PROV. 3. 16, 17.
The chief design of the Wise-man in this Text, is, to set forth the many great advantages that belong to Religion; in order to which, he doth here enumerate those five principal things that must contribute to a compleat state of Happiness in this World, namely, Health, and Riches, and Honour, and Pleasure, and Peace; and asserts concerning them, that they are the proper effects of that wisdom which consists in being Religious,
This he expresses by way of Allegory, representing Wisdom (as is usual for other Virtues) in the shape of a Woman, or Queen, with her Arms extended, in the posture of directing and rewarding her Followers; holding in her right-hand the blessing of Health, or length of Days, the great Promise of the Law; to which the Precedence of the right-hand is therefore given, because it is amongst all worldly Blessings the greatest and most desirable; that, without which, a man cannot enjoy any thing else, nor so much as his own self; Length of days is in her right-hand. And then, for those other things, which the generality of men do so much covet and labour after, Wealth, and Reputation; these likewise are at her disposal, and must proceed from her gift; And in her left-hand, Riches and Honour. And, as for the Cheerfulness of our conditions, he affirms, that the truest Pleasure must be found in those ways that are directed by her; Her ways are ways of Pleasantness. And because there are several things which have some present delight in them, seeming to drop as the Honey-comb, and to be smoother (Prov. 5. 4) than Oyl, and yet upon trial, do prove in the issue, bitter as Wormwood, and sharp as a two-edged Sword; therefore ‘tis added, that her ways are not only pleasant, but they are likewise safe and quiet; all her paths are Peace.
That these things are the effects of Religion, is here only affirmed, which, to them who believe the Authority of Scripture, is evidence sufficient: But, it were easy to prove this concerning each of them, by all other kinds of evidence, of which such matters are capable.
I purpose at this time to treat only concerning the third of them, namely, Honour; as being the most proper Subject for this Presence and Auditory. And that this can only be attain’d by Religion and Virtue, I doubt not but to prove with so much strength and perspicuity, as shall be sufficient to convince any one, who will but attend and consider.
In order to this, I shall first endeavour to state the true nature of Honour, and to shew wherein the most proper Notion of it doth consist; ‘tis an equivocal word, and is capable of various sences.
First, Sometimes ‘tis used to denote worthy and creditable Parentage; the being derived from such Ancestors as have been famous in their Generation for some eminent Virtue or Exploit: Wherein there is this benefit, that a man hath great examples in his own Family, and so much the stronger Obligation not to degenerate from them: But it shews rather what such a man should be, than what he is; and, to a person that is not Virtuous, doth prove a prejudice rather than an advantage.
Secondly, Sometimes ‘tis used to signify Titles of Place and Dignity, according to the various orders and degrees of nobility in several Nations: But, this kind of Honour depending meerly upon the Princes Favour, must therefore be wholly extrinsecal, and consequently can have no more due to it than a meer external respect. Such persons may challenge from us, that we should give them their due Titles, and demean our selves towards them with that Observance and Ceremony as becomes their Quality: But then, as to inward esteem and affection, they can demand no greater a share of this, than according as their real worth and virtue shall require. The Royal Stamp upon any kind of Metal may be sufficient to give it an extrinsick value, and to determine the Rate at which it is to pass amongst Coins, but it cannot give an intrinsick value, or make that which is but Brass, to be Gold.
‘Tis true indeed, there are some Callings and Relations of men, to whom an inward Veneration is due, though the persons themselves should not be Virtuous; namely, Magistrates, and Ministers, and Parents, and Benefactors; who, having somewhat of a Divine Stamp and Impress upon them, may therefore challenge from us, that we should demean our selves towards them, both with such an outward Respect as may become their Places, and with such an inward Respect too, as may be sutable to that Image which they bear, our dependance upon them, and obligation to them. But then, we cannot be obliged to think such persons good men, unless we have some evidence to believe them to be so, or at least, not to be otherwise; So that they are beholding to something extrinsical to their Persons, namely, to their Callings and Relations, for that Honour which is paid to them.