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VIII.6. Vindication of the Prerogative regarding Church Legislation

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VI. The natural subject of power1 civil all men confess to be the body of the commonwealth: the good or evil estate whereof dependeth so much upon the power of making laws, that in all well settled states, yea though they be monarchies, yet diligent care is evermore had that the commonwealth do not clean resign up herself and make over this power wholly into the hands of any one. For this cause William, whom we call the Conqueror, making war against England in right of his title to the crown, and knowing that as inheritor thereof he could not lawfully change the laws of the land by himself, for that the English commonwealth had not invested their2 kings before with the fulness of so great power; therefore he took the style and title of a conqueror. Wherefore, as they themselves cannot choose but grant that the natural subject of power to make laws civil is the commonwealth; so we affirm that in like congruity the true original subject of power also to make church-laws is the whole entire body of that church for which they are made. Equals cannot impose laws and3 statutes upon their equals. Therefore neither may any one man indifferently impose canons ecclesiastical upon another, nor yet one church upon another. If they go about at any time to do it, they must either shew some commission sufficient for their warrant, or else be justly condemned of presumption in the sight both of God and men. But nature itself doth abundantly authorize the Church to make laws and orders for her children that are within her. For every whole thing, being naturally of greater power than is any part thereof, that which a whole church will appoint may be with reason exacted indifferently of any within the compass of the same church, and so bind all unto strict obedience.

The greatest agents of the bishop of Rome’s inordinate sovereignty strive against no one point with such earnestness as against this, that jurisdiction (and in the name of jurisdiction they also comprehend the power of dominion spiritual) should be thought originally to be the right of the whole Church; and that no person hath or can have the same, otherwise than derived from the body of the Church.

The reason wherefore they can in no wise brook this opinion is, as friar Soto confesseth4, because they which make councils above popes do all build upon this ground, and therefore even with teeth and all they that favour the papal throne must hold the contrary. Which thing they do. For, as many as draw the chariot of the pope’s preeminence, the first conclusion which they contend for is5: The power of jurisdiction ecclesiastical doth not rest derived from Christ immediately into the whole body of the Church, but into the prelacy. Unto the prelacy alone it belongeth; as ours also do imagine, unto the governors of the Church alone it was first given, and doth appertain, even of very divine right, in every church established to make such laws concerning orders and ceremonies as occasion doth require.

Wherein they err, for want of observing as they should, in what manner the power whereof we speak was instituted. One thing it is to ordain a power, and another thing to bestow the same being ordained: or, to appoint the special subject of it, or the person in whom it shall rest. Nature hath appointed that there should be in a civil society power to make laws; but the consent of the people (which are that society) hath instituted the prince’s person to be the subject wherein supremacy of that power shall reside. The act of instituting such power may and sometimes doth go in time before the act of conferring or bestowing it. And for bestowing it there may be order two ways taken: namely, either by appointing thereunto some certain person, one or many; or else, without any personal determination, and with appointment only of some determinate condition touching the quality of their persons (whosoever they be that shall receive the same), and for the form or manner of taking it.

Now God himself preventeth sometimes these communities, himself nominateth and appointeth sometimes the subject wherein their power shall rest, and by whom either in whole or in part it shall be exercised; which thing he did often in the commonwealth of Israel. Even so Christ having given unto his Church the power whereof we speak, what she doth by her appointed agents, that duty though they discharge, yet is it not theirs peculiarly, but hers; her power it is which they do exercise. But Christ hath sometimes prevented his Church, conferring that power and appointing it unto certain persons himself, which otherwise the Church might have done. Those persons excepted which Christ himself did immediately bestow such power upon, the rest succeeding have not received power as they did, Christ bestowing it upon their persons; but the power which Christ did institute in the Church they from the Church do receive, according to such laws and canons as Christ hath prescribed, and the light of nature or Scripture taught men to institute.

But in truth the whole body of the Church being the first original subject of all mandatory and coercive power within itself, in case a monarch of the world together with his whole kingdom under him receive Christianity, the question is whether the monarch of that commonwealth may without offence or breach of the law of God have and exercise power of dominion ecclesiastical within the compass of his own territories, in such ample sort as the kings of this land may do by the laws thereof.

6[4.] 7The case8 is not9 like when such assemblies are gathered together by supreme authority concerning other affairs of the Church, and when they meet about the making of10 ecclesiastical laws or statutes. For in the one they are only to advise, in the other they are11 to decree. The persons which are of the one, the King doth voluntarily assemble, as being in respect of gravity12 fit to consult withal; them which are of the other he calleth by prescript of law, as having right to be thereunto called. Finally, the one are but themselves, and their sentence hath but the weight of their own judgment; the other represent the whole clergy, and their voices are as much as if all did give personal verdict. Now the question is, Whether the clergy alone so assembled ought to have the whole power of making ecclesiastical laws, or else consent of the laity may thereunto be made necessary, and the King’s assent so necessary, that his sole denial may be of force to stay them from being laws.

If they with whom we dispute were uniform, strong and constant in that which they say, we should not need to trouble ourselves about their persons to whom the power of making laws for the Church belongeth13. For they are sometimes very vehement in contention, that from the greatest thing unto the least about the Church, all must needs be immediately from God. And to this they apply14 the pattern of the ancient tabernacle which God delivered unto Moses, and was therein so exact, that there was not left so15 much as the least pin for the wit of man to devise in the framing of it. To this they often16 apply that strict17 and severe charge18 which God so often gave concerning his own law, “Whatsoever I command you, take heed ye19 do it; thou shalt put nothing thereunto, thou shalt take nothing from it;” nothing, whether it be great or small. Yet sometime bethinking themselves better, they speak as acknowledging that it doth suffice to have received in such sort the principal things from God, and that for other matters the Church hath20 sufficient authority to make laws. Whereupon they now have made it a question, what persons they are whose right it is to take order for the Church’s affairs, when the institution of any new thing therein is requisite.

Laws21 may be requisite to be made either concerning things that are only to be known and believed in, or else touching that which is to be done by the Church of God. The law of nature and the law of God are sufficient22 for declaration in both what belongeth unto each man separately, as his soul is the spouse of Christ, yea so sufficient, that they plainly and fully shew whatsoever God doth require by way of necessary introduction unto the state of everlasting bliss. But as a man liveth joined with others in common society, and belongeth unto the outward politic body of the Church, albeit the same23 law of nature and scripture24 have in this respect also made manifest the things that are of greatest necessity; nevertheless, by reason of new occasions still arising which the Church having care of souls must take25 order for as need requireth, hereby it cometh to pass, that there is and ever will be26 great use even of human laws and ordinances, deducted by way of discourse as conclusions27 from the former divine and natural, serving for28 principles thereunto.

