VII. An earnest desire to draw all things unto the determination of bare and naked Scripture hath caused here much pains to be taken in abating the estimation and credit of man. Which if we labour to maintain as far as truth and reason will bear, let not any think that we travail about a matter not greatly needful. For the scope of all their pleading against man’s authority is, to overthrow such orders, laws, and constitutions in the Church, as depending thereupon if they should therefore be taken away, would peradventure leave neither face nor memory of Church to continue long in the world, the world especially being such as now it is. That which they have in this case spoken I would for brevity’s sake let pass, but that the drift of their speech being so dangerous, their words are not to be neglected.
Wherefore to say that simply an argument taken from man’s authority doth hold no way, “neither affirmatively nor negatively1,” is hard. By a man’s authority we here understand the force which his word hath for the assurance of another’s mind that buildeth upon it; as the Apostle somewhat did upon their report of the house of Chloe2; and the Samaritans in a matter of far greater moment upon the report of a simple woman. For so it is said in St. John’s Gospel, “Many of the Samaritans of that city believed in him for the saying of the woman, which testified, He hath told me all things that ever I did3.”
The strength of man’s authority is affirmatively such that the weightiest affairs in the world depend thereon. In judgment and justice are not hereupon proceedings grounded? Saith not the Law that “in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall be confirmed4?” This the law of God would not say, if there were in a man’s testimony no force at all to prove any thing.
And if it be admitted that in matter of fact there is some credit to be given to the testimony of man, but not in matter of opinion and judgment; we see the contrary both acknowledged and universally practised also throughout the world. The sentences of wise and expert men were never but highly esteemed. Let the title of a man’s right be called in question; are we not bold to rely and build upon the judgment of such as are famous for their skill in the laws of this land? In matter of state the weight many times of some one man’s authority is thought reason sufficient, even to sway over whole nations.
And this not only “with the simpler sort;” but the learneder and wiser we are, the more such arguments in some cases prevail with us. The reason why the simpler sort are moved with authority is the conscience of their own ignorance; whereby it cometh to pass that having learned men in admiration, they rather fear to dislike them than know wherefore they should allow and follow their judgments. Contrariwise with them that are skilful authority is much more strong and forcible; because they only are able to discern how just cause there is why to some men’s authority so much should be attributed. For which cause the name of Hippocrates (no doubt) were more effectual to persuade even such men as Galen himself, than to move a silly empiric. So that the very selfsame argument in this kind which doth but induce the vulgar sort to like, may constrain the wiser to yield. And therefore not orators only with the people, but even the very profoundest disputers in all faculties have hereby often with the best learned prevailed most.
As for arguments taken from human authority and that negatively; for example sake, if we should think the assembling of the people of God together by the sound of a bell, the presenting of infants at the holy font by such as commonly we call their godfathers, or any other the like received custom, to be impious, because some men of whom we think very reverently have in their books and writings nowhere mentioned or taught that such things should be in the Church; this reasoning were subject unto just reproof, it were but feeble, weak, and unsound. Notwithstanding even negatively an argument from human authority may be strong, as namely thus: The Chronicles of England mention no moe than only six kings bearing the name of Edward since the time of the last conquest; therefore it cannot be there should be moe. So that if the question be of the authority of a man’s testimony, we cannot simply avouch either that affirmatively it doth not any way hold; or that it hath only force to induce the simpler sort, and not to constrain men of understanding and ripe judgment to yield assent; or that negatively it hath in it no strength at all. For unto every of these the contrary is most plain.
Neither doth that which is alleged concerning the infirmity of men overthrow or disprove this. Men are blinded with ignorance and error; many things may escape them, and in many things they may be deceived; yea, those things which they do know they may either forget, or upon sundry indirect considerations let pass; and although themselves do not err, yet may they through malice or vanity even of purpose deceive others. Howbeit infinite cases there are wherein all these impediments and lets are so manifestly excluded, that there is no show or colour whereby any such exception may be taken, but that the testimony of man will stand as a ground of infallible assurance. That there is a city of Rome, that Pius Quintus and Gregory the Thirteenth and others have been Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainly enough persuaded. The ground of our persuasion, who never saw the place nor persons beforenamed, can be nothing but man’s testimony. Will any man here notwithstanding allege those mentioned human infirmities, as reasons why these things should be mistrusted or doubted of?
