men also, so much as is possible; To the intent that they, ¹³³ seeing our good works, may praise and glorifie the father.

Neither is that of anie great weight, when they saie, that this lie was to indure but a short time; séeing it should come to passe within a few daies, that the mind of him that spake it, should be manifest: insomuch as Iehu was about to slaie the Baalites, whereby the people should knowe how great an enimie he was vnto that kind of idolatrie. For these men be verie much deceiued, which imagine, that sinnes must be measured by a space of time; séeing in a verie moment, a horrible crime maie be committed. Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Baalites did for the time being, confirme themselues in their peruerse idolatrie, through that fact of Iehu. Further, they committed great sinne, in preparing of themselues to sacrifice; & they were constreined therevnto by the authoritie of the king, who had called them togither by setting forth his edict, who also had commanded the kéeper of the vestrie, to giue vnto them the accustomed garments: which they hauing receiued, did violate the lawe of God. By which place it euidentlie appeareth, that they, in their sacrifices, had garments, which were peculiar and differing from others that were vsuall and prophane. For the diuell indeuoreth in all the things he can, to imitate GOD; ¹³⁴ who ordeined, that Aaron, in ministering before him, should haue garments curiouslie wrought. He commanded also, that his children; to wit, the meaner priests, should weare certeine apparell, which he had appointed for them. ¹³⁵ So likewise did the Baalites prouide to be doone in their idolatrie.

24 Such kind of lieng and fraud was vsed in times past, when Augustine liued, to discouer the error of the Priscillianists. These wicked heretikes did priuilie corrupt manie, and in the meane time could scarselie be called to place of iudgement, or there be condemned; bicause they dissembled their heresie, and being accused, they vtterlie detested and denied it by oth; notwithstanding that in their mind they reteined still a pestiferous meaning; nor yet did they cease to seduce & beguile. Whervpon, manie of the faithfull sort taking it grieuouslie, ¹³⁶ that they should kéepe themselues close; they, to the intent they might drawe them out into the sight of the world, and discouer them, would otherwhile haue accesse to some of them, and feigne, that they also were fauorers of the Priscillianists. So then, they hearing this, shewed vnto them their secrets. Augustine reprooued the Catholikes, and persuaded them to absteine from this kind of lieng; and for the same cause wrote an excellent booke intituled De mendacio to Consentius. Againe, they that defend Iehu, ¹³⁷ obiect Elias vnto vs, who séemeth to haue prouoked the Baalites vpon mount Carmel, to doo sacrifice vnto the idoll. But betwéene these things there is no small difference: for Elias did not of himselfe, and absolutelie stirre them vp vnto sacrifice, but prouoked them for the accomplishment of a miracle; namelie, to put in proofe, whether part should cause fire to come from heauen. Further, the Baalites at that time were prepared for their dailie sacrifices; yea, and they made oblations vnto their god euerie daie, & after a sort called vpon him continuallie. But this happened not now among the Baalites; séeing they durst not, for feare of the new king Iehu, doo sacrifice to their idoll.

Wherfore, they which professe the Gospell, must not confirme themselues by these arguments; and in the meane time pollute themselues in poperie, by abiurations and wicked masses. It sufficeth not to haue a sincere heart onelie, but God dooth also require our outward actions: for he, being the creator of the whole man, dooth also challenge the whole vnto himselfe. Wherefore (me thinketh) we should confesse it to be verie good indéed, that the Achabites and Baalites should be destroied; but not that all the circumstances vsed therein should wholie be allowed. Neither shuld we be verie carefull to discharge Iehu of sinne; sith he was otherwise a worshipper of golden calues: neither did he (as the holie scriptures declare) walke perfectlie in the lawe of the Lord. ¹³⁸ Indéed he was appointed to subuert the seruice of Baal, but not to promote and dissemble the same. Wherefore, I cannot sée, how this kind of lieng may be excused; vnlesse perhaps it be said, that he did not lie in respect of his owne mind and iudgement, but by the motion of God, which stirred him vp vnto such a lie; euen as in like maner he willed the people to borowe costlie garments, and gold and siluer vessels of the Aegyptians; when as yet the Hebrues knew verie well, that these things should not be lent, but quite taken awaie from the owners: but yet God commanded, that so it should be; as we read in Exodus. ¹³⁹ But of Iehu this cannot be affirmed. Indéed the Baalites deserued thus to be seduced by fraud, séeing they deceiued the people, and that in a most weightie matter. And they, which had sollicited & incensed kings and a quéene against the prophets, & men of God; now they themselues also deserued to be circumuented by fraud and guile. Howbeit, Iehu in the meane time is not excused from pernicious lieng. I am not ignorant, that there is both good guile, and ill guile, ¹⁴⁰ and that it is lawfull sometimes to vse good guile. But this, whereof we now intreat, I affirme to be ill guile; and therefore vnlawfull. Indéed the lawe commanded, that the idolaters should be slaine; ¹⁴¹ but it willed not, that by this kind of lieng and legierdemaine it should be doone.

25 Iehu setteth foorth his seruice of Baal by a comparison. Achab séemed in that religion to be most superstitious; but it is said, that in comparison of Iehu, he worshipped Baal but a litle. This is euen as if he should saie; Those things were but sport and plaie, in comparison of those same, which I am minded to giue. The holie scriptures testifie, that he did these things fraudulentlie; ¹⁴² to the intent he might gather all the Baalites into one, and slaie them all togither; bicause he might not otherwise haue brought his purpose to pas. For verie manie of the Baalites, hauing intelligence of the slaughter of Achab and Ochozias, and also the children of Achab, and kindred of Ochozias, fled awaie for feare, and hid themselues in secret places. Wherefore, Iehu feigned these things, and made proclamation that he did maruellouslie fauour the Baalites. Moreouer, he perhaps feared, least if he should deale violentlie and openlie, a sedition might be raised among the people, to take in hand new matters. But the Baalites, being inuited by such faire and curteous indeuours, came in, and of their owne accord cast themselues headlong into the danger of death; whereas otherwise they were both subtill and craftie. But after this maner God dooth infatuate such men, and taketh them tarde in their owne wilinesse. Euen as we also perceiue, that it came to passe in Pharao; ¹⁴³ who wilfullie, and of his owne accord entring into the red sea, was drowned, and all his whole host with him.

¹⁴⁴ This kind of guile and lieng, in times past Constantius, the father of Constantine the great vsed; who, hauing imbraced Christ, set foorth an edict, which was far contrarie vnto his will, as though he would not suffer anie christian to liue in his Court. So as he commanded by his edict, that they, which would professe christian religion, should surrender the offices, which they had receiued, and should be discharged from the wars. They, which sincerelie imbraced Christ, despised courtlie dignities, and departed from the Emperours traine: on the other side, they, which onelie bare the name of christians; bicause they would kéepe their former place and degrée, departed from Christ. But the matter fell out otherwise: for the Emperour called home those that went their waie, and commanded, that they should enioie their former offices and commodities; and he put awaie those from him, which had forsaken Christ. And he vsed this reason; If they were not faithfull to that power, that is Christ, whom they worshipped; neither will they be faithfull to me: nor yet faithfullie labour and indeuour for the defense of me and mine empire. But Iulian, whom they call the Apostata, who reuolted from Christ, made an other maner of lie. ¹⁴⁵ For (as Ammianus Marcellinus reporteth) when he led his armie against Constantius his brother by the fathers side, fearing least he should offend his soldiers, of whom the most part were Christians, feigned himselfe to worship Christ also; when as he was alreadie reuolted from him. Wherefore, vpon a solemne feast daie of Epiphanie, he entered into the temple, togither with the Christians. And there be verie manie dissimulations, as touching religion, to be found out in the histories.

Of Dissimulation.

