7. The seuenth Chapter. Whether yong and incontinent men, and final

The seuenth Chapter. Whether yong and incontinent men, and finallie anie other sort are to be excluded from hearing of the word of God.

IT should séeme that Aristotle may for iust cause be blamed, when he wold exclude a yoong man fro~ hearing of morall philosophie: for thus he saith; He will heare in vaine, & without fruit, bicause he hath not experience: and that although he haue his right reason, yet is he ouercome with lusts and affections, and so ouercome, as he cannot doo those things that he would: and therfore (he saith) that as his reason is ouercome, so is this learning vnderstood of him ouercome, & that since he is not able to produce the same into act, his labor in hearing will be frustrate. Howbeit hereof is gathered an argument of the contrarie, to wit; that they by this facultie are verie greatlie holpen, which doo suffer their affections to be ruled by reason. Againe, it belongeth to those that be perfect men, to subdue the affections of their mind to reason: and yoong and incontinent men, which haue most néed of amendement, are not iudged méet for these things. These being plucked awaie from hearing, there will be no kind of men left, vnto whom these things will bring anie commoditie. Whervpon Aristotle shall hardlie auoid it, but that this will become superfluous. Eustratius answereth, that there be some men, and those not a few, which are lead onlie by custome to become good; but they cannot procéed therein by an order and waie prescribed, séeing they are destitute of infallible rules, which when they haue afterward procured to themselues by this doctrine, they are most of all established in iust and honest actions, not being now anie more led by customs, but throughlie persuaded by a full assurance of their mind. And there be some, which of a certeine naturall inclination doo flie from wickednes, and desire goodnes; but how those things doo differ one from another, or by what meanes they may, of the good things, which without doubt are manifold, followe the better, they are ignorant by themselues: neither is there anie doubt, but that they which be so framed, may thereby obteine great helpes. ¹ And therefore we are not to thinke that the incontinent, and they which be subiect to their affections, shall (as we haue heard of Aristotle ) be altogither vnprofitable hearers: for vnlesse they be wholie without sense, they, when these things are set before them, will at the leastwise knowe, whither they are brought by their lusts, and wil perceiue how far off they are now distant from the right course: & it cannot possiblie be, but that some maner of waie they will be stirred vp vnto better things; wherevpon they may by little and little both be healed and reape commoditie; as we read that it happened at Athens to the most desperate yoong man Polemon, ² when he had heard Xenocrates dispute manie things of temperance.

Wherfore these things which are here spoken, must not be vnderstood without exception. For sometime there be yoong men so framed by nature, and so amended onlie by discipline and education, that euen by this kind of learning they are able to profit much, as touching outward iustice and ciuill conuersation, which I thinke dooth most take place in them, which being instructed from their youth in the christian faith, doo imbrace godlines from their hart. And this, ³ by a most manifest example did Edward the sixt, king of England, testifie, who without doubt being a yoong man, was euen in his first age most prompt to the exercise of all vertue. The verie which thing also will happen to you, if yée folowe the doctrine of the gospell with that indeuour which you haue begun. Wherefore Aristotle ment not to exclude all yong men vniuersallie; but this did he most regard, to put awaie the obiections which might hurt the woorthines or estimation of this facultie. And this he did, least if thou shalt sée yoong men trained vp in learning to becom at anie time nothing the better, thou shouldest ascribe that vnto the fault of this facultie, as though it were of no estimation, and serued to no vse: wherefore he laieth the fault in the want of age, bicause it is destitute of experience, and is troobled with perturbations of the mind. These, he saith, be the impediments, for which the procéedings of doctrine and approoued fruits of the same haue no good successe. And neither was Aristotle alone of this mind, but Pindarus also, who saith; ⟨…⟩, that is, For light wits or yoong heads want experience: and Homer, ⟨…⟩, that is to saie, For yoong folke are alwaies rash & vnstaid. Moreouer Horace, pronounceth thus of a yoong man, that, Youth vnto vice, like waxe is soone applide, And fierce to those that warning them doo chide. And how wanton they commonlie are, & kindled in their affections, the Comedie giueth a most euident testimonie. Also the histories doo declare, how Cicero was deceiued in Octauius; and how little, Aristotle himselfe could bring to passe towards the reformation of maners in his scholer Alexander of Macedonia, who being alwaies inflamed with excéeding great ambition, did most insolentlie beare himself in prosperous fortune, most foolishlie desired to be a god, and so gaue himselfe to wine, as being droonke he s⟨…⟩ue his most louing friend, and at the desire of an harlot burned the most noble, populous, & large citie Persepolis, which was the head citie of the kingdome, in such sort as it was vtterlie extinct. The like things dooth Plato in his dialog Gorgias speake, when he said, that There be two passages, whereby good studies doo flowe out of our minds; namelie Obliuion, and Incredulitie: for by Obliuion is taken awaie the skill, and experience which are gathered in the memorie; and by the other, to wit Incredulitie, it coms to passe, that we giue no credit to those that admonish vs. But yoong men doo soone forget those things that they haue once or twise séene and had experience of: wherefore they hardlie get to themselues generall sentences and rules. For we cannot obteine those, but by long and continuall obseruation, which yoong men cannot gather by a short time of their life, neither doo they willinglie giue credit to those that admonish them, bicause they are carried awaie by the blind swaie of their affections.