No man doubteth, but that for matters of action and practice in the affairs of God, for the manner of29 divine service, for order in ecclesiastical proceedings about the regiment of the Church, there may be oftentimes cause very urgent to have laws made: but the reason is not so plain wherefore human laws should appoint men what to believe. Wherefore in this we must note two things: First, That in matter of opinion, the law doth not make that to be truth which before was not, as in matter of action it causeth that to be duty30 which was not before, but it31 manifesteth only and giveth men notice of that to be truth, the contrary whereunto they ought not before to have believed. Secondly, That as32 opinions do cleave to the understanding, and are in heart assented unto, it is not in the power of any human law to command them, because to prescribe what men shall think belongeth only unto God. “Corde creditur, ore fit confessio,” saith the Apostle33. As opinions are either fit or inconvenient to be professed, so man’s law hath34 to determine of them. It may for public unity’s sake require men’s professed assent, or prohibit contradiction35 to special articles, wherein, as there haply hath been controversy what is true, so the same were like to continue still, not without grievous detriment to a number of souls, except law to remedy that evil should set down a certainty which no man is36 to gainsay. Wherefore as in regard of divine laws, which the Church receiveth from God, we may unto every man apply those words of Wisdom37 in Solomon38, Conserva, fili mi, præcepta patris tui39: “My son, keep thou thy father’s precepts;” even so concerning the statutes and ordinances which the Church itself maketh40, we may add thereunto the words that follow, Et ne dimittas legem matris tuæ, “And forsake not thou41 thy mother’s law38.”

It is undoubtedly42 a thing even natural, that all free and independent societies should themselves make their own laws, and that this power should belong to the whole, not to any certain part of a politic body, though haply some one part may have greater sway in that action than the rest: which thing being generally fit and expedient in the making of all laws, we see no cause why to think otherwise in laws concerning the service of God; which in all well-ordered43 states and commonwealths is the first thing that law hath care to provide for44. When we speak of the right which naturally belongeth to a commonwealth, we speak of that which needs must45 belong to the Church of God. For if the commonwealth be Christian, if the people which are of it do publicly embrace the true religion, this very thing doth make it the Church, as hath been shewed. So that unless the verity and purity of religion do take from them which embrace it, that power wherewith otherwise they are possessed; look, what authority, as touching laws for religion, a commonwealth hath simply46, it must of necessity being Christian, have the same as touching laws for Christian religion47.

It will be therefore perhaps alleged, that a part of the verity of Christian religion is to hold the power of making ecclesiastical laws a thing appropriated unto the clergy in their synods; and that48 whatsoever is by their only voices agreed upon, it needeth no further approbation to give unto it the strength of a law: as may plainly appear by the canons of that first most venerable assembly49, where those things which50 the Apostles and James had concluded, were afterward51 published and imposed upon the churches of the Gentiles abroad as laws, the records thereof remaining still in the book of God for a testimony, that the power of making ecclesiastical laws belongeth to the successors of the Apostles52, the bishops and prelates53 of the Church of God.

To this we answer, that the council of Jerusalem is no argument for the power of the clergy alone54 to make laws. For first, there hath55 not been sithence56 any council of like authority to that in Jerusalem: secondly, the cause why that was of such authority came by a special accident: thirdly, the reason why other councils being not like unto that in nature, the clergy in them should have no power to make laws by themselves alone, is in truth so forcible, that except some commandment of God to the contrary can be shewed, it ought notwithstanding the foresaid example to prevail.

The decrees of the council of Jerusalem were not as the canons of other ecclesiastical assemblies, human, but very divine ordinances: for which cause the churches were far and wide commanded57 every where to see them kept, no otherwise than if Christ himself had personally on earth been the author of them.

The cause why that council was of so great authority and credit above all others which have been sithence58, is expressed in those words of principal observation59, “Unto the Holy Ghost and to us it hath seemed good:” which form of speech, though other councils have likewise used, yet neither could they themselves mean, nor may we so understand them, as if both were in equal sort assisted with the power of the Holy Ghost; but the later had the favour of that general assistance and presence which Christ doth promise60 unto all his, according to the quality of their several estates and callings; the former, that61 grace of special, miraculous, rare, and extraordinary illumination, in relation whereunto the Apostle, comparing the Old Testament and the New together, termeth62 the one a Testament of the letter, for that God delivered it written in stone, the other a Testament of the Spirit, because God imprinted it in the hearts and declared it by the tongues of his chosen Apostles through the power of the Holy Ghost, framing both their conceits and speeches in most63 divine and incomprehensible manner. Wherefore inasmuch as the council of Jerusalem did chance to consist of men so enlightened, it had authority greater than were meet for any other council besides to challenge, wherein no64 such kind of persons are.

As now65 the state of the Church doth stand, kings being not then that which now they are, and the clergy not now that which then they were: till it be proved that some special law of Christ hath for ever annexed unto the clergy alone the power to make ecclesiastical laws, we are to hold it a thing most consonant with equity and reason, that no ecclesiastical law66 be made in a Christian commonwealth, without consent as well of the laity as of the clergy, but least of all without consent of the highest power.

For of this thing no man doubteth, namely, that in all societies, companies, and corporations, what severally each shall be bound unto, it must be with all their assents67 ratified. Against all equity it were that a man should suffer detriment at the hands of men, for not observing that which he never did either by himself or by others, mediately or immediately, agree unto; much more that a king should constrain all others unto the strict observation of any such human ordinance as passeth without his own approbation. In this case therefore especially that vulgar axiom is of force68, “Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet.” Whereupon Pope Nicholas, although otherwise not admitting lay-persons, no not emperors themselves to be present at synods, doth notwithstanding seem to allow of their presence when matters of faith are determined, whereunto all men must stand bound69: “Ubinam legistis imperatores, antecessores vestros, synodalibus conventibus interfuisse; nisi forsitan in quibus de fide tractatum est, quæ universalis est, quæ omnibus communis est70, quæ non solum ad clericos, verum etiam ad laicos et omnes pertinet Christianos?” A law, be it civil or ecclesiastical, is as71 a public obligation, wherein seeing that the whole standeth charged, no reason it should pass without his privity and will, whom principally the whole doth depend upon. “Sicut laici jurisdictionem clericorum perturbare, ita clerici jurisdictionem laicorum non debent imminuere72;” saith Innocent73, “As the laity should not hinder the clergy’s jurisdiction, so neither is it reason that the laity’s right should be abridged by the clergy74.” But were it so that the clergy alone might give laws unto all the rest, forasmuch as every estate doth desire to enlarge the bounds of their own liberties, is it not easy to see how injurious this might prove unto men of other condition75? Peace and justice are maintained by preserving unto every order their rights76, and by keeping all estates as it were in an even balance. Which thing is no way better done, than if the king, their common parent, whose care is presumed to extend most indifferently over all, do bear the chiefest sway in the making of laws77 which all must be ordered by.

