According to the pattern of which example, the like power in causes ecclesiastical is by the laws of this realm annexed unto the crown. And there are which imagine²⁶, that²⁷ kings, being mere lay persons, do by this means exceed the lawful bounds of their calling²⁸. Which thing to the end that they may persuade, they first make a necessary separation perpetual and personal between the Church and the²⁹ commonwealth. Secondly³⁰, they so tie all kind of power ecclesiastical unto the Church, as if it were in every degree their only right which³¹ are by proper spiritual function³² termed Church-governors, and might not unto Christian princes in³³ any wise appertain.

To lurk under shifting ambiguities and equivocations of words in matters³⁴ of principal weight is childish. A church and a commonwealth we grant are things in nature the³⁵ one distinguished from the other. A commonwealth is one way, and a church another way, defined. In their opinion³⁶ the church and the³⁷ commonwealth are corporations, not distinguished only in nature and definition, but in subsistence³⁸ perpetually severed; so that they which³⁹ are of the one can neither appoint nor execute, in whole nor in part, the duties which belong unto them which are of the other, without open breach of the law of God, which hath divided them, and doth require that being so⁴⁰ divided they should distinctly and⁴¹ severally work, as depending both upon God, and not hanging one upon the other’s approbation for that which either hath to do.

We say that the care of religion being common unto all societies politic, such societies as do embrace the true religion have the name of the Church given unto every⁴² of them for distinction from the rest; so that every body politic hath some religion, but the Church that religion which is only true. Truth of religion is that proper difference whereby a church is distinguished from other politic societies of men. We here mean true religion in gross, and not according to every particular: for they which in some particular points of religion do swerve⁴³ from the truth, may nevertheless most⁴⁴ truly, if we compare them to men of an heathenish religion, be said to hold and profess that religion which is true. For which cause, there being of old so many politic societies established throughout⁴⁵ the world, only the commonwealth of Israel, which had the truth of religion, was in that respect the Church of God: and the Church of Jesus Christ is every such politic society of men, as doth in religion hold that truth which is proper to Christianity. As a politic society it doth maintain religion; as a church, that religion which God hath revealed by Jesus Christ.

With us therefore the name of a church importeth only a society of men, first united into some public form of regiment, and secondly distinguished from other societies by the exercise of Christian⁴⁶ religion. With them on the other side the name of the Church in this present question importeth not only a multitude of men so united and so distinguished, but also further the same divided necessarily and perpetually from the body of the commonwealth: so that even in such a politic society as consisteth of none but Christians, yet the Church of Christ and the commonwealth are two corporations, independently each subsisting by itself⁴⁷.

We hold, that seeing there is not any man of the Church of England but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth; nor any man a⁴⁸ member of the commonwealth, which is not also of the Church of England; therefore as in a figure triangular⁴⁹ the base doth differ from the sides thereof, and yet one and the selfsame line is both a base and also a side; a side simply, a base if it chance to be the bottom and underlie the rest: so, albeit properties and actions of one kind⁵⁰ do cause the name of a commonwealth, qualities and functions of another sort the name of a Church⁵¹ to be given unto⁵² a multitude, yet one and the selfsame multitude may in such sort be both, ⁵³and is so with us, that no person appertaining to the one can be denied to be also⁵⁴ of the other. Contrariwise, unless they against us should hold, that the Church and the commonwealth are two, both distinct and separate societies, of which two, the⁵⁵ one comprehendeth always persons not belonging to the other; that which they do⁵⁶ they could not conclude out of the difference between the Church and the commonwealth; namely, that⁵⁷ bishops may not meddle with the affairs of the commonwealth, because they are governors of another corporation, which is the Church; nor kings with making laws for the Church, because they have government not of this corporation, but of another divided from it, the commonwealth; and the walls of separation between these two must for ever be upheld. They hold the necessity of personal separation, which clean excludeth the power of one man’s dealing in⁵⁸ both; we of natural, which doth not hinder⁵⁹ but that one and the same person may in both bear a⁶⁰ principal sway⁶¹.

The causes of common received error⁶² in this point seem to have been especially two: one, that they who embrace true religion living in such commonwealths as are opposite thereunto, and in other public affairs retaining civil communion with such, ⁶³are constrained, for the exercise of their religion, to have a several communion with those who are of the same religion with them. This was the state of the Jewish Church both in Egypt and in ⁶⁴Babylon, the state of Christian Churches a long time after Christ. And in this case, because the proper affairs and actions of the Church, as it is the Church, have⁶⁵ no dependence⁶⁶ upon the laws, or upon the governors⁶⁷ of the civil state, an opinion hath thereby grown, that even so it should be always⁶⁸. This was it which deceived Allen in the writing of his Apology: “The Apostles,” saith he⁶⁹, “did govern the church in Rome when Nero bare⁷⁰ rule, even as at this day in all the Turk’s⁷¹ dominions, the Church hath a spiritual regiment without dependence, and so ought she to have, live she⁷² amongst heathens, or with Christians.”

Another occasion of which misconceit is, that things appertaining unto religion are both distinguished from other affairs, and have always had in the Church special⁷³ persons chosen to be exercised about them. By which distinction of spiritual affairs and persons therein employed from temporal, the error of personal separation always necessary between the Church and the⁷⁴ commonwealth hath strengthened itself. For of every politic society that being true which Aristotle hath⁷⁵, ⁷⁶namely, “that the scope thereof is not simply to live, nor the duty so much to provide for life⁷⁷, as for means of living well:” and that even as the soul is the worthier part of man, so human societies are much more to care for that which tendeth properly unto the soul’s estate, than for such temporal things as this life doth stand in⁷⁸ need of: other proof there needs⁷⁹ none to shew that as by all men the kingdom of God is first to be sought⁸⁰ for⁸¹, so in all commonwealths things spiritual ought above temporal to be provided⁸² for. And of things spiritual, the chiefest is religion⁸³. For this cause, persons and things employed peculiarly about the affairs of religion, are by an excellency termed spiritual. The heathen⁸⁴ themselves had their spiritual laws, causes, and offices⁸⁵, ⁸⁶always severed from their temporal; neither did this make two independent estates among⁸⁷ them. God by revealing true religion doth make them that receive it his Church. Unto the Jews he so revealed the truth of religion, that he gave them in special consideration⁸⁸ laws, not only for the administration of things spiritual, but also temporal. The Lord himself appointing both the one and the other in that commonwealth, did not thereby distract it into several independent communities, but institute several functions of one and the same⁸⁹ community. Some reason⁹⁰ therefore must⁹¹ be alleged⁹² why it should be otherwise in the Church of Christ.

I shall not need to spend any great store of words in answering that which is brought out of⁹³ holy Scripture to shew that secular and ecclesiastical affairs and offices are distinguished; neither that which hath been borrowed from antiquity, using by phrase of speech to oppose the commonwealth⁹⁴ to the Church of Christ; nor yet the⁹⁵ reasons which are wont to be brought forth as witnesses, that the Church and commonwealth are⁹⁶ always distinct. For whether a church and a⁹⁷ commonwealth do differ, is not the question we strive for; but our controversy is concerning the kind of distinction, whereby they are severed the one from the other; whether as under heathen kings the Church did deal with her own affairs within herself, without depending at all upon any in civil authority, and the commonwealth in hers, altogether without the privity of the Church; so it ought to continue still, even in such commonwealths as have now publicly embraced the truth of Christian religion; whether they ought to be⁹⁸ evermore two societies, in such sort, several and distinct.