2 And saie not vnto me that yoong men doo protest, and haue in their mouth, ⁴ and doo kéepe in memorie speciall and honest sentences of philosophie: for although they speake manie things trulie, yet doo they not thinke as they speake; and sometime they perceiue & are mooued with those things that be vttered, not much better than Iaies doo vnderstand mens wordes, which they are wont to prattle; yea & drunken and intemperate men doo oftentimes iangle and tell a faire tale, where neuerthelesse, either they iudge the contrarie, or else they cannot tell what they speake: and bréefelie, their speach is not according to their mind, but they haue one thing in their mind, and another in their hart: which is then most of all perceiued, when they get libertie, & haue a full fréedome of their choise. Then albeit they were first modest & chast, they bewraie their mind that lurked, and their nature that laie hidden. Who was a more commendable prince than Nero himselfe, in the first yéere (of his reigne) while he was yet gouerned by the direction of Seneca? Of who~ was there greater hope than of Co~modus, who as he was of an excellent wit from his youth, so afterward he became a monstrous beast? And doo we not remember Ioas in the holie historie, which gouerned himselfe rightlie in the beginning of his dominion, so long as he gouerned by the counsels of Iohiada the faithfull high préest; whose authoritie when he afterward despised, he became straitwaie corrupt, and by the libertie which he claimed to himselfe made manifest the shameful desires of his mind? But yet for all these reasons were neuer our forefathers lead, ⁵ nor at this daie are wise men lead; but that they bring their children, when they become to yoong mens state, vnto philosophers to be instructed by their learning and wisedome. They send them also vnto lawiers, that they may vnderstand those things which be iust and honest. And all this we learne out of Platos Axioms, and out of the philosophers liues, and we also obserue the custome of our times. Which was therefore so doone in old time, and is also doone at this daie; for those words which Aristotle here writeth of, haue not that sense, as though yoong men by this philosophie shall receiue no profit; but bicause they are not able to procéed so well forward as they can iudge in their mind what is here, & foorthwith to direct their actions according to vertue, and to procure vnto themselues good and honest habits of the mind: since these things require a mind fullie persuaded and trulie assenting therevnto. But in perceiuing of other faculties, it is enough if the wit be applied, which whosoeuer shall haue it but dull and blockish, shall not become skilfull.