Wherefore, of them which in this point attribute most to the clergy, I would demand what evidence there is, which way78 it may clearly be shewed, that, in ancient kingdoms Christian, any canon devised by the clergy alone in their synods, whether provincial, national, or general, hath by mere force of their agreement taken place as a law, making all men constrainable to be obedient thereunto, without any other approbation from the king before or afterwards required in that behalf? But what speak we of ancient kingdoms, when at this day, even in79 the papacy itself, the very Tridentine80 council hath not every where as yet obtained to have in all points the strength of ecclesiastical law81. Did not Philip, king of Spain, publishing that council in the Low Countries, add thereunto82 an express clause of special provision, that the same should in no wise prejudice, hurt, or diminish any kind of privilege which the king or his vassals aforetime had enjoyed, either touching83 possessory judgments of ecclesiastical livings, or concerning nominations thereunto, or belonging to whatsoever rights84 they had else in such affairs? If therefore the king’s exception85 taken against86 some part of the canons contained in that council, were a sufficient bar to make them of none effect within his territories; it followeth87 that the like exception against any other part had been also of like efficacy, and so consequently that no part thereof had obtained the strength of a law, if he which excepted against a part had so done against the whole: as, what reason was there but that the same authority which limited might quite and clean have refused that council? Whoso alloweth the said act of the Catholic King88 for good and lawful, must grant that the canons even of general councils have but the force89 of wise men’s opinions concerning that whereof they treat, till they be publicly assented unto, where they are to take place as laws; and that, in giving such public assent, as maketh a Christian kingdom subject unto those laws, the king’s authority is the chiefest. That which an University of men, a Company or Corporation90 doth without consent of their Rector, is as nothing. Except therefore we make the king’s authority over the clergy less in the greatest things, than the power of the meanest governor is in all things over the college or society which is under him; how should we think it a matter decent, that the clergy should impose laws, the supreme governor’s assent not asked91?

There are which wonder that we should count92 any statute a law, which the high court of parliament in England hath established about the matter of church regiment; the prince and court of parliament having, as they suppose, no more lawful means to give order to the Church and clergy in these93 things, than they have to make laws for the hierarchies of angels in heaven94: that the parliament being a mere temporal court, can neither by the law of nature, nor of God, have competent power to define of such matters95; that supremacy of power96 in this kind cannot belong unto kings, as kings, because pagan emperors, whose princely power was notwithstanding97 true sovereignty, never challenged thus98 much over the99 Church: that power, in this kind, cannot be the right of any earthly crown, prince, or state, in that they be Christian, forasmuch as if they be Christians, they all owe subjection unto the pastors of their souls100: that the prince therefore not having it himself cannot communicate it unto the parliament, and consequently cannot make laws, hear101, or determine of the Church’s regiment by himself, parliament, or any other court in such sort102 subjected unto him103.

The parliament of England together with the convocation annexed thereunto, is that whereupon the very essence of all government within this kingdom doth depend; it is even the body of the whole realm; it consisteth of the king, and of all that within the land are subject unto him: for they all are there present, either in person or by such as they voluntarily have derived their very personal right unto104. The parliament is a court not so merely temporal as if it might meddle with nothing but only leather and wool105. Those days of Queen Mary are not yet forgotten, wherein the realm did submit itself unto the legate of Pope Julius106: at which time had they been persuaded as this man seemeth now to be, had they thought that there is no more force in laws made by parliament concerning the107 Church affairs, than if men shall108 take upon them to make orders for the hierarchies of angels in heaven, they might have taken all former statutes in109 that kind as cancelled, and by reason of nullity abrogated in themselves110. What need was there that they should bargain with the cardinal, and purchase their pardon by promise made beforehand, that what laws they had made, assented unto, or executed against the bishop of Rome’s supremacy, the same they would in that present parliament effectually abrogate and repeal? Had they power to repeal laws made, and none to make laws concerning the regiment of the Church?

Again, when they had by suit obtained his confirmation for such foundations111 of bishoprics, cathedral churches, hospitals, colleges, and schools; for such marriages before made, for such institutions unto112 livings ecclesiastical, and for all such judicial processes, as having been ordered according to laws113 before in force, but contrary to the canons and orders of the church of Rome, were in that respect thought defective; although the cardinal in his letters of dispensation did give validity unto those acts, even apostolicæ firmitatis robur, “the very strength of apostolical solidity;” what had all this been without those grave114 authentical words115, “Be it enacted by the authority of this present parliament, that all and singular articles and clauses contained in the said dispensation, shall remain and be reputed and taken to all intents and constructions in the laws of this realm, lawful, good and effectual to be alleged and pleaded in all courts ecclesiastical and temporal, for good and sufficient matter either for the plaintiff or defendant, without any allegation or objection to be made against the validity of them by pretence of any general council, canon, or decree to the contrary.” Somewhat belike they thought there116 was in this mere temporal court, without which the pope’s own mere ecclesiastical legate’s dispensation had taken small effect in the Church of England; neither did they or the cardinal himself, as then, imagine117 any thing committed against the law of nature or of God, because they took order for the Church’s affairs, and that even in the court of parllament.

The most natural and religious course in making of118 laws is, that the matter of them be taken from the judgment of the wisest in those things which they are to concern. In matters of God, to set down a form of public119 prayer, a solemn confession of the articles of Christian120 faith, rites121 and ceremonies meet for the exercise of religion; it were unnatural not to think the pastors and bishops of our souls a great deal more fit, than men of secular trades and callings: howbeit, when all which the wisdom of all sorts can do is done for devising122 of laws in the Church, it is the general consent of all that giveth them the form and vigour of laws, without which they could be no more unto us than the counsels of physicians to the sick: well might they seem as wholesome admonitions and instructions, but laws could they never be without consent of the whole Church, which is the only thing that bindeth each member of the Church123, to be guided by them. Whereunto both nature and the practice of the Church of God set down in Scripture, is found every way so fully consonant, that God himself would not impose, no not his own laws upon his people by the hand of Moses, without their free and open consent. Wherefore to define and determine even of the church’s affairs by way of assent and approbation, as laws are defined of in that right of power, which doth give them the force of laws; thus to define of our own church’s regiment, the parliament of England hath competent authority.

Touching the124 supremacy of power which our kings have in this case of making laws, it resteth principally in the strength of a negative voice; which not to give them, were to deny them that without which they were but kings125 by mere title, and not in exercise of dominion. Be it in states of126 regiment popular, aristocratical, or regal, principality resteth in that person, or those persons, unto whom is given the127 right of excluding any kind of law whatsoever it be before establishment. This doth belong unto kings, as kings; pagan emperors even Nero himself had not128 less, but much more than this in the laws of his own empire. That he challenged not any interest in129 giving voice in the laws of the church, I hope no man will so construe, as if the cause were conscience, and fear to encroach upon the Apostles’ right.

