SEcondly, As for those perfections belonging to the Divine Will, namely, his Goodness, his Justice, his Truth and Faithfulness: The due apprehension of these, should excite in us the virtue of Love, with all the genuine fruits of it. By Love, I mean an esteeming of him, and a seeking after him as our only happiness.
So that there are two ingredients of this virtue of Love, Estimation and Choice.
- An Estimation of the judgment; a due valuation of those excellencies which are in the Divine nature, whereby we look upon God as the supreme Being in genere boni: From whom all created goodness is derived, and by conformity to whom it is to be measured. And this notion is the proper importance of the word Charity, whereby we account a thing dear or pretious. And in this sense doth our Saviour oppose despising to loving, Either he must hate the one, and love the other; (Mat. 6. 34) or he must hold to the one, and despise the other.
Now these perfections of the Divine nature may be considered, either absolutely or relatively.
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Absolutely, as they are in themselves, abstracting from any benefit that we our selves may have by them. And in this sense they can only produce in us an esteem of our judgments, without any desire or zeal in our will or affections. The Devil doth understand these absolute perfections of the Divine nature, that God is in himself most wise, most just, and powerful: And he knows withal that these things are good, deserving esteem and veneration; and yet he doth not love God for these perfections, because he himself is evil, and is not like to receive any benefit by them.
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Relatively, with reference to that advantage which may arrive to us from the Divine goodness. When men are convinced of their infinite need of him, and their misery without him; and that their utmost felicity doth consist in the enjoyment of him: This is that which properly provokes affection and desire, namely, his relative goodness as to us. There is scarce any one under such transports of love, as to believe the person whom he loves, to be in all respects the most virtuous, wise, beautiful, wealthy that is in the world. He may know many others, that do in some, if not in all these respects, exceed. And yet he hath not an equal love for them, because he hath not the same hopes of attaining an interest in them, and being made happy by them. So that this Virtue doth properly consist in such a kind of esteem, as is withal accompanied with a hope and belief of promoting our own happiness by them. And this is properly the true ground and original of our love to God. From whence will follow
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Our choice of him, as being the only proper object of our happiness, preferring him before any thing else that may come in competition with them. Not only (as the Scripture expresseth it) loving him above father and mother, but1 hating father and mother, yea and life it self for his sake: Counting all other things but dross and dung, in comparison of him.
Now it cannot otherwise be, but that a due apprehension of the Divine excellencies in general, especially of his particular goodness to us, must excite in the soul suitable affections towards him. And hence it is, that the misapprehension of the Divine nature, as to this Attribute, doth naturally produce in men that kind of superstition styled […], which imports a frightful and over-timorous notion of the Deity, representing God as austere and rigorous, easily provoked by every little circumstantial mistake, and as easily appeased again by any flattering and slight formalities. Not but that there is sufficient evidence from the principles of natural reason, to evince the contrary; but the true ground of their mistake in this matter, is from their own vitious and corrupt affections. ‘Tis most natural for selfish and narrow men, to make themselves the rule and measure of perfection in other things. And hence it is, that according as a mans own inclinations are, so will he be apt to think of God; Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one (Psa. 50. 21) as thy self. Those that are of ill natures and of little minds, whose thoughts are fixed upon small and low matters, laying greater weight upon circumstances, salutes, addresses, than upon the real worth of persons and substantial duties, being themselves apt to be provoked unto wrath and fierceness, upon the omission of these lesser circumstances, and to be pacified again by any flattering and formal services; such men must consequently think themselves obliged to deal just so towards God, as they expect that others should deal with them. And according to the different natures and tempers of those men who do mistake this notion of the Divine goodness, so are the effects and consequences of this mistake various (as a learned man hath well observed) When2 it meets with stout and sturdy natures, who are under a consciousness of guilt, it works them to Atheism, hardens them to an opposition of him, to an endeavour of undermining and destroying the notion of that Deity, by whom they are not like to be safe or happy. If with more soft and timorous natures, men of base and slavish minds, it puts such men on to flatter and collogue with him, and to propitiate his favour by their zeal in lesser matters. And though in this kind of temper and carriage there may be a shew of Religion, yet the terminating of it in such things is most destructive to the nature of it, rendring all converse with the Deity irksom and grievous, begetting a kind of forced and praeternatural zeal, instead of that inward love and delight, and those other genuine kindly advantages which should arise to the soul from an internal frame of Religion.
And that the perfections of the Divine nature, and particularly his Goodness, should excite our love of him, may be made evident by all kind of proofs. There being no kind of motive to affection, whether imaginary or real, but ‘tis infinitely more in God than in any thing else besides. I shall mention only these three things.
