The Principles of Nature and of Grace

1. Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple or compound. Simple substance is that which has no parts. Compound substance is the combination of simple substances or Monads. Monas is a Greek word, which means unity, or that which is one. Compounds or bodies are pluralities [multitudes]; and simple substances, lives, souls, spirits, are unities. And everywhere there must be simple substances, for without simple substances there would not be compounds; and consequently all nature is full of life.

2. The Monads, having no parts, can neither be made [formées] nor unmade. They can neither come into being nor come to an end by natural means, and consequently they last as long as the universe, which will be changed, but which will not be destroyed. They can have no shape [figure]; otherwise they would have parts. Consequently any one Monad in itself and at a particular moment can be distinguished from any other only by internal qualities and activities [actions], which cannot be other than its perceptions (that is to say, the representations of the compound, or of that which is outside, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is to say, its tendencies to pass from one perception to another), which are the principles of change. For the simplicity of substance is by no means inconsistent with the multiplicity of the modifications which are to be found together in that same simple substance, and these modifications must consist in variety of relations to the things which are outside. It is as in the case of a centre or point, in which, although it is perfectly simple, there is an infinite number of angles formed by the lines which meet in it.

3. All nature is a plenum. There are simple substances everywhere, which are actually separated from one another by activities of their own, and which continually change their relations; and each specially important [distinguée] simple substance or Monad, which forms the centre of a compound substance (e. g. of an animal) and the principle of its oneness, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other Monads, which constitute the particular body of this central Monad, and according to the affections of its body the Monad represents, as in a kind of centre, the things which are outside of it. This body is organic, though it forms a kind of automaton or natural machine, which is a machine not only as a whole, but also in the smallest parts of it that can come into observation. Since the world is a plenum all things are connected together and each body acts upon every other, more or less, according to their distance, and each, through reaction, is affected by every other. Hence it follows that each Monad is a living mirror, or a mirror endowed with inner activity, representative of the universe, according to its point of view, and as subject to rule as is the universe itself. And the perceptions in the Monad are produced one from another according to the laws of desires [appétits] or of the final causes of good and evil, which consist in observable perceptions, regular or irregular, as, on the other hand, the changes of bodies and external phenomena are produced one from another according to the laws of efficient causes, that is to say, of motions. Thus there is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the Monad and the motions of bodies, a harmony pre-established from the beginning between the system of efficient causes and that of final causes. And it is in this way that soul and body are in agreement and are physically united, while it is not possible for the one to change the laws of the other.

4. Each Monad, with a particular body, forms a living substance. Thus not only is there everywhere life, accompanied with members or organs, but there is also an infinity of degrees in the Monads, one dominating more or less over another. But when the Monad has organs so arranged that they give prominence and sharpness [du relief et du distingué] to the impressions they receive, and consequently to the perceptions which represent these (as, for instance, when, by means of the form of the eye’s humours, the rays of light are concentrated and act with more force), this may lead to feeling [sentiment], that is to say, to a perception accompanied by memory, in other words, a perception of which a certain echo long remains, so as to make itself heard on occasion. Such a living being is called an animal, as its Monad is called a soul. And when this soul is raised to reason, it is something more sublime and is reckoned among spirits [esprits], as will presently be explained. It is true that animals are sometimes in the condition of mere [simple] living beings and their souls in the condition of mere Monads, namely when their perceptions are not sufficiently sharp [distingué] to be remembered, as happens in a deep dreamless sleep or in a swoon. But perceptions which have become completely confused are sure to be developed again in animals, for reasons which I shall presently mention (§ 12). Thus it is well to make distinction between perception, which is the inner state of the Monad representing outer things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this inner state, and which is not given to all souls nor to the same soul at all times. It is for lack of this distinction that the Cartesians have made the mistake of ignoring perceptions of which we are not conscious, as ordinary people ignore imperceptible [insensible] bodies. It is this also that has led these same Cartesians to believe that only minds [esprits] are Monads, that the lower animals have no soul, and that still less are there other principles of life. And as they came into too great conflict with the common opinion of men in denying feeling [sentiment] to the lower animals, so on the other hand they conformed too much to the prejudices of the crowd in confounding a prolonged unconsciousness, which comes from a great confusion of perceptions, with absolute death, in which all perception would cease. This has confirmed the ill-founded opinion that some souls are destroyed, and the bad ideas of some who call themselves free-thinkers [esprits forts] and who have disputed the immortality of our soul.

5. There is a connexion among the perceptions of animals which has some likeness to reason; but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes. Thus a dog avoids the stick with which it has been beaten, because memory represents to it the pain which this stick has caused it. And men, in so far as they are empirics, that is to say in three-fourths of their actions, do not act otherwise than the lower animals. For instance, we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow because our experience has always been so: it is only the astronomer who rationally foresees it, and even his prediction will ultimately fail when the cause of daylight, which is not eternal, ceases. But genuine reasoning depends upon necessary or eternal truths, such as those of logic, of number, of geometry, which produce an indubitable connexion of ideas and infallible inferences. The animals in which these inferences do not appear are called the lower animals [bêtcs]; but those which know these necessary truths are properly those which are called rational animals, and their souls are called minds [esprits]. These souls have the power to perform acts of reflexion and to observe that which is called ego, substance, soul, mind [esprit], in a word, immaterial things and truths. And this it is which makes science or demonstrative knowledge possible to us.