If then it be demanded by what right from Constantine downward, the Christian emperors did so far intermeddle with the church’s affairs, either we must herein condemn them utterly130, as being over presumptuously bold, or else judge that by a law which is termed Regia, that is to say royal131, the people having derived into132 the emperor their whole power for making of laws, and by that mean133 his edicts being made laws134, what matter soever they did concern, as imperial dignity endowed135 them with competent authority and power to make laws for religion, so they were taught136 by Christianity to use their power, being Christians, unto the benefit of the Church of Christ. Was there any Christian bishop in the world which did then judge this repugnant unto the dutiful subjection which Christians do owe to the pastors of their souls? to whom, in respect of their sacred order, it is not by us, neither may be denied, that kings and princes are as much as the very meanest that liveth under them, bound in conscience to shew themselves gladly and willingly obedient, receiving the seals of salvation, the blessed sacraments, at their hands, as at the hands of our Lord Jesus Christ, with all reverence, not disdaining to be taught and admonished by them, not137 withholding from them as much as the least part of their due and decent honour. All which, for any thing that hath been alleged, may stand very well without resignation of supremacy of power in making laws, even laws concerning the most spiritual affairs of the Church.

Which laws being made amongst us, are not by any of us so taken or interpreted, as if they did receive their force from power which the prince doth communicate unto the parliament, or to any other court under him, but from power which the whole body of this138 realm being naturally possessed with, hath by free and deliberate assent derived unto him that ruleth over them, so far forth as hath been declared. So that our laws made concerning religion, do take originally their essence from the power of the whole realm and church of England, than which nothing can be more consonant unto the law of nature and the will of our Lord Jesus Christ.

To let these go, and to139 return to our own men; “Ecclesiastical governors,” they say140, “may not meddle with the141 making of civil laws, and of laws for the commonwealth; nor the civil magistrate, high or low, with making of orders for the Church.” It seemeth unto me very strange, that those142 men which are in no cause more vehement and fierce, than where they plead that ecclesiastical persons may not κυριεύειν, be lords143, should hold that the power of making ecclesiastical laws, which thing is of all other144 most proper unto dominion, belongeth to none but persons ecclesiastical145 only. Their oversight groweth herein for want of exact observation, what it is to make a law. Tully, speaking of the law of nature, saith, “That thereof God himself was inventor, disceptator, lator, the deviser, the discusser, the146 deliverer147:” wherein he plainly alludeth unto the chiefest parts148 which then did appertain to this149 public action. For when laws were made, the first thing was to have them devised; the second, to sift them with as much exactness of judgment as any way might be used; the next, by solemn voice of sovereign authority to pass them, and give them the force of laws. It cannot in any reason seem otherwise than most fit, that unto ecclesiastical persons the care of devising ecclesiastical laws be committed, even as the care of civil unto them which are in those affairs most skilful. This taketh not away from ecclesiastical persons all right of giving voice with others, when civil laws are proposed for regiment of that150 commonwealth, whereof themselves, (howsoever151 now the world would have them annihilated,) are notwithstanding as yet a part: much less doth it cut off that part of the power of princes, whereby, as they claim, so we know no reasonable cause wherefore we may not grant them, without offence to Almighty God, so much authority in making of152 all manner of laws within their own dominions, that neither civil nor ecclesiastical do pass without their royal assent. In devising and discussing of laws, wisdom is specially153 required: but that which establisheth154 and maketh them, is power, even power of dominion; the chiefty whereof, amongst us, resteth in the person of the king. Is there any law of Christ’s which forbiddeth kings and rulers of the earth to have such sovereign and supreme power in the making of laws, either civil or ecclesiastical? If there be, our controversy hath an end.

Christ in his church hath not appointed any such law concerning temporal power, as God did of old deliver155 unto the commonwealth of Israel; but leaving that to be at the world’s free choice, his chiefest care was156 that157 the spiritual law of the Gospel might be published far and wide.

They that received the law of Christ, were for a long time people scattered in sundry kingdoms, Christianity not exempting them from the laws which they had been subject unto, saving only in such cases as those laws did enjoin that which the religion of Christ forbade158. Hereupon grew their manifold persecutions throughout all places where they lived: as oft as it thus came to pass, there was no possibility that the emperors and kings under whom they lived, should meddle any whit at all with making laws for the Church. From Christ therefore having received power, who doubteth, but as they did, so they might bind themselves159 to such orders as seemed fittest for the maintenance of their religion, without the leave of high or low in the commonwealth; forasmuch as in religion it was divided utterly from them, and they from it?

But when the mightiest began to like of the Christian faith; by their means whole free states and kingdoms became obedient unto Christ. Now the question is, whether kings by embracing Christianity do therein160 receive any such law, as taketh from them the weightiest part of that sovereignty which they had even when they were heathens: whether being infidels they might do more in causes of religion, than now they can by the law161 of God, being true believers. For whereas in regal states, the king or supreme head of the commonwealth, had before Christianity a supreme stroke in the162 making of laws for religion: he must by embracing Christian religion utterly thereof deprive himself163, and in such causes become a164 subject to his own165 subjects, having even within his own dominions them whose commandment he must obey; unless this166 power be placed in the hand167 of some foreign spiritual potentate: so that either a foreign or domestical commander upon168 earth he must needs169 admit, more now than before he had, and that in the chiefest things whereupon commonwealths do stand. But apparent it is unto all men which are not strangers in170 the doctrine of Jesus Christ, that no state in171 the world receiving Christianity is by any law therein contained bound to resign the power which they lawfully held before: but over what persons and in what causes soever the same hath been in force, it may so remain and continue still. That which as kings they might do in matter172 of religion, and did in matter of false religion, being idolaters173 or174 superstitious kings, the same they are now even in every respect as175 fully authorized to do in all affairs pertinent unto the state of true Christian176 religion.

177And concerning their178 supreme power of179 making laws for all persons in all causes to be guided by, it is not to be let pass, that the head enemies of this headship are constrained to acknowledge180 the king endowed181 even with this very power, so that he may and ought to exercise the same, taking order for the Church and her affairs of what nature or kind soever, in case of necessity: as when there is no lawful ministry, which they interpret then to be (and this surely is a point very markable182), whensoever183 the ministry is wicked. A wicked ministry no184 lawful ministry185; and in such sort no lawful ministry, that what doth belong to them as ministers by right of their calling, the same to be annihilated in respect of their bad qualities186; their wickedness in itself a deprivation of right to deal in the affairs of the Church, and a warrant for others to deal in them which are held to be of a clean other society, the members whereof have been before so peremptorily for ever excluded from power of dealing with the affairs187 of the Church.

They which have once throughly learned this lesson, will quickly be capable perhaps of another equivalent unto it. For if the wickedness of the ministry transfer188 their right unto the king; in case the king be as wicked as they, to whom then shall the right descend? There is no remedy, all must come by devolution at the189 length, even as the family of Brown will have it190, unto the godly among the people; for confusion unto191 the wise and the192 great, the poor and the simple193, some Knipperdoling194 with his retinue, must take the195 work of the Lord in hand; and the making of church laws and orders196 must prove to be their right in the end. If not for love of the truth, yet for very197 shame of so198 gross absurdities, let these contentions199 and shifting200 fancies be abandoned.