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His absolute goodness and excellency.
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His relative goodness and kindness to us.
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The necessity we are under of being utterly lost and undone, without an interest in his favour.
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His absolute perfections are infinite, being the original of all that good which we behold in other things. Whatever attractives we find diffused amongst other creatures, by which they are rendred amiable, they are all derived from him, and they are all, in comparison to him, but as little drops to the Ocean. There is much of loveliness in the fabrick of this beautiful world, the glorious Sun, the Moon and the Stars which he hath ordained; which is abundantly enough to render the notion and the name of him excellent in all the earth. We may perhaps know some particular persons so very eminent for all kind of accomplishments, virtue, and wisdom, and goodness, &c. as to contract an esteem and veneration from all that know them. But now the highest perfections that are in men, besides that they are derived from him, are so infinitely disproportionable to his, that they may be said not to be in any of the creatures. There is some kind of communicated goodness, and wisdom, and power, and immortality in men; and yet these perfections are in Scripture appropriated to the Divine nature in such a manner, as if no Creature did partake of them. There is3 none good, or wise, but he. He is the only Potentate; who only hath immortality. No man can take a serious view of the works he hath wrought, whether they concern Creation or Providence, but he must needs acknowledg, concerning the Author of them, that he is altogether lovely, and say with the Prophet, How great (Zech. 9. 17) is his goodness? and how great is his bounty? The comeliness of them is upon all accounts so eminent and conspicuous, as cannot but be owned by every one who considers them. For any man to ask, what Beauty is, this is […], as Aristotle speaks, the question of a blind man. Every man who hath eyes, may judg of it at first view. Not to discern it, is a sure argument of blindness and darkness. And that the Divine nature is not more amiable to us, shews the great imperfection of our present condition. It shall be the perpetual employment of our future state in heaven, to celebrate these excellencies of the Divine nature. The blessed Angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect, do receive a chief part of their felicity, by contemplating these Divine perfections in the beatifical vision.
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His relative goodness and kindness to us; testified in so many particulars, that when we would reckon them up, they are (Psal. 100. 3) more in number than the sand. He is the Author of our beings and our well-beings. It is he that made us, and not we our selves.4 He spreads our tables, and fills our cups, in him we live, and move, and have our beings. He doth daily follow us, compass us about, load us with his benefits. He gives us all that we enjoy, and he is willing upon our repentance to forgive us all that we offend. And to whom much is given, or forgiven, they should love much. To love them that love us, is a duty but of a low attainment, the Publicans and sinners do the same; nay, the very Beasts will do it, The Oxe knows his owner, and the Ass his masters crib. That person must be void of the reason of a man, who will not admire and love God for his Excellencies; but he that doth not love him for his kindness, must be more stupid and senseless than the brute creatures.
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We are utterly undone, without an interest in his favour. So that if the apprehension of his absolute goodness cannot work upon our reason, nor the sense of his relative goodness or kindness upon our ingenuity and gratitude; yet the consideration of our undone estate without him, ought to prevail with all such, as have not forfeited the first and most universal principle of self-preservation. The not having him for our friend, and much more the having him for our enemy, putting a man into an absolute incapacity of all kind of happiness. ‘Tis a question proposed by St. Austin, why we are so often in Scripture enjoyned to love God and our neighbours, but have no-where any precept commanding us to love our selves? To which he gives this answer, Fingi non potest major dilectio sui, quàm dilectio Dei; The highest and truest self-love, is to love that which can alone make us happy. Men do not need any motive or argument to perswade them to love themselves. ‘Tis a natural principle, rather than a moral duty; they must do so, nor can they do otherwise. Only this is that wherein they stand in greatest need of direction, how to set this natural principle on work upon its due object. Felicity must be every mans chief end, there is no need of perswading any one to that; all the difficulty is to convince men, wherein this happiness doth consist. And there is no rational considering man, but must needs grant it to be in the fruition of the first and supreme good; so that to love God as our happiness is to love our selves, beyond which there is nothing to be said or fancyed by way of motive or perswasion.
‘Tis a duty this, upon all accounts, so plain and reasonable, that no man whatsoever can pretend to any kind of doubt or dispute about it. And therefore I shall add no more by way of proof or confirmation of the necessity of it.
I shall only offer two considerations, which should engage mens utmost diligence and caution in this matter.
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‘Tis a business of greatest consequence, to know whether we truly love God.
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‘Tis a matter wherein we are very liable to mistake.
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‘Tis a business of unspeakable concernment, to understand whether we love God or not: It being the same thing as to enquire, whether there be any thing in us of true Religion, or not. ‘Tis not a question about the fruits or the branches, but about the root; not about the degrees, but about the very essence of grace and holiness. There being no medium betwixt loving God and hating of him. He that is not with me, is against me, (saith our Saviour), Luke 11. 23.
