Remarks in Mental Philosophy—the Mind
There are four distinct series of these manuscript Notes or Remarks, which from the handwriting, as well as from other evidence, were obviously commenced by him during his collegiate life, and as nearly as can be judged in the following order. The first, entitled ”The Mind,“ is a brief collection of discussions and remarks in mental philosophy. The second is without a title, and consists of ”Notes on Natural Science.“ The third is entitled ”Notes on the Scriptures.“ The fourth is entitled, ”Miscellanies.“ and consists chiefly of observations on the doctrines of the Scriptures. The two last he continued through life.
The following series of remarks, entitled “The Mind.” appears to have been composed either during, or soon after, his perusal of Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding.
“THE MIND.”
Title. The Natural History of the Mental World, or of the Internal World: being a Particular Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Mind, with respect to both its Faculties—the Understanding and the Will—and its various Instincts, and Active and Passive Powers.
Introduction. Concerning the two worlds—the External and the Internal: the External, the subject of Natural Philosophy; the Internal, our own Minds. How the Knowledge of the latter is, in many respects, the most important. Of what great use the true knowledge of this is; and of what dangerous consequence errors, here, are more than in the order.
Subjects to be handled in the Treatise on the Mind.
1. Concerning the difference between Pleasure and Pain, and Ideas, or the vast difference between the Understanding and the Will.
2. Concerning Prejudices; the influence of Prejudice to cloud the mind. The various sorts of prejudices in particular, and how they come to cloud the mind; particularly Prejudices of Interest—the true reason why they cloud the judgment.—Prejudices of Education and Custom. Their universal influence on wise, and learned, and rational, as well as other men; demonstrated from fact and experience—of their insensible influence, how it is insensible on great men.—How difficultly a people are got out of their old customs. In husbandry, how difficult to persuade that a new way is better.—Another prejudice is the general cry, and fashion, and vogue, of an age. Its exceeding strong influence, like a strong stream, that carries all that way. This influence on great men, Prejudices of People, in favour of individual great men, to the contempt of others.—Again, the voice of men in power, riches, or honourable place.—How some Churches would laugh at their ceremonies, if they were without them.—How a man’s being rich, or in high place, gives great weight to his word.—How much more weighty a man’s sayings are, after he becomes a Bishop, than before—another prejudice is from ridicule, or an high, strong, overbearing, contemptuous style.
3. Either after or before this, to have a dissertation concerning the exceeding vanity, blindness, and weakness of the mind of man.—What poor fallible creatures men are. How every man is insensible of his own; thinks himself best.—Concerning the Pride of men; how ready to think they shall be great men, and to promise themselves great things.
4. How some men have Strong Reason, but not Good Judgment.
5. Concerning Certainty and Assurance. How many things that are demonstrations in themselves, are not demonstrations to men, and yet are strong arguments; no more demonstrations than a boy may have, that a cube of two inches may be cut into eight cubes of one inch, for want of proper clearness, and full comprehension of the ideas. How assurance is capable of infinite degrees.—How none have such a degree, but that it might be heightened—even of that, that two and two make four. It may be increased by a stronger sight, or a greater clearness of ideas. Minds of clearer and stronger sight may be more assured of it, than those of more obscure vision. There may be beings of a thousand times stronger sight than we are. How God’s sight only is infinitely clear and strong. That which is demonstration at one time, may be only probable reasoning at another, by reason of different degrees of clearness and comprehension. It is almost impossible, that a long demonstration should beget so great assurance as a short one; because many ideas cannot be so clearly comprehended at one time, as a few. A very long demonstration may beget assurance, by a particular examination of each link of the chain, and so by recollection, that we were very careful and assured in the time of it; but this is less immediate, and less clear.
6. Why it is proper for Orators and Preachers to move the Passions—needful to show earnestness, &c. how this tends to convince the judgment, and many other ways is good and absolutely necessary.