¹⁴⁶ 26 But what shall we set downe as touching dissimulation? ¹⁴⁷ I saie, that the same is of two sorts. One, which hath respect onelie to deceiue; the which, séeing it differeth not much from a lie, vndoubtedlie it is sinne. If one, being wicked, doo faine himselfe to be honest and godlie, the same man is an hypocrite; & in that he dissembleth, he sinneth gréeuouslie. Whosoeuer also, hauing a malicious and enuious heart against anie man, flattereth him, and feigneth to be his fréend, is not without sinne; yea, he is infected with a detestable dissimulation. But there is an other kind of dissimulation, which tendeth not to the deceiuing of anie man; but serueth onelie to kéepe counsell secret, least they should be hindered: and this dissimulation is not to be refused, or condemned as sinne, séeing (as we haue alreadie declared) it is not alwaies required, that we should open whatsoeuer truth we doo knowe. Socrates was praised, ¹⁴⁸ although he were a verie great dissembler. Howbeit, he said he knew nothing, [meaning] in comparison of the knowledge of God. So dooth Plato excuse him in his Apollogie. Also he compared those things, which he knew, with those things which he knew not; and being so compared, they might be accounted nothing. Besides this, his mind was not to deceiue; but rather to shew vnto others, which boasted that they knew manie things, how verie little or nothing they knew.

So Christ, being most innocent, tooke vpon him the flesh of sinne, ¹⁴⁹ and hid his innocencie and diuine nature: the which he did, not to deceiue mortall men, but that he might suffer for the saluation of men. For if he had béene knowne to be the Lord of glorie, they would neuer (as saith the apostle) haue crucified him. Moreouer, Christ feigned also before two of his disciples, that he wold haue gone further: this he did not, ¹⁵⁰ bicause he would deceiue them; but he therefore opened not himselfe vnto them for a time, bicause he would reprooue them of their incredulitie, and instruct them by testimonies of the scriptures. Therewithall also he signified, how far he was from their hearts: or (as Augustine interpreteth it) he shadowed vnto them his departure into heauen. Wherefore it euidentlie appéereth, that in those dissimulations, there was no lie; séeing his words well agréed with the thing signified.

27 And Dauid, ¹⁵¹ when he fell into a most perillous danger, being with Achis the king of Geth, changed his countenance, and feigned himselfe a foole: and by meanes that he séemed to be such a one, he escaped. Héere some saie, that he dissembled not; but that God, to deliuer him, strake such a feare into him: and that his senses being taken from him, he might doo those things which be spoken of him in the first booke of Samuel. ¹⁵² Wherefore, in his psalme, which beginneth; I will alwaies giue thanks vnto the Lord, ¹⁵³ he gaue God thanks for so great a benefit. Togither also with this his act, he, by the inspiration of God, shewed what Christ should suffer for our sakes; namelie, to be counted as a foole and a mad man. Or else it may be answered, that Dauid is not wholie to be excused of sinne; if he, as being a man, more afraid than was méet, sought for this kind of helpe. But if he, by the motion of God, did it wittinglie and with knowledge, we will not accuse him of sinne, though we may not imitate his example.

Neither is it lawfull, that anie man should feigne himselfe to haue committed anie crime, which he hath not doone: ¹⁵⁴ though Gregorie saith; that It is the part of good minds, there to acknowledge a fault, where none is. Of this matter, ¹⁵⁵ Augustine, in his 29. sermon De verbis apostoli, hath taught more soundlie and trulie. For he writeth; By feigning on this wise, if thou wast not a sinner before, thou shalt become a sinner; namelie, in saieng that thou hast co~mitted that, which thou hast not committed. Indéed it is lawfull for euerie man to confesse himselfe generallie to be a sinner, but this or that crime speciallie (hauing not committed the same) no man ought to take vpon him. Moreouer, we must note this to be true; to wit, that it is not required of vs to open the truth at all times, and in all places to speake all that we knowe. Howbeit, in iudgement, the case is otherwise: for there, while we be examined as witnesses, we are bound to testifie that, which we knowe to serue vnto the thing, whereof we be at that time demanded.

Of Truth, and of a Lie: which place is treated of In Iudges 3. and also In 1. Sam. 21, verse 12.

¹⁵⁶ 28 Now let vs treat of another question; namelie, whether it be lawfull for a good and godlie man to lie. But before I speake of a lie, I thinke best to speake somewhat of truth; which doubtlesse is an excellent vertue. ¹⁵⁷ Truth (as saith Tullie in his booke De inuentione ) is that, whereby things which are, haue béene, and shall be, are spoken without alteration. Wherein we will first note, that it consisteth in words: for he saith, that they are spoken. Not that I am ignorant, but that dumbe men, and others, doo sometimes speake by signes. ¹⁵⁸ But bicause (as saith Augustine in his first booke De doctrina christiana ) among other signes, words are the principall and most plaine. Further, we be taught hereby, that truth is not onelie to be considered as touching one difference of time; but as touching thrée differences. For he saith, that both those things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be. These things be then spoken trulie, when they be set foorth without alteration; that is, euen as they are, and by speaking made neither more ample, nor lesse than they be. The verie selfe-same thing in a maner hath Augustine said, in his booke De vera religione, ¹⁵⁹ the 36. chapter, where he writeth; that Truth is, whereby that which is, is signified. And it is a vertue; ¹⁶⁰ bicause by it men are made prone and readie to speake that, which is true.

If thou demand what is the generall word of truth; It is equalitie: wherevnto is ioined, ¹⁶¹ for difference sake; namelie, of words, about the things which are signified. And as it is well knowne to all men, all vertues doo aime at the meane, and eschew extremities. Wherefore, ¹⁶² in the kind of speaking, thou shalt perceiue two faults; namelie, if thou speake more than the thing will permit, or lesse than the thing is. Neither is vertue content onelie with the meane: for we must adde circumstances, which vse commonlie to followe it. So as the truth must not alwaies be spoken to euerie man, neither at all times, nor yet of euerie thing: and yet we must not lie. But it is wisedome sometime to kéepe secret those things, which for iust cause we will not haue known. He, which should vaunt abroad euerie-where, and to all men, the gifts of God giuen vnto him; should be counted foolish and fond. As contrariewise, he which should boast of a crime, whereinto by mans infirmitie he hath fallen, ought iustlie and woorthilie to be reprooued. Wherefore, truth requireth, ¹⁶³ that what we haue within vs, as touching our sense and will, that should prudentlie be signified by vs as it is. Further, the vertue, whereof we speake, hath simplicitie most of all ioined with it: and it is verie contrarie vnto doublenesse.

Besides this, it is a part of iustice: for both vnto things it giueth the proper words; and vnto a neighbour the truth which is due vnto him: without the which, mans fellowship cannot stand. For, if a man should continuallie suspect himselfe to be deceiued by anie man, he would neuer giue anie credit vnto him: by meanes whereof, all trades and societies among men would decaie. Aristotle, in his Ethiks, ¹⁶⁴ affirmeth; that Truth declineth somewhat toward the defect; especiallie when anie man speaketh of himselfe. For this wisedome requireth, that a man boast not of himselfe. Wherevpon Paule, in his second epistle to the Corinthians and twelfe chapter, wrote; If I will boast of my selfe, ¹⁶⁵ I shall not be vnwise, but I will forbeare, lest anie man should thinke of me more than that he seeth in me, or that he heareth of me. By these words he reprooueth them as foolish and vnwise, which doo boast and glorie, euen of those good things, which they haue: and he saith, that he will absteine from it. Neither (saith he) doo I require, that anie man should thinke more of me, than either he séeth in me, ¹⁶⁶ or heareth of me. And he, which speaketh lesse of himselfe, than he is, is not straitwaie to be accused as a lier. For that, which is the more, comprehendeth and conteineth in it the lesse. For whosoeuer hath fiftie, he may truelie saie that he hath twentie; although he speaketh not of all that he hath. Howbeit, if the same man should affirme, that he hath but twentie onelie; or else should denie that he hath anie at all, ¹⁶⁷ out of doubt he should lie: the which must not be committed, either for modestie sake, or (as they saie) for humilitie.