I ask therefore, what society that was, that was⁹⁹ in Rome, whereunto the Apostle did give the name of the Church of Rome in his time? If they answer, as needs they must, that the Church of Rome in those days was that whole society of men which in Rome professed the name of Christ, and not that religion which the laws of the commonwealth did then authorize; we say as much, and therefore grant that the commonwealth of Rome was one society, and the Church of Rome another, in such sort as¹⁰⁰ there was between them no mutual dependency¹⁰¹. But when whole Rome became Christian, when they all embraced the gospel, and made laws in the¹⁰² defence thereof, if it be held that the church and the¹⁰³ commonwealth of Rome did then remain as before; there is no way how this could be possible, save only one, and that is, they must restrain the name of the¹⁰⁴ Church in a Christian commonwealth to the clergy, excluding all the residue¹⁰⁵ of believers, both prince and people. For if all that believe be contained¹⁰⁶ in the name of the Church, how should the Church remain by personal subsistence¹⁰⁷ divided from the commonwealth, when the whole commonwealth doth believe?

The Church and the commonwealth therefore¹⁰⁸ are in this case personally one society, which society being termed a commonwealth as it liveth under whatsoever form of secular law and regiment, a church as it hath¹⁰⁹ the spiritual law of Jesus Christ¹¹⁰; forasmuch¹¹¹ as these two laws contain so many and so¹¹² different offices, there must of necessity be appointed in it some to one charge, and some to another, yet without dividing the whole, and making it two several impaled societies.

The difference therefore either of affairs or offices ecclesiastical from secular¹¹³, is no argument that the Church and the commonwealth are always separate and independent the one on¹¹⁴ the other: which thing even Allen himself considering somewhat better, doth in this point a little¹¹⁵ correct his former judgment before mentioned¹¹⁶, and confesseth in his Defence of English Catholics, that “the power political hath her princes, laws, tribunals; the spiritual, her prelates, canons, councils, judgments; and those (when the¹¹⁷ princes are pagans) wholly separate, but in Christian commonwealths joined though not confounded¹¹⁸.” Howbeit afterwards his former sting appeareth again; for in a Christian¹¹⁹ commonwealth he holdeth, that the Church ought not to depend at all upon the authority of any civil person whatsoever, as in England he saith it doth.

It will be objected, that “the Fathers do oftentimes mention the commonwealth and the Church of God by way of opposition¹²⁰. Can the same thing be opposite¹²¹ unto itself? If one and the same society be both¹²², what sense can there be in that speech which saith¹²³, that ‘they suffer and flourish together¹²⁴?’ What sense in that which maketh one thing¹²⁵ adjudged to the Church, another¹²⁶ to the commonwealth¹²⁷? Finally, in that which putteth a difference between the causes of the province and of¹²⁸ the Church? Doth¹²⁹ it not hereby appear that the Church and the commonwealth are things evermore personally separate¹³⁰?”

No, it doth not hereby appear that there is¹³¹ perpetually any such separation; we may¹³² speak of them as two, we may sever the rights and causes of the one well enough from the other, in regard of that difference which we grant there¹³³ is between them, albeit we make no personal difference. For the truth is, that the Church and the commonwealth are names which import things really different; but those things are accidents¹³⁴, and such accidents as may and should always¹³⁵ dwell lovingly¹³⁶ together in one subject. Wherefore the real difference between the accidents signified by those names, doth not prove different subjects for them always to reside in. For albeit the subjects wherein they are¹³⁷ resident be sometime¹³⁸ different, as when the people of God have their being¹³⁹ among infidels; yet the nature of them is not such but that their subject may be one, and therefore it is but a changeable accident, in those accidents¹⁴⁰, when the subjects they are in be diverse.

There can be no error in our conceit concerning this point, if we remember still what accident that¹⁴¹ is, for which a society hath the name of a commonwealth, and what accident that which doth cause it to be termed a Church. A commonwealth we name it simply in regard of some regiment or policy under which men live; a church for the truth of that religion which they profess. Now names betokening accidents unabstracted, do betoken¹⁴² not only those¹⁴³ accidents, but also together with them the¹⁴⁴ subjects whereunto they cleave. As when we name a schoolmaster and a physician, these¹⁴⁵ names do not only betoken two accidents, teaching and curing, but also some person or persons in whom these accidents are. For there is no impediment but both may be one man¹⁴⁶, as well as they are for the most part diverse¹⁴⁷. The commonwealth and the Church therefore being such names, they do not only betoken those accidents of civil government and Christian religion which we have mentioned, but also together with them such multitudes as are the subjects of those¹⁴⁸ accidents. Again, their nature being such that¹⁴⁹ they may well enough dwell together in one subject, it followeth that their names, though always implying that difference of accidents which¹⁵⁰ hath been set down, yet do not always imply different subjects also. When we oppose the Church¹⁵¹ therefore and the commonwealth in a¹⁵² Christian society, we mean by the commonwealth that society with relation unto all the public affairs thereof, only the matter of true religion excepted; by the Church, the same society with only reference unto the matter of true religion, without any other¹⁵³ affairs besides: when that society which is both a church and a commonwealth doth flourish in those things which belong unto it as a commonwealth, we then say, “the commonwealth doth flourish;” when¹⁵⁴ in those things which concern it as a church, “the Church doth flourish;” when in both, then¹⁵⁵ “the Church and commonwealth flourish together.”

The Prophet Esay, to note corruptions in the commonwealth, complaineth, “¹⁵⁶That where judgment and justice¹⁵⁷ had lodged now were murderers; princes were become companions of thieves; every one loved gifts and rewards; but the fatherless was not judged, neither did the widow’s cause come before them.” To shew abuses in the Church, Malachy doth make his complaint¹⁵⁸: “Ye offer unclean bread upon mine altar: if ye offer the blind for sacrifice, it is not amiss¹⁵⁹ as ye¹⁶⁰ think; if the lame and the sick, nothing is amiss.” The treasures¹⁶¹ which David¹⁶² did bestow¹⁶³ upon the temple do¹⁶⁴ argue the love which he bare to the Church: the pains that¹⁶⁵ Nehemias^{166 167}took for building the walls of the city are tokens of his care for the commonwealth. Causes of the commonwealth, or province, are still as Gallio was content to be judge of¹⁶⁸: “If it were a matter of wrong, or an evil deed, O ye Jews, I would according to reason maintain you.” Causes of the Church are such as Gallio there¹⁶⁹ rejecteth¹⁷⁰: “If it be a question of your law, look you unto it, I will be no judge of those things¹⁷¹.” In respect of these differences¹⁷² therefore the Church and the commonwealth may in speech be compared or opposed aptly enough the one to the other; yet this is no argument that they are two independent societies.

Some other reasons there are, which seem a little more nearly to make for the purpose, as long as they are but heard and not sifted. For what though a man being severed by excommunication from the Church, be not thereby deprived of freedom in the city; nor¹⁷³ being there discommoned, is thereby¹⁷⁴ forthwith excommunicated and excluded from¹⁷⁵ the Church¹⁷⁶? what though the Church be bound to receive them upon repentance, whom the commonwealth may refuse again to admit¹⁷⁷ if it chance the same men to be shut out of both? That division¹⁷⁸ of the church and commonwealth, which they contend for, will very hardly hereupon follow.

For we must note that members of a Christian commonwealth have a triple state; a natural, a civil, and a spiritual. No man’s natural estate is cut off otherwise than by that capital execution, after¹⁷⁹ which he that is gone from¹⁸⁰ the body of the commonwealth doth not, I think, remain still¹⁸¹ in the body of the¹⁸² visible Church.