But in this our philosophie two things are to be perfourmed; one, that the precepts should be vnderstood; the other, that they be put in practise. As touching that first, there is no let, but that yoong and intemperate men, which liue dissolutelie, may attaine vnto. For if they be anie thing prompt and wittie, they will easilie vnderstand those things which be taught; but to expresse the precepts of this facultie in this life, they will not be brought, partlie bicause they want experience, as Aristotle saith; and partlie for that they are caried awaie with euill affections. ⁶ Perhaps thou wilt demand what maner of experience it is, that we require of them which should be fit hearers? I will shew it by examples; namelie, by abstinence to ouercome lusts. By valiant and temperate actions, if they be often practised, men at the length become valiant and temperate; so as without anie gréefe, yea rather with singular pleasure they exercise themselues in the duties belonging to these vertues. ⁷ And to conclude, we must vnderstand, that there are two kinds of ends of this art; one that we vnderstand what is spoken; the other and that the chéefe & principall, that what we haue learned, we should performe: of which latter end, since Aristotle sawe, that as well yoong as incontinent doo faile, therefore he pronounced this kind of hearers to be vnfit, if they be compared with others, which haue now subdued their affections & motions of their mind to the rule of reason. For these may not onlie vnderstand what is said, but are able also to iudge rightlie thereof: which as it is manifest, this philosopher did most respect, since all his whole reason leaneth to this principle, that yoong and incontinent men cannot rightlie iudge of these things. Also let vs distinguish mankind, ⁸ that som be sound, and some be altogither incurable, and that there be others in a meane betwéene both: and they that be sound, we thinke haue no néed of these doctrines, since they be faultlesse and liue perfectlie. The incurable and intemperate, and they which haue vtterlie giuen themselues to filthie pleasures, shall not be holpen, vntill they haue laid awaie this mind: but they which be in the meane, shall take great fruit hereby. Trulie this distinction is well to be liked; so neuertheles, as there be added therevnto, as touching them whose recouerie is despaired of; that they must neuer be so despaired of, but that good counsels and holsome admonishments may at one time or other doo them good. For as the power of physicke is not onlie to maintaine the health which is gotten, and to finish that which is begun; but also to heale those that be destitute thereof: so admonitions and good doctrines, which be the medicines of the mind, haue power not onelie to retaine good habits, and to make perfect the vertues begun; but also to reduce to the health of mind those men which haue quite lost the same, especiallie if we passe not the bounds of ciuill iustice and outward conuersation.

4 Now remaineth, ⁹ that we passe not ouer a verie necessarie disputation, the same is, how it commeth to passe, that since Aristotle said, that Yoong and incontinent men are no fit hearers; he did not also reckon them which be indued with such a constitution, temperature, or nature, as they cannot be made better, and are altogither vnapt to receiue vertues. And that such there be, ¹⁰ Galen sheweth in sundrie places, and especiallie in the booke wherein he treateth of the mutuall consequence of the maners of the mind, and temperature of the bodie, where he saith, that They which thinke that all men haue a mind apt vnto vertues; or on the other side, that there be none at all; doo measure mankind but by the one halfe, neither haue they knowne and perceiued the whole nature of man. For all men (saith he) are not by the complexion of their bodie borne enimies of vertue, neither doo all men loue and desire the same by the power of their owne nature. ¹¹ Afterward he remooueth this sentence or definition of his by a certeine obiection; for that we sée some so well allowed and praised for their excellent vertues, and contrariwise others to be condemned and dispraised, bicause they be corrupted and infected with vices. Neither is it méet, that for those things which be naturallie within vs, we should either be commended or dispraised. Yea, and the one sort, where a Common weale is well gouerned, are punnished; and the other sort haue rewards giuen them. Herevnto he saith, that This is the naturall iudgement of men, ¹² to allow, succour, helpe, & praise those things which be good, profitable and comelie; howsoeuer they come, whether of nature, or of indurstie; and those things which be euill, damnable, & full of shame, they dispraise, kéepe vnder, and take away (so much as in them lieth) not regadring the cause from which they procéed: which he indeuoureth to declare plainelie by examples. We kill spiders, aspes, and adders; neither doo we first deliberate with our selues whether venim be naturallie planted in those things, or whether they got the same by their owne indeuour and will. Also we doo loue & worship God, not weighing with our selues whether he hath attained to his owne goodnes by indeuour and his owne proper will; or whether the same haue béene graffed in him by nature from euerlasting.