29 Concerning testimonies out of the holie scriptures, which doo stir vs vp to speake the truth; doubtlesse verie manie might be alledged: but a few shall suffice. In the ten commandements, ¹⁶⁸ it is written; Thou shalt not beare false witnesse. Which commandement must be obserued, not onelie in iudgement, but in all things, which in our talke we testifie, to be either true or false. Moreouer, God is set before our eies to be followed; ¹⁶⁹ whom the scriptures in euerie place pronounce to be true. Wherefore we also ought to be most feruent louers of the truth. ¹⁷⁰ And for that cause Iethro, in the 18. chapter of Exodus, counselled Moses to set such men to be rulers ouer the people, as did feare God, men of courage, louers of the truth, and those, which hated couetousnesse. ¹⁷¹ Also Dauid saith; Behold, thou hast loued truth, and therefore thou hast made me to vnderstand wisdome in the inward and secret parts of my mind. These things sufficientlie declare, that we are taught of God both by inward inspiration, and also by outward doctrine; bicause he is a louer of the truth: neither dooth he suffer, that his children should either erre, or be deceiued by lies. In Zacharie, the eight chapter, ¹⁷² it is written; Speake ye the truth euerie man to his neighbour. Which selfe-same sentence Paule vseth to the Ephesians: ¹⁷³ and he commandeth the same to the Colossians. But in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, ¹⁷⁴ he saith of himselfe, and of the other apostles, that they can haue nothing against the truth. Yea and the Scribes and Pharisies, being ioined with the Herodians, on this wise flattered Christ (whom they went about to intrap in his spéech;) Maister, ¹⁷⁵ we knowe that thou acceptest no persons, yea thou teachest the waie of God in truth. Hereby they declared, that it is a singular vertue for a noble and notable man, to prefer the truth before all things. But let these testimonies of the holie scriptures be sufficient at this time.

30 It remaineth, ¹⁷⁶ that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, ¹⁷⁷ who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the spéech. And vndoubtedlie, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrarie position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrarie to that, which Tullie affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be, are said to be vnaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrarie. This vice is so hurtfull, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to reioise, and be glad in falsehood. The generall word of truth, is equalitie; ¹⁷⁸ and the generall of this vice, inequalitie. And as truth is verie néere ioined with simplicitie, so a lie belongeth to doublenesse. Truth is a part of iustice, but a lie is a part of iniustice. By truth, the societie of man is preserued; but by lieng, it is hurt and ouerthrowne. But returne we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceiue speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liers speake another thing than they haue in their mind. But the desire to deceiue is vtterlie against iustice, loue, and amitie; which we mutuallie owe one towards another. So then there be thrée things in a lie; first, ¹⁷⁹ to speake that which is false; secondlie, his will in speaking; and thirdlie, a desire to deceiue. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts perteine vnto the forme.

31 A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. ¹⁸⁰ And this diuision commeth of no other thing, but of the effects, or of the ends. For this is euermore true, that the ends themselues may haue the nature both of the cause, and of the effect: séeing lies doo either profit, or delite, or else hurt. The end of a pernicious lie, is to hurt; the end of a sporting lie, is to delite; and the end of an officious lie, is to profit. But, forsomuch as in vertue, ¹⁸¹ Aristotle hath respect chéeflie vnto the meane, if then in speaking thou excéed that meane, ¹⁸² he calleth it boasting: but if thou come short, he nameth it dissimulation or mocking. And in this euill, that most of all hurteth; bicause an euill or false opinion is ingendred in the mind of our neighbor. For which cause it séemeth, that the same Aristotle said well; that Lieng is a wicked thing, ¹⁸³ and must be auoided. Which we may prooue by testimonies of the holie scriptures. For herevnto belong all those things, which we rehearsed before, for prouoking of vs to speake the truth. And there be manie other places dispersed here and there, which detest lieng. Dauid saith; ¹⁸⁴ Thou shalt destroie all those which speake lies. ¹⁸⁵ There be reasons also, which persuade the same: whereof one is, ¹⁸⁶ that in a lie there is an abuse of signes. And for so much as it is not lawfull to abuse the gifts of GOD: a lie also is vnderstood to be forbidden.

Moreouer, as it is before said; a lie is enimie vnto the societie of man. For in lieng, the vnderstanding of the mind is not communicated vnto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, séeing by nature man is made vnto societie and communication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striueth against his owne nature. And (as Augustine saith; ¹⁸⁷ ) Faith héerein is harmed, bicause he which heareth, beléeueth those things which are spoken. Wherefore, that faith, which he giueth vnto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, euerie man by lieng looseth his owne credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be euer after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to helpe his neighbour. So the fault that is in a lie, not onelie respecteth the losse or hurt of our neighbour, but it is in it of his owne kind: as manifestlie appéereth by that, which we haue alreadie said. ¹⁸⁸ But among lies, that séemeth to be most heinous, which is in matter of religion, doctrine, and godlinesse: for in no other thing can guile be more hurtfull and pernicious. For if we shall erre therein, we be cast from euerlasting felicitie. Wherefore Augustine, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, hath verie well written; that They indéed sinne gréeuouslie, which deceiue trauelling men, in shewing them a contrarie waie. But they be much more detestable, which in lieng about matters of religion, doo bring men into error.

32 If the thrée kinds of lies should be compared togither, I meane the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should iustlie be counted the more detestable. Bicause in it are two euils: one is, the abuse of signes; ¹⁸⁹ an other is, the hurt of our neighbour, and that both of the mind that is deceiued (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supplie of the helpe. ¹⁹⁰ And indéed, a sporting lie hath in it but a small and slender nature of a lie: for so much as the falshood is straitwaie found out, neither can it be long hidden from the hearers. ¹⁹¹ Yea Augustine writeth, that such lies are not to be counted for lies. But as touching an officious lie, ¹⁹² the iudgement thereof is more hard and obscure; séeing some denie it to be sinne: for they saie it hath a respect vnto helping of our neighbour, whom we ought in woords and déeds to reléeue as much as we can. So as they thinke that therein is no abuse of the signes: forsomuch as all our dooings ought to haue respect to the commoditie of our brethren. Neither doo they thinke, that therin is offense committed against mans societie: bicause through this kind of lie, men are made safe, and kept harmelesse.

Further, they saie, that whereas it is written in the holie scriptures; ¹⁹³ that God will destroie all those that speake lies: the same is not to be vnderstood of euerie kind of lie; but of a pernicious lie onelie. Which Augustine also, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, séemeth to grant. They alledge also the opinion of Plato, ¹⁹⁴ in his booke De Repub. who, as he did fraie the common people from lies; yet he gaue magistrates libertie to lie: especiallie in making of lawes. But in my iudgement, the thing is farre otherwise. Neither can I easilie grant, that an officious lie is without the abuse of the signes. For Aristotle, ¹⁹⁵ in his booke ⟨…⟩, in defining of words, saith; that They are notes of those affections, which we haue in our mind. Whereby it followeth, that all they abuse words, which signifie things to be otherwise, than they thinke in their mind. Further, that reason, which they bring of loue, is verie weake. For we ought to helpe our neighbours; but that must be by iust and honest meanes: otherwise we will suffer our selues to steale, to the intent to bestowe it in giuing of almes. But the sentence of the apostle must stand fast, which is; that Euill must not be doone, ¹⁹⁶ to the intent that good may come thereof. Neither doo I thinke it to be true, that by those kind of lies, the societie of man is not hurt: séeing that, if fidelitie be taken awaie, there remaineth no dealing of one man with an other.

33 But as touching that sentence of the holie scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt destroie all them that speake lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not vniuersallie spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and ioining togither with Christ indureth; so long those sinnes are not imputed: which otherwise of their owne nature would be our destruction. And this also I may easilie grant touching officious and sporting lies: bicause they are not so much against charitie, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can denie, but that in making of a lie, we deale against faith. And we must wholie grant, that he which lieth, dooth loose his owne credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitablie admonish, reprooue, or fruitfullie giue counsell, as he ought to doo. For they, which heare him, will soone thinke that he lieth officiouslie; to call them againe into the waie, and not that the thing is so in verie déed.

Certeinlie, this was the cause that Augustine was against Ierom, who in a maner fathered an officious lie vpon the holie scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authoritie of the holie scriptures would soone be impaired; for the readers thereof would soone saie, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the kéeping of men in their dutie. Neither ought the authoritie of Plato to mooue vs much; ¹⁹⁷ séeing in that place he erred greatlie, granting, that in things perteining to GOD, they might feine fables, which should serue to bring foorth and kéepe a good opinion of them. Doubtles we must not ieast in diuine matters. Further, the lawe of God is equall, and euermore one: and as it will not haue the common people to lie; so dooth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot iustlie be accused of a lie, which in their talke be farre from double meaning. For otherwhile it commeth to passe, that some speake that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true. ¹⁹⁸ Among which men they also are to be excused, who haue giuen a promise to doo a thing; which afterward they be not able to performe: bicause at the beginning, when they promised it, they were fullie minded to doo that, which they had promised: and therefore they haue not lied. If they afterward doo not accomplish those things, which they spake, the same happeneth by some other occasion.