And concerning a¹⁸³ man’s civil estate¹⁸⁴, the same is subject partly to inferior abatements of liberty, and partly unto diminution in the very¹⁸⁵ highest degree, such as banishment is; which¹⁸⁶, sith it casteth out quite and clean from the body of the commonwealth, must¹⁸⁷ needs also consequently cast the banished party even out of the very Church he was of before, because that Church and the commonwealth he was of were both one and the same society: so that whatsoever doth separate utterly¹⁸⁸ a man’s person from the one, it separateth also from the other¹⁸⁹. As for such abatements of civil state as take away only some privilege, dignity, or other benefit which a man enjoyeth in the commonwealth, they reach only unto our dealing with public affairs, from which what should¹⁹⁰ let but that men may be excluded and thereunto restored again, without diminishing or augmenting the number of persons in whom either church or commonwealth consisteth? He that by way of punishment loseth his voice in a public election of magistrates, ceaseth not thereby to be a citizen. A man disfranchised may notwithstanding enjoy as a subject the common benefit of protection under laws and magistrates. So that these inferior diminutions which touch men civilly, but neither do clean extinguish their estate as they belong to the commonwealth, nor impair a whit their condition as they are of the Church of God: these I say clearly do¹⁹¹ prove a difference of the affairs of¹⁹² the one from the other, but such a difference as maketh nothing for their surmise of distracted societies.

And concerning excommunication, it cutteth off indeed from the Church, and yet not from the commonwealth; howbeit so, that the party excommunicate is not thereby severed from one body which subsisteth in itself, and retained of¹⁹³ another in like sort subsisting; but he that¹⁹⁴ before had fellowship with that society whereof he was a member, as well touching things spiritual as civil, is now by force of excommunication, although not severed from the same¹⁹⁵ body in civil affairs, nevertheless for the time cut off from it as touching communion in those things which belong to the said¹⁹⁶ body, as it is the Church.

A man which hath¹⁹⁷ both been excommunicated by the Church, and deprived of civil dignity in the commonwealth, is upon his repentance necessarily readunited¹⁹⁸ into the one, but not of necessity into the other. What then? that which he is adunited¹⁹⁹ unto is a communion in things divine, whereof saints²⁰⁰ are partakers; that from which he is withheld is the benefit of some human privilege or right which other citizens haply enjoy. But are not those²⁰¹ Saints and Citizens one and the same people? are they not one and the same society? doth it hereby appear that the Church which receiveth²⁰² an excommunicate man²⁰³, can have no dependency of²⁰⁴ any person which is of²⁰⁵ chief authority and power, in those things of²⁰⁶ the commonwealth whereunto the same²⁰⁷ party is not admitted?

Wherefore to end this point, I conclude: First, that under ²⁰⁸dominions of infidels, the Church of Christ, and their commonwealth, were two societies independent. Secondly, that in those commonwealths where the bishop of Rome beareth sway, one society is both the Church and the commonwealth; but the bishop of Rome doth divide the body into two diverse bodies, and doth not suffer the Church to depend upon the power of any civil prince or²⁰⁹ potentate. Thirdly, that within this realm of England the case is neither as in the one, nor as in the other of the former two: but from the state of pagans we differ, in that with us one society is both the Church and commonwealth, which with them it was not; as also from the state of those nations which subject²¹⁰ themselves to the bishop of Rome, in that our Church hath dependency upon²¹¹ the chief in our commonwealth, which it hath not under him²¹². In a word, our estate is according to the pattern of God’s own ancient elect people, which people was not part of them the commonwealth, and part of them the Church of God, but the selfsame people whole and entire were both under one chief Governor, on whose supreme authority they did all²¹³ depend.

II. Now the drift of all that hath been alleged to prove perpetual separation and independency between the Church and the commonwealth is, that this being held necessary, it might consequently be thought²¹⁴, that in a Christian kingdom he whose power is greatest over the commonwealth may not lawfully have supremacy of power also over the Church, as it is a church²¹⁵; that is to say, so far as to order²¹⁶ and dispose²¹⁷ of spiritual affairs, ²¹⁸as the highest uncommanded commander in them. Whereupon it is grown a question, whether power²¹⁹ ecclesiastical over the Church²²⁰, power²²¹ of dominion in such degree²²² as the laws²²³ of this land do grant unto the sovereign governor thereof, may by the said supreme Head and²²⁴ Governor lawfully be enjoyed and held? For resolution wherein, we are, first, to define what the power of dominion is: ²²⁵then to shew by what right: after what sort: in what measure: with what conveniency²²⁶: according unto whose example Christian kings may have it. And when these generalities²²⁷ are opened, to examine afterwards how lawful that is which we in regard of dominion do attribute unto our own: namely, the title of headship over the Church, so far as the bounds of this kingdom do reach: ²²⁸the prerogative of calling and dissolving greater²²⁹ assemblies, about spiritual affairs public: the right of assenting unto all those orders concerning religion, which must after be in force as laws²³⁰: the advancement of principal church-governors to their rooms of prelacy: judicial authority higher than others are capable of: and exemption from being punishable with such kind of censures as the platform of reformation doth teach that they ought to be subject unto.

Without order there is no living in public society, because the want thereof is the mother of confusion, whereupon division of necessity followeth, and out of division, inevitable²³¹ destruction²³². The Apostle²³³ therefore giving instruction to public societies, requireth that all things be orderly done. Order can have no place in things, unless²³⁴ it be settled amongst the persons that shall by office be conversant about them. And if things or²³⁵ persons be ordered, this doth imply that they are distinguished by degrees. For order is a gradual disposition.

The whole world consisting of parts so many, so different, is by this only thing upheld; he which framed them hath set them in order. Yea²³⁶, the very Deity itself both keepeth and requireth for ever this to be kept as a law, that wheresoever there is a coagmentation²³⁷ of many, the lowest be knit to the highest by that which being interjacent may cause each to cleave unto other²³⁸, and so all to continue one.

This order of things and persons in public societies is the work of polity²³⁹, and the proper instrument thereof in every degree is power; power being that ability which we have of ourselves, or receive from others, for performance of any action. If the action which we are²⁴⁰ to perform be conversant about matter²⁴¹ of mere religion, the power of performing it is then spiritual; and if that power be such as hath not any other to overrule it, we term it dominion, or power supreme, so far as the bounds thereof do extend²⁴².

When therefore Christian kings are said to have spiritual dominion or supreme power in ecclesiastical affairs and causes, the meaning is, that within their own precincts and territories they have ²⁴³authority and power to command even in matters of Christian religion, and that there is no higher nor greater that can in those causes²⁴⁴ over-command them, where they are placed to reign as kings. But withal we must likewise note that their power is termed supremacy, as being the highest, not simply without exception of any thing. For what man is there²⁴⁵ so brain-sick, as not to except in such speeches God himself, the King of all the kings of the earth?²⁴⁶ Besides, where the law doth give him dominion²⁴⁷, who doubteth but that the king who receiveth it must hold it of and under²⁴⁸ the law? according to that²⁴⁹ axiom, “Attribuat rex legi, quod lex attribuit ei, potestatem et dominium²⁵⁰:” and again, “Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege²⁵¹.” Thirdly, whereas it is not²⁵² altogether without reason, “that kings are judged to have by virtue of their dominion, although greater power than any, yet not than all the states²⁵³ of those societies conjoined, wherein such sovereign rule is given them;” there is not hereunto any thing contrary²⁵⁴ by us affirmed, no, not when we grant supreme authority unto kings, because supremacy is no²⁵⁵ otherwise intended or meant²⁵⁶ than to exclude partly foreign powers, and partly the power which belongeth in several unto others, contained as parts ²⁵⁷within that politic body over which those kings have supremacy. “Where the king hath power of dominion, or supreme power, there no foreign state or potentate, no state or potentate domestical, whether it consist²⁵⁸ of one or ²⁵⁹of many, can possibly have in the same affairs and causes authority higher than the king.”