Yea, that which is more, utterly to infringe the force and strength of man’s testimony were to shake the very fortress of God’s truth. For whatsoever we believe concerning salvation by Christ, although the Scripture be therein the ground of our belief; yet the authority of man is, if we mark it, the key which openeth the door of entrance into the knowledge of the Scripture. The Scripture could not teach us the things that are of God, unless we did credit men who have taught us that the words of Scripture do signify those things. Some way therefore, notwithstanding man’s infirmity, yet his authority may enforce assent.
Upon better advice and deliberation so much is perceived, and at the length confest; that arguments taken from the authority of men may not only so far forth as hath been declared, but further also be of some force in “human sciences;” which force be it never so small, doth shew that they are not utterly naught. But in “matters divine” it is still maintained stiffly, that they have no manner force at all5. Howbeit, the very selfsame reason, which causeth to yield that they are of some force in the one, will at the length constrain also to acknowledge that they are not in the other altogether unforcible. For if the natural strength of man’s wit may by experience and study attain unto such ripeness in the knowledge of things human, that men in this respect may presume to build somewhat upon their judgment; what reason have we to think but that even in matters divine, the like wits furnished with necessary helps, exercised in Scripture with like diligence, and assisted with the grace of Almighty God, may grow unto so much perfection of knowledge, that men shall have just cause, when any thing pertinent unto faith and religion is doubted of, the more willingly to incline their minds towards that which the sentence of so grave, wise, and learned in that faculty shall judge most sound? For the controversy is of the weight of such men’s judgments. Let it therefore be suspected; let it be taken as gross, corrupt, repugnant unto the truth, whatsoever concerning things divine above nature shall at any time be spoken as out of the mouths of mere natural men, which have not the eyes wherewith heavenly things are discerned. For this we contend not. But whom God hath endued with principal gifts to aspire unto knowledge by; whose exercises, labours, and divine studies he hath so blessed that the world for their great and rare skill that way hath them in singular admiration; may we reject even their judgment likewise, as being utterly of no moment? For mine own part, I dare not so lightly esteem of the Church, and of the principal pillars therein.
The truth is, that the mind of man desireth evermore to know the truth according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of things can yield. The greatest assurance generally with all men is that which we have by plain aspect and intuitive beholding. Where we cannot attain unto this, there what appeareth to be true by strong and invincible demonstration, such as wherein it is not by any way possible to be deceived, thereunto the mind doth necessarily assent, neither is it in the choice thereof to do otherwise. And in case these both do fail, then which way greatest probability leadeth, thither the mind doth evermore incline. Scripture with Christian men being received as the Word of God; that for which we have probable, yea, that which we have necessary reason for, yea, that which we see with our eyes, is not thought so sure as that which the Scripture of God teacheth; because we hold that his speech revealeth there what himself seeth, and therefore the strongest proof of all, and the most necessarily assented unto by us (which do thus receive the Scripture) is the Scripture. Now it is not required or can be exacted at our hands, that we should yield unto any thing other assent, than such as doth answer the evidence which is to be had of that we assent unto. For which cause even in matters divine, concerning some things we may lawfully doubt and suspend our judgment, inclining neither to one side nor other; as namely touching the time of the fall both of man and angels: of some things we may very well retain an opinion that they are probable and not unlikely to be true, as when we hold that men have their souls rather by creation than propagation, or that the Mother of our Lord lived always in the state of virginity as well after his birth as before (for of these two the one, her virginity before, is a thing which of necessity we must believe; the other, her continuance in the same state always, hath more likelihood of truth than the contrary); finally in all things then are our consciences best resolved, and in most agreeable sort unto God and nature settled, when they are so far persuaded as those grounds of persuasion which are to be had will bear.
