V.God alone excepted, who actually and everlastingly is whatsoever he may be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now he is not1; all other things besides are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not in act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they incline to something which they may be; and when they are it, they shall be perfecter than now they are. All which perfections are contained under the general name of Goodness. And because there is not in the world any thing whereby another may not some way be made the perfecter, therefore all things that are, are good.
Again, sith there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause of all things; and every effect doth after a sort contain, at leastwise resemble, the cause from which it proceedeth: all things in the world are said in some sort to seek the highest, and to covet more or less the participation of God himself2. Yet this doth no where so much appear as it doth in man, because there are so many kinds of perfections which man seeketh. The first degree of goodness is that general perfection which all things do seek, in desiring the continuance of their being. All things therefore coveting as much as may be to be like unto God in being ever, that which cannot hereunto attain personally doth seek to continue itself another way, that is by offspring and propagation. The next degree of goodness is that which each thing coveteth by affecting resemblance with God in the constancy and excellency of those operations which belong unto their kind. The immutability of God they strive unto, by working either always or for the most part after one and the same manner; his absolute exactness they imitate, by tending unto that which is most exquisite in every particular. Hence have risen a number of axioms in philosophy3, showing how “the works of nature do always aim at that which cannot be bettered.”
These two kinds of goodness rehearsed are so nearly united to the things themselves which desire them, that we scarcely perceive the appetite to stir in reaching forth her hand towards them. But the desire of those perfections which grow externally is more apparent; especially of such as are not expressly desired unless they be first known, or such as are not for any other cause than for knowledge itself desired. Concerning perfections in this kind; that by proceeding in the knowledge of truth, and by growing in the exercise of virtue, man amongst the creatures of this inferior world aspireth to the greatest conformity with God; this is not only known unto us, whom he himself hath so instructed4, but even they do acknowledge, who amongst men are not judged the nearest unto him. With Plato what one thing more usual, than to excite men unto the love of wisdom, by shewing how much wise men are thereby exalted above men; how knowledge doth raise them up into heaven; how it maketh them, though not gods, yet as gods, high, admirable, and divine? And Mercurius Trismegistus speaking of the virtues of a righteous soul5, “Such spirits” (saith he) “are never cloyed with praising and speaking well of all men, with doing good unto every one by word and deed, because they study to frame themselves according to the pattern of the Father of spirits.”
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Footnotes
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[“Let him know, that I have considered, that God only is what he would be; and that I am by his grace become now so like him, as to be pleased with what pleaseth him.” Walton’s Life of Herbert, p. 321. ed. 1675.] ↩
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Πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται. Arist. de An. lib. ii. cap. 4. [Opp. I. 390. ed. Lugd. 1590.] ↩
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Ἐν τοι̑ς ϕύσει δει̑ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μα̑λλον· ἡ ϕύσις ἀεὶ ποιει̑ τω̑ν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον. Arist. 2. de cœl. cap. 5. [t. i. p. 283.] ↩
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Matt. v. 48; Sap. vii. 27. ↩
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Ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ κόρον οὐδέποτε ἔχει ὑμνου̑σα εὐϕημου̑σά τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις πάντας [πάντως] εὐποιου̑σα, μιμουμένη αὐτη̑ς τὸν πατέρα. [c. 10. §. 21.] lib. iv. f. 12. ↩