And otherwhile it commeth to passe, that he which deliuereth his sword to a man to kéepe, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custodie of the sword, ought not to redeliuer it vnto him; bicause (as the lawiers saie) a new case requireth a new helpe. ¹⁹⁹ After the verie same sort is Paule excused, who said, that he would go into Spaine; when as neuerthelesse he went not thither. ²⁰⁰ Paule also promised to the Corinthians, that he would come vnto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: bicause, when he spake those words, he was minded so to doo: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22. cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Vndoubtedlie, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolueth all bonds: as it is written in the 19. cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.

34 But what shall we saie touching the hyperbolicall spéeches, which are in the holie scriptures, which at the first sight séeme to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence kéepe not a meane in respect of quantitie; yet, as touching the maner, it dooth. For those excessiue spéeches amplifie a matter, bicause their nature is not onelie to set foorth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that maner of spéech they most commodiouslie atteine vnto. Neither haue lies anie place there, forsomuch as they bréed not in the the minds of the readers and hearers anie false or corrupt sense. A meane therefore must there be kept; vndoubtedlie, not of the thing, but of the maner. The euangelists also are not to be holden as liers, when as they, setting foorth the acts of Christ, doo not all vse the selfe same words. For it is sufficient vnto the truth, that a thing be set foorth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the selfe same words. Yea, it is oftentimes doone through the goodnesse of the holie Ghost, that the maner of the narration should differ. For by such meanes, those things, which are not sufficientlie expressed by one, are more plainelie shewed by an other.

35 But they vse to obiect the midwiues of the Hebrues, which although they lied, ²⁰¹ yet God rewarded them. ²⁰² The same also happened to Rahab the harlot, or vitler. Augustine answereth, ²⁰³ that it was not the lie which the midwiues made, but the faith and feare that they had towards God, and the mercie shewed vnto the Israelits, that pleased the Lord: which the holie historie by expresse words dooth testifie. And no otherwise must we thinke of Rahab. ²⁰⁴ But I neuer like of the opinion of Gregorie, who saith; that for the lie which they made, their eternall reward was turned to a temporall reward: bicause it is said, that God, for their euerlasting blessednesse, builded them houses. But I iudge, that by reason of the true faith, which was effectuall in them, in such sort, as it brought foorth in them both loue and the feare of God, (which be lawfull and iust fruits of that faith) the lie, which they made through infirmitie, béereaued them not of eternall felicitie.

36 Abraham also is obiected, who said, ²⁰⁵ that Sara was his sister. Howbeit, therein (as Augustine teacheth) he lied not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not all the truth. And that is of no man required, to vtter all that he knoweth to be true. He did not saie that she was his wife: yet, bicause she was his kinswoman, he might (according to the maner of the Hebrues) truelie saie that she was his sister. Notwithstanding, he séemeth not to be holden altogither excused: for although he lied not in calling of hir sister; yet it appéereth that therein he fell, bicause, by not reuealing that she was his wife, he put hir in danger of loosing hir chastitie; sith he lest hir void of that helpe, whereby onelie she might haue béene defended from falling into the loue of strangers. Neither is it néedfull, that I should indeuour to excuse Abraham altogither: for he was a man, and by too muth feare might easilie doo amisse. Howbeit, ²⁰⁶ Augustine mentioneth; that Abraham was then in danger two maner of waies: the one, least he should be killed him selfe; the other, the adulterie of his wife. The first he might shun, in calling hir his sister: the other; namelie, least she should be polluted, he was not able to repell. For although he had said that he was hir husband, that would not haue serued, to deliuer hir from the shamefull lusts of the Aegyptians. Wherefore, that which he himselfe was not able to shun, he committed vnto God: and in that, which was in his owne power, he would not tempt him. This séemeth to be the iudgement of Augustine. But what I iudge, I haue before declared.

37 But did not the same Abraham lie, when he said vnto his seruants; ²⁰⁷ Tarrie here, and we will returne vnto you: when neuerthelesse he was minded to sacrifice his sonne? Which if he had doone, he might not haue returned, hauing his sonne with him; but should haue returned alone without him. Iacob also by expresse words lied, ²⁰⁸ when he said vnto his father; I am Esau thy sonne. Paule also (as it is written in the Acts) saith, that he knew him not to be the chéefe priest, which commanded him to be striken; when for all that (as Augustine testifieth in his sermon of the Centurions sonne, and as it is written in the 23. cause, question the first, chapter Paratus ) he knew him well enough. Paule (saith he) was brought vp among the Iewes, he had learned the lawe at the féet of Gamaliel: wherefore he verie well knew the chéefe priest from other men. ²⁰⁹ Iehu also lied manifestlie, when he said, ²¹⁰ that he would worship Baal. Augustine writeth, that there be two kinds of men mentioned in the holie scriptures. For that there were some so perfect, as although they were not without sinne, yet we may not rashlie iudge euill of them; but rather séeke how we may defend those things, which in their works haue a shew of sinne. They oftentimes were so mooued by the holie Ghost, that God by their words and acts might make certeine secrets knowne. And so we must beléeue, that oftentimes they both spake and did certeine things by prophesie. So Abraham, when he said; We will returne vnto you, prophesied vnwares, that which shuld come to passe: for he safelie returned from the mountaine with Isaac.

And Iacob, in saieng; I am Esau, ment to declare nothing else, but that he was the man, to whom the degrée, blessing, and dignitie was due: which séemed to perteine vnto Esau, who was the first borne. Paule also prophesied, what should at the length become of the high priest; namelie, that as a painted wall, and a thing altogither feigned and hypocriticall, he should be taken awaie. Further (saith Augustine ) there were other men, not so perfect, but were euill; which are spoken of in the old testament, either to haue lied; or else to haue doone some thing, that might séeme to be sinne. But he thinketh, that we should not so greatlie indeuor to defend the good name and opinion of those men. Of this sort of men was Iehu: for although that murther, which he executed vpon Achab, and his familie, and also his wéeding out of Baal, and the worshippers thereof, pleased God: yet neuerthelesse, he was a wicked king; neither forsooke he the worshipping of golden calues. Wherefore it shall be lawfull to confesse, that in lieng he committed sinne. But in my iudgement (and as I noted before) by this onelie distinction we may easilie dissolue this doubt; namelie, ²¹¹ that those men were stirred vp to lie, either by the spirit of man, or by the motion of God. When they did it as men, we will not denie, but that they sinned: but when they spake so by the inspiration of God, we maruell at their saiengs and dooings. But we will not take it as an example and president to followe.

VVhether it be lawfull to lie, for preseruing the life of our neighbour.

38 But there ariseth a harder doubt; ²¹² namelie, whether it be lawfull to make a lie, for the preseruation of our neighbors life? Augustine, ²¹³ De mendacio ad Consentium, saith; If a man shuld be in great perill of death, and the same man should also knowe, that his sonne were in extreame danger; who happening to die, thou hauing knowledge thereof, if the father aske thée; Dooth my sonne liue? And thou art sure that he also will die, if thou shew him that his sonne is departed, what wouldest thou doo in this case? Whether thou saiest, he liueth; or whether thou saiest, I cannot tell: thou liest. But if so be thou answer that he is dead, all men will crie out vpon thée, as though thou haddest committed man-slaughter; and as though thou, by thy heauie newes, haddest béene the occasion of the death of this father, being sicke, and lieng at the point of death. Augustine granteth that the case is hard; neither denieth he, but that (as a man) he should be mooued; and perhaps it might so chance, that affections would not suffer him to speake that, which is iust and right. But at the length he concludeth, that he ought not to lie.