The cause which moved them for a time to hold a wicked ministry no lawful ministry; and in this defect of a lawful ministry, kings authorized201 to make laws and orders for the affairs of the Church, till the Church be well202 established, is surely this: First, they see that whereas the continual dealing of the kings of Israel in the affairs of the Church doth make now very strongly203 against them, the burden thereof204 they shall in time well enough shake off, if it may be obtained that it is for kings lawful indeed 205to follow those206 holy examples, howbeit no longer than during the foresaid207 case of necessity, while the wickedness, and in respect thereof the unlawfulness of the ministry doth continue. Secondly, they perceive right well, that unless they should yield authority unto kings in case of such supposed necessity, the discipline they urge were clean excluded, as long as the clergy of England doth thereunto remain opposite. To open therefore a door for her entrance, there is no remedy208 but the tenet must be this: that now when the ministry of England is universally wicked, and, in that respect, hath lost all authority, and is become no lawful ministry, no such ministry as hath the right which otherwise should belong unto them, if they were virtuous and godly as their adversaries are; in this necessity the king may do somewhat for the church: that which we do imply in the name of headship, he may both have and exercise till they be entered which will disburden and ease him of it; till they come, the king is licensed to hold that power which we call headship. But what afterwards? In a church [well?] ordered, that which the supreme magistrate hath209, is “to see that the laws of God touching his worship, and touching all matters and orders of the Church, be executed and duly observed; to see that every ecclesiastical person do that office whereunto he is appointed; to punish those that fail in their office210.” In a word, (that which Allen himself acknowledgeth211,) unto the earthly power which God hath given him it doth belong to defend the laws of the Church, to cause them to be executed, and to punish the transgressors212 of the same.

On all sides therefore it is confessed, that to the king belongeth power of maintaining laws213 made for church214 regiment, and of causing them to be observed; but principality of power in making them, which is the thing that215 we attribute unto kings, this both the one sort and the other do216 withstand217: although218 not both in such sort but that still it is granted by the one that albeit ecclesiastical councils consisting of church officers did frame the laws whereby the church affairs were ordered in ancient times, yet no canon, no not of any council, had the force of a law in the Church, unless it were ratified and confirmed by the emperor being Christian. Seeing therefore it is acknowledged219, that it was then the manner of the emperor to confirm the ordinances which were made by the ministers, which is as much in effect to say that the emperor had in church ordinances a voice negative;—and that without his confirmation they had not the strength of public ordinances;—why are we condemned as giving more unto kings than the Church did in those times, we giving them no more but that supreme power which the emperor did then exercise with much larger scope than at this day any Christian king either doth or possibly can use it over the Church220?

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Footnotes

  1. l will E.Q.C.L. ↩

  2. m hir D. ↩

  3. n or E.Q.C.L. ↩

  4. Soto in 4 Sent. [ubi infra. “Gerson in Tract. Potest. Eccles.” (cons. iv, xi.) … “atque alii fautores illius opinionis, quod concilium est supra papam, arbitrati suam opinionem ex hoc fundamento pendere, aiunt, potestatem ecclesiasticam jurisdictionis in utroque foro residere in tota universitate Ecclesiæ, hoc est, in toto corpore … Jure enim naturæ potestas regendi rempubl. in tota ipsa est, et in nullo seorsim membro, nisi ab ipsa eligatur, ut est videre in antiquo regimine Romanorum … Nisi quod illæ quæ rege gubernantur ipsum elegerunt, in quem suam transtulerunt auctoritatem, quæ jure hæreditario perpetuo succederet in suam sobolem, juxta tenorem legis, Quod principi placuit. Sic ergo aiunt existere potestatem in corpore Ecclesiæ immediate.” Which opinion he proceeds to combat on the ground of the apostolical charter granted in Scripture.] ↩

  5. Potestas jurisdictionis ecclesiasticæ non residet in toto corpore immediate, sed in prælatis. Caiet. [Thomas de Vio, of Gaeta, Dominican theologian, 1469-1534.] in Opusc. de comp. Pap. et Concil. [t. i. tract. i. c. xii.] Turrecr. [John Torquemada of Valladolid, Dominican theologian, 1388-1468.] Summ. Eccl. l. 2. c. 71. [fol. 196, 197. Venet. 1561. apud] Soto in 4 Sent. Dist. 20 q. 1. art. 4. ↩

  6. [Possibly this paragraph might case it should stand as § 1 of this be meant as a transition from the chapter. It is here given as in the former chapter to this: in which Dubl. MS.] ↩

  7. o This portion of the work, to “assent not asked?” p. 407, is omitted in the edition of 1651, but found in part in Clavi Trabales, p. 73-76, &c. and was inserted by Bishop Gauden in his edition of Hooker’s works, 1662. It occurs in MSS. Q.C.L. but much later, viz. where Bishop Gauden inserted it, after the words “defence of the truth therein,” at the end of c. viii. On the authority of the MS. D, confirmed by internal evidence, it is now placed here. ↩

  8. p cause E. ↩

  9. q not om. D. It had been “unlike,” but the “un” is erased. ↩

  10. r of om. Cl. Trab. ↩

  11. s they are om. E. ↩

  12. t quality E.Q.C.L. ↩

  13. u belongs E. ↩

  14. [Eccl. Disc. transl. by T. C. p. 4. ed. 1617; comp. T. C. i. 84. al. 63. ap. Whitg. Def. 305. “Moses that was the overseer of the work was a wise and a godly man; the artificers that wrought it, Bezaleel and Aholiab, most cunning workmen: and yet observe how the Lord leaveth nothing to their will, but telleth not only of the boards, of the curtains, of the apparel; but also of the bars, of the rings, of the strings, of the hooks, of the besoms, of the snuffers,” &c… . “If in the shadows, how much more in the body … Is it a like thing … that he that then remembered the pins did here forget the master builders?”] ↩

  15. x as E.Q. Cl. Trab. ↩

  16. y also E.Q.C.L. Cl. Trab. ↩

  17. z strait E. ↩

  18. Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; [quoted in Admonit. p. 1. ed. 1617;] Jos. i. 7. ↩

