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Book 2, Chapter 1. Shewing in general how Religion conduces to our Happiness

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I proceed now to the second Part of my design, which was to shew The Wisdom of Practising the Duties of Natural Religion. In which I shall endeavour to convince men, how much it is, upon all accounts, their chief happiness and interest to lead a religious and virtuous course of life.

Solomon, who is so much celebrated in Scripture for his wisdom and knowledg, hath purposely written a Book, the main argument whereof is to enquire, wherein the chief happiness of man doth consist: And having in the former part of it shewed the insufficiency of all other things that pretend to it, he comes in the conclusion to fix it upon its true basis, asserting every mans greatest interest and happiness, to consist in being religious. Let us hear the cnclusion. of the whole (Eccl. 12. 13) matter; Fear God, and keep his commandements: for this is the whole of man. That is, the serious practice of Religion is that which every considerate man after all his other disquisitions, will find to be his chief interest, and that which doth deserve his utmost care and diligence.

And because these words of Solomon, do so fully express that, which is to be the main argument of my following discourse, I shall by way of preface or introduction to it, more particularly consider the commendation which he here gives to the practice of Religion, in that full and significant expression, this is the whole of man.

Which words are by the Septuagint and Vulgar thus rendered, this is All, or Every man. The word duty which is supplied by our English, being not in the original, or in other Translations. This ought to be the way and course of all mankind, so the Targum. This is the course to which every man is designed, so the Syriack. This will be most profitable and advantageous to men, so the Arabick. Hoc est totum hominis. This is the whole of man; so some of our later Interpreters, mosg properly to the scope of the place, it being an usual Enallage in the Hebrew, totius universalis pro toto integrante, All for Whole.

So that according to these various interpretations of the words, they may contain in them a threefold reference. To the Essence, the Happiness, the Business of man.

According to which the sense of them must be, that Religion, or the fearing of God and keeping his commandements is a matter of so great consequence to Humane Nature, that

  1. The Essence or Being of man may be said to consist in it.

  2. The great Business or duty of man, is to be conversant about it, and to labour after it.

  3. The Happiness or well-being of man doth depend upon it.

These particulars I shall endeavour to make out by such clear Principles of Reason, attested to by several of the wisest Heathen Writers, as may be enough to satisfy any serious man, who is able to understand the reason and consequence of things, and will but attend and consider.

First: Religion is of so great importance, that the Essence of man may be said to consist in it. Man may be considered under a twofold notion:

  1. In his single capacity, according to that principle whereby he is constituted in such a rank of creatures.

  2. In Society, for which man seems to be naturally designed, and without which he could not well subsist. Now Religion will appear to be Essential to him, in both these respects.

  3. As considered in his single capacity, according to those principles by which he is framed. That which doth constitute any thing in its Being, and distinguish it from all other things, this is that which we call the Form or Essence of a thing. Now the things which distinguish Humane Nature from all other things, are the chief principles and foundations of Religion, namely, the Apprehension of a Deity, and an expectation of a future state after this life: Which no other creature, below man, doth partake of; and which are common to all mankind, notwithstanding the utmost endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them.

As for what is commonly alledged in the behalf of Reason, it may be observed that in the actions of many brate creatures, there are discernable some footsteps, some imperfect strictures and degrees of Ratiocination; such a natural sagacity as at least bears a near resemblance to reason. From whence it may follow, that it is not Reason in the general, which is the Form of Humane nature; But Reason as it is determined to actions of Religion, of which we do not find the least signs or degrees in Brutes: Man being the only creature in this visible world, that is formed with a capacity of worshipping and enjoying his Maker. Nor is this any new opinion, but what several of the antient Writers, Philosophers, Orators, Poets, have attested to; who make the notion of a Deity, and adoration of him, to be the true difference betwixt Man and Beast.

So Tully: Ex tot generibus nullum est1 animal praeter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei; ipsisque in hominibus, nulla gens est, neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quae non etiamsi ignoret, qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Amongst all the living creatures that are in the world, there is none but Man, that hath any notion of a Deity; and amongst mankind, there is no Nation so wild and barbarous, but pretends to some Religion; whence it should seem that this is the most proper difference betwixt man and beasts. And in another place, he makes this to be the Character of that Reason, which is the Form of man, that it is vinculum Dei & hominis, which imports both name and thing.

Of the same sense is that of the Satyrist, who speaking of Religion and a sense of Divine things, saith this of it. —separat hoc nos A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli2 Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces.

‘Tis this, saith he, which doth distinguish us from brute creatures, That we have souls capable of Divine impressions.