And he addeth moreouer, that if thou knowe, that anie vnchast woman loueth thée inordinatelie, which also threateneth to kill hir selfe; ²¹⁴ yea and will doo it indéed, except thou assent to hir wicked lusts, whether herein thou oughtest to commit anie shamefull things against chastitie? I thinke not. So likewise (saith he) thou oughtest not to offend against the truth, for sauing of thy neighbors life. And moreouer, what a windowe should be opened vnto lieng, if we should determine to doo otherwise? For that, which one should thinke to be lawfull in respect of life, another would iudge that he may doo the same for monie; another for estimation, or for defending of lands and possessions. And so it would come to passe, that there would be no measure nor end of lieng. We may not suffer (saith Augustine ) that anie man should kill his owne soule for the bodilie life of another man. No, nor that it is lawfull to lie for the saluation of anie mans soule. Euerie lie (saith Iohn) is not of GOD. But we ought not to speake those things, which are not of God.

²¹⁵ 39 What if a man were sought out of murtherers to be killed, and that thou knewest that the man lieth there hidden, where thou presentlie art; and they demand of thée if thou knowest whether he be there or no? He answereth, that if thou be of a valiant courage, and as becommeth a christian, thou must saie; Where he is I knowe, but I will not vtter it, doo you what ye will. Notwithstanding, when the matter commeth to this point, that for the defense of anie mans life thou must make a lie: knowe thou, that thou oughtest to commit the matter vnto God, and that thou hast no more there to doo. Either thou must answer, that thou wilt not betraie him, or else thou must hold thy peace. But by thy silence the murtherer will suspect that he is in thy house, and then thou shalt séeme to haue giuen an occasion of his apprehension. But in verie déed, thou hast not giuen it; for thou canst not lett him to thinke what he will. Wherefore, the matter must rather be committed vnto God, than to make a lie. Howbeit, thou must temper thy words with singular consideration; namelie, that thou speake in such sort, as thou vtter not all, and yet speake not falselie. For in these cases, I thinke it is not forbidden; naie, I rather thinke it most lawfull to speake doubtfullie. And, as touching this question, this is sufficient.

VVhether for modestie sake it be lawfull to lie; vpon the second of Samuel, chapter the 9. verse the 8.

²¹⁶ 40 There be some so importunate men, as although God haue heaped his benefits vpon them, yet are they alwaies complaining; We haue borne the burthen and heate of the daie, ²¹⁷ and yet dooest thou make vs equall vnto them? Some also be so modest, as euen in prosperitie they humble themselues. Others be broken with miserie, and are become more humble. But they, which in their losses and afflictions reteine still the fearsenes of nature, be too insolent and obstinate. Humilitie is like a bridle, ²¹⁸ wherewith the insolencie of our nature must be held in his dutie. And men be most of all reclaimed vnto modestie, when they begin to consider how verie little they haue of themselues. Howbeit, the same humbling of our selues ought to be ioined with the acknowledging of Gods benefits. For manie, while they be either ignorant thereof, or else dissemble it, become like vnto beasts; as they, which cannot one whit vnderstand, with what benefits they be indued by God. But there must be a speciall regard had, that we doo not counterfet that modestie; and that the same consist not onelie in words, but in the mind also.

Yet to reteine that vertue, ²¹⁹ it is not lawfull for thée to make a lie vpon thy selfe for modestie sake. For Aristotle himselfe, in his Ethiks, reckoneth a lie among vnhonest things. And (as Paule saith; Wee must not doo euill, that good may come of it. Augustine, in his 8. epistle to Ierom, touching this matter, citeth the words of Paule to the Corinthians; ²²⁰ ) If Christ be not risen, in vaine is our preaching, and your faith also is in vaine. For we be found false witnesses of God, when we saie, that God raised vp Christ from the dead; whom he raised not vp, if the dead doo not rise againe. But here (saith Augustine ) a man might saie vnto Paule; Why dooest thou so much detest lieng, since the same tendeth to the setting foorth of the glorie of God? And he maketh Paule to answer, that he dooth detest such lies, and that it is no lesse euill, to commend things that be not true concerning God, than not to beléeue things that be true of him. Hereby we gather this argument; If it be not lawfull to lie for the honour of God, it is much lesse lawfull to lie for the reteining of anie vertue. Yea, and it is no lesse euill to ascribe to thy selfe euill, which thou hast not committed, than to arrogate vnto thy selfe anie good, which thou hast not doone.

41 Contrariwise neuerthelesse, ²²¹ Paule vnto Timothie séemeth somwhat to make a lie of himselfe; Christ (saith he) came to saue sinners, ²²² of whom I am the cheefe. For Paule was not the chéefe, or the greatest sinner. And in the 30. chapter of the Prouerbs, the prophet Agur, whether he were Salomon himselfe, or some other man; ²²³ I am (saith he) more foolish than all men, and the wisdome of man is not in me; I haue learned no knowledge, neither haue I the vnderstanding of holie things. Yet was he both a prophet, and a wise man, and answered prudentlie vnto questions. And Christ himselfe, of himselfe; I am (saith he) a woorme and no man, ²²⁴ a verie scorne of men, and the outcast of the people. Some defend these spéeches on this wise, saieng; that They, which haue thus amplified their sinnes, they onelie respected their owne strength, which they themselues had by themselues, and a certeine naturall inclination of their owne vnto euill. For they themselues sawe, that they should gréeuouslie haue fallen, vnlesse God had staied them. These in verie déed be no small prouocations, to make vs iudge humblie and lowlie of our owne selues. But it is one thing for a man to saie that he is prone and readie bent vnto euill; and an other thing to confesse that he hath doone some euill, which he hath not doone. For there is as much difference betwéene these, as there is betwéene act and power. Certeinlie, we may euerie one of vs slip, yet no man ought to saie that he hath slipped, when he hath not. We ought all to confesse our selues to be sinners, but none ought to ascribe vnto himselfe anie sinne by name, which he hath not committed.

I saie therefore, that those spéeches, which I haue made mention of, if they be throughlie weighed, they be true. For some be vttered after that sort, bicause absolutelie they be so; some, for that they be extolled by an excessiue spéech; some, bicause they be compared with an other thing by contention. ²²⁵ Paule calleth himselfe the principall sinner, either bicause he was the first that came vnto Christ, among those that persecuted the church of GOD; or bicause he iudged himselfe in verie déed to be chéefe and greatest of the sinners. Not as if there had béene no man that had sinned more heinouslie (for there were such as had sinned against the holie Ghost, there were those which had sinned without anie repentance:) but bicause that among all them, which were redéemed by Christ, and had obteined the mercie of God, he thought himselfe to haue sinned most gréeuouslie. For some had sinned of infirmitie, some of plaine error and incredulitie; some had procéeded so farre, as they crucified Christ, who neuerthelesse were afterward, by the preaching of the word of God, called home vnto repentance. ²²⁶ Therefore saith Peter in the Acts; I knowe brethren that ye did it by ignorance, euen as did your rulers. But Paule had no recourse vnto the sermons of the apostles: there was néed of greater bonds for the drawing of him vnto Christ. Wherevpon Christ spake thus vnto him from heauen; ²²⁷ Saule, Saule, whie persecutest thou me? With these men therefore he compareth himselfe: and of these he saith he is the principall.

And so Chrysostome, vpon this place, saith; that These words be against other words of his in the epistle to the Philippians. ²²⁸ For there he saith, that he was conuersant in the Iewish religion, without crime, and without complaint. But these things (saith he) are nothing repugnant. For euen they themselues, which had performed the righteousnesse of the lawe, yet were they sinners neuerthelesse. And although Paule spake those things modestlie of himselfe, yet did he not ascribe an vntruth vnto himselfe. For, notwithstanding he granteth himselfe to haue béene a persecuter, and a blasphemer; yet he saith not, that he was an adulterer, or a fornicatour, or a théefe; séeing these things should not haue béene true. The things obiected out of the Prouerbs, touching Agur the prophet, ²²⁹ were true by waie of comparing them vnto those things, whereof a demand was made. He saith that he had no wisdome; not in respect that the wisdome which he had, was no wisdome; but bicause the same, being compared vnto so great matters, might séeme to be none. So Socrates was woont to saie; This onlie I knowe, that I knowe nothing: bicause that knowledge, which he had, would be nothing, in comparison of the multitude of those things that he knew not. ²³⁰ So Christ called himselfe a woorme, and a reproch of the people; bicause men so accompted of him, by reason of his afflictions and crosse. Also in speaking, there hapneth somtime an excessiue or hyperbolicall spéech; such indéed as is not ioined with a a lie, but which may serue for the better setting foorth of the matter.