Which thing I do so much the rather set down, for that I see how a number of souls are for want of right information in this point oftentimes grievously vexed. When bare and unbuilded conclusions are put into their minds, they finding not themselves to have thereof any great certainty, imagine that this proceedeth only from lack of faith, and that the Spirit of God doth not work in them as it doth in true believers; by this means their hearts are much troubled, they fall into anguish and perplexity: whereas the truth is, that how bold and confident soever we may be in words, when it cometh to the point of trial, such as the evidence is which the truth hath either in itself or through proof, such is the heart’s assent thereunto; neither can it be stronger, being grounded as it should be.
I grant that proof derived from the authority of man’s judgment is not able to work that assurance which doth grow by a stronger proof; and therefore although ten thousand general councils would set down one and the same definitive sentence concerning any point of religion whatsoever, yet one demonstrative reason alleged, or one manifest testimony cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary, could not choose but overweigh them all; inasmuch as for them to have been deceived it is not impossible; it is, that demonstrative reason or testimony divine should deceive. Howbeit in defect of proof infallible, because the mind doth rather follow probable persuasions than approve the things that have in them no likelihood of truth at all; surely if a question concerning matter of doctrine were proposed, and on the one side no kind of proof appearing, there should on the other be alleged and shewed that so a number of the learnedest divines in the world have ever thought; although it did not appear what reason or what Scripture led them to be of that judgment, yet to their very bare judgment somewhat a reasonable man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbecilities which are incident into our nature.
And whereas it is thought, that especially with “the Church, and those that are called and persuaded of the authority of the Word of God, man’s authority” with them especially “should not prevail;” it must and doth prevail even with them, yea with them especially, as far as equity requireth; and farther we maintain it not6. For men to be tied and led by authority, as it were with a kind of captivity of judgment, and though there be reason to the contrary not to listen unto it, but to follow like beasts the first in the herd, they know not nor care not whither, this were brutish. Again, that authority of men should prevail with men either against or above Reason, is no part of our belief. “Companies of learned men” be they never so great and reverend, are to yield unto Reason; the weight whereof is no whit prejudiced by the simplicity of his person which doth allege it, but being found to be sound and good, the bare opinion of men to the contrary must of necessity stoop and give place.
Irenæus7, writing against Marcion, which held one God author of the Old Testament and another of the New, to prove that the Apostles preached the same God which was known before to the Jews, he copiously allegeth sundry their sermons and speeches uttered concerning that matter and recorded in Scripture. And lest any should be wearied with such store of allegations, in the end he concludeth, “While we labour for these demonstrations out of Scripture, and do summarily declare the things which many ways have been spoken, be contented quietly to hear, and do not think my speech tedious: Quoniam ostensiones quæ sunt in Scripturis non possunt ostendi nisi ex ipsis Scripturis; Because demonstrations that are in Scripture may not otherwise be shewed than by citing them out of the Scriptures themselves where they are.” Which words make so little unto the purpose, that they seem as it were offended at him which hath called them thus solemnly forth to say nothing.
And concerning the verdict of Jerome8; if no man, be he never so well learned, have after the Apostles any authority to publish new doctrine as from heaven, and to require the world’s assent as unto truth received by prophetical revelation; doth this prejudice the credit of learned men’s judgments in opening that truth, which by being conversant in the Apostles’ writings they have themselves from thence learned?
St. Augustine exhorteth not to hear men, but to hearken what God speaketh. His purpose is not (I think) that we should stop our ears against his own exhortation, and therefore he cannot mean simply that audience should altogether be denied unto men, but either that if men speak one thing and God himself teach another, then he not they to be obeyed; or if they both speak the same thing, yet then also man’s speech unworthy of hearing, not simply, but in comparison of that which proceedeth from the mouth of God.
“Yea, but we doubt what the will of God is.” Are we in this case forbidden to hear what men of judgment think it to be? If not, then this allegation also might very well have been spared.
In that ancient strife which was between the catholic Fathers and Arians, Donatists, and others of like perverse and froward disposition, as long as to Fathers or councils alleged on the one side the like by the contrary side were opposed, impossible it was that ever the question should by this means grow unto any issue or end. The Scripture they both believed: the Scripture they knew could not give sentence on both sides; by Scripture the controversy between them was such as might be determined. In this case what madness was it with such kinds of proofs to nourish their contention, when there were such effectual means to end all controversy that was between them! Hereby therefore it doth not as yet appear, that an argument of authority of man affirmatively is in matters divine nothing worth.