Power of spiritual dominion therefore is in causes ecclesiastical that ruling authority, which neither any foreign state, nor yet any part of that politic body at home, wherein the same is established, can lawfully overrule²⁶⁰.

Unto which supreme power in kings two kinds of adversaries there are that²⁶¹ have opposed themselves: one sort defending, “that supreme power in causes ecclesiastical throughout the world appertaineth of divine right to the bishop of Rome:” another sort, “that the said power belongeth in every national church unto the clergy thereof assembled.” We which defend as well against the one as against the other²⁶², “that kings within their own precincts may have it,” must shew by what right it may²⁶³ come unto them.

First, unto me it seemeth almost out of doubt and controversy, that every independent multitude, before any certain form of regiment established, hath, under God’s²⁶⁴ supreme authority, full dominion over itself, even as a man not tied with the bond²⁶⁵ of subjection as yet unto any other, hath over himself the like power. God creating mankind did endue it naturally with ²⁶⁶full power to guide itself²⁶⁷, in what kind²⁶⁸ of societies²⁶⁹ soever it²⁷⁰ should choose to live. A man which is born lord of himself may be made another’s servant: and that power which naturally whole societies have, may be derived into²⁷¹ many, few, or one, under whom the rest shall then live in subjection.

Some multitudes are brought into subjection by force, as they who being subdued are fain to submit their necks unto what yoke it pleaseth their conquerors to lay upon them; which conquerors by just and lawful wars do hold their power over such multitudes as a thing descending unto them, divine providence itself so disposing. For it is God who giveth victory in the day of war. And unto whom dominion in this sort is derived, the same they enjoy according unto that²⁷² law of nations, which law authorizeth conquerors to reign as absolute lords over them whom they vanquish.

Sometimes²⁷³ it pleaseth God himself by special appointment to choose out and nominate such as to whom dominion shall be given, which thing he did often in the commonwealth of Israel. They who²⁷⁴ in this sort receive power have it²⁷⁵ immediately from God, by mere divine right; they by human, on whom the same is bestowed according unto men’s discretion, when they are left free²⁷⁶ by God to make choice of their own governor²⁷⁷. By which of these means soever it happen that kings or governors be advanced unto their states²⁷⁸, we must acknowledge both their lawful choice to be approved of God, and themselves to be²⁷⁹ God’s lieutenants²⁸⁰, and confess their power²⁸¹ his²⁸².

As for supreme power in ecclesiastical affairs, the word of God doth no where appoint that all kings should have it, neither that any should not have it; for which cause it seemeth to stand altogether by human right, that unto Christian kings there is such dominion given.

Again, on whom the same is bestowed even²⁸³ at men’s discretion, they likewise do hold it by divine right. If God in his own²⁸⁴ revealed word have²⁸⁵ appointed such power to be, although himself extraordinarily bestow it not, but leave the appointment of the²⁸⁶ persons unto men; yea, albeit God do neither appoint the thing²⁸⁷ nor assign the person; nevertheless when men have²⁸⁸ established both, who doth doubt but that sundry duties and offices²⁸⁹ depending thereupon are prescribed in²⁹⁰ the word of God, and consequently by that very right to be exacted?

For example’s sake, the power which the²⁹¹ Roman emperors had over foreign provinces was not a thing which the law of God did ever institute, neither was Tiberius Cæsar by special commission from heaven therewith invested; and yet the²⁹² payment of tribute unto Cæsar being²⁹³ made emperor is the plain law of Jesus Christ. Unto kings by human right, honour by very divine right, is due; man’s ordinances are many times presupposed²⁹⁴ as grounds in the statutes of God. And therefore of what kind soever the means be whereby governors are lawfully advanced unto their seats²⁹⁵, as we by the law²⁹⁶ of God stand bound meekly to acknowledge them for God’s lieutenants, and to confess their power his, so they by the same law²⁹⁷ are both authorized and required to use that power as far as it may be in any sort²⁹⁸ available to his honour. The law appointeth no man to be an husband, but if a man have²⁹⁹ betaken himself unto that condition, it giveth him then³⁰⁰ authority over his own wife. That the Christian world should be ordered by³⁰¹ kingly regiment, the law of God doth not any where command; and yet the law of God doth give them right³⁰², which once are exalted to that³⁰³ estate, to exact³⁰⁴ at the hands of their subjects general obediences in whatsoever affairs their power may serve to command. So³⁰⁵ God doth ratify the³⁰⁶ works of that sovereign authority which kings have received by men.

This is therefore the right whereby kings do hold their power; but yet in what sort the same doth rest and abide in them it somewhat further behoveth³⁰⁷ to search. Wherein, that we be not enforced to make over-large discourses about the different conditions of sovereign or supreme power, that which we speak of kings shall be with³⁰⁸ respect to³⁰⁹ the state and according to the nature of this kingdom, where the people are in no subjection, but such as willingly themselves have condescended unto, for their own most behoof and security. In kingdoms therefore of this quality the highest governor hath indeed universal dominion, but with dependence upon that whole entire body, over the several parts whereof he hath dominion; so that it standeth for an axiom in this case, The king is “major singulis, universis minor³¹⁰.”

The king’s dependency we do not construe as some have done, who are of opinion that no man’s birth can make him a king, but every particular person advanced unto such authority hath at his entrance into his reign the same bestowed upon him, as an estate in condition, by the voluntary deed of the people, in whom it doth lie to put by any one, and to prefer some other before him, better liked of, or judged fitter for the place, and that the party so rejected hath herein³¹¹ no injury³¹², no not³¹³ although this³¹⁴ be done in a place where the crown doth go κατὰ³¹⁵ γένος, by succession, and to a person which being capable³¹⁶ hath apparently, if blood be respected, the nearest right. They plainly affirm³¹⁷, that³¹⁸ “in all well-appointed kingdoms, the custom evermore hath been, and is, that children succeed not their deceased³¹⁹ parents till the people after a sort have created them anew, neither that they grow to their fathers as natural and proper heirs, but are then to be reckoned for kings, when at the hands of such as represent the people’s³²⁰ majesty they have by a sceptre and diadem³²¹ received as it were the investiture of kingly power.” Their very words are³²², “That where such power is settled into a family or kindred, the stock itself is thereby chosen, but not the twig that springeth of it. The next of the stock unto him which³²³ reigneth are not through nearness of blood made kings, but rather set forth to stand for the kingdom. Where regal dominion is hereditary, it is notwithstanding if ye³²⁴ look to the persons themselves³²⁵ which have it altogether elective.” To this purpose are alleged^{326 327}heaps of Scriptures concerning the solemn coronation or inauguration of Saul, of David, of Solomon, of³²⁸ others, by the nobles, ancients, and people of the commonwealth of Israel; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed, whereby the right of dominion is given³²⁹. Which³³⁰ strange, untrue, and unnatural conceits, set abroad by seedsmen of rebellion, only to animate unquiet spirits, and to feed them with a possibility of aspiring unto thrones and sceptres³³¹, if they can win the hearts of the people, what hereditary title soever any other before them may have, I say, these³³² unjust and insolent positions I would not mention, were it not thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient: for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all law, equity, and reason, we must (there is no remedy) acknowledge, that in kingdoms hereditary birth giveth right unto sovereign dominion; and the death of the predecessor putteth the successor by blood in seisin. Those public solemnities before mentioned³³³ do but either³³⁴ serve for an open testification of the inheritor’s right, or belong to the form of inducting him into possession of that thing he hath right unto. And³³⁵ therefore in case it do³³⁶ happen that without right of blood a man in such wise be possessed, all those things³³⁷ are utterly void, they make him no indefeasible estate, the inheritor by blood may dispossess him as an usurper.