VVhether faith must be kept toward him that breaketh his promise.

42 In the beginning of the ninth chapter of the second booke of Samuel, Dauid demandeth; ²³¹ Is there anie man left aliue of the familie of Saule, to whom I may doo good for Ionathans sake? When he speaketh of Ionathan, he excludeth not God; naie rather, that which he did for Ionathans sake, he did chéefelie for God and godlinesse sake. So God saith, that he would doo well to the people of the Iews, for the couenant which he had made with Abraham; yet dooth he not exclude his owne goodnesse. Naie rather, he chéefelie includeth the same therein; séeing that couenant procéeded of the méere goodnesse and mercie of God. But thou wilt demand, whie Dauid saith that he will doo good vnto anie of the house of Saule, for Ionathans sake; and not for Saules owne sake. For in the 24. chapter of the first booke of Samuel, what time as he had cut off the skirt of Saules cloke, ²³² he being inforced by Saule to sweare, promised, that he would not root out his séed. Whereby he was bound, not onelie vnto Ionathan, but also vnto Saule. Some answer, that Dauid was now discharged of his oth; bicause Saule kept not promise with him, but had doone him excéeding great wrong. For he that breaketh his faith (saie they) let faith be broken with him. And Cicero, in his third booke of Offices, citeth a verse out of Accius an old Poet; Hast thou broken thy faith? Atreus, whom he bringeth in to speake, answereth; Neither haue I giuen neither doo I giue my faith to anie faithlesse person.

But this is no sure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and false of promise: yet oughtest not thou for that cause to shrinke from thy promises; séeing God dooth oftentimes kéepe promise euen with vs that doo euill. He promised, that he would continue the kingdome, or else some great honour in the familie of Dauid, euen vnto Messias. He promised that he would giue a sonne which should redéeme mankind. Men vndoubtedlie were euill, vnfaithfull, and vnworthie to haue the promises kept with them: yet did he performe these things to them, according to his excellent faithfulnes. Some answer on this wise, that faith in déed must be kept with an euill and vnfaithfull man, if he be vnfaithfull towards other, so he be no such towards vs; or else, if he doo hurt vs, so it be not in the selfe same thing, wherein it was agréed vpon betwéene vs. Naie rather, if he faile euen in the verie same thing which is agréed vpon, yet must we kéepe promise: if by that meanes, neither his naughtinesse be increased; nor a greater power to doo hurt be giuen vnto him. We be therefore loosed of our promise, if the thing cannot be, which we haue promised; or else, if it should fall out ill vnto himselfe, to whom the promise is made: as if thou deliuer a sword vnto a furious man, which thou didst promise vnto a man of sobrietie; or if he wax woorse and woorse, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reape a benefit of his vnfaithfulnesse: or else, if thou shalt promise such a thing, as is against the word of God, or the profit of the Church or Common-weale. Therfore it is written in the 22. cause, question second; In euill promises breake thy faith.

But most of all, we be at libertie of our promise, if we being circumuented by anie fraud, haue promised anie thing that we ought not to haue doone; or else, if the things themselues be now changed. Some haue added; If thou being compelled either by force or feare, dooest promise anie thing that thou wouldest not. But it can scarselie be perceiued, how so great a feare and compulsion can happen vnto a couragious and good man, that he should promise that, which might be against either his dutie, or the word of God. Howbeit, if a man be fallen in such wise, he is at libertie. But aboue all, we must take héed, that we doo not craftilie colour our promises, and séeke by fraud and counterfet meanes to vnwind our selues out: séeing fraud (as Cicero verie rightlie said) dooth not vndoo periurie, but it tieth it fast. Dauid, when as perhaps he might haue inuented manie things to breake his promises; yet would he doo no such thing. For being a godlie prince, he was rather minded to followe truth and faithfulnesse.

43 Certeinlie, the nature and consideration of these two vertues; [namelie, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogither the selfe-same: wherein they doo agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare. ²³³ Truth is a vertue, whereby we are readie to speake those things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind doo expresse: for hereby, bicause we speake those things which we thinke, are we called faithfull and true of our word. And faith is a vertue, whereby is brought to passe, that our déeds be answerable to our promises. There is some conformitie on both parts. In truth there is a conformitie of words with the meaning of the mind, and in faith a conformitie of déeds with promises. So as lieng is contrarie vnto truth, and falsehood vnto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is so called, bicause that is doone which is spoken. And he defined the same after a sort on this maner; ²³⁴ Faith is a constancie of words and of couenants. In another place he saith, that Faith is the truth of a mans word.

But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reason, whereby we are readie to doo those things that we haue promised. This definition (as I haue said) is more perfect, and it consisteth of a generall word, and of a difference. For faith apperteineth vnto iustice, and it causeth vs to yéeld vnto euerie man, that which perteineth to him; séeing what thou shalt promise to anie man, that is now become his, to whom thou hast promised. And the same vnlesse thou performe in time, thou withholdest that, which is another mans. And so great is the force of faith, as it comprehendeth in one all the parts of mans life: bicause neither matrimonie, neither the bargains which citizens haue among themselues, neither anie part of the Common-weale can consist without faith. It differeth (as I said) from truth, although with the same it hath manie things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we speake, are either true or false; whether they be past, whether they be present, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to doo onelie in promises: neuerthelesse, those promises must be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is euill, or a hinderance to good: otherwise they ought not to be firme.

Wherefore, faith should haue the verie same companions ioined therewith, that an oth hath; namelie, truth, righteousnesse, and iudgement. So as he, that breaketh his prom⟨…⟩se, dooth not onelie sinne in so dooing; but he must also make amends for the hinderance, which through his vnfaithfulnesse the other partie receiueth, to whom the promise is made. Dauid, being singularlie adorned with these vertues, would not depart from the promises. For he made the promise of his owne accord, being not forced thereto by anie feare or violence: and that, which he promised, was neither repugnant to the word of God, nor yet hurtfull to the Common-weale. For is was a matter of good example, that so notable a king did fulfill his promise: neither was there anie danger, least they, to whom he had promised, should become the woorse by his promise: for they were alreadie dead. Wherefore, there was no cause, why he should shrinke from it. And bicause he would performe his promise vnto Saule, therefore he demanded, whether anie of his familie were remaining, whom he might doo good vnto. But he speaketh of Ionathan by name, bicause he was bound vnto him; not onelie by the bond of promise, but also of fréendship, and most néere acquaintance. Vndoubtedlie, he that faileth of his faith, is vnwoorthie to haue faith kept with him. Howbeit, we must haue a speciall regard vnto these circumstances; least for the naughtinesse of another, we also should become naught our selues, and séeke corners for periurie.

Of a Fable and Apollogie.

²³⁵ 44 They saie that an apollogie is a kind of fable: ²³⁶ and a fable they define to be a narration of a false thing, deuised for commoditie or delite sake. Or (as Augustine, in his second booke, & 11. chapter De soliloquijs saith;) A fable is a lie, made for delectation sake, although properlie it cannot be called a lie. For the falsehood of it is straitwaie found out, and especiallie in apollogies. For in them are brought in insensible and vnreasonable creatures talking one with another, and intreating of verie weightie matters. And so soone as the hearer perceiueth this, he straitwaie vnderstandeth, that the matter is feigned, ²³⁷ and not so doone [as it is vttered.] And doubtlesse some fables are likelie to be true, and some are far from probabilitie. For it is verie likelie, that once there fell a contention betwéene Aiax and Vlysses for the armor of Achilles, which at the length was iudged vnto Vlysses: and that Aiax tooke so great displeasure thereat, as becomming mad, he slue himselfe. But contrariewise, it is without all probabilitie, that a woman was turned into a plant, or into a stone: ²³⁸ so as an apollogie may be likened to a fable that is not likelie to be true.