  19. a to Cl. Trab. you D. ↩

  20. b had E. ↩

  21. c law E. ↩

  22. Thom. ii. [2 Sum. pars i.] quæst. 108. art. 2. [p. 709. Venet. 1596.] ↩

  23. d said Cl. Trab. D. ↩

  24. e of scripture D. ↩

  25. f must needs take D. ↩

  26. g so great E.Q.C.L. Cl. Trab. ↩

  27. h as a conclusion E. ↩

  28. i as E.Q.C. ↩

  29. k for manner in E.C.L. Cl. Trab. for manner of Q. ↩

  30. l a duty E. ↩

  31. m it om. E.C.L. ↩

  32. n as om. E. ↩

  33. [Rom. x. 10.] ↩

  34. o man’s laws have E. ↩

  35. p their contradiction E.Q.C.L. Cl. Trab. ↩

  36. q man afterwards is E.C.L. Cl. Trab. ↩

  37. r man of wisdom apply those words of D. ↩

  38. Prov. vi. 20. ↩ ↩2

  39. s The English first E.Q. ↩

  40. t makes E.Q.C.L. ↩

  41. u thou not E.Q.C.L. ↩

  42. x a thing even undoubtedly E.C.L. ↩

  43. y ordained D. ↩

  44. Δει̑ τὸν νόμον τὰ περὶ Θεοὺς καὶ δαίμονας καὶ γονέας, καὶ ὅλως τὰ καλὰ καὶ τίμια, πρω̑τα [πρα̑τα] τίθεσθαι· δεύτερον δὲ τὰ συμϕέροντα· τὰ γὰρ μήονα τοι̑ς μείζοσιν ἀκολουθει̑ν καθήκει. [ποθάκει.] Archyt. de Leg. et Justit. That is, “It behoveth the law first to establish or settle those things which belong to the gods, and divine powers, and to our parents, and universally those things which be virtuous and honourable; in the second place, those things that be convenient and profitable: for it is fit that matters of the less weight should come after the greater.” [Ap. Stob. Floril. II. 169. ed. Gaisford.] ↩

  45. z must needs E.Q.C.L. ↩

  46. a Here the fragment in Cl. Trab. breaks off. ↩

  47. b it must of necessity retain the same, being of the Christian religion E. of necessity being [of 1676] Christian Religion, Gauden, 1662. ↩

  48. c that om. E.C.Q. inserted L.D. ↩

  49. Act. xv. 7. 13-23. ↩

  50. d which om. E. ↩

  51. e afterwards E.Q.C.L. ↩

  52. [See App. No. iv.] ↩

  53. f belongeth to the prelates E. The MSS. all give it as above: except that the before bishops is omitted in D. ↩

  54. g alone om. E. ↩

  55. h has E.C.L. hath Gauden. ↩

  56. i since D. ↩

  57. Acts xvi. 4. ↩

  58. k since D. ↩

  59. Acts xv. 28. ↩

  60. Matt. xxviii. 20. ↩

  61. l the E.C. ↩

  62. 2 Cor. iii. 3, 6. ↩

  63. m more D. ↩

  64. n no om. E. ↩

  65. o are, as now E.C.L. ↩

  66. p laws E.Q.C.L. ↩

  67. Cap. Dilecta, de Excess. Prælator. [Decretal. Greg. v. 31, 14. c. 1642. Lugd. 1572. This is an inhibition of Pope Honorius III. to the clergy of Jouars, in the diocese of Meaux, forbidding them to make or use a common seal without the consent of the abbess of Jouars, who was “ipsorum caput et patrona.”] L. Per fundum [Tit. de servitutib.] rusticor. Præd. [Digest. lib. viii. tit. iii. l. 11. “Per fundum, qui plurium est, jus mihi esse eundi, agendi, potest separatim cedi: ergo subtili ratione non aliter meum fiet jus, quam si omnes cedant: et novissima demum cessione superiores omnes confirmabuntur.”] et § Religiosum. De rerum divis. [Inst. II. 1. § 9. “Religiosum locum unusquisque sua voluntate facit. In communem autem locum purum invito socio inferre non licet.”] ↩

  68. Gloss. [in verb. Pertinet.] Dist. 96. c. Ubinam. [fol. xcix. Lugd. 1509. Bonifac. viii. De Regulis Juris, ad calc. lib. 6i Decretal. Lugd. 1572. Reg. xxix. col. 742.] ↩

  69. [Decr. Gratian. pars i. d. 96. col. 468, from a letter of Nicholas I. to the Greek emperor Michael III, reproving him for having been a party to the proceedings of the provincial synod which deposed Ignatius patriarch of Constantinople without any charge of heresy, and substituted Photius in his place. ad 865. Concil. Hard. v. 158 C.] ↩

  70. q quæ univ… . communis est om. E. ↩

  71. r as om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  72. s minuere E.C.L. ↩

  73. Extrav. de Judic. C. Novit. (Extra de judiciis novit, Gauden in text.) [This passage does not appear in the Extravagantes, Tit. De Judiciis, ad calc. vi. Decretal. ed. 1573. The forty-second canon of the fourth Lateran council, which was drawn up by Innocent III, ad 1215, runs thus: “Sicut volumus ut jura clericorum non usurpent laici, ita velle debemus, ne clerici jura sibi vindicent laicorum. Quo circa universis clericis interdicimus, ne quis prætextu ecclesiasticæ libertatis suam de cætero jurisdictionem extendat in præjudicium justitiæ sæcularis.” Conc. Hard. vii. 49. In the title De Judiciis, Decretal. Greg. ix. lib. ii. tit. i. cap. 13, (which begins, Novit ille qui nihil ignorat) the following passage is given of the letter from Innocent to the bishops of France; by which he interfered between king John and Philip Augustus, ad 1204; “Non putet aliquis quod jurisdictionem illustris regis Francorum perturbare aut minuere intendamus, cum ipse jurisdictionem nostram nec velit nec debeat impedire.” col. 489. Lugd. 1572.] ↩

  74. t saith Pope Innocent E.Q.C.L. ↩

  75. u conditions E.L. ↩

  76. x right E.C. ↩

  77. y in making laws E.Q.C.L. ↩

  78. z whereby E.Q.C.L. ↩

  79. a in om. E.C.L. ↩

  80. b Tridental E. ↩

  81. c laws E. ↩

  82. Boet. Epo, Heroic. Quæst. lib. i. sect. 284. [“Ecclesiasticarum sive Heroicarum Quæstionum libri sex.” No date, but some time before 1588, in which year were published three additional books, “De jure Sacro.” The author was Boetius Epo, a native of Friesland, [1529-1599] Professor of Canon Law at Douay, 1578. The editor has not obtained a sight of the work here quoted. It appears from the continuation of it, that the writer was a strenuous assertor of the pope’s plenary power: and from the preface to his “Antiquit. Ecclesiast. Syntagmata,” that he had once been a Protestant. (Moreri; Hurter, Nomenclator Liter. i. 228.)] ↩

  83. d touching either E.Q.C.L. ↩

  84. e right E.Q.C.L. ↩

  85. [It should seem from Strada’s account, b. iv. p. 106, 107, that no formal exception was made, but from Fra Paolo, viii. 85, that the publication took place in the king’s name and not in the pope’s; and from Brandt, (Hist. of the Reform. in the Low Countries, b. v. Eng. Transl. t. i. 153,) that the “temporal magistrates were directed to assist the prelates… and to be conformable to the canons of the council in every thing, save only where they might seem to derogate from his majesty’s prerogatives or from the rights of any of his vassals.” This statement is confirmed by the original documents as they stand in Le Plat, Monum. Hist. Concil. Trid. t. vii. especially the king’s final letter to the duchess of Parma, p. 91. The points specified by Hooker about patronage, &c. are specified not in the king’s letter, but in various memorials, given by Le Plat, from the councils of Namur, Brabant, &c. (p. 71, 83,) and forwarded by the duchess to Philip: which memorials occasioned the letter.] ↩