The case thus standing, albeit we judge it a thing most true, that kings, even inheritors, do hold their right to³³⁸ the power of dominion, with dependency upon the whole entire³³⁹ body politic over which they rule³⁴⁰ as kings; yet so it may not be understood, as if such dependency did grow, for that every supreme governor doth personally take from thence his power by way of gift, bestowed of their own free accord upon him at the time of his entrance into his³⁴¹ said place of sovereign³⁴² government. But the cause of dependency is in³⁴³ that first original conveyance, when power was derived by³⁴⁴ the whole into one; to pass from him unto³⁴⁵ them, whom out of him nature by lawful birth³⁴⁶ should produce, and no natural or legal inability make uncapable³⁴⁷. Neither can any man with reason think, but that the first institution of kings is³⁴⁸ a sufficient consideration wherefore their power should always depend on that from which it did then flow³⁴⁹. Original³⁵⁰ influence of power from the body into the king, is cause of the king’s³⁵¹ dependency in power upon the body.

By dependency we mean subordination and subjection. A manifest token of which dependency may be this: as there is no more certain argument that lands are held under any as lord³⁵², than if we see that such lands in defect of heirs do fall by escheat unto him³⁵³; in like manner it doth rightly follow³⁵⁴, that seeing dominion, when there is none to inherit it, returneth unto the body, therefore they which before were inheritors thereof did hold it with dependency upon the body. So that by comparing the body with the head, as touching power, it seemeth always to reside in both; fundamentally or³⁵⁵ radically in the one, in the other derivatively; in the³⁵⁶ one the habit, in the other the act of power.

May then a body politic³⁵⁷ at all times withdraw in whole or in part that³⁵⁸ influence of dominion which passeth from it, if inconvenience doth³⁵⁹ grow thereby? It must be presumed, that supreme governors will not in such case oppose themselves, and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with public detriment: but surely without their consent I see not how the body should be able by any just means³⁶⁰ to help itself, saving when dominion doth escheat. Such things therefore must be thought upon beforehand, that power may be limited ere it be granted; which is the next thing we are to consider.

In power of dominion, all kings have not an equal latitude. Kings by conquest make their own charter: so that how large their power, either civil or spiritual, is, we cannot with any certainty define, further than only to set them in general ³⁶¹the law of God and nature for bounds. Kings by God’s own special appointment have also that largeness of power, which he doth assign or permit with approbation. Touching kings which were first instituted by agreement and composition made with them over whom they reign, how far their power may lawfully³⁶² extend, the articles of compact between them must³⁶³ shew: not the articles only³⁶⁴ of compact at the first beginning, which for the most part are either clean worn out of knowledge, or else known unto very few, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntary manner condescended unto, whether by express consent, whereof positive laws are witnesses, or else by silent allowance famously notified through custom reaching beyond the memory of man. By which means of after-agreement, it cometh many times to pass in kingdoms, that they whose ancient predecessors were by violence and force made subject, do grow even by little and little³⁶⁵ into that most³⁶⁶ sweet form of kingly government which philosophers define to be³⁶⁷ “³⁶⁸regency willingly sustained³⁶⁹ and endured, with chiefty of power in the greatest things.”

Many of the ancients in their writings do speak of kings with such high and ample terms, as if universality of power, even in regard of things and not of persons only, did appertain to the very being of a king³⁷⁰. The reason is, because their speech concerning kings they frame according to the state of those monarchs to whom unlimited authority was given: which some not observing, imagine that all kings, even in that they are kings, ought to have whatsoever power they find³⁷¹ any sovereign ruler lawfully to have enjoyed. But the³⁷² most judicious philosopher, whose eye scarce any thing did escape³⁷³ which was to be found in the bosom of nature, he considering how far the power of one sovereign ruler may be different from another’s³⁷⁴ regal authority, noteth in Spartan kings³⁷⁵, “that of all others lawfully reigning they had³⁷⁶ the most restrained power³⁷⁷.” A king which hath not supreme power in the greatest things, is rather entitled a king, than invested with real sovereignty. We cannot properly term him a king, of whom it may not be said, at the leastwise, as touching certain the very³⁷⁸ chiefest affairs of state³⁷⁹, αὐτῳ̑ μὲν³⁸⁰ ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι³⁸¹ δὲ ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς, “his right in them is to have rule, not subject to any other predominant³⁸².” I am not of opinion that simply always³⁸³ in kings the most, but the best limited power is best³⁸⁴: the most limited is, that which may deal in fewest things; the best, that which in dealing is tied unto the soundest, perfectest, and most indifferent rule; which rule is the law; I mean not only the law of nature and of God, but very national or municipal law consonant thereunto³⁸⁵. Happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest things, than that whose king is himself their law. Where the king doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth is like an harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are tuned and handled all by one³⁸⁶, following as laws the rules and canons of musical science³⁸⁷. Most divinely therefore Archytas maketh unto public felicity these four steps³⁸⁸, every later whereof³⁸⁹ doth spring from the former, as from a mother³⁹⁰ cause; ὁ μὲν³⁹¹ βασιλεὺς νόμιμος, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων ἀκόλουθος, ὁ δὲ ἀρχόμενος ἐλεύθερος³⁹², ἁ δ’ ὅλα³⁹³ κοινωνία εὐδαίμων³⁹⁴; adding on the contrary side, that “where this order is not, it cometh by transgression thereof to pass that the king³⁹⁵ groweth³⁹⁶ a tyrant; he that ruleth under him abhorreth to be guided and commanded by him³⁹⁷; the people subject under³⁹⁸ both, have freedom under neither; and the whole community is wretched³⁹⁹.”

In which respect, I cannot choose but commend highly their wisdom, by whom the foundations of this⁴⁰⁰ commonwealth have been laid; wherein though no manner person⁴⁰¹ or cause be unsubject to the king’s power, yet so is the power of the king over all and in all limited, that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule. The axioms of our regal government are these: “Lex facit regem:” the king’s grant of any favour made contrary to the⁴⁰² law is void; “Rex nihil potest nisi quod jure potest.” Our kings therefore, when they take⁴⁰³ possession of the room⁴⁰⁴ they are called unto, have it painted⁴⁰⁵ out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs by the said⁴⁰⁶ law their supreme authority and power⁴⁰⁷ reacheth. Crowned we see they are, and⁴⁰⁸ enthronized, and anointed: the crown a sign of military⁴⁰⁹; the throne, of sedentary or⁴¹⁰ judicial; the oil, of religious or sacred power.

It is not on any side denied, that kings may have such⁴¹¹ authority in secular affairs. The question then is, “What power they lawfully may⁴¹² have, and exercise in causes of God.” “A prince, a magistrate, or community,” saith D. Stapleton⁴¹³, “may have power to lay corporal punishment⁴¹⁴ on them which are teachers of perverse things; power to make laws for the peace of the Church; power to proclaim, to defend, and even by revenge to preserve from violation⁴¹⁵ dogmata, very⁴¹⁶ articles of religion themselves.” Others⁴¹⁷ in affection no less devoted unto the papacy, do likewise yield, that “the civil magistrate may by his edicts and laws keep all ecclesiastical persons within the bounds of their duties, and constrain them to observe the canons of the Church, to follow the rules⁴¹⁸ of ancient discipline.” That “if Joas⁴¹⁹ were⁴²⁰ commended for his care and provision concerning so small a part of religion as the church-treasury⁴²¹; it must needs be both unto Christian kings themselves greater honour, and to Christianity a larger benefit, when the custody of religion whole⁴²² and of⁴²³ the worship of God in general is their charge.” If therefore all these things mentioned be most properly the affairs of God, and ecclesiastical⁴²⁴ causes; if the actions specified be works of power; and if that power be such as kings may use of themselves, without the leave⁴²⁵ of any other power superior in the same things⁴²⁶: it followeth necessarily, that kings may have supreme power, not only in civil, but also in ecclesiastical affairs; and consequently, that they may withstand what bishop or pope soever shall, under the pretended claim of higher spiritual authority, oppose himself⁴²⁷ against their proceedings. But they which have made us the former grant, will hereunto never⁴²⁸ condescend. What they yield that princes may do, it is with secret exception always understood, if the bishop of Rome give leave, if he interpose no prohibition: wherefore somewhat it is in shew, in truth nothing, which they grant.