6. Modern research has taught us, and reason confirms it, that the living beings whose organs are known to us, that is to say, plants and animals, do not come from putrefaction or chaos, as the ancients thought, but from preformed seeds, and consequently from the transformation of pre-existing living beings. In the seed of large animals there are animalcules which by means of conception obtain a new outward form, which they make their own and which enables them to grow and become larger so as to pass to a greater theatre and to propagate the large animal. It is true that the souls of human spermatic animals are not rational, and that they become so only when conception gives to these animals human nature. And as in general animals are not entirely born in conception or generation, no more do they entirely perish in what we call death; for it is reasonable that what does not come into being by natural means should not any more come to an end in the course of nature. Thus, throwing off their mask or their tattered covering, they merely return to a more minute theatre, where they may nevertheless be as sensitive [sensible] and as well ordered as in the larger theatre. And what has just been said about the large animals applies also to the generation and death of spermatic animals themselves, that is to say, they are growths of other smaller spermatic animals, in comparison with which they in turn may be counted large, for everything in nature proceeds ad infinitum. Thus not only souls but also animals are ingenerable and imperishable: they are only developed, enveloped, clothed, unclothed, transformed. Souls never put off the whole of their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is entirely new to them. Accordingly there is no metempsychosis, but there is metamorphosis. Animals change, take on and put off, parts only. In nutrition this takes place gradually and by little imperceptible [inscnsible] portions, but continually; and on the other hand, in conception or in death, when much is gained or lost all at once, it takes place suddenly and in a way that can be noticed [notablement], but rarely.

7. Thus far we have spoken merely as pure physicists: now we must rise to metaphysics, making use of the grcat principle, usually little employed, which affirms that nothing takes place without sufficient reason, that is to say, that nothing happens without its being possible for one who should know things sufficiently, to give a reason which is sufficient to determine why things are so and not otherwise. This principle being laid down, the first question we are entitled to put will be—Why does something exist rather than nothing? For ‘nothing’ is simpler and easier than ‘something.’ Further, granting that things must exist, we must be able to give a reason why they should exist thus and not otherwise.

8. Now this sufficient reason of the existence of the universe cannot be found in the sequence of contingent things, that is to say, of bodies and their representations in souls: because, matter being in itself indifferent to motion and to rest and to one or another particular motion, we cannot find in it the reason of motion and still less the reason of one particular motion. And although the motion which is at present in matter comes from the preceding motion, and that again from another preceding motion, we are no farther forward, however far we go; for the same question always remains. Thus the sufficient reason, which has no need of any other reason, must needs be outside of this sequence of contingent things and must be in a substance which is the cause of this sequence, or which is a necessary being, bearing in itself the reason of its own existence, otherwise we should not yet have a sufficient reason with which we could stop. And this ultimate reason of things is called God.

9. This primary simple substance must include eminently the perfections contained in the derivative substances which are its effects. Thus it will have power, knowledge and will in perfection, that is to say, it will have supreme [souveraine] omnipotence, omniscience and goodness. And as justice, taken very generally, is nothing but goodness in conformity with wisdom, there must also be in God supreme justice. The reason which has led to the existence of things through Him makes them also depend upon Him for their continued existence and working; and they continually receive from Him that which makes them have any perfection; but any imperfection that remains in them comes from the essential and original limitation of the created thing.

10. It follows from the supreme perfection of God that in producing the universe He has chosen the best possible plan, in which there is the greatest variety along with the greatest order; ground, place, time being as well arranged as possible; the greatest effect produced by the simplest ways; the most power, knowledge, happiness and goodness in created things that the universe allowed. For as all possible things in the understanding of God claim existence in proportion to their perfections, the result of all these claims must be the most perfect actual world that is possible. And apart from this it would not be possible to give a reason why things have gone thus rather than otherwise.

11. The supreme wisdom of God led Him to choose specially the laws of motion which are most fitting and which are most in conformity with abstract or metaphysical reasons. There is conserved the same quantity of total and absolute force, or of activity [action], also the same quantity of relative force or of reaction, and finally the same quantity of force of direction. Further, action is always equal to reaction, and the whole effect is always equivalent to its full cause. And it is remarkable [surprenant] that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or of matter it was impossible to explain these laws of motion which have been discovered in our time and of which a part has been discovered by myself. For I have found that we must have recourse to final causes, and that these laws are dependent not upon the principle of necessity, like the truths of logic, arithmetic, and geometry, but upon the principle of fitness [convenance], that is to say, upon the choice of wisdom. And this is one of the most effective and remarkable proofs of the existence of God for those who can go deeply into these things.