Which opinion being once inserted into the minds of the vulgar sort, what it may grow unto God knoweth. Thus much we see, it hath already made thousands so headstrong even in gross and palpable errors, that a man whose capacity will scarce serve him to utter five words in sensible manner blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of Scripture to think his own bare Yea as good as the Nay of all the wise, grave, and learned judgments that are in the whole world: which insolency must be repressed, or it will be the very bane of Christian religion.
Our Lord’s disciples marking what speech he uttered unto them, and at the same time calling to mind a common opinion held by the Scribes, between which opinion and the words of their Master it seemed unto them that there was some contradiction, which they could not themselves answer with full satisfaction of their own minds; the doubt they propose to our Saviour, saying, “Why then say the Scribes that Elias must first come9?” They knew that the Scribes did err greatly, and that many ways even in matters of their own profession. They notwithstanding thought the judgment of the very Scribes in matters divine to be of some value; some probability they thought there was that Elias should come, inasmuch as the Scribes said it. Now no truth can contradict any truth; desirous therefore they were to be taught how both might stand together; that which they knew could not be false, because Christ spake it; and this which to them did seem true, only because the Scribes had said it. For the Scripture, from whence the Scribes did gather it, was not then in their heads. We do not find that our Saviour reproved them of error, for thinking the judgment of the Scribes to be worth the objecting, for esteeming it to be of any moment or value in matters concerning God.
We cannot therefore be persuaded that the will of God is, we should so far reject the authority of men as to reckon it nothing. No, it may be a question, whether they that urge us unto this be themselves so persuaded indeed10. Men do sometimes bewray that by deeds, which to confess they are hardly drawn. Mark then if this be not general with all men for the most part. When the judgments of learned men are alleged against them, what do they but either elevate their credit, or oppose unto them the judgments of others as learned? Which thing doth argue that all men acknowledge in them some force and weight, for which they are loath the cause they maintain should be so much weakened as their testimony is available. Again, what reason is there why alleging testimonies as proofs, men give them some title of credit, honour, and estimation, whom they allege, unless beforehand it be sufficiently known who they are; what reason hereof but only a common ingrafted persuasion, that in some men there may be found such qualities as are able to countervail those exceptions which might be taken against them, and that such men’s authority is not lightly to be shaken off?
Shall I add further, that the force of arguments drawn from the authority of Scripture itself, as Scriptures commonly are alleged, shall (being sifted) be found to depend upon the strength of this so much despised and debased authority of man? Surely it doth, and that oftener than we are aware of. For although Scripture be of God, and therefore the proof which is taken from thence must needs be of all other most invincible; yet this strength it hath not, unless it avouch the selfsame thing for which it is brought. If there be either undeniable appearance that so it doth, or reason such as cannot deceive, then Scripture-proof (no doubt) in strength and value exceedeth all. But for the most part, even such as are readiest to cite for one thing five hundred sentences of holy Scripture; what warrant have they, that any one of them doth mean the thing for which it is alleged? Is not their surest ground most commonly, either some probable conjecture of their own, or the judgment of others taking those Scriptures as they do? Which notwithstanding to mean otherwise than they take them, it is not still altogether impossible. So that now and then they ground themselves on human authority, even when they most pretend divine. Thus it fareth even clean throughout the whole controversy about that discipline which is so earnestly urged and laboured for. Scriptures are plentifully alleged to prove that the whole Christian world for ever ought to embrace it. Hereupon men term it The discipline of God. Howbeit examine, sift and resolve their alleged proofs, till you come to the very root from whence they spring, the heart wherein their strength lieth; and it shall clearly appear unto any man of judgment, that the most which can be inferred upon such plenty of divine testimonies is only this, That some things which they maintain, as far as some men can probably conjecture, do seem to have been out of Scripture not absurdly gathered. Is this a warrant sufficient for any man’s conscience to build such proceedings upon, as have been and are put in ure for the stablishment of that cause?