Our own reformers do the very like. When they make their discourses⁴²⁹ in general concerning the authority which magistrates may have, a man would think them far⁴³⁰ from withdrawing any jot of that which with reason may be thought due. “The prince and civil magistrate⁴³¹,” saith one of them, “hath to see that⁴³² the laws of God touching his worship, and touching all matters and orders⁴³³ of the Church be⁴³⁴ executed, and duly observed; and to see that⁴³⁵ every ecclesiastical person do that office whereunto he is appointed, and to punish those which fail in their office accordingly.” Another acknowledgeth⁴³⁶, that “the magistrate may lawfully uphold all truth by his sword, punish all persons, enforce all to do⁴³⁷ their duties unto⁴³⁸ God and men; maintain by his laws every point of God’s word, punish all vice in all men; see into all causes, visit the ecclesiastical estate, and correct the abuses thereof; finally, to look to his subjects, that under him they may lead their lives in all godliness and honesty.” A third more frankly professeth⁴³⁹, that in case their church-discipline were established, so little it shorteneth the arms of sovereign dominion in causes ecclesiastical, that her gracious Majesty, for any thing which⁴⁴⁰ they teach or hold to the contrary, may no less than now “remain still over all persons, in all things supreme governess, even with that full and royal authority, superiority, preeminence⁴⁴¹, supremacy, and prerogative, which the laws already established do give her, and her Majesty’s injunctions, and the articles of the Convocation-house, and other writings apologetical of her royal authority and supreme dignity, do declare and explain.”

Posidonius was wont to say of the Epicure, “That he thought there were no gods, but that those things which he spake concerning the gods were only given out for fear of growing odious amongst men; and therefore that in words he left gods remaining, but in very deed overthrew them, inasmuch⁴⁴² as he gave them no kind of motion⁴⁴³, no kind of action⁴⁴⁴.” After the very selfsame manner, when we come unto those particular effects and⁴⁴⁵ prerogatives of dominion which the laws of this land do grant unto the kings thereof, it will appear how these⁴⁴⁶ men, notwithstanding their large and liberal speeches, abate such parcels out of the fore-alleged grand⁴⁴⁷ and flourishing sum⁴⁴⁸, that a man comparing the one with the other may half stand in doubt, lest their opinions⁴⁴⁹ in very truth be against that authority which by their speeches they seem mightily to uphold, partly for the avoiding of public obloquy, envy, and hatred; partly to the intent they may both in the end, by establishment⁴⁵⁰ of their discipline, extinguish the force of supreme power which princes have, and yet in the meanwhile by giving forth these smooth discourses, obtain that their favourers may have somewhat to allege for them by way of apology, and that in such words as sound towards all kind of fulness in power⁴⁵¹. But for myself, I had rather construe such their contradictions in the better part, and impute their general acknowledgment of the lawfulness of kingly power unto the force of truth, presenting itself before them sometimes alone⁴⁵²; their particular contrarieties, oppositions, denials, unto that error which having so fully possessed their minds, casteth things inconvenient upon them; of which things in their due place.

Touching that which is now in hand, we are on all sides fully agreed; first, that there is not any restraint or limitation of matter for regal authority and power to be conversant in, but of religion whole⁴⁵³, and of whatsoever cause thereto⁴⁵⁴ appertaineth, kings may lawfully have charge, they lawfully may therein exercise dominion, and use the temporal sword: secondly, that some kinds⁴⁵⁵ of actions conversant about such affairs are denied unto kings; as, namely, actions of the power of order⁴⁵⁶, and of that power of jurisdiction, which is⁴⁵⁷ with it unseparably⁴⁵⁸ joined; power to administer the word and sacraments, power to ordain, to judge as an ordinary, to bind and loose, to excommunicate, and such like: thirdly, that even in these⁴⁵⁹ very actions which are proper unto dominion, there must be some certain rule, whereunto kings in all their proceedings ought to be strictly tied; which rule for proceedings⁴⁶⁰ in ecclesiastical affairs and causes by regal power, hath not hitherto been agreed upon with so⁴⁶¹ uniform consent and certainty as might be wished⁴⁶². The different sentences of men herein I will not⁴⁶³ now go about to examine, but it shall be enough to propose what rule doth seem in this case most reasonable.

It hath been declared already⁴⁶⁴ in general, how “the best established dominion is where the law doth most rule the king:” the true effect whereof particularly is found as well in ecclesiastical as in⁴⁶⁵ civil affairs. In these the king, through his supreme power, may do great things and sundry⁴⁶⁶ himself, both appertaining unto peace and war, both at home, by commandment⁴⁶⁷ and by commerce with states abroad, because so much the law doth⁴⁶⁸ permit. Some things⁴⁶⁹ on the other side, the king⁴⁷⁰ alone hath no power⁴⁷¹ to do without consent of the lords and commons assembled in parliament⁴⁷²: the king of⁴⁷³ himself cannot change the nature of pleas, nor courts, no not so much as restore blood; because the law is a bar unto him; not any law divine⁴⁷⁴ or natural⁴⁷⁵, for against neither it were though kings of themselves⁴⁷⁶ might do both, but⁴⁷⁷ the positive laws of the realm have abridged therein⁴⁷⁸ and restrained⁴⁷⁹ the king’s power; which positive laws, whether by custom or otherwise established without repugnancy unto the law⁴⁸⁰ of God and nature, ought no⁴⁸¹ less to be of⁴⁸² force even in the spiritual⁴⁸³ affairs of the Church. Wherefore⁴⁸⁴ in regard of ecclesiastical laws, we willingly embrace that of Ambrose, “Imperator bonus⁴⁸⁵ intra ecclesiam, non supra ecclesiam, est; kings have dominion to exercise in ecclesiastical causes, but according to the laws of the Church.” Whether it be therefore the nature of courts, or the form of pleas, or the kind of governors, or the order of proceedings⁴⁸⁶ in whatsoever spiritual⁴⁸⁷ businesses⁴⁸⁸; for the received laws and liberties⁴⁸⁹ of the⁴⁹⁰ Church the king hath supreme authority and power, but against them, none⁴⁹¹.

What such positive laws have appointed to be done by others than the king, or by others with the king, and in what form they have appointed the doing of it, the same of necessity must be kept, neither is the king’s sole authority to alter it.

Yea⁴⁹² even as it were a thing unreasonable, if in civil affairs the king (albeit the whole universal body did join with him) should do any thing by their absolute supreme power⁴⁹³ for the ordering of their state at home, in prejudice of any of⁴⁹⁴ those ancient laws of nations which are of force throughout⁴⁹⁵ the world, because the necessary commerce of kingdoms dependeth on them; so in principal matters belonging to Christian religion, a thing very scandalous and offensive it must needs be thought, if either kings or laws should dispose of the affairs⁴⁹⁶ of God, without any respect had to that which of old hath been reverently thought of throughout the world, and wherein there is no law of God which forceth us to swerve from the way⁴⁹⁷ wherein so many and so⁴⁹⁸ holy ages have gone.