We might also adde, that beautifull bodies are had in admiration of all men, & are celebrated with singular praise, although that beautie hath come by nature: and gifts fréelie giuen (as the Diuines speake) ought to be praised. And bréefelie, this he séemeth to affirme, that Euill men are condemned and dispraised; and contrariwise good men are allowed and praised; although it be not known for a certeintie, whether that naughtinesse or goodnesse came to them by industrie, or by nature; or by anie other meanes. And in this respect he blamed the Stoiks, ¹³ for that they iudged that all men were by nature made apt vnto vertue; wherevnto though by nature and strength they be inclined, yet by the ill example of other men, by peruerse opinions, and by the talke and conuersation of corrupt men, they are reuoked from the same. But if it should be granted them, what I beséech you could they alledge concerning those first men; such as they cannot denie, but that now & then yea oftentimes there haue béene in the world? When as at sundrie and certeine times appointed they déeme that the world hath perished, either by the ouerflowing of waters, or by the consuming of all things with fier; and that againe it hath béene renewed. Whom I saie will they affirme to haue corrupted either with ill examples, or ill doctrine, or with pleasures found out, or with corrupt inuentions, these first men brought foorth againe into light? Certeinlie this reason is of force against the Stoiks. But against the Peripatetiks and others, which thinke that the world neuer began, they vse in verie déed another kind of argument: & that is; Put the case there be certeine brethren which are begotten of the selfe-same parents, which vse the selfe-same meats, liue all vnder one schoole-maister, and haue no conuersation with strangers; who (I beséech you) shall be assigned the authour, that some be of corrupt and lewd maners, and that others doo continuallie shew an honest & chast disposition? And if we will grant that, which for the most part happeneth, we will affirme, that there be verie few children, yea in a maner none at all, that of nature haue a disposition inclined to vertue; as those which must continuallie be stirred vp therevnto by threats chastisements, and admonishments of schoole-maisters. For immediatelie, euen in their first age, either they be too fearefull, or else more bold than is méet, insatiable, sluggish, wanton, soone angrie, and enuious. Wherefore it is a maruell how the Stoiks can desend their opinion, namelie, that All men are by nature apt to receiue vertue.

4 And no lesse likelie things to be true, doo they thinke they speake, which haue affirmed, that Mankind is so drawne awaie, that it cannot procéed in the swift course to vertue, by reason of the pleasure that riseth vp vnto it. For they which so saie, dooth Possidonius notablie reprehend, who affirmeth, ¹⁴ that we from our first conception haue certeine sparks, which kindle vs vp vnto vices; wherefore it coms to passe, that we cannot beware of our selues, but that we be inwardlie vicious; when as notwithstanding we may prouide that such ill séed and vicious sparks shal not breake foorth into open wickednesse, and increase so far as they can be no more restrained. And finallie, by the iudgment of these men, the euill is far greater and more gréeuous, that we in our selues doo beare about vs, than that which by outward contagion is procured. Indéed they grant, ¹⁵ that a wicked custome, when it happens, maketh vs wicked; and that a great deale woorse than we were before by nature. But as touching the power whereby we vnderstand, this they teach: first, that it may be, that by schoolmaisters, or by wise men, or by vnlearned men, we may perceiue true or false opinions: but the sharpenes of wit, foolishnesse, blockishnesse, and such like, which belong to the vnderstanding, we obtaine according to the qualitie of the temperature, which we in our mothers wombe doo take, euen of the substance whereof we are begotten; whervnto afterward doo come manie and maruellous increases, aswell by meanes of the meats, which doo bréed good or euill iuice; as of the qualities of the aire, and sundrie chances that doo happen. And there he citeth Aristotle, who treating of the parts of liuing creatures, saith that men doo also followe the complexion of their mother. And in the first booke of the historie that he writeth of liuing creatures, he affirmeth, that the proportion of the instrumental parts are made correspondent to the maners of the mind, and that therefore those parts being well considered, manie things as touching the maners and inward affections may be shewed by them that are skilfull in the art of physiognomie. These be the arguments for the which Aristotle in his first book of Ethicks may séeme not to haue spoken circumspectlie; that those which in nature are procreated ⟨…⟩; that is, with an ill temperature of the bodie, he said would not become fit hearers of this doctrine. Howbeit we will after this maner defend him, that although the greater part of men, yea in a maner all of vs come into the world infected with the sparks of vices and lusts, prone vnto filthines and wickednes; yet that these things are not so strong and firme, but that either they may be vtterlie ouercome, or at the leastwise qualified and mitigated; whereby either men, as touching morall vertues and outward conuersation, may become excellent; or at the leastwise be lesse molested with these euill affections. And bicause while they lacke experience of things of the mind, as in yoong men it happeneth; and that with the violence of a disturbed mind, some are plucked awaie, and are subiect to incontinencie; it is vnpossible they should be adorned with vertues, and performe in déed those things which in this facultie they haue heard: therefore I saie did Aristotle pronounce, that yoong and incontinent men would not become méete hearers.

