← Back to the beginning of Question 107. But is it enough that we do not kill any man in the manner mentioned above?

There are two ways in which we may contribute to the preservation of life; either by not injuring, or by rendering assistance to men. Hence there are two classes of virtues growing out of this commandment—the former including those which do not injure the lives and safety of men, the other including those which contribute to the preservation of life, and the safety of men. The virtues included in the former class consist of three kinds; for we may not injure any one, viz, either being not injured or provoked; or being provoked; or in both respects, whether provoked or not. Particular justice which does wrong to no one is included in the first; in the second, gentleness and equity; in the third, peaceableness. The virtues contributing to the safety of man are two-fold; for we may be said to aid, either by repelling evils and dangers, or by doing good. The first method includes commutative justice, fortitude and indignation; the other includes humanity, mercy and friendship.

The virtues which do not injure the safety of men

I. PARTICULAR JUSTICE, injuring no one, is that, which does not injure the life or body of any one, neither from design, nor from negligence, by whom we have not been injured, unless God require it at our hands. Or it is a virtue which carefully avoids every injury which might be inflicted upon our own, or upon the safety of our neighbor, whether it be by violence, deceit or negligence. This is expressed in the words of the commandment, Thou shalt not kill.

That which is opposed to this virtue, and condemned by this commandment, includes, 1. Every injury which may be inflicted, either by design or by negligence, upon our own, or upon the life and body of another. 2. Excessive lenity, by which it comes to pass that they are not punished, who ought to be punished by those who are vested with the power to do so.

II. GENTLENESS , or placability, or readiness to forgive, which is a virtue, governing and controlling anger, is not provoked without any cause, nor by one that is trifling in its character; and where there is a cause of just displeasure, it does not desire the destruction of the person inflicting the wrong; but is indignant at the reproach which is cast upon the name of God, or at the injustice and injury inflicted upon our neighbor—it indulges no desire of revenging any injury however great it may be, but heartily desires the safety and well-being even of enemies, and those who deserve ill at our hands, and endeavors to contribute thereto according to its own ability and their necessity. Or it is a virtue which moderates anger, and shows itself in shunning all unlawful excitement, and so moderates that anger which is lawful, that it does not pass beyond the limits which God has prescribed, and does not burn with a desire of revenge, but extends pardon even to enemies notwithstanding their offences and provocations have been great and heavy; so that the anger which is felt is not directed to the persons, but to the sins of the wicked, and that, too, in such a way that it desires the safety even of those who transgress under the most aggravated form. “Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth.” (Matt. 5:5.)

The opposite of this virtue comprises, 1. Undue lenity, which is not to be indignant in view of shocking injuries, and which does not restrain or punish them, or is, at least, too remiss in prohibiting and suppressing them. 2. Hastiness of temper, with every form of unlawful and immoderate anger 3. Desire of vengeance, grudging and animosity.

III. EQUITY is a virtue closely allied to gentleness. It is the governness of stern justice (preserves a just proportion between punishment and crime) upon just and probable causes, as when in view of the crime itself, or our own duty, or the public and private safety of those who sin, or for the sake of avoiding offence, we yield somewhat of our right in punishing sins, or in demanding satisfaction for injuries received. “Let your moderation be known unto all men.” (Phil. 4:5.)

The first thing which we may mention as opposed to this virtue is, immoderate severity or cruelty, as when there is no proper regard to the circumstances under which men do wrong, concerning which it is said, extreme right is extreme wrong. 2. Too great lenity, which shows itself in not being influenced by those things which ought to influence us, as when God commands, &c. 3. Partiality.

IV. PEACEABLENESS , or a desire of peace and harmony is a virtue which consists in diligently and carefully avoiding all unnecessary occasions and causes of offence, discord, strife and hatred, and in reconciling those who are offended, either at us, or at others, and which for the sake of retaining or preserving peace does not shrink from troubles, or from the endurance of injuries, so long as there is no reproach cast upon the name of God, or grievous wrong inflicted upon our own safety or that of others. In a word, it is a virtue avoiding all offences and occasions of anger and discoid, and which at the same time endeavors to remove and bring to an end such strifes and misunderstandings as arise from time to time.

There is opposed to this virtue, 1. Quarrelsomeness, which shows itself in giving and seizing occasions of strife, to which there is attached an eager desire or delight in contention, slandering, backbiting, whispering, &c. Hence all contentious persons, slanderers, backbiters, wisperers, &c., are here condemned. 2. Such a lenity as when any one desires to keep peace without any proper regard to the glory of God, or his own and neighbor’s safety. This is a sinful gratification.

The virtues which contribute to the safety of men

V. COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE IN PUNISHING is a virtue which preserves an equality between offences and punishments, inflicting either equal punishments, or less in view of just and satisfactory causes, having a proper regard to the circumstances which should ever be taken into consideration in civil courts, for the sake of maintaining the glory of God, and the preservation of human society. For when God forbids the infliction of any wrong upon society, and wills that the magistrate be the defender and preserver of order according to the whole Decalogue, he also designs that those who manifestly and grossly violate this order be restrained and kept within proper bounds by just punishments. The magistrate, therefore, may be guilty of doing wrong not only in being cruel and unjustly severe, but also in being too lenient and in granting permission to certain persons to injure others. “Because thou hast let go out of thy hand, a man whom I appointed to utter destruction, therefore thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people.” “He that killeth any man, shall surely be put to death.” “Ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, which is guilty of death; but he shall surely be put to death. (1 Kings 20:42. Lev. 24:17. Num. 35:31.) This form of justice, therefore, belongs to this commandment.