Wherefore not without good consideration the very law itself hath provided, “That judges ecclesiastical appointed under the king’s commission shall not adjudge for heresy any thing but that which heretofore hath been so⁴⁹⁹ adjudged by the authority of the canonical scriptures, or by the first four general councils, or by some other general council wherein the same hath been declared heresy by the express words of the said canonical scriptures, or such as hereafter shall be termed⁵⁰⁰ heresy by the high court of parliament of this realm, with the assent of the clergy in the convocation⁵⁰¹.” By which words of the law who doth not plainly see, how in that⁵⁰² one branch of proceeding by virtue of the king’s supreme authority, the credit which those four⁵⁰³ general councils have throughout all churches evermore⁵⁰⁴ had, was judged by the makers⁵⁰⁵ of the foresaid act a just cause wherefore they⁵⁰⁶ should be mentioned in that case, as a requisite part of the⁵⁰⁷ rule wherewith dominion was to be limited⁵⁰⁸. But of this we shall further consider, when we come unto that which sovereign power may do in making ecclesiastical laws.

The cause⁵⁰⁹ of deriving supreme power from a whole entire multitude unto⁵¹⁰ some special part thereof, is partly the necessity of expedition in public affairs; partly the inconveniency of⁵¹¹ confusion and trouble, where a multitude of equals dealeth; and partly the dissipation which must needs ensue in companies, where every man wholly seeketh his own particular (as we all would do, even with other men’s hurt⁵¹²) and haply the very overthrow of ourselves⁵¹³ in the end also, if for procurement⁵¹⁴ of the common good of all men, by keeping every several man in order, some were not armed⁵¹⁵ with authority over all, and encouraged with prerogatives of honour⁵¹⁶ to sustain the weighty burden of that charge. The good which is proper unto each man belongeth to the common good of all, as a part of the whole’s perfection⁵¹⁷; but yet⁵¹⁸ these two are things different; for men by that which is proper are severed, united they are by that which is common. Wherefore, besides that which moveth each man in particular to seek his private, there must⁵¹⁹ of necessity in all public societies be also a general mover, directing unto the⁵²⁰ common good, and framing every man’s particular to it. The end whereunto all government was instituted, was bonum publicum, the universal or common good. Our question is of dominion, for that end and purpose derived into one⁵²¹. Such as in⁵²² one public state have agreed that the supreme charge of all things should be committed unto one, they I say, considering what inconveniences⁵²³ may grow where states are subject unto sundry supreme authorities, were⁵²⁴ for fear of those⁵²⁵ inconveniences withdrawn from liking to establish many; οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, the multitude of supreme commanders is troublesome. “No man,” saith our Saviour, “can serve two masters:” surely two supreme masters would make any one⁵²⁶ man’s service somewhat uneasy in such cases as might fall out. Suppose that to-morrow the power which hath dominion in justice require thee at the court; that which in war, at the field; that which in religion, at the temple: all have equal authority over thee, and impossible it is, that thou shouldest be in such case⁵²⁷ obedient to all: by choosing any one whom thou wilt obey, certain thou art for thy disobedience to incur the displeasure of the other two.

[III.] But there is nothing for which some colourable⁵²⁸ reason or other may not be found. Are we able to shew any commendable state of government, which by experience and practice hath felt the benefit of being in all causes subject unto the supreme authority of one? Against the polity⁵²⁹ of Israel⁵³⁰, I hope there will no man except, where Moses deriving so great a part of his burden in government unto others, did notwithstanding retain to himself universal supremacy. Jehosaphat appointing one to be chief⁵³¹ in the affairs of God, and another in the king’s affairs, did this as having himself⁵³² dominion over them in both. If therefore, with⁵³³ approbation from⁵³⁴ heaven, the kings of God’s own chosen people had in the affairs of Jewish religion supreme power, why not Christian kings the like power⁵³⁵ also in Christian religion? Unless⁵³⁶ men will answer, as some have done⁵³⁷, “that touching the Jews, first their religion⁵³⁸ was of far lessHooker1888: 1. perfection and dignity than ours is⁵³⁹, ours being that truth whereof theirs was but a shadowish prefigurative resemblance.” Secondly⁵⁴⁰, “That all parts of their religion,Hooker1888: 2. their laws, their sacrifices, their⁵⁴¹ rites and ceremonies, being fully set down to their hands, and needing no more but only to be put in execution, the kings might well have highest authority to see that done: whereas with us there are a number of mysteries even in belief, which were not so generally⁵⁴² for them, as for us, necessary to be with sound express acknowledgment understood; a number of things belonging unto external regiment⁵⁴³, and one⁵⁴⁴ manner of serving God, not set down by particular ordinances, and delivered unto us in writing; for which cause the state of the Church doth now require that the spiritual authority of ecclesiastical persons be large, absolute, and not subordinateHooker1888: 3. to regal power.” Thirdly⁵⁴⁵, “that whereas God armeth religion Jewish, with⁵⁴⁶ temporal, Christian, with a⁵⁴⁷ sword but of spiritual punishment; the one with power to imprison, to scourge, and⁵⁴⁸ to put to death, the other with bare authority to censure and excommunicate; there is no reason that the Church, which now⁵⁴⁹ hath no visible sword, should in regiment be subject unto any other power, than only unto theirs which have authority to bind andHooker1888: 4. loose.” Fourthly⁵⁵⁰, “that albeit while⁵⁵¹ the Church was restrained unto⁵⁵² one people, it seemed not incommodious to grant their kings⁵⁵³ the general chiefty of power; yet now, the Church having spread itself over all nations, great inconveniency⁵⁵⁴ might⁵⁵⁵ thereby grow, if every Christian king in his several territory should have the like power.” Of all these differences, there is not one which doth prove it a thing repugnant unto the law either of God or nature⁵⁵⁶, that all supremacy of external power be in Christian kingdoms granted unto the⁵⁵⁷ kings thereof, for preservation of quietness, unity, order, and peace, in such manner as hath been shewed.

⁵⁵⁸The service which we do unto the true God who made heaven and earth is far different from that which heathens have done unto their supposed gods, though nothing else were respected but only the odds between their hope and ours. The offices of piety or true religion sincerely performed have the promises both of this life and of the life to come: the practices of superstition have neither. If notwithstanding the heathens, reckoning upon no other reward for all which they did but only protection and favour in the temporal estate and condition of this present life, and perceiving how great good did hereby publicly grow, as long as fear to displease (they knew not what) divine power was some kind of bridle unto them, did therefore provide that the highest degree of care for their religion should be the principal charge of such as having otherwise also the greatest and chiefest power were by so much the more fit to have custody thereof: shall the like kind of provision be in us thought blameworthy?

A gross error it is, to think that regal power ought to serve for the good of the body, and not of the soul; for men’s temporal peace, and not for⁵⁵⁹ their eternal safety: and if God had ordained kings for no other end and purpose but only to fat up men like hogs, and to see that they have their mast⁵⁶⁰? Indeed, to lead men unto salvation by the hand of secret, invisible, and ghostly regiment, or by the external administration of things belonging unto priestly order, (such as the word and sacraments are,) this is denied unto Christian kings: no cause in the world to think them uncapable of supreme authority in the outward government which disposeth the affairs of religion so far forth as the same are disposable by human authority, and to think them uncapable thereof, only for that the said religion is everlastingly beneficial to them that faithfully continue in it. And even as little cause there is, that being admitted thereunto amongst the Jews, they should amongst the Christians of necessity be delivered from ever exercising any such power, for the dignity and perfection which is in our religion more than in theirs⁵⁶¹.

