Answer. Indeed we are, except we are regenerated by the Spirit of God.
Exposition
The question of the freedom of the will, or the power of the human will to obey God, and to do that which is good, is intimately connected with the subject of the misery of man, and claims our attention next in order. It is also necessary to know what ability man possessed before the fall, and what he has since, that, having a correct knowledge of the effects of the first sin, we may be the more excited to humility, and to an earnest desire for divine grace and guidance; and also to true gratitude to God. For this doctrine of the liberty of the will, brings us to a consideration, not of the ability and excellence of man, but of his weakness and misery.
The principal question and object, in this discussion, is, Whether man can now, in the same way in which he separated himself from God, also return to him by his own strength—accept of the grace that is offered him by God, and recover for himself the position which has been lost by sin? And also, whether the will of man be the chief cause why some are converted, whilst others continue in sin; and why, both among the converted and the unconverted, some are better than others? In a word, whether the will of man be the cause why men do good or evil, whether in this, or in that manner?
The Pelagians, and others of a similar character, reply to this question, That so much grace is given by God, and left by nature, to all men, that they can of themselves return to God, and obey him: neither are we to seek for any other cause than the will of man, as the reason why some receive and retain, whilst others reject and disregard, divine aid in forsaking sin, and do, after this or that manner, resolve upon and execute their own counsels and deeds.
The Holy Scriptures, however, teach a wholly different doctrine, which, as we understand it, is, that no work acceptable and pleasing to God can be undertaken, and performed by any one, without regeneration and the special grace of the Holy Spirit; neither can there be any more or less good in the counsels and actions of any man, than God of his own free grace chooses to produce in them; nor can the will of any creature be inclined in any other direction than that which seems good to the eternal and gracious counsel of God. And yet all the actions of the created will, both good and bad, are performed freely. That this may be the better understood, let us inquire:
I. What is freedom of will, or free power of choice?
II. What is the distinction which exists between the liberty which is in God, and that which is in his rational creatures, angels and men?
III. Is there any freedom of the human will?
IV. What kind of freedom of will is there in man; or how many de grees of free-will are there in man, according to his fourfold state?
I. What Is the Freedom of the Will, or Free Power of Choice?
The term freedom, or liberty, sometimes signifies a relation, power or right, be it the ordering or disposing of a person or thing, made by the will of a certain person, or by nature, for the purpose of acting with one’s own choice, or from fear according to just laws, or the order which is in harmony with the nature of man; for the purpose of enjoying those benefits which are fit and proper for us, without any prohibition and restraint; and for the purpose of being relieved from enduring the wants and burdens which are not peculiar to our nature. This may be termed a freedom from bondage and misery, and is opposed to slavery. So God is most free, because he is bound to no one: so the Jews and Romans were free, not being bound by foreign governments and burdens: so a state, or city is free from tyranny and servitude, whilst in the enjoyment of civil liberty: so we, being justified by faith, are through Christ freed from the wrath of God, the curse of the law, and the ceremonies instituted by Moses. But this signification of liberty does not properly belong to this discussion of the freedom of the will; because it is evident, and admitted by all, that we are the servants of God, and that the law binds us either to obedience, or punishment. There are also many things which our will chooses freely, which it nevertheless has not the power or ability to perform.
Secondly, freedom is opposed to constraint, and is a quality of the will, or a natural power of an intelligent creature, concurring with the will; that is, it is the power of choosing or refusing, of its own accord, and without any constraint, an object presented by the understanding, the nature of the will remaining the same, and being free to choose this or that, or to defer any action it may see fit, just as a man may be willing to walk, or not to walk. This is to act upon mature deliberation, which is the method of acting peculiar to the will.
This freedom of will belongs to God, angels, and men: and, when considered in relation to them, is called free power of choice. For that is said to be free which is endowed with this power, or liberty of willing or not willing, whilst the power of choice is the will itself, as it follows or rejects the judgment of the mind in the choice which it makes; for it comprehends both faculties of the mind, viz: the judgment and the will.
Free power of choice is therefore the faculty or power of willing or not willing, of choosing or rejecting an object presented by the understanding, of its own accord, and without any constraint. This faculty is called the power of choice in respect to the mind, which presents objects to the will, to be chosen or rejected; and it is called free in respect to the will following voluntarily and of its own accord, without any constraint, the judgment of the mind. That is called free which is voluntary, and which is opposed to what is involuntary and constrained, but not to that which is necessary; for that which is voluntary may agree and harmonise with what is necessary, but not with what is involuntary, as God and the holy angels are necessarily good, but not involuntarily or constrainedly; but most freely, because they have the beginning and cause of their goodness, which is free will, in themselves. That is said to be constrained which has only an external beginning and cause of its own activity, and not, at the same time, one that is also internal, by which it may move itself to art this or in that manner.
There is, therefore, such a difference between what is necessary anœ constrained, as that which exists between what is general and particular. Whatever is constrained is necessary, but not every thing that is necessary is constrained. Hence there is what is called a double necessity—a necessity of immutability and of constraint. The former may exist with what is voluntary, but the latter cannot.
The same distinction also exists between what is free and contingent. Every thing that is free is contingent, but not the opposite. Therefore that which is free is a species of what is contingent, as is also that which is fortuitous and casual.