But to conclude, I would gladly understand how it cometh to pass, that they which so peremptorily do maintain that human authority is nothing worth are in the cause which they favour so careful to have the common sort of men persuaded, that the wisest, the godliest and the best learned in all Christendom are that way given, seeing they judge this to make nothing in the world for them. Again how cometh it to pass they cannot abide that authority should be alleged on the other side, if there be no force at all in authorities on one side or other? Wherefore labour they to strip their adversaries of such furniture as doth not help? Why take they such needless pains to furnish also their own cause with the like? If it be void and to no purpose that the names of men are so frequent in their books, what did move them to bring them in, or doth to suffer them there remaining? Ignorant I am not how this is salved, “They do it not but after the truth made manifest first by reason or by Scripture: they do it not but to control the enemies of the truth, who bear themselves bold upon human authority making not for them but against them rather11.” Which answers are nothing: for in what place or upon what consideration soever it be they do it, were it in their own opinion of no force being done, they would undoubtedly refrain to do it.
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Footnotes
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T. C. lib. i. p. 25. [13.] “When the question is of the authority of a man, it holdeth neither affirmatively nor negatively. The reason is, because the infirmity of man can neither attain to the perfection of any thing whereby he might speak all things that are to be spoken of it, neither yet be free from error in those things which he speaketh or giveth out. And therefore this argument neither affirmatively nor negatively compelleth the hearer, but only induceth him to some liking or disliking of that for which it is brought, and is rather for an orator to persuade the simpler sort than for a disputer to enforce him that is learned.” ↩
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1 Cor. i. 11. ↩
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iv. 39. ↩
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Deut. xix. 15; Matt. xviii. 16. ↩
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T. C. lib. ii. p. 19: “Although that kind of argument of authority of men is good neither in human nor divine sciences; yet it hath some small force in human sciences, (forasmuch as naturally, and in that he is a man, he may come to some ripeness of judgment in those sciences,) which in divine matters hath no force at all; as of him which naturally, and as he is a man, can no more judge of them than a blind man of colours. Yea so far is it from drawing credit, if it be barely spoken without reason and testimony of Scripture, that it carrieth also a suspicion of untruth whatsoever proceedeth from him; which the Apostle did well note, when, to signify a thing corruptly spoken, and against the truth, he saith, that ‘it is spoken according to man,’ Rom. iii. He saith not, ‘as a wicked and lying man,’ but simply, ‘as a man.’ And although this corruption be reformed in many, yet for so much as in whom the knowledge of the truth is most advanced there remaineth both ignorance and disordered affections (whereof either of them turneth him from speaking of the truth), no man’s authority, with the Church especially and those that are called and persuaded of the authority of the Word of God, can bring any assurance unto the conscience.” ↩
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T. C. lib. ii. p. 21: “Of divers sentences of the Fathers themselves (whereby some have likened them to brute beasts without reason which suffer themselves to be led by the judgment and authority of others, some have preferred the judgment of one simple rude man alleging reason unto companies of learned men) I will content myself at this time with two or three sentences. Irenæus saith, Whatsoever is to be shewed in the Scripture cannot be shewed but out of the Scriptures themselves. lib. iii. cap. 12. Jerome saith, ‘No man be he never so holy or eloquent hath any authority after the Apostles:’ in Ps. lxxxvi. Augustine saith, ‘That he will believe none how godly and learned soever he be, unless he confirm his sentence by the Scriptures, or by some reason not contrary to them.’ Ep. 18.” [al. 82. t. ii. p. 190.] “And in another place, Hear this, the Lord saith; Hear not this, Donatus saith, Rogatus saith, Vincentius saith, Hilarius saith, Ambrose saith, Augustine saith, but hearken unto this, The Lord saith. Ep. 48.” [al. 93. c. 6. Opp. t. ii. p. 239. It may be questioned whether this place is at all relevant to Cartwright’s purpose. Glorificatum est nomen meum in gentibus, dicit Dominus. Audi, dicit Dominus; non, dicit Donatus, aut Rogatus, aut Vincentius, aut Hilarius, aut Ambrosius, aut Augustinus; sed, dicit Dominus; cum legitur, Et benedicentur in eo omnes tribus terræ … . Et replebitur gloria ejus omnis terra, fiat, fiat. Et tu sedes Cartennis, et cum decem Rogatistis, qui remansistis, dicis, Non fiat, non fiat.] “And again, having to do with an Arian, he affirmeth that neither he ought to bring forth the Council of Nice, nor the other the Council of Arimine, thereby to bring prejudice each to other; neither ought the Arian to be holden by the authority of the one nor himself by the authority of the other, but by the Scriptures, which are witnesses proper to neither but common to both, matter with matter, cause with cause, reason with reason, ought to be debated. Cont. Max. Arian. lib. iii. c. 14.” [al. lib. ii. c. 14. § 3. t. viii. 704. Nec nunc ego Nicænum, nec tu debes Ariminense tanquam præjudicaturus proferre concilium. Nec ego hujus auctoritate, nec tu illius detineris. Scripturarum auctoritatibus, non quorumque propriis, sed utrisque communibus testibus, res cum re; causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione concertet.] “And in another place against Petilian the Donatist he saith, Let not these words be heard between us, I say, You say; let us hear this, Thus saith the Lord. And by and by speaking of the Scriptures he saith, There let us seek the Church, there let us try the cause. De Unit. Eccles. cap. 5.” [cap. 2, 3. Inter nos et Donatistas quæstio est, ubi sit hoc corpus: i. e. ubi sit Ecclesia. Quid ergo facturi sumus? in verbis nostris eam quæsituri; an in verbis capitis sui, Domini nostri Jesu Christi? Puto, quod in illius potius verbis eam quærere debemus, qui Veritas est, et optime novit corpus suum … . In verbis nostris Ecclesiam quæri nolumus … c. 5. Non audiamus, “Hæc dicis, hoc dico,” sed audiamus, “Hæc dicit Dominus.” Sunt certe libri Dominici, quorum auctoritati utrique consentimus, utrique cedimus, utrique servimus: ibi quæramus Ecclesiam, ibi discutiamus causam nostram.] “Hereby [here] it is manifest that the argument of the authority of man affirmatively is nothing worth.” ↩
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[P. 230. ed. Grabe. “Nobis autem conlaborantibus his ostensionibus quæ ex Scripturis sunt, et quæ multifarie dicta sunt breviter et compendiose annuntiantibus, et tu cum magnanimitate attende eis, et non longiloquium puta; hoc intelligens: quoniam,” &c.] ↩
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[viii. 127. C. sup. Psalm. 86. v. 6. “ ‘Dominus narrabit in scriptura populorum et principum, horum qui fuerunt in ea.’ ‘Principum:’ hoc est, Apostolorum et Evangelistarum. ‘Horum qui fuerunt in ea.’ Videte quid dicat: ‘Qui fuerunt,’ non ‘qui sunt:’ ut exceptis Apostolis, quodcunque aliud postea dicetur, abscindatur: non habeat postea auctoritatem, Quamvis ergo sanctus sit aliquis post Apostolos, quamvis disertus sit, non habet auctoritatem.”] ↩
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[S. Matt. xvii. 10.] ↩
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[Christ. Letter, p. 8: “We pray you to explane your owne meaning, whether you thinke that there be anie naturall light, teaching knowledge of things necessarie to salvation, which knowledge is not contayned in holy Scripture.” Hooker, MS. note: “They are matters of salvation I think which you handle in this booke. If therefore determinable only by Scripture, why presse you me so often with humane authorities? Why alleage you the Articles of Religion as the voice of the Church aganst me? Why cite you so many commentaries, bookes and sermons, partly of Bishops, partly of others?”] ↩
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“If at any time it happened unto Augustine (as it did against the Donatists and others) to allege the authority of the ancient Fathers which had been before him; yet this was not done before he had laid a sure foundation of his cause in the Scriptures, and that also being provoked by the adversaries of the truth, who bare themselves high of some council, or of some man of name that had favoured that part.” T. C. lib. ii. p. 22. ↩