12. Again, it follows from the perfection of the Supreme Author not only that the order of the whole universe is the most perfect that can be, but also that each living mirror representing the universe according to its point of view, that is to say, each Monad, each substantial centre, must have its perceptions and its desires [appétits] as thoroughly well-ordered as is compatible with all the rest. Whence it also follows that souls, that is to say, the most dominant Monads, or rather animals themselves cannot fail to awake again from the condition of stupor into which death or some other accident may put them.

13. For all is regulated in things, once for all, with as much order and mutual connexion as possible, since supreme wisdom and goodness can act only with perfect harmony. The present is big with the future, the future might be read in the past, the distant is expressed in the near. We might get to know the beauty of the universe in each soul, if we could unfold all that is enfolded in it and that is perceptibly developed only through time. But as each distinct perception of the soul includes an infinite number of confused perceptions, which involve the whole universe, the soul itself knows the things of which it has perception, only in so far as it has distinct and heightened [or unveiled] perceptions of them; and it has perfection in proportion to its distinct perceptions. Each soul knows the infinite, knows all, but confusedly; as when I walk on the sea-shore and hear the great noise the sea makes, I hear the particular sounds which come from the particular waves and which make up the total sound, but I do not discriminate them from one another. Our confused perceptions are the result of the impressions which the whole universe makes upon us. It is the same with each Monad. God alone has a distinct knowledge of all, for He is the source of all. It has been very well said that as a centre He is everywhere, but His circumference is nowhere, for everything is immediately present to Him without any distance from this centre.

14. As regards the rational soul or mind [l’esprit], there is in it something more than in the Monads or even in mere [simple] souls. It is not only a mirror of the universe of created beings, but also an image of the Deity. The mind [l’esprit] has not merely a perception of the works of God, but it is even capable of producing something which resembles them, although in miniature. For, to say nothing of the wonders of dreams, in which we invent without trouble (but also without willing it) things which, in our waking hours, we should have to think long in order to hit upon, our soul is architectonic also in its voluntary activities and, discovering the scientific principles in accordance with which God has ordered things (pondere, mensura, numero, &c.), it imitates, in its own province and in the little world in which it is allowed to act, what God does in the great world.

15. It is for this reason that all spirits [esprits], whether of men or of angels [génies], entering in virtue of reason and of eternal truths into a kind of fellowship with God, are members of the City of God, that is to say, of the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and best of monarchs: in which there is no crime without punishment, no good action without a proportionate reward, and in short as much virtue and happiness as is possible; and this, not by any interference with the course of nature, as if what God prepares for souls were to disturb the laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural things, in virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time between the realms of nature and of grace, between God as Architect and God as Monarch, so that nature itself leads to grace, and grace, by the use it makes of nature, brings it to perfection.

16. Thus although reason cannot make known to us the details of the great future (which are reserved for revelation), we can be assured by this same reason that things are made in a way which exceeds our desires. Further, as God is the most perfect and most happy and consequently the most lovable of substances, and as genuine pure love consists in the state in which we find pleasure in the perfections and the felicity of the beloved, this love is sure to give us the greatest pleasure of which we are capable, when God is its object.

17. And it is easy to love God as we ought, if we know Him as I have just said. For although God cannot be perceived by our external senses, He is none the less very lovable and He gives very great pleasure. We see how much pleasure honours give to men, although they do not consist in anything that appeals to the external senses. Martyrs and fanatics (though the emotion of the latter is ill-governed) show how much influence mental pleasure [le plaisir de l’esprit] can have: and, what is more, even the pleasures of sense are really intellectual pleasures confusedly known. Music charms us, although its beauty consists only in the harmonies [convenances] of numbers and in the counting (of which we are unconscious but which nevertheless the soul does make) of the beats or vibrations of sounding bodies, which beats or vibrations come together at definite intervals. The pleasure which sight finds in good proportions is of the same nature; and the pleasures caused by the other senses will be found to amount to much the same thing, although we may not be able to explain it so distinctly.

18. It may even be said that from this time forth the love of God enables us to enjoy a foretaste of future felicity. And although this love is disinterested, it constitutes by itself our greatest good and interest, even though we may not seek these in it and though we may consider only the pleasure it gives without regard to the advantage it brings; for it gives us perfect confidence in the goodness of our Author and Master, which produces real tranquillity of mind, not as in the case of the Stoics, who forcibly school themselves to patience, but through a present content which also assures to us a future happiness. And besides the present pleasure it affords, nothing can be of more advantage for the future than this love of God, for it fulfils our expectations also and leads us in the way of supreme happiness, because in virtue of the perfect order that is established in the universe, everything is done as well as possible both for the general good and also for the greatest individual good of those who believe in it and who are satisfied with the Divine government. And this belief and satisfaction must inevitably be the characteristic of those who have learned to love the Source of all good. It is true that supreme felicity (by whatever beatific vision, or knowledge of God, it may be accompanied) can never be complete, because God, being infinite, cannot be entirely known. Thus our happiness will never consist (and it is right that it should not consist) in complete enjoyment, which would leave nothing more to be desired and would make our mind [esprit] stupid; but it must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.