It may be a question, whether the affairs of Christianity require more wit, more study, more knowledge of divine things in him which shall order them, than the Jewish religion did. For although we deny not the form of external government, together with all other rites and ceremonies, to have been in more particular manner set down: yet withal it must be considered also, that even this very thing did in some respects make the burthen of their spiritual regiment the harder to be borne; by reason of infinite doubts and difficulties which the very obscurity and darkness of their law did breed, and which being not first decided, the law could not possibly have due execution.

Besides, inasmuch as their law did also dispose even of all kind of civil affairs; their clergy, being the interpreters of the whole law, sustained not only the same labour which divines do amongst us, but even the burthen of our lawyers too. Nevertheless, be it granted that moe things do now require to be publicly deliberated and resolved upon with exacter judgment in matters divine than kings for the most part have: their personal inability to judge, in such sort as professors do, letteth not but that their regal authority may have the selfsame degree or sway which the kings of Israel had in the affairs of their religion, to rule and command according to the manner of supreme governors.

As for the sword, wherewith God armed his Church of old, if that were a reasonable cause why kings might then have dominion, I see not but that it ministreth still as forcible an argument for the lawfulness and expediency of their continuance therein now. As we degrade and excommunicate, even so did the Church of the Jews both separate offenders from the temple, and depose the clergy also from their rooms, when cause required. The other sword of corporal punishment is not by Christ’s own appointment in the hands of the Church of Christ, as God did place it himself in the hands of the Jewish Church. For why? He knew that they whom he sent abroad to gather a people unto him only by persuasive means, were to build up his Church even within the bosom of kingdoms, the chiefest governors whereof would be open enemies unto it every where for the space of many years. Wherefore such commission for discipline he gave them, as they might any where exercise in quiet and peaceable manner; the subjects of no commonwealth being touched in goods or person, by virtue of that spiritual regiment whereunto Christian religion embraced did make them subject.

Now when afterwards it came to pass, that whole kingdoms were made Christian, I demand whether that authority, which⁵⁶² served before for the furtherance of religion, may not as effectually serve⁵⁶³ to the maintenance of Christian religion. Christian religion hath the sword of spiritual discipline. But doth that suffice? The Jewish which had it also, did nevertheless stand in need to be aided with the power of the civil sword. The help whereof, although when Christian religion cannot have, it must without it sustain itself as far as the other which it hath will serve; notwithstanding, where both may be had, what forbiddeth the Church to enjoy the benefit of both? Will any man deny that the Church doth need the rod of corporal punishment to keep her children in obedience withal? Such a law as Macabeus⁵⁶⁴ made amongst the Scots, that he which continued an excommunicate two years together, and reconciled not himself to the church, should forfeit all his goods and possessions.

Again, the custom which many Christian churches have to fly to the civil magistrate for coercion of those that will not otherwise be reformed,—these things are proof sufficient that even in Christian religion, the power wherewith ecclesiastical persons were endued at the first is unable to do of itself so much as when secular power doth strengthen it; and that, not by way of ministry or service, but of predominancy, such as the kings of Israel in their time exercised over the Church of God.

Yea, but the Church of God was then restrained more narrowly to one people and one king, which now being spread throughout all kingdoms, it would be a cause of great dissimilitude in the exercise of Christian religion if every king should be over the affairs of the church where he reigneth supreme ruler.

Dissimilitude in great things is such a thing which draweth great inconvenience after it, a thing which Christian religion must always carefully prevent. And the way to prevent it is, not as some do imagine, the yielding up of supreme power over all churches into one only pastor’s hands; but the framing of their government, especially for matter of substance, every where according to the rule of one only Law, to stand in no less force than the law of nations doth, to be received in all kingdoms, all sovereign rulers to be sworn no otherwise unto it than some are to maintain the liberties, laws, and received customs of the country where they reign. This shall cause uniformity even under several dominions, without those woeful inconveniences whereunto the state of Christendom was subject heretofore, through the tyranny and oppression of that one universal Nimrod⁵⁶⁵ who alone did all.

And, till the Christian world be driven to enter into the peaceable and true consultation about some such kind of general law concerning those things of weight and moment wherein now we differ, if one church hath not the same order which another hath: let every church keep as near as may be the order it should have, and commend the just defence thereof unto God, even as Juda did, when it differed in the exercise of religion from that form which Israel followed.

Concerning therefore the matter whereof we have hitherto spoken, let it stand for our final conclusion, that in a free Christian state or kingdom, where one and the selfsame people are the Church and the commonwealth, God through Christ directing that people to see it for good and weighty considerations expedient that their sovereign lord and governor in causes civil have also in ecclesiastical affairs a supreme power; forasmuch as the light of reason doth lead them unto it, and against it God’s own revealed law hath nothing: surely they do not in submitting themselves thereunto any other than that which a wise and religious people ought to do.

It was but a little overflowing of wit in Thomas Aquinas⁵⁶⁶, so to play upon the words of Moses⁵⁶⁷ in the Old, and of Peter⁵⁶⁸ in the New Testament, as though because the one did term the Jews “a priestly kingdom,” the other us “a kingly priesthood,” those two substantives “kingdom” and “priesthood” should import, that Judaism did stand through the kings’ superiority over priests, Christianity through the priests’ supreme authority over kings. Is it probable, that Moses and Peter had herein so nice and curious conceits? Or else more likely that both meant one and the same thing; namely that God doth glorify and sanctify his, even with full perfection in both; which thing St. John doth in plainer sort express, saying that “Christ hath made us both kings and priests⁵⁶⁹.”

[IV. 1.] These things being thus first considered⁵⁷⁰, it will be the easier⁵⁷¹ to judge concerning our own estate, whether by force of ecclesiastical dominion⁵⁷² with us⁵⁷³ kings have any other kind of prerogative than they may lawfully hold and enjoy. It is as some do imagine too much, that kings of England should be termed Heads, in relation to the Church. That which we understand⁵⁷⁴ by headship, is their only supreme power in ecclesiastical affairs or⁵⁷⁵ causes. That which lawfully⁵⁷⁶ princes are, what should make it unlawful for men by⁵⁷⁷ special⁵⁷⁸ styles or titles to signify? If the having of supreme power be allowed, why is the expressing thereof by the title of head condemned? They seem in words, at the⁵⁷⁹ leastwise some of them, now at the length to acknowledge that kings may have supreme⁵⁸⁰ government even over all, both persons and causes. We in terming our princes heads of the Church, do but testify that we acknowledge them such governors.

Against⁵⁸¹ this peradventure it will⁵⁸² be replied⁵⁸³, that howsoever we interpret ourselves, it is not fit for a mortal man, and therefore not fit⁵⁸⁴ for a civil magistrate, to be entitled head of the Church. Why so? First “this title, Head of the Church⁵⁸⁵, was given unto our Saviour Christ⁵⁸⁶, to lift him above all powers, rules, and dominions⁵⁸⁷, either in heaven or in earth. Where if this title belong also to the civil magistrate⁵⁸⁸, then it is manifest that there is a power in earth whereunto our Saviour Christ is not in this point superior. Again, if the civil magistrate may have this title, he may be also termed⁵⁸⁹ the first-begotten of all creatures, the first-begotten of⁵⁹⁰ the dead, yea the Redeemer of his people. For these are alike given him as dignities whereby he is lifted up above all creatures. Besides this, the whole argument of the Apostle in both places doth lead to shew that this title, Head of the Church, cannot be said of any creature. And further, the very demonstrative article⁵⁹¹, among the Hebrews especially, whom S. Paul doth follow, serveth to tie that which is verified of one, unto himself alone: so that when the apostle doth say that Christ is ἡ κεϕαλὴ, the Head; it is as much as⁵⁹² if he should say, Christ, and no⁵⁹³ other, is the Head of the Church.”