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And then ‘tis a matter wherein men are liable to mistake. There is naturally in all Nations of men, who dwell on the face of the earth, a kind of confused inclination towards God, whereby they seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, as the Apostle speaks. (Acts 17. 27) And men are apt to mistake this natural propension for the grace of Love; whereas this is rather an inclination, than a firm choice and resolution; rather a natural disposition, than an acquired or infused habit. None could have more confident perswasions of their love to God, and their zeal for him, than the Jews had; and yet our Saviour tells them, But I know (Joh. 5. 42) you, that you have not the love of God in you. ‘Tis not an outward profession, though accompanied with zeal, that is a sufficient argument of our love. Though there are many in the world, who both live and dye under this delusion, Mat. 7. 22. Many will say unto me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name have cast out Devils, and in thy name done many wonderful works. And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you, depart from me you that work iniquity. ‘Tis not the being gifted and called, for these extraordinary works of prophesying and miracles; ‘tis not an ability to undergo the flames of martyrdom, and the giving our bodies to be burned: Neither gifts nor priviledges, nor some particular acts of duty, though of the most noble kind and greatest difficulty, can be a sufficient evidence of this love. So that ‘tis a matter wherein men are very liable to mistake, and where a mistake will prove of infinite consequence. And therefore will it concern us, to be very considerate and cautious in our enquiry about it.
There is one kind of affection seated in the rational part of the soul, the understanding and will; and another in the sensitive, the fancy and appetite. The one consisting in a full conviction, deliberate choice, and firm resolution; the other consisting more in some sudden impetus and transport of desire after a thing. The first of these may be styled the virtue, the other the passion of love. Now though a man should, in some fits of devotion, love God with as great a degree of fervor, as to passionate sensitive love, as some Martyrs have done; yet were it possible for him in his judgment, to esteem any thing else but equally, or never so little more than God; such a kind of affection, though it were sufficient to make the other a Martyr, yet could not preserve him from being an Apostate, and renouncer or blasphemer of Religion (as a learned Author hath proved more at large);5 nay, I add further, from the same Author, though a man should love God with an equal degree of affection, yet because the objects are so infinitely disproportionable, and ‘tis the nature of moral duties to be measured from those motives by which we are to be induced to them; therefore of such an one it may be affirmed, that he doth not love God. He that makes him but equal to any worldly thing· may be said infinitely to despise and undervalue him.
For the further explication of this, I shall suggest to you a distinction, not commonly (if at all) taken notice of by others, betwixt natural principles and moral duties. The misunderstanding of which is the occasion of many difficulties and confusions, about this and some other points.
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By natural principles, I mean such kind of impressions as are originally stamped upon the nature of things, whereby they are fitted for those services to which they are designed in their creation; the acts of which are necessary, and under no kind of liberty of being suspended: All things must work according to their natural principles, nor can they do otherwise; as heavy bodies must tend downwards. The beauty of the world, and the wisdom of the Creation, is generally acknowledged to consist in this, that God was pleased to endue the kinds of things, with such natures and principles, as might accommodate them for those works to which they were appointed. And he governs all things by such laws, as are suited to those several natures which he had at first implanted in them. The most universal principle belonging to all kind of things, is self-preservation, which in man (being a rational Agent) is somewhat farther advanced to strong propensions and desires of the soul after a state of happiness, which hath the predominancy over all other inclinations, as being the supreme and ultimate end, to which all their designs and actions must be subservient by a natural necessity.
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Whereas on the other hand, those rules or means which are most proper for the attaining of this end, about which we have a liberty of acting, to which men are to be induced in a moral way, by such kind of motives or arguments as are in themselves sufficient to convince the reason: These I call moral duties; duties, as deriving their obligation from their conducibility to the promoting of our chief end; and moral, as depending upon moral motives. So that self-love, and the proposing of happiness as our chief end, though it be the foundation of duty, that basis or substratum upon which the Law is founded, yet it is not properly a moral duty, about which men have a liberty of acting. They must do so, nor can they do otherwise. The most vile and profligate wretches that are, who are most opposite to that which is their true happiness, they are not against happiness it self, but they mistake about it, and erroneously substitute something else in the room of it. So that if men were upon all accounts firmly convinced, that God was their chief happiness, they would almost as necessarily love him, as hungry men do eat, and thirsty men do drink. I have enlarged somewhat the more upon this particular, the better to manifest the true cause or ground of this love, to consist in this perswasion, that our chief happiness is in the favour of God, and the enjoyment of him.
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