But forsomuch as men (of ripe age) may profit much, although by the violence of ill humors and by nature they be stirred vp vnto vices; therefore dooth not the philosopher remooue them from the number of those that should be hearers: for that which is wanting to nature, we may supplie by our diligence and studie, so as prouocations and ill motions may be restrained and kept vnder. Neither to the obtaining of vertues is it required, that we should altogither put off those ingraffed euils; onelie it is required of vs, that (as much as in vs lieth) wée should indeuour our selues to the weakening of them: which if by diligence and exercise we shall performe, the possession of vertues shall not be hindered; which bicause we are neuer able to challenge, vnlesse there come an experience of things which is necessarie, and vnlesse there be a helpe of the weaknes of reason, wherewith incontinent men are troubled; therefore dooth Aristotle in a maner reiect those hearers, and thought that of these there should be no mention made. And he himselfe vnto that which Galen obiected, ¹⁶ would haue answered somwhat otherwise, as touching praise and dispraise. For he would haue said, that the louers of vertues are therefore praised, not bicause they are led therevnto by the force of nature; but bicause they haue striuen against the ill inclination thereof, and in that fight haue had an excellent victorie: and on the other side, that the wicked are dispraised, bicause they being ouercome and made weake by the power of naturall violence, are thereby drawne to suffer shamefull things.

5 Neither was Galen against this opinion, though at the first sight he may séeme to mislike the same. For in his little booke which treateth of the knowing & curing the affects of the mind, he testifieth, that No man ought to be discouraged from the indeuour of making himselfe better; yea, although he were thrée score yéeres of age. And moreouer he saith, ¹⁷ that If anie man certeinlie knowe, that he could neuer obtaine wisedome; yet should he at the leastwise indeuour this, to wit, that he haue not a mind vtterlie deformed, as the bodie of Thersites was to be cured, although otherwise it were most ill fauored. But and if it happen, that we be not able with excellent and most wise men to occupie the first places; yet this neuertheles must we indeuour, that we may be receiued into the second, third, or fourth places. And he aduiseth vs by what meanes and by what reason this may be doone; saieng, that by reason, and by earnest exercise whosoeuer will, may obtaine it. And to incourage mens minds, he saith; Thou labourest verie much to become a Grammarian, and refusest no paines to become an excellent Musician: why then doost thou not suffer thy selfe to be made a good man? Then in the same booke he compareth this diligence of obtaining a good life, with the industrie which husbandmen vse about plants. I grant indéed (saith he) that a husbandman cannot by his labour and industrie change a bramble, and take awaie his nature, or to make it beare fruit: but yet vines within their owne nature are ordained to beare fruits; if they be neglected, if they be left onelie to the gouernement and fertilitie of the soile, they will beare either woorse fruit, or in a maner none at all: euen so good wits, though they be otherwise capable of good maners, if they shall want their tilth, doo soone become either wicked or slothfull. But although that in yoong men this exercise of moderating their affections from their tender age, may séeme a difficult thing; yet in processe of time the paines will be lessened. For by these laudable exercises, reason will be more confirmed, which being made strong, it will be better obeied of the inferiour powers of the mind. ¹⁸

And from these things dooth not Plutarch disagrée, who writing of the increase of good maners dooth also confesse, that there is setled in our minds a certeine infinite & vnspeakable naughtines, which neuertheles by accesse therevnto may be increased, and by some forsaking of it be diminished. And the same Plutarch treating of the education of children saith; There are thrée things required to the making of a man perfect, nature, discipline, and exercise. What thou maist vnderstand by nature, it hath béene alreadie shewed; a temperature (I saie) of the bodie, and a naturall inclination. And there néeds no labour to expound what is exercise; the doubt onlie séemes to be as touching discipline. Therefore we saie, ¹⁹ that the same is a certeine facultie, which applieth the actions and choises of men vnto reason, and this it worketh by doctrine, corrections, admonitions, and (when néed shall require) by punishments. And whatsoeuer of these things anie man wanteth, he cannot be made perfect as touching ciuill maners and vertues. Vnto this his doctrine he compareth husbandrie, vnto the good successe whereof is required a fertile soile; secondlie, a painefull and conuenient husbanding of the ground; lastlie, good and profitable séed: and if anie of these thrée things be wanting, we faile of the fruits that we looke for. Vnto nature answereth the soile, vnto discipline the tilth, and the seed vnto exercise. And if the drops of water by a continuall fall doo make stones hollowe; if iron & brasse, be they neuer so hard, be worne with vse: so are bodies by sloth and sluggishnes made féeble, and féeble bodies by holsome diet & iust exercise brought to an incredible strength. A barren land well husbanded is not vtterlie without fruit, and a fertile soile neglected waxeth wild, and bringeth foorth thornes and wéeds both hurtfull and vnprofitable. Also the most fierce wild beasts, by mans labor and industrie are made tame: yea and those beasts, which in their owne nature would be mild and tractable, if they be so let alone, vse to become wild, as we sée it comes to passe in horsses and buls.

