Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, in a Letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland. 1
Rev. Sir,
The intimations you have given me of the use which has by some been made of what I have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c. to vindicate what is said on the subject of liberty and necessity, by the author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, has occasioned my reading this author’s Essay on that subject with particular care and attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that has read both his Essay and my Inquiry, that our schemes are exceedingly different from each other. The wide difference appears particularly in the following things.
This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to all men’s actions, as is inconsistent with liberty, 2 and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus, (p. 168.) after he had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations, as connected with motives, he concludes with saying, “In short, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at bottom have—no liberty.” Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty: and that the moral necessity which universally takes place, is not in the least inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of.
I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity of men’s volitions, which I suppose to be universal, at least some degree of liberty denied; that though it be true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-determining power in the Will, and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold a higher sort of freedom than I do: but I think this is certainly a great mistake.
Liberty, as I have explained it, is the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting himself, in any respect, according to his pleasure; without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been demonstrated, that no necessity of men’s volitions that I maintain, is inconsistent with this liberty: and I think it is impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than this: If any imagine they desire, and that they conceive of, a higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words, instead of ideas. If any one should here say, “Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting himself in any respect as he pleases, viz. a liberty of choosing as he pleases.” Such an one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own proposal. For, is not choosing as he pleases, conducting himself, in some respect, according to his pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that pleasure? If he says, “Yes, I came by that pleasure by my own choice.” If he be a man of common sense, by this time he will see his own absurdity: for he must needs see that his notion or conception, even of this liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception how he comes by that choice, which first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own Will respecting the affair. Or if any shall say, “That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice, preference, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;” this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty: as such a determination of the Will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according to its pleasure, what advantage would it give? and what liberty, worth contending for, would be exercised in it? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: which notion is perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men’s actions, which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of sovereignty of the Will, self-determining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis, power of choosing differently in given cases, &c. &c. as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused unmeaning words, instead of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have; but they never can answer the challenge.