Obj. It is here said, Thou shalt not kill. Therefore no one must be put to death—consequently this justice is not comprehended in this commandment inasmuch as it cannot be maintained, without putting many to death. Ans. Thou shalt not kill, that is, not thou who art merely a private person, according to thy judgment and desire, when I do not command thee, and give thee any warrant from this law. But this does not do away with the office of the magistrate; “for he is the minister of God and does not bear the sword in vain.” (Rom. 13:4.) Hence when the magistrate puts wicked transgressors to death, it is not man, but God who is the executioner of the deed. We may also reply to this objection by reversing the argument thus: Therefore some are to be put to death, lest human society be destroyed by thieves and robbers.

The opposite of this virtue is, 1. Cruelty, or too great severity. 2. Private revenge. 3. Lenity, when those are not punished who ought to be punished. 4. Partiality. Or to express it more briefly we may say that the opposite of commutative justice is injustice, which either deos not punish at all, or else punishes unjustly.

VI. FORTITUDE is a virtue which braves such dangers as sound reasons requires us to meet and encounter for the glory of God, the salvation of the church and commonwealth, and for the preservation and defence either of ourselves or others against grievous wrongs and oppressions. The fortitude of the saints springs from faith, hope, and the love of God and our neighbor. Heroic fortitude is a special gift of God, as in the case of Joshua, Sampson, Gideon, David, &c. Warlike fortitude is the defender of justice, and the undertaker of just defence respecting ourselves and others, although it is not accomplished without great danger. War is either a necessary defence against such as are guilty of robbery, cruelty or oppression; or it is a just punishment for wicked outrages, which is undertaken by the force of arms by the ordinary power.

The opposite of this virtue comprises timidity, which shows itself in flying from necessary dangers; and presumption, or fool-hardiness in rushing into clangers unnecessarily.

VII. INDIGNATION, or zeal is, from a love of justice, and from a regard to our neighbor, to be indignant on account of some grievous or outrageous wrong inflicted upon the innocent, and which, according to the ability which any one possesses, endeavors to repel and revenge the wrong according to the commandment of God. Or, it is a virtue which is justly provoked and indignant on account of reproach cast upon the name of God and on account of some grievous wrong by which either God, or our neighbor is injured.

There is opposed to this, 1. Unjust anger. 2. Lenity, or remissness, which shows itself when there is no just grief or indignation felt in view of grievous injuries, and when there is no disposition to avenge them.

VIII. HUMANITY , or philanthropy, specially and properly so called, is a true and sincere good will, and desire to perform towards men what we desire others to perform towards us, with a declaration of good will in such words, actions and duties as are fit and becoming. Or it is benevolence in the mind, will and heart towards others, and a declaration of it in such words, actions and duties, as are possible and proper. This virtue is likewise called in the holy Scriptures the love of our neighbor. Philosophy terms it humanity. All men, by this virtue, perform towards others what they desire others to perform towards themselves. “Let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith.” (Gal. 6:10.)

The opposite of this virtue comprises, 1. Inhumanity, or moroseness, which either omits doing those things which humanity requires, or does the opposite. 2. Ill-will, or envy, which shows itself in grief at the good and prosperity of others, and in a desire to secure this good to itself, or at least to avert it from others. Mir nicht, dir nicht. 3. Self-love, with a neglect of our neighbor. 4. Unlawful gratification.

IX. MERCY is a grief felt in view of the calamities and misfortunes of the innocent, or such as fall through weakness and infirmity, with a desire and attempt to mitigate these calamities. Or it is a virtue which pities good men in their calamities, or those who sin through ignorance or infirmity, and which desires to remove their misfortunes, or at least alleviate them as much as justice will admit of, and which rejoices not in the calamities even of such as are our enemies. “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” (Matt. 5:7.)

There is opposed to this virtue on the side of want, 1. A want of mercy, or cruelty and hard-heartedness, which is seen in not having compassion upon those whom we ought to commiserate. 2. Rejoicing in the calamities of others. And on the side of excess we may mention lenity, as that which spares those whom God wills to be punished, which is a cruel mercy, by which society itself is injured, and also the person that is spared.

X. FRIENDSHIP , a species of humanity, is a true and mutual good will between good men, formed by a knowledge which each party has of the other’s virtues, or by the performance of such duties towards each other as are becoming and possible. “A man that hath friends must show himself friendly; and there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother.” (Prov. 13:24.)

The extremes of friendship are, 1. Enmity. 2. Neglect of friends. 3. Readiness in contracting and breaking friendship. 5. Flattery. 6 Unjust gratification.

Forty-First Lord’s Day


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← Back to the beginning of Question 107. But is it enough that we do not kill any man in the manner mentioned above?