I know there is an Objection against this, which is obvious to every one, to which something must be said by way of answer. Did not our Saviour tell his disciples that they should be hated of all men for his sake, Matth. 10.22. And doth not David complain of some that were enemies to him, for this very reason, because he was a follower of that which was good, Psal. 38.20. All that will live godly in Christ Iesus must suffer persecution, 2 Tim. 3.12. Because ye are not of the world, therefore doth the world hate you, Joh. 15.19. with several other scriptures; besides the constant experience of all Ages to the same purpose.

To this it may be answered, that ‘tis true, there is in Nature, a necessary unavoidable enmity, betwixt light and darkness, good and evil, the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent. And ‘tis not the meaning of these promises to abolish or reconcile that enmity or opposition, which is founded in the nature of things, but only to suspend the Acts of it. The more righteous any man is, by so much the greater opposition must there be betwixt him and sinners. But yet he is hereby after a more especial manner intitled to Gods protection, to preserve him from any real hurt, or damage by them. And they are for the most part, the imperfections and failings of good men, that do expose them to sufferings of this nature. And then besides, tho some men have such a superfluity of malitiousness, as the phrase is Iam. 1.21 being hardened against the common principles of morality, as to express a hatred and enmity against others, for their goodness, yet it is not so with all, nor perhaps with any at all times. But the worst of men, must in their secret judgments and most retired thoughts, bear an inward reverence towards those that are good. As there is in vice a natural deformity, whereby it doth appear odious, even to the consciences of those who are guilty of it; so is there a beauty in holiness and virtue, whereby it appears lovely even to those mens hearts, whose mouths are apt to reproach it. It cannot be but that some men will be apt to speak against us for well-doing. And yet well-doing is the best way to put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, 1 Pet. 2.15. Or if it do not wholly silence them, but that they will be speaking against us as evil doers, yet ‘tis not without some secret shame, and guilt of being false accusers, 1 Pet. 3.16.

And so much may serve for the proof of the Point. I come now to the Application of it: Wherein it may serve for these two Uses, Instruction and Exhortation.

I. Information: If it be so, that the minding of the main things of Religion, more than lesser differences, be that which must render us acceptable to God, and approved of men, then these things will follow.

1. We have reason to suspect that our ways upon this account may not be acceptable unto God, when we find that we do not stand approved to men, especially to good men.

2. ‘Tis a preposterous course to seek the approbation of men by any such way, as will render us unacceptable to God; these two being linked together, both in their own natures, and by particular promises. ‘Tis true, a man may get into the favour of a Party, by appearing vehement and zealous in some particular contest, but this will render him less approved to other good men, less useful in his generation, and consequently less acceptable to God.

3. ‘Tis a vain thing to expect any peace and settlement amongst men, till they come to be more concerned for those great things of Religion, than for others of lesser moment. There may be a change of Forms and Parties and the external state of things, but their minds will still abide at the same distance, till they come to be united in these great things of righteousness, and peace, and joy in the holy Ghost. ‘Tis not the pouring of a liquor from one vessel to another that takes off its sourness and acrimony, without such a mixture as may enter into it, and alter the nature of it. If men would make this to be their great design and business to strive who should be most righteous, and peaceable, and patient, other contentions amongst them would quickly vanish.

4. A man may insist so much in the vindication of some truths and duties, as thereby to bring a prejudice upon Religion. He may do the Devils work by his endeavours to promote such things, as are in themselves right and true. I mean such contests, as concern points of the same or the like nature, with those of meats and drinks in the Text.

But what then may some say, should we be of no opinion in such things? Must we all turn Scepticks, and be indifferent to every thing, as if there could be no certainty?

I answer, by no means, nothing less; every man should endeavour to have a full persuasion in his own mind concerning the things in difference: And when he doth well understand them, he should be ready to assert and maintain them, as occasion may be offered, and so far as the nature of the things will bear.

Only herein lies the great difficulty which will require much Christian prudence and consideration to the stating of it, namely, how to proportion our zeal aright, in reference to several truths, which I shall particularly speak to in the next Use.

II. Use of Exhortation.

1. To be cautious and considerate in the right managing of our differences about these lesser things. There was never any Age, wherein contests of this nature have not been in fashion; tho perhaps never so much as in ours. And therefore it will the more concern us to regulate our prosecutions and demeanour about them. In order to which these two things are to be well weighed and considered, namely, the Evidence and Importance of the things in question.