45 The kinds or sorts of a fable, are comedies, tragedies, satyrs, and narrations of harping and h⟨…⟩dicall poets, and also apollogies. But which of these feignings be lawfull, and which be not lawfull, may thus be defined. Those, which haue vnmanerlines and scurrilitie; that is, a mirth ioined with dishonestie, ought not to be admitted. But those, which are written honestlie, and with shamefastnesse, so that they can refresh the mind with some pleasure, and are also profitable to teach good maners, are not to be despised. That such, as be vnciuill, must be put awaie, it is confirmed by two testimonies of the apostle. To the Corinthians he writeth; Euill talke corrupteth good maners. ²³⁹ And vnto the Ephesians, the fift chapter, it is written; Let not whooredome, nor anie vncleannesse, ²⁴⁰ nor couetousnesse be named among you, as it becommeth saints. Then is added ⟨…⟩, filthinesse; ⟨…⟩, foolish talking; and ⟨…⟩, iesting; which are not comelie. By these words he reprooueth all communications, which are defiled either with dishonestie or scurrilitie.

The verie same sawe Plato, ²⁴¹ in his third booke De Repub. where he excludeth poets that spake of gods, as though they should speake of men: bicause they, in so writing, doo both dishonourablie treate of the nature of God, which is the best and most excellent; and also excuse the sinnes of common men, when as they testifie, that both the gods, and also noble men, did things alike. Which certeinlie we may perceiue in the comedie of Eunuchus in Terence, where Chaerea, ²⁴² a wicked yoong man, beholding a wanton table in the harlots house (wherein was painted Iupiter comming into Danae by a shower) began to haue a pleasure in himselfe; séeing he, being but a séelie man, did those things, which he perceiued by that table, that the chéefe god in old time had committed; I did it (saith he,) yea I did it with good will. Also, Cicero saith, ²⁴³ that Homer feigned these things, and translated humane things vnto the gods. But I would rather they had transferred diuine things vnto vs!

46 Augustine, in his second booke of confessions, the 15. and 16. chapters, ²⁴⁴ complaineth and soroweth, that he being a child and a yoong man, learned profitable words, but yet in vaine things. I would to God (saith he) I had béene instructed in profitable writings! I heard Iupiter thundering, and therwithall committing adulterie. The minds and affections of men are prone enough vnto vices. Wherefore it is wickedlie doone, that children and yoong men should in that age be stirred vp to sinne, by vile and filthie fables. But apollogies are profitable, which consisting both of honest words and good arguments, doo rightlie instruct that first age. Aesope, the ancient writer, ²⁴⁵ happilie exercised himselfe in this kind: although some doo ascribe his fables vnto Hesiodus, who was before Aesops time. But this one apollogie (whereof we now treat) was written long before the time of Aesope & Hesiodus. For the time of the Iudges, and namelie of Gedeon, was an hundreth yeares and more, before the war of Troie. There is an other apollogie also in the second booke of kings, ²⁴⁶ the 14. chapter, where Amasias obteining victorie of the Edomits, prouoked the king of Israel to make warre with him. Vnto whom king Ioas answered thus; The thistle of Libanon sent vnto the cedar that is of Libanon, and said; Giue thy daughter to my sonne to wife. And a wild beast went out of Libanon, and trode down the thistle. By which apollogie he shewed, that he was so much greater than Amasias the king of Iuda, as the cedar trée excelleth the thistle: and gaue him warning, that he should, after that sort, be troden downe and oppressed by his host, as the thistle perisheth that is troden downe by wild beasts.

²⁴⁷ 47 These things haue I therefore rehearsed; bicause the Gréeke and Ethnike writers should not be thought to be the first inuenters of these profitable deuises. All men agree, that the vse of apollogies is then to be added, when we haue to deale with rude persons. For they vnderstand not what a perfect argument or an vnperfect meaneth; neither are they able to perceiue inductions: so that of particulars they might gather vniuersals. And they passe not vpon the examples of noble personages; bicause they themselues are abiect and base. Wherefore, séeing they be smallie instructed by those meanes, there remaine fained narrations: where they being allured with the strangenesse of the matter, giue great héed to the things that are spoken, and are otherwhiles at length persuaded. Moreouer, they are good to helpe memorie: for things, that are so new and pleasant, doo verie much delight; and those things, that be so pleasant, be not easilie forgotten. Furthermore, men can sooner abide themselues to be reprooued by apollogies, than by euident spéeches. For the plaine truth ingendereth hatred, but being couered with apollogies or darke spéeches, it may be abidden. At the beginning, the hearers know not wherevnto the matter tendeth: therefore being ignorant what will be spoken, they tarrie out the end, and perhaps be persuaded at the length. Christ finished the whole parable of the vine, ²⁴⁸ and at the end, the Scribes and Pharisies perceiued, that it was spoken against themselues. So also among the Romans, Menenius Agrippa, by an apollogie wan the co~mon people, which had diuided themselues from the Senators, to ioine themselues againe with them. For these causes are the parables, dreames, and visions of the prophets verie much vsed in the holie scriptures.

---

← 30. The twelfe Chapter. ¶ The eight · Contents · 32. The xiiij. Chapter. The last precept →