  86. f again D. ↩

  87. g follows E.C.L. ↩

  88. h king’s E.C. Kings Gaud. ↩

  89. i face E.L. ↩

  90. k a corporation E. ↩

  91. l Here the printed editions since Gauden, and all the MSS., insert a passage, which will be found below, as a note by way of Appendix to this book. The reasons for omitting it here will be found elsewhere. The Dublin MS. then proceeds as in § 14. “And concerning,” to “over the Church.” But as that MS. is clearly erroneous and incoherent in one part of this arrangement, the transposition has not been adopted. ↩

  92. m account E.Q.C.L. ↩

  93. n those E.C.L. ↩

  94. [Allen, Apol. 1583, c. iv. p. 69. “Veritas est, nec regem nec parlamentum habere potestatem legitimam præscribendi ordinem ecclesiæ vel clero in hac parte, magis quam hierarchiis angelorum in cœlo commorantium.” The points which he had just been mentioning were the royal supremacy and the validity of the protestant episcopal orders.] ↩

  95. [Ibid. p. 64. “Parlamentum autem est conventus plane civilis, in quo nec episcopi aliter quam ut regni barones jus suffragandi obtinent, nec ut barones ullam habent tractandi aut definiendi negotia, aliam quam quæ ad civilem status gubernationem spectant, potestatem: cum omnis potestas, quam vel episcopi vel alii in illo loco exercent, sit a Principe et Rep. civili derivata; ad quos nec lege divina nec naturali hujusmodi rerum definitio spectat.”] ↩

  96. o of power om. E. ↩

  97. p notwithstanding om. E.C.L. ↩

  98. q so E. ↩

  99. [Ibid. 65. “Non ad paganos imperatores hoc spectabat, (quamvis non minus olim imperiales et regales quam nunc temporis extiterint) nec ab illis expetebatur; nam sub Nerone, præcipui Apostoli ecclesiam Romanam gubernabant.”] ↩

  100. [Ibid. 67. “Hoc itaque regimen non est jus regi terreno, principi, aut statui ulli debitum: hi enim omnes (si Christiani sunt) tenentur subesse pastoribus animarum suarum et ecclesiæ Christi.”] ↩

  101. r laws here E.C.L.Q. and D. read as in the text. ↩

  102. s in such sort om. E.C. ↩

  103. [Ibid. “Nec eam ecclesia concessit, nec unquam concedere potest, cum nec a natura illis, ut patet in ethnicis, competat, nec jure Christianitatis, cujus virtute omnes quotquot in universo orbe vivunt, ecclesiæ Christi obedire tenentur, non eidem imperare; nec ulla civilis resp. eam principi suo auctoritatem largiri potest quam nulla vi naturæ possidet: unde princeps cum hanc potestatem nec a populo nec a majoribus per naturalem propagationem aut alia ratione acceptam consecutus sit, eam parlamento haud communicare potest, et consequenter nullas ferre leges, nec audire nec determinare, per se vel per parlamentum aut aliud quodcunque tribunal modo jam dicto sibi subjectum, quidquam de ecclesiæ gubernatione potest.”] ↩

  104. t For they … . unto om. E. ↩

  105. [Saravia. de Honore Præsulibus et Presbyteris debito, c. 25. “Coriarii, tinctores, textores, coctores cervisiæ, fabri, fullones, mercatores, comitia celebrant, de Republ. sententiam dicunt (quod equidem in libero populo non improbo): sed pastores ecclesiarum excludi, contra æquabile jus civium est, qui sub iisdem legibus et magistratu vivunt, et communia ferunt cum cæteris civibus onera: de quorum vita et fortunis, de iisque omnibus a quibus tum ipsorum privata salus, tum ecclesiarum publica pendet, non minus deliberatur, quam de pannis, de lana, de piscibus, de coriis cæterisque mercibus importandis aut exportandis. Num minor pastoribus ecclesiarum cura Reip. esse debet, quam Burgimagistris?”] ↩

  106. u Jule D. ↩

  107. x the om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  108. xx should E′. ↩

  109. y of E.Q.C.L. ↩

  110. z in themselves om. E. ↩

  111. a foundation D. ↩

  112. b into E. ↩

  113. c the laws E.C. ↩

  114. d grand D. ↩

  115. An. 1 et 2 Phil. et Mar. c. 8. ↩

  116. e there om. D. ↩

  117. f neither did they or the cardinal imagine E. or the cardinal himself, as they imagine, any thing commit Q; commit any thing C.L. ↩

  118. g of om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  119. h public om. E.C.L. ↩

  120. i the Christian E. ↩

  121. j rites om. E. ↩

  122. k the devising E. ↩

  123. l This clause om. E. ↩

  124. l that E.Q.C.L. ↩

  125. m kings but E. ↩

  126. n states of om. E. ↩

  127. o the om. E. ↩

  128. p no E.C.L. ↩

  129. q of E.Q.C.L. ↩

  130. r utterly om. E.C.L. ↩

  131. s regal E.C. ↩

  132. t unto their emperors E.Q.C.L. ↩

  133. u means E.C.L.Q. ↩

  134. “Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: cum lege Regia, quæ de ejus imperio lata est, populus ei et in eum omne imperium suum et potestatem concedat.” Inst. [lib. i. t. 2.] de J. N. G. et C. [§ 6.] ↩

  135. x endued E. ↩

  136. y thought E. ↩

  137. z nor E.Q.C.L. ↩

  138. a the E. ↩

  139. b to om. E.C.L. ↩

  140. T. C. lib. i. p. 92. (292 D.) [al. 154. ap. Whitg. Def. 695. “As for the making of the orders and ceremonies of the Church, they do (where there is a constituted and ordered church,) pertain unto the ministers of the Church and to the ecclesiastical governors; and as they meddle not with the making of civil laws for the commonwealth, so the civil magistrate hath not to ordain ceremonies pertaining to the Church.”] ↩

  141. c the om. E.Q. ↩

  142. d these E.Q.C.L. ↩

  143. e be lords om. D. ↩

  144. f of all other is E. is most proper of all other C. ↩

  145. g ecclesiastical persons E.C. ↩

  146. h and E. and the C.L. ↩

  147. [De Rep. iii. ap. Lactant. vi. 8.] ↩

  148. i part D. ↩

  149. k his E.C.L. [Fulm. this.] ↩

  150. l the E.L. ↩

  151. m though E. however C. ↩

  152. n of om. C.L. ↩

  153. o especially is E. ↩

  154. p establisheth them E.C.L.Q. ↩

  155. q deliver om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  156. s is E. ↩

  157. t that om. D. ↩

  158. u did forbid E. ↩

  159. x them E. ↩

  160. y thereby E.Q. ↩

  161. z laws E.C. ↩

  162. a the om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  163. b deprive himself thereof E. ↩

  164. c a om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  165. d own om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  166. e his E. [Fulm. this] L. ↩