2. For their Evidence: Every truth, whether natural or revealed, is not alike evident; some are more obscure and doubtful than others. And because the evidence of things is the ground and formal reason of our assent to them, therefore ‘tis our duty to proportion the degrees of our assent, to those of our evidence. Not to be doubtful in things that are clear, nor to be confident in things that are doubtful; but with an equal disposition of mind, to submit to every thing according to its clearness and perspicuity: In opposition to this there are two extreams, which are exceedingly prejudicial to Religion (especially in times when controversies and disputes about it do so much abound) namely, Scepticalness and Dogmaticalness.

3. By Scepticalness, I mean, a willingness and inclination of mind, rather to comply with doubts and objections, than with proofs and evidences; an aptness to pick quarrels with every thing, tho never so manifest, as if we were not willing that any thing should be certain and established. Besides the insolence and pride which is the ground of this disposition, there is likewise much of folly and contradiction in it, whereby such men do become obnoxious unto that other extream of Dogmaticalness, which they affect most to avoid. For to look upon every thing as doubtful, is to deny the clear evidence of some things; and ‘tis as well dogmaticalness to deny clear evidence where it is, as to assert it where it is not.

4. By Dogmaticalness, I mean, a readines to be over confident of the things we are well inclined to; an aptness to own every thing for equally true and certain, which is professed by that Company or Party of men, amongst whom our names are listed; when a man receives a whole System of doctrine by the bulk, as if every thing in it, were undoubtedly true, and alike evident, without a particular enquiry into the grounds and reasons of things. An unwillingness to listen unto any objection, which may seem to make against them, or to shake their certainty. This is a blameable partiality on the other hand; and hath in it the like inconsistency and contradiction with the other extream. Such Persons hereby exposing the most clear and manifest truths to the suspicion of error, by putting more obscure and doubtful matters in the same rank with them.

5. The Second thing to be considered is the Importance of the matters in question. As every truth is not of the same evidence, so neither is it of the same necessity. But there are in this respect likewise several degrees amongst them: Some things are essential to Religion, belonging to the foundation, and are therefore necessary to the very being of a Christian. As Righteousness in the Text, that is, faith, and holiness, and justice, or as it is elsewhere expressed, faith which worketh by love: Other things are only superstructions, and belong only to the well-being of a Christian, amongst which some are as gold, and silver, and pretious stones, things of the greatest value amongst men, next to life and being; others are of a lighter consequence and more remote from the foundation. Now herein much Christian prudence will be required to distinguish aright, concerning the importance of several truths and duties, and accordingly to proportion our zeal for them, and our contention about them.

Not by our remisness to bring down foundation Truths to the same rate with superstructions; nor by our forwardness on the other hand, to raise up superstructions unto the same value with fundamentals; which are the two extreams referring to the importance of the things, by which truth it self will be very much prejudiced.

1. Too great carelesness and coldness about necessary truths, a kind of indifferency about all matters of Religion, as if they were all alike, and did so far only oblige, as the Civil Laws of several Countries did inforce them. I cannot say of this extream, that it doth encrease Controversies in Religion; but it doth that which is much worse, it takes away the subject of the question, I mean Religion it self.

2. On the other side, a man may lay too great a weight on some things, which are truths and duties. And there is nothing more ordinary than for good men, when they are once well persuaded of some particular opinion, to think they do God good service, by prosecuting it with their utmost zeal, or by laying greater weight upon it than the nature of the thing requires, or will admit. But this must needs be of very dangerous consequence: For if this course be admitted, where shall it end? Why may not falshood be obtruded upon us on the same account? If we once transgress those bounds which are fixed by the nature of things in respect of their evidence and importance, there can be no security against the wildest errors in the world.

These two things that I have mentioned, being soberly considered and impartially applyed, to some of our late and present controversies, would very much conduce to the healing of the minds of men, and taking them off from many of those contentions and animosities which now abound.

2. We should hence be persuaded to lay out our selves with our utmost zeal and intention of mind upon those great things of righteousness, and peace, and joy in the holy Ghost. It were easie to mention abundance of Arguments, to excite and quicken men to a fervency about these things, would the time permit it. I shall very briefly sum up what remains under these two heads, the Excellency and Seasonableness of these things.