But what shall I saie more? Did not the two whelps comming both of one dam and fire, which Lycurgus brought foorth into the open assemblie of the Lacedaemonians declare by their running vnto things most contrarie, what the diuersitie of education is able to doo? ²⁰ But what shall we say vnto Plato in his Protagoras, who séemeth there to affirme that vertues cannot be taught? For Pericles (saith he) and other excellent men, although they caused their children to be instructed in learning, musicke, and such like good arts, wherein their children did greatlie profit, yet did they not make them to be adornd with vertues, which vndoubtedlie we must beléeue, that they would haue desired most, if they could haue obtained the same by learning & industrie. Wherevpon it séemes to be prooued, that there be some of nature so estranged from vertues, as they are not able to attaine vnto them; and that others shall labour in vaine, when they indeuour to traine them vp to vertue. Howbeit, this also dooth nothing at all weaken those things which we determin; bicause either their parents laboured not so much as they should in bringing of them vp, or else if they did vse sufficient diligence, and that the nature of the children (by reason of the temperature of their bodie) was not giuen to vertues, yet did they by their labor and industrie bring somwhat to passe. For although, if they should be compared with the chéefest, perfect, & most absolute citizens, they might séeme to be vtterlie destitute of vertue; yet neuertheles being compared with rude and sauage men, which are altogether trained vp without discipline, they might be counted ciuill, gentle, and adorned with some shew of vertues. Wherefore we conclude, that indeuour, discipline, and studie are not altogither in vaine, euen as touching them which by naturall inclination be enimies vnto vertues.

6 Now let vs sée how those things, ²¹ which Aristotle hath said, doo agrée or disagree with the holie scriptures. Yoong and incontinent men in the holie scriptures are not excepted; neither be anie remooued from hearing the word of God, in this respect, that they be as yet disquieted and ouercome with troubles of the mind; neither for this cause, that they want experience, and the vse of things. Thou maist sée that Publicans, ²² and harlots, and also théeues were admitted by Christ vnto his discipline; and that not onlie yoong men, but yoong children were called. And we might alledge manie out of histories, which before time hauing liued shamefullie and most wickedlie, were straight-waie so reformed and amended by the doctrine of Christ, as afterward they not onlie attained to a singular innocencie of life; but also with an incredible fortitude did suffer themselues to be put to death with great torments, least they should violate the decrées of our faith, and the godlines which they had attained vnto, when as there was both deliuerance and great rewards offered them, if they would haue forsaken their determination. And we sée, that not onlie men haue fallen into this kind of conflict; but we are not ignorant that women being otherwise but weake, yea boies & girls haue with great courage indured these things.

Neither let anie man saie, ²³ that those which sinne against the holie Ghost take no profit at all by the word of God, and that it may therefore séeme that they should be driuen from hearing of the same. We grant indéed, that they which so sin, doo heare the word of God in vaine; howbeit, since those can by no vsuall meanes be knowne from others, they are not excluded. God verie well knoweth who they be which are wrapped in this kind of sinne; but men séeing they knowe not, who are by nature fallen into so great a wickednes, may not remooue them from the holie doctrine. It is requisit (no doubt) that those which are sinners against the holie Ghost, be not such as fall by ignorance, or infirmitie, but that they be such as are led therevnto by a hatred of the truth to striue against the same, so that willinglie and wittinglie they oppose themselues against the truth, resist it, and to the vttermost of their power hinder the course thereof; which neuertheles they will knowe to be the truth. How are men able to vnderstand this thing, séeing they cannot attaine to the secretnes of anie mans mind and will? Wherfore those which be thus ill affected, doo heare the word of God without fruit; although they be not excluded from the hearing thereof; euen for this cause, that they cannot be perceiued: howbeit, that which they heare, dooth increase their greater condemnation. For of such force is the word of God, ²⁴ as either it saueth the hearers, or becommeth a destruction vnto them. And so great héed dooth the church take, ²⁵ that it driueth not awaie anie from the word of God; ²⁶ & it admitteth thervnto euen those which be excommunicate, and them which doo not yet beléeue, whom otherwise it driueth both from the sacraments and from publike praiers. Perhaps thou wilt demand: How co~meth this difference betwéene the word of God, and the doctrine of the philosophers? Herof assuredlie it commeth, ²⁷ that mens saiengs, although they be famous and commendable; yet are they not indued with that strength and power, as they be able to change or correct vnprofitable and corrupt minds. But the power and strength of the word of God, to call men vnto God, is incredible. Not as though euen those things which the philosophers also taught or put in writing, be without their strength. For we denie not that most ancient common saieng, wherin it is said, that Whatsoeuer is true, of what author soeuer it was spoken, procéedeth from the holie Ghost. But those things, which be spoken by the motion of the holie Ghost, cannot be altogither void of some effect, although it be of much lesse effect than the vehemencie, wherewith the holie scriptures are furnished. Who will denie that the common sort of stones are adorned with their owne strength and proper power, and the same not vnprofitable to our life, although they may not be compared with the strength of pretious stones?

