Secondly, As for those perfections belonging to the Divine Will, namely, his Goodness, his Justice, his Truth and Faithfulness: The due apprehension of these, should excite in us the virtue of Love, with all the genuine fruits of it. By Love, I mean an esteeming of him, and a seeking after him as our only happiness.
So that there are two ingredients of this virtue of Love, Estimation and Choice.
- An Estimation of the judgment; a due valuation of those excellencies which are in the Divine nature, whereby we look upon God as the supreme Being in genere boni: From whom all created goodness is derived, and by conformity to whom it is to be measured. And this notion is the proper importance of the word Charity, whereby we account a thing dear or pretious. And in this sense doth our Saviour oppose despising to loving, Either he must hate the one, and love the other; (Mat. 6. 34) or he must hold to the one, and despise the other.
Now these perfections of the Divine nature may be considered, either absolutely or relatively.
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Absolutely, as they are in themselves, abstracting from any benefit that we our selves may have by them. And in this sense they can only produce in us an esteem of our judgments, without any desire or zeal in our will or affections. The Devil doth understand these absolute perfections of the Divine nature, that God is in himself most wise, most just, and powerful: And he knows withal that these things are good, deserving esteem and veneration; and yet he doth not love God for these perfections, because he himself is evil, and is not like to receive any benefit by them.
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Relatively, with reference to that advantage which may arrive to us from the Divine goodness. When men are convinced of their infinite need of him, and their misery without him; and that their utmost felicity doth consist in the enjoyment of him: This is that which properly provokes affection and desire, namely, his relative goodness as to us. There is scarce any one under such transports of love, as to believe the person whom he loves, to be in all respects the most virtuous, wise, beautiful, wealthy that is in the world. He may know many others, that do in some, if not in all these respects, exceed. And yet he hath not an equal love for them, because he hath not the same hopes of attaining an interest in them, and being made happy by them. So that this Virtue doth properly consist in such a kind of esteem, as is withal accompanied with a hope and belief of promoting our own happiness by them. And this is properly the true ground and original of our love to God. From whence will follow
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Our choice of him, as being the only proper object of our happiness, preferring him before any thing else that may come in competition with them. Not only (as the Scripture expresseth it) loving him above father and mother, but1 hating father and mother, yea and life it self for his sake: Counting all other things but dross and dung, in comparison of him.
Now it cannot otherwise be, but that a due apprehension of the Divine excellencies in general, especially of his particular goodness to us, must excite in the soul suitable affections towards him. And hence it is, that the misapprehension of the Divine nature, as to this Attribute, doth naturally produce in men that kind of superstition styled […], which imports a frightful and over-timorous notion of the Deity, representing God as austere and rigorous, easily provoked by every little circumstantial mistake, and as easily appeased again by any flattering and slight formalities. Not but that there is sufficient evidence from the principles of natural reason, to evince the contrary; but the true ground of their mistake in this matter, is from their own vitious and corrupt affections. ‘Tis most natural for selfish and narrow men, to make themselves the rule and measure of perfection in other things. And hence it is, that according as a mans own inclinations are, so will he be apt to think of God; Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one (Psa. 50. 21) as thy self. Those that are of ill natures and of little minds, whose thoughts are fixed upon small and low matters, laying greater weight upon circumstances, salutes, addresses, than upon the real worth of persons and substantial duties, being themselves apt to be provoked unto wrath and fierceness, upon the omission of these lesser circumstances, and to be pacified again by any flattering and formal services; such men must consequently think themselves obliged to deal just so towards God, as they expect that others should deal with them. And according to the different natures and tempers of those men who do mistake this notion of the Divine goodness, so are the effects and consequences of this mistake various (as a learned man hath well observed) When2 it meets with stout and sturdy natures, who are under a consciousness of guilt, it works them to Atheism, hardens them to an opposition of him, to an endeavour of undermining and destroying the notion of that Deity, by whom they are not like to be safe or happy. If with more soft and timorous natures, men of base and slavish minds, it puts such men on to flatter and collogue with him, and to propitiate his favour by their zeal in lesser matters. And though in this kind of temper and carriage there may be a shew of Religion, yet the terminating of it in such things is most destructive to the nature of it, rendring all converse with the Deity irksom and grievous, begetting a kind of forced and praeternatural zeal, instead of that inward love and delight, and those other genuine kindly advantages which should arise to the soul from an internal frame of Religion.