3. From their Excellency: There are but two kind of things that any men aim at or endeavour after, to get into the favour of Men, and of God, to be safe here and happy hereafter. Why now these things do entitle us to both, they make us to be accepted of God, and approved of men. They are not only duties but privileges, the chief part of that salvation and glory, which we are capable of on this side of Heaven. That which makes men zealous in other points, is their apprehension of the importance and clearness of the things they insist upon: Why, there can be nothing of greater importance than these things, wherein the power and substance of Religion doth consist. And as for their evidence, let it be supposed that in some of the controversies now on foot amongst us, there should in some solemn Assembly be an appeal made to heaven, to determine which of the Parties were in the right: If upon such an appeal, an Angel should immediately be sent down, or men should rise from the dead, and declare that such a Way and Party were in the right, and the others mistaken, one would think that upon such an advantage, men might have good ground to be zealous and confident. Why we have more reason to be zealous for righteousness, and peace, and joy in the holy Ghost, than men would have upon such a miraculous confirmation of their Opinions: Because these things are of the highest importance, and we have for them the same if not better evidence. And the reason is this: By the same natural light which convinces a man that God alone is Omnipotent, and can only do miracles, that he is infinitely good, and will not perform any miracle in confirmation of a sin or an error: By the same light it is that we are convinced of moral duties. But now we cannot have the like degree of evidence, that this or that particular action is a miracle, (because of the obscurity of natural causes) as we may that holiness, and righteousness, and peaceableness, are duties, and of a natural goodness and obligation. We are in the frame of our natures better fitted and prepared to understand morals, than naturals, what is honest rather than what is possible; and ‘tis great reason we should be so, because we are more concerned in the one than the other. So that ‘tis not possible there should be any better evidence than what we have for the goodness and obligation of these things.

4. From the Seasonableness of these things, both in respect of. 1. What we have seen in the Times lately past, And 2. What we are in expectation of for the future.

5. For the time past: No man can be ignorant of those horrid scandals that have been brought upon Religion by the neglect of these moral duties, under the highest pretences of zeal to other matters. Whereby some men have been induced to despise all profession of Religion, as being but mere pretence and design, as if there were nothing in it of reality. Now if we have in us any tenderness for the honor of Religion, if we would make up that breach and wipe off that blemish that hath in this respect been brought upon it, it must be by our integrity and zeal for the promoting of these more substantial matters, both in our selves and others. ‘Tis true, men have been always apt to rest themselves in moral performances, as if they alone were sufficient to entitle us to heaven, and consequently as the endeavour to drive them off from such presumptions as these, can never be unseasonable, so on the other hand when men shall out of pretence to some higher notions and attainments, dare to neglect and violate these moral duties, ‘tis then, if ever, seasonable to insist upon the necessity, and importance of them.

6. In reference to that settlement and peace, which we are now in expectation of, to which these things will most effectually conduce. It must be granted that ‘tis beyond humane contrivance to find out any infallible way of securing future events; nor is it consistent with the nature of humane affairs, which are often swayed by such intricate providences, as we are not able to fore-see or comprehend the reason of; God sometimes making use of such men, who are most vehement against a thing to be the chief instruments of promoting it, and those who are most for it to be the occasions of hindering it.

So that I say in this respect, there is a necessity that we should acquiesce in such fair probabilities, as the prudence of men can contrive and the state of things will admit. He that hath observed those various providences, which these poor distracted Nations have of late years been exercised with, cannot but take notice, that since our first civil tempests and storms, there have been some seasons wherein we have seemed to be near the Harbour and upon the borders of settlement: And yet in the midst of all our hopes, there hath still been some unexpected emergency, whereby we have been driven back again into the wide Ocean, and exposed to all our former fears and dangers. What may be the issue of our present expectations, no man can be certain of. Only of this we may be most sure, that this laying out our selves upon the duties of righteousness, and peace, and joy in the holy Ghost, will be the best security for every man in his private capacity, and the most effectual remedy for the publick.

It cannot be but that in times of change and revolution, mens minds must be variously exercised with hopes and fears, according as their several interests do engage them. The great thoughts of heart upon some men are, how they may be secured in the change of times: But now if men would repose themselves upon Scripture security, I would refer them to that place Rom. 13.3. Wilt thou not then be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. This being the very natural end of magistracy, namely, the praise of them that do well, 1 Pet. 2.14.

I shall shut up all with that saying of the Apostle, 1 Pet. 3.10. cited out of the 34 Psal. What man is he that would see good days? Let him eschew evil and do good, let him seek peace and ensue it. He may be most certain by this means to be entitled unto the protection of God: For the eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open unto their prayers: And safety from men; For who is he that will harm you if you be followers of that which is good?

The End of the Third Sermon.

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Footnotes

1. Prop. III. ↩

2. 2 Tim. 2.23. Titus 3.9. ↩