²⁸ But I returne to the matter. I find onlie one kind of men, vnto whom the holie doctrine must not be imparted; and they be such as deride and openlie slander the doctrine of Christ. For he commanded his apostles, that they should not commit the heauenlie doctrine to dogs & hogs: which in verie déed must be vnderstood of contempt and outward derision; that is, ²⁹ when with slanders and contumelies they raile vpon true godlines. Which if they doo secretlie to themselues, so that they will heare quietlie, and will suffer themselues to be admonished and taught, they must not be put backe from hearing the same. Neither must publike preaching be left off for their sakes, which are open scoffers, railers, & reprochfull persons, when such cannot be driuen awaie, bicause perhaps they be ouer mightie; lest for one or two mens causes the whole people should be defrauded of the food of their soule. Yée sée therefore that onlie these are to be remooued from the holie doctrine, from whence other men, of what condition soeuer they be, must not be forbidden; naie rather they must be exhorted to come verie often therevnto. Those things, which I haue spoken, belong to the vsuall and receiued ordinance of the church, since I knowe that the spirit hath sometime forbidden the apostles, and may now restraine some, that they preach not in some places to those, to whom otherwise they had determined to preach: which bicause it is a worke of God, not of men; therefore it serueth not to this purpose.

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Footnotes

1. That incontinent men may receiue fruit by hearing of good doctrine. ↩

2. That yoong men may be profitable hearers. ↩

3. A praise of Edward the sixt, king of England. ↩

4. How yoong men behaue themselues in hearing of doctrine. ↩

5. Yong mens faults must be no cause to keepe them from hearing holsome doctrine. ↩

6. What kind of experience is required of them that should be meet hearers. ↩

7. Two ends of them that be hearers of good doctrine. ↩

8. The kinds of men distinguished. ↩

9. Why Aristotle omitted them which by nature are vnapt to receiue vertues. ↩

10. Galens opinion of that matter. ↩

11. An obiection that vertues and vices are not in men by nature. ↩

12. That men in punishing and rewarding, respect not whether things be doone by nature or by industrie. ↩

13. Against the Stoiks which saie that men by nature are made vnto vertue, but are corrupted by other mens examples. ↩

14. Against those which saie that men by nature were made vnto vertue, but that they were wrested from it by pleasure. ↩

15. What nature and custome is able to doo about vertues and vices. ↩

16. Why vertues are to be praised, and vices to be dispraised. ↩

17. We must indeuor to become better although we cannot attaine to perfection. ↩

18. Plutarchs opinion of this matter. ↩

19. What discipline is. ↩

20. An obiection of Plato that vertues cannot be taught. ↩

21. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

22. Matt. 9, 11. and 19, 11. Matt. 19, 14. ↩

23. Whether sinners against the holie Ghost must be excluded from hearing the word of God. ↩

24. Iam. 1, 21. ↩

25. 1. Cor. 1, 18.
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26. Excommunicate persons are not excluded from hearing the word of God. ↩

27. Wherein the word of God, and the philosophers doctrine differ. ↩

28. Vnto who~ the holie scriptures must not be imparted. ↩

29. Matth. 7, 6. ↩