Footnotes

1. In 2. Sam. 16, vers. 21. A distribution of this place. ↩

2. What is contumelie. ↩

3. A definitiof contumelie. ↩

4. Three kinds of contumelie. ↩

5. The contrarie vnto contumelie. ↩

6. 2 Sam. 16, 20. ↩

7. When tawnts are sinnes, and no sinnes. 2. Sam. 16, 17. ↩

8. Another distinction. ↩

9. When tawnts are no contumelies. ↩

10. Gal. 3, 1. Luke. 24, 25 ↩

11. Esai. 1. Eze. 16. and else where. ↩

12. verse. 12. ↩

13. Of the causes of contumelies. Anger. ↩

14. 1. Sam. 16, 7
    ↩

15. Pride. ↩

16. Prou. 11, 2. ↩

17. 2 kin. 18, 30. ↩

18. Foolishnes. ↩

19. 1 Sam. 25, 14. Pro. 20, 30. ↩

20. Whether contumelie be s⟨…⟩aine. ↩

21. Pro. 10, 12. ↩

22. Matth. 5, 22. ↩

23. The weightinesse of vices is considered by their obiects. ↩

24. verse. 22. ↩

25. Whether contumelies ought to be suffered. ↩

26. Matth. 5, 30 ↩

27. Iohn. 18, 23 ↩

28. Pro. 26, 10. ↩

29. Pro. 26, 5. ↩

30. Why contumelies must be repressed. ↩

31. When contumelies must be suffered. ↩

32. Pro. 26, 4. ↩

33. I⟨…⟩ suffering of contumelies, what we must take heed of. ↩

34. What must be doone when we perceiue that a contumelie is not to be suffered. ↩

35. Gala. 6, 1. ↩

36. The reasons of Dauid weighed. ↩

37. Whether Dauid did well in bearing of the contumelies. ↩

38. In 1. Cor. 4. verse. 5. ↩

39. Iudgement in the Church, in the common-weale, and in a houshold are necessarie. ↩

40. Iudgements of two sorts. ↩

41. Ciuill and ecclesiasticall iudgements are not taken awaie. ↩

42. Matt. 18, 15. Matth. 7, 5. From whence priuate iudgements doo spring. Augustine. ↩

43. We must ⟨…⟩ot rashlie ⟨…⟩udge of o ⟨…⟩her mens faults. ↩

44. Gala. 6, 1. ↩

45. Augustine. ↩

46. Chrysost. ↩

47. What things shuld reuoke vs from rash iudgement. ↩

48. 1. Cor. 2, 15.
    ↩

49. Augustine. ↩

50. Esai 45, 9. ↩

51. Rom. 9, 20. ↩

52. If things of the holie scripture offend vs, whereto we must referre them. ↩

53. Gen. 11, 5. ↩

54. Gen. 18, 21. ↩

55. Augustine. Things that may be doone as well with a good mind as with a bad, must not be iudged of. ↩

56. Matth. 7, 1. 1. Cor. 4, 5. ↩

57. 1. Tim. 5, 24.
    ↩

58. verse. 22. ↩

59. Matth. 7, 1. ↩

60. Augustine. ↩

61. Gen. 16, 1⟨…⟩ ↩

62. In 1. Sam. 29, verse. 3. A definition of suspicion. ↩

63. 1. Sam. 2, 19.
    ↩

64. We must not giue place to our suspicions. Augustine. ↩

65. What is lawfull in suspicion. ↩

66. In 1. kin. 18 verse. 17. ↩

67. What maner of mockings be lawfull. Looke in 1. Sam. 22, verse. 16. ↩

68. verse. 12. ↩

69. The whole chapter. ↩

70. Ephe. 5, 4. ↩

71. In Iudg. 3⟨…⟩ ↩

72. Plautus. ↩

73. A definition of guilt. Seruius. ↩

74. Labeo. ↩

75. Another definition of guile. ↩

76. Vlpian. ↩

77. Cicero. ↩

78. Augustine. ↩

79. Iohn. 1, 14. ↩

80. Guile coms of a doublenes of the heart. verse. 3. ↩

81. Rom. 3, 4. Rom. 7, 18. ↩

82. 1. Pet 2, 22.
    ↩

83. Psal. 32, 2. ↩

84. Augustine. ↩

85. Psal. 34, 13. ↩

86. Flatterers. ↩

87. Homer. ↩

88. Good guile and euill guile. ↩

89. Chrysost. ↩

90. 1. Sam. 12, 13.
    ↩

91. Iudg. 3, 19. Exo. 12, 35. ↩

92. 2. Sam. 17, 7
    ↩

93. Gen. 34, 13. ↩

94. Ill guile is not forbidden against enimies. ↩

95. Who be verie enimies. ↩

96. Ierom. ↩

97. 1. Kin. 10, 21
    ↩

98. A guile vsed by the king of Denmarke against theeues. Augustine. ↩

99. Exo. 12, 35. ↩

100. Iosua. 8, 4. ↩

101. Ierom. ↩

102. Deut. 23, 20. ↩

103. 2. Co. 12, 1⟨…⟩.
     ↩

104. That is mockerie. ↩

105. The ciuill laws allow of guile against enimies. ↩

106. Attilius Regulus. ↩

107. An oth distinguished. ↩

108. Psal. 15, 4. ↩

109. Ierom. ↩

110. verse. 15. ↩

111. Augustine. ↩

112. Ambrose. ↩

113. Iosua 9, 4. ↩

114. An oth giuen for an vniust cause must be cut off. ↩

115. The Pope cutteth off oths both lawfull and vnlawfull. ↩

116. A prouerbe in the court of Rome. ↩

117. Ierom. ↩

118. verse. 15. ↩

119. A sophisticall act of the Thracians. ↩

120. A guile of the Romane legat against Antiochus. ↩

121. Ierom. ↩

122. An oth dissolueth not former bonds. ↩

123. 1. Cor. 7, 9.
     ↩

124. Whether faith must be kept with Heretiks. ↩

125. They which come vnto princes vpon safe conduct, be not in their power. ↩

126. Of Iehu. ↩

127. Whether promise giuen to theeues is to be kept. ↩

128. Attilius Regulus. ↩

129. What is to be considered in a generall oth. ↩

130. The fact of Iehu. ↩

131. A seruiceable lie. ↩

132. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

133. Matth. 5, 16 ↩

134. Exod. 28. ↩

135. 1. Kin. 10, 22
     ↩

136. The guile of Iehu was vsed in the persecution of the Priscillianists. ↩

137. 1. Kin. 18, 23
     ↩
138. 2. Kin. 10, 31
     ↩

139. Exod. 12, 3. ↩

140. Good guile and euill guile. ↩

141. Deut. 13. 5. and 6. ↩

142. Why Iehu pretended an honour and seruice vnto Baal. ↩

143. Exo. 14, 23. ↩

144. The fact of Constantius Cesar. ↩

145. A lie of Iulian the Apostata. ↩

146. In Iud. 3. at the end. ↩

147. Dissimulation is of two sorts. ↩

148. In the Commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks. ↩

149. After what maner Christ dissembled. 1. Cor. 2, 8. ↩

150. Luke. 24, 28 ↩

151. Of Dauids dissimulation. Looke in 1. Sam. 21. at the end. ↩

152. 1. Sa. 21, 13.
     ↩

153. Psal. 34. ↩

154. Gregorie. ↩

155. Augustine. ↩

156. Of truth. ↩

157. What is truth. Cicero. ↩

158. Augustine. ↩

159. Augustine. ↩

160. Truth is a vertue. ↩

161. The generall word of truth. ↩

162. Two faults in speeches. ↩

163. What thing truth requireth. ↩

164. Aristotle. ↩

165. 2. Cor. 12, 6.
     ↩

166. He that speaketh lesse of himselfe than he hath, lieth not. ↩

167. We must not lie for humilitie sake. ↩

168. Exo. 20, 16. ↩

169. Rom. 3, 4. ↩

170. verse. 21. ↩

171. Psal. 51, 8. ↩

172. verse. 16. ↩

173. Ephes. 4, 25. Col. 3, 9. ↩

174. 2. Cor. 3, 8.
     ↩

175. Matt. 22, 16. ↩

176. Of a lie. ↩

177. Augustine. ↩

178. Inequalitie the generall word of a lie. ↩

179. Three things incident to a lie. ↩

180. The distinction of a lie. ↩

181. Aristotle. ↩

182. Looke In 2. Sam. 16, verse 33. ↩

183. A lie is wicked and must be shunned. ↩

184. Psal. 5, 6. ↩

185. Psal. 5, 6. ↩

186. In a lie is an abuse of signes. ↩

187. Augustine. ↩

188. What kind of lie is most greeuous. ↩

189. In a pernicious lie are two euils. ↩

190. A sporting lie. ↩

191. Augustine. ↩

192. Whether a s⟨…⟩ssable lie be sinne. ↩

193. Psal. 5, 6. ↩

194. Plato. ↩

195. Aristotle. ↩

196. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

197. Plato in an error. ↩

198. Who are to be excused of a lie. ↩

199. Rom. 15, 24 and 28. ↩

200. 2. Cor. 1, 15.
     ↩

201. Exod. 1, 19. ↩

202. Iosua. 2, 5. ↩

203. Augustine. ↩

204. Gregorie. ↩

205. Looke In Gen. 12. at the end, and 19. 8. Gen. 12, 13. ↩

206. Augustine. ↩

207. Gen. 22, 5. Looke In Gen. 27, 19. ↩

208. Gen. 27, 19. ↩

209. 2. Kin. 10. 18
     ↩

210. Augustine. Two kinds of men. ↩

211. Note a distinction. ↩

212. Looke In 2. Sam. 15, 33 ↩

213. Augustine. ↩

214. A similitude. ↩

215. We must not lie no not to saue a mans life. ↩

216. Looke In 1. King. 17, 18 ↩

217. Matt. 20, 12 ↩

218. Humilitie or modestie. ↩

219. A man may not for modestie sake lie of himselfe. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

220. 1. Co. 15, 14
     ↩

221. An obiection. ↩

222. 1. Tim. 1, 15
     ↩

223. verse. 2. ↩

224. Psal. 22, 7. ↩

225. In what respect Paule calleth himselfe the principall sinner. ↩

226. Acts. 3, 17. ↩

227. Acts. 9, 4. ↩

228. Phil. 3, 6. ↩

229. How Agur had no wisdome. ↩

230. Psal. 22, 6. ↩

231. Whether it were lawfull to doo good for Ionathans sake. ↩

232. verse. 22, and 23, ↩

233. Wherein truth and faith do⟨…⟩ differ. ↩

234. A definition of faith. ↩

235. In Iudg. 9. ↩

236. What a fable is. Augustine. ↩

237. Of fables some are likelie to be true, and some not. ↩

238. An apollogie. ↩

239. 1. Co. 15, 33
     ↩

240. Ephes. 5, 3. and 4. ↩

241. Plato. ↩

242. Terence. ↩

243. Cicero. ↩

244. Augustine. ↩

245. Aesope. ↩

246. verse. 9. ↩

247. The vse of apollogies. ↩

248. Matt. 21, 33. ↩