  167. ee head E′. Gauden, ’62, ’76, ’82. ↩

  168. f on D. ↩

  169. g needs om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  170. h unto E.Q. ↩

  171. i of E. ↩

  172. k matters E.C.L. ↩

  173. l idolatrous E.Q.C.L. ↩

  174. m and E.C. ↩

  175. n as om. E. ↩

  176. o true and Christian D. ↩

  177. p The passage which follows, down to “over the Church,” p. 419, is placed by the Dublin MS. before “There are which wonder,” &c. c. vi. 9. The margin of D. has, “Power to make laws.” ↩

  178. q the E.C.L. ↩

  179. r for D. ↩

  180. T.C. lib. iii. p. 159 (51 E.) [T. C. i. 193. al. 155. ap. Whitg. Def. 701, says, “We say, that if there be no lawful ministry to set good orders (as in ruinous decays and overthrows of religion,) that then the prince ought to do it; and if (when there is a lawful ministry) it shall agree of any unlawful or unmeet order, that the prince ought to stay that order, and not to suffer it, but to drive them to that which is lawful and meet.” And iii. 159: (quoting Jewel and Nowell;) “ ‘Christian princes have rather to do with these matters than ignorant and wicked priests … In case of necessity (meaning when the ministry is wicked) the prince ought to provide for convenient remedy:’ the very selfsame thing which we maintain, in saying, when there is no lawful ministry, that then the prince ought to take order in these things.” ↩

  181. s endued E. ↩

  182. t remarkable E.C.L. ↩

  183. u wheresoever E.Q.C.L. ↩

  184. x is no E. ↩

  185. y ministry? D. ↩

  186. z quality? D. ↩

  187. a dealing for ever with affairs E. ↩

  188. b transfers E. ↩

  189. c the om. E.C.Q. ↩

  190. [See at the end of Greenwood’s “Answer to G. Gifford’s pretended Defence of Read Prayers,” 1590, a circular letter from the bishop of London (Aylmer) to his clergy, with “A Brief of the Positions holden by the new sectory of Recusants:” of which the 10th is, “That if the prince, or magistrate under her, do refuse, or defer to reform, such faults as are amiss in the Church, the people may take the reforming of them into their own hands, before or without her authority.” And in a subsequent paper, Art. 6. “They affirm that the people must reform the Church and not tarry for the magistrate.” Their own reply is, “We go not about to reform your Romish bishopricks, deans, officers, advocates, courts, canons, neither your popish priests, half priests, ministers, all which come out of the bottomless pit: but we leave those merchantmen and their wares with the curse of God upon them until they repent … We are to obey God rather than man, and if any man be ignorant let him be ignorant still. We are not to stay from doing the Lord’s commandment upon the pleasure or offence of any.”] ↩

  191. d to D. ↩

  192. e and to the D.E. ↩

  193. f the great, by the poor and the simple; some Kniperdoling, &c. E. Gauden. Kimperdoling E. G. Kniperdoling 1676. But all the MSS. omit by: which seems to indicate the change of punctuation here adopted. ↩

  194. [Bernard Knipperdoling, of Munster, one of the leaders of the anabaptists in the tumult of 1533, and designated by Sleidan as ‘facile primus ejus factionis.” Commentar. b. x. f. 106. ed. Argentorat. 1559. “Vaticinatur Cnipperdolingus, fore ut in summo gradu collocati deturbentur, alii autem e sordibus et infimis emergant subselliis: deinde jubet omnia templa destrui.” Ibid.] ↩

  195. g this E.C.L. ↩

  196. h and orders om. D. ↩

  197. i very om. E. ↩

  198. k so om. E. ↩

  199. l qu. contentious? ↩

  200. m stifling E. [trifling Fulm. Q. in marg.] ↩

  201. n authorized kings E. ↩

  202. o till it were well E. ↩

  203. p strong E.Q.C.L. ↩

  204. q whereof E. hereof C. ↩

  205. r indeed lawful for kings E.C.L. ↩

  206. s these E.C.L. ↩

  207. t foresaid om. E.C.L.Q. ↩

  208. u reason C. ↩

  209. T. C. lib. i. p. 192. [al. 153. ap. Whitg. Def. 694.] ↩

  210. x vid. p. 17. [marg. D.] ↩

  211. Apol. fol. 40. p. 2. [c. iv. p. 67. “Ad terrenam spectat potestatem, quam Deus illis largitus est, ecclesiæ leges defendere, negotiorum suscipere executionem, et punire rebelles atque transgressores.”] ↩

  212. y punish rebels and transgressors E.Q.C.L. ↩

  213. z the laws E.Q.C.L. ↩

  214. a the church D. ↩

  215. z that om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

  216. a doth D. ↩

  217. [Here in E.Q.C.L. ends the treatise on Legislative Supremacy, and the section “Touching the king’s supereminent authority,” &c. (c. viii.) begins. But in D. the following passage is inserted: which, occurring as it does afterwards, the first part of it almost verbatim, was probably put here as a note in the copy from which that MS. was transcribed, and got by mistake into the text. (It appears also in Cl. Trab. p. 71.) “Wherein it is, from the purpose altogether, alleged, that Constantine,” &c. (as in c. viii. § 8. to “a matter of theirs:) all which hereupon may be inferred reacheth no further than only unto the administration of church affairs, or the determination of strifes and controversies rising about the matter of religion: it proveth that in former ages of the world it hath been judged most convenient for church officers to have the hearing of causes merely ecclesiastical, and not the emperor himself in person to give sentence of them. No one man can be sufficient for all things. And therefore public affairs are divided, each kind in all well-ordered states allotted unto such kind of persons as reason presumeth fittest to handle them. Reason cannot presume kings ordinarily so skilful as to be personal judges meet for the common hearing and determining of church controversies; but they which are hereunto appointed, and have all their proceedings authorized by such power as may cause them to take effect. The principality of which power in making laws, whereupon all these things depend, is not by any of these allegations proved incommunicable unto kings.”] ↩

  218. [In a second instance here the order of the Dublin MS. fol. 107; and of Cl. Trab. p, 72, has been departed from; the following passage to the end of this section, as they give it, is quite incoherent, followingthe extract given above, (note 1,) in this way: “The principality of which power in making laws whereupon all these things depend, is not by any of these allegations proved incommunicable unto kings, although not both in such sort,” &c. This being clearly wrong, and the passage as it stands in the text fitting in tolerably well, perhaps the insertion of it on conjecture may not seem too bold.] ↩

  219. T. C. lib. i. p. 193. [al. 154. ap. Def. 698. “By the emperor’s epistle in the first action of the council of Constantinople…it appeareth that it was the manner of the emperors to confirm the ordinances which were made by the ministers, and to see them kept.”] ↩

  220. b These sentences from “although not both,” p. 418, l. 4, occur only in D. They are followed by the passage “There are which wonder,” &c. c. vi. 9. to “Christian religion,” p. 415. After which at an interval, that MS. proceeds with the words “Touching the advancement,” &c. as in the text. ↩

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