That the strangenesse of this opinion is no sufficient reason why it should be rejected, because other certaine truths have beene formerly esteemed ridiculous, and great absurdities entertained by common consent.
There is an earnestnesse and hungering after noveltie, which doth still adhere unto all our natures, and it is part of that primitive image, that wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of man. For this, since its depravation in Adam, perceiving it felfe altogether emptied of any good, doth now catch after every new thing, conceiving that possibly it may finde satisfaction among some of its fellow creatures. But our enemie the devill (who strives still to pervert our gifts, and beat us with our owne weapons) hath so contriv’d it, that any truth doth now seeme distastefull for that very reason, for which errour is entertain’d.. Novelty. For let but some upstart heresie be set abroach, and presently there are some out of a curious humour; others, as if they watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up for canonicall, and make it part of their creede and profession; whereas solitary truth cannot any where find so ready entertainment; but the same Novelty which is esteemed the commendation of errour, and makes that acceptable, is counted the fault of truth, and causes that to be rejected.
How did the incredulous World gaze at Columbus, when hee promised to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a long time, by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian Princes, either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an experiment? Now if he, who had such good grounds for his assertion, could finde no better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of the World; ‘tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver, shall receive any thing from the men of these dayes, especially our vulgar wits, but misbeliefe or derision.
It hath alwayes beene the unhappinesse of new truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that are ignorant of the causes of things, and rejected by others, whose perversenesse ties them to the contrary opinion, men whose envious pride will not allow any new thing for truth, which they themselves were not the first inventors of. So that I may justly expect to be accused of a pragmaticall ignorance, & bold ostentation; especially since for this opinion Xenophanes, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit to his assertion, could not escape the like censure from others. For Natales Comes speaking of that Philosopher,1 and this his opinion, saith thus, Nonulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in Philosophiam introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant. Some there are who lest they might seeme to know nothing, will bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they may be famed for the invention of somewhat. The same Author doth also in another place accuse Anaxagoras of folly for the same opinion.2 Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiae, vel si nescias quid dicas, tamen velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire. ‘Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or other, when a man knowes not what to say.
If these men were thus censur’d, I may justly then expect to be derided by most, and to be beleeved by few or none; especially since this opinion seemes to carry in it so much strangenesse, and contradiction to the generall consent of others. But how ever, I am resolved that this shall not be any discouragement, since I know that it is not common opinion that can either adde or detract from the truth. For,
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Other truths have beene formerly esteemed altogether as ridiculous as this can be.
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Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall opinion.
I shall give an instance of each, that so I may the better prepare the Reader to consider things without a prejudice, when hee shall see that the common opposition against this which I affirme, cannot any way derogate from its truth.
- Other truths have beene formerly accounted as ridiculous as this. I shall specifie that of the Antipodes, which have beene denied, and laught at by many wise men and great Schollers,3 such as were Herodotus, Chrysostome, Austine, Lactantius, the venerable Bede, Lucretius the Poet, Procopius, and the voluminous Abulensis, together with all those Fathers or other Authors who denied the roundnesse of the heavens. Herodotus counted it so horrible an absurdity, that hee could not forbeare laughing to think of it. Γελῶ δὲ ὁρῶν γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἐχόντως ἐξηγησάμενον, οἳ Ὠκεανόν τε ῥέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν γράφουσι, ἐούσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου. I cannot choose but laugh, (saith he) to see so many men venture to describe the earths compasse, relating those things that are without all sense, as that the Sea flowes about the World, and that the earth it selfe is round as an Orbe. But this great ignorance is not so much to be admired in him, as in those learneder men of later times, when all Sciences began to flourish in the World. Such were St. Chrysostome, who in his 14 Homily upon the Epistle to the Hebrewes, dos make a chalenge to any man that shall dare to defend that the heavens are round, and not rather as a tent. Thus likewise St. Austine, who censures that relation of the Antipodes to be an incredible fable;4 and with him agrees the eloquent Lactantius,5 Quid illi qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodes putant? num aliquid loquuntur? aut est quispiam tam ineptus, qui credat esse homines, quorum vestigia sunt superiora quàm capita? aut ibi quae apud nos jacent inversapendere? fruges & arbores deorsum versus crescere, pluvias & nives, & grandinem sursum versus cadere in terram? & miratur aliquis hortos pensiles inter septem mira narrari, quum Philosophi, & agros & maria, & urbes & montes pensiles faciunt, &c. What (saith he) are they that think there are Antipodes, such as walk with their feet against ours? doe they speake any likelihood? or is there any one so foolish as to beleeve that there are men whose heeles are higher than their heads? that things which with us doe lie on the ground, doe hang there? that the Plants and Trees grow downwards, that the haile, and raine, and snow fall upwards to the earth? and doe we admire the hanging Orchards amongst the seven wonders, whereas here the Philosophers have made the Field and Seas, the Cities & mountains hanging? What shall we think (saith hee in Plutarch) that men doe cling to that place like wormes, or hang by their clawes as Cats? or if we suppose a man a little beyond the Center, to be digging with a spade, is it likely (as it must be according to this opinion) that the earth which hee loosened, should of it selfe ascend upwards? or else suppose two men with their middles about the Center, the feet of the one being placed where the head of the other is, and so two other men crosse them, yet all these men thus situated according to this opinion should stand upright, and many other such grosse consequences would follow (saith he) which a false imagination is not able to fancie as possible. Vpon which considerations, Bede also denies the being of any Antipodes,6 Neque enim Antipodarum ullatenus est Fabulis accommodandus assensus, Nor should we any longer assent to the Fable of Antipodes. So also Lucretius the Poet speaking of the same subject, sayes, Sed vanus stolidis haec omnia finxerit error.7