There are abundance of expressions to this purpose in several other of the Heathen Writers. That in Plutarch, where3 he styles irreligion, a kind of stupor whereby men are as it were deprived of their senses. And in another place, he asserts it to be an exceeding improper thing, to ascribe true reason to those, who do not acknowledg and adore the Deity. So again Tully, esse Deos qui negat,4 vix eum sanae mentis existimem. I can hardly think that man to be in his right mind, who is destitute of Religion. And in another place of the same Book. Quis hunc hominem dixerit? &c. Why should any one style such an one a man, who by what he sees in the world is is not convinced of a Deity, and a providence, and of that adoration he owes to the Deity? Non modo non philosophos, (Lactant) sed nec homines quidem fuisse dixerim, (saith another). Men that are destitute of Religion, are so far from being learned philosophers, that they ought not to be esteemed so much as reasonable men.

‘Tis true, nothing is more ordinary than for such persons as are sceptical in these first principles, to entertain great thoughts of themselves, as if they had considered things more deeply, and were arrived unto a higher pitch of reason and wit than others. But yet the plain truth is, they who have not attained to this conviction of placing their chief interest in being religious, they are so far from exceeding others in degrees, that they come short of the very nature and essence of men, as being destitute of those first Notions concerning truth and falshood, good and evil, wherein the essence of a rational Being doth consist: Besides their palpable deficiency in such plain consequences and deductions of Reason, as would become those, who in any measure pretend to that principle.

So that, by what hath been said, it may appear, that the Definition of Man may be rendered as well by the Difference of Religiosum as Rationale. As for that inconvenience which some may object, That Atheistical and prophane persons will hereby be excluded: Why, so they are by the other Difference likewise; such persons having no just pretence to Reason, who renounce Religion: And it were well, if they might not only be reckoned among Beasts (as they are by the Psalmist, where he styles them brutish), but driven out amongst them likewise, and banished from all humane society, as being publick pests and mischiefs of mankind, such as would debase the nobility of our natures to the condition of brute creatures, and therefore are fit only to live amongst them. Which brings me to the

2d. Consideration of Man as a sociable creature. Religion is essential to him, in this respect also; as being the surest bond to tye men up to those respective duties towards one another, without which Government and Society could not subsist.

There is a remarkable passage in Plutarch to this purpose, where he styles Religion, […], the cement of all Community, and the5 chief Basis of all Legislative power. And in another place he says, That ‘tis much more easie to build a City in the open Air, without any ground to found it upon, than to establish Government without Religion. A City (saith he) may make some shift to subsist without Walls, Schools, Theatres, Houses; nay, without Money, but not without Religion.

If it were not for this notion of a Deity, and those natural impressions which we have concerning Justice and Probity, so necessary for the conservation of humane society; instead of those well-ordered Governments and Cities which are now in the world, Mankind must have lived either wild and solitary in Caves and Dens, like savage beasts; or else in troops of Robbers, subsisting upon the spoil and rapine of such as were weaker than themselves.

Pietate sublatâ, sides etiam, & societas6 humani generis, & una excellentissima virtus justitia tollitur, saith Tully. Take but away the awe of Religion, and all that Fidelity and Justice, so necessary for the keeping up of humane society, must perish with it.

‘Tis this fear of a Deity, and the sense of our obligation to Him, that is the onely effectual means to restrain men within the bounds of duty. And were this wholly extinguished, there would follow such wild disorders and extravagancies amongst men, as would not leave so much as the face or least shadow of virtue or honesty in the world. There being no kind of vice which men would not abandon themselves unto, considering the impetuousness of their own natural appetites, and the power of external temptations, were this restraint from Religion once removed or abolished.

The two chief Opposites to Religion, are Prophaneness and Superstition. Both which are prejudicial to civil Government; the one by destroying conscience, the strongest obligation to political duties; the other by perverting and abusing it; introducing in the stead of it a new primum mobile, which ravisheth the spheres of Government, and puts them into a praeternatural course, as a Noble Author7 expresseth it.

The two grand Relations that concern society, are Government and Subjection: And Irreligion doth indispose men for both these.

  1. For Government. Without Religion Magistrates will lose that courage and confidence belonging to their stations, which they cannot so well exert in punishing the offences of others, when they are guilty of the same or the like themselves. Those that sit on the throne of judgment, should be able to scatter away evil with their eyes, as Solomon speaks, Prov. 20. 8. By their very presence and looks to strike an awe upon offenders. Which will not be so easily done, if they lye under the same guilt themselves. Sine bonitate nulla majestas, saith Seneca; the very nature of majesty doth denote Goodness as well as Power. And without this, Governours may easily lose that Reverence which is due to them from others, and consequently that Authority which they ought to have over them. When they cease to be Gods in respect of their Goodness, they will soon diminish in their Power. And though they should be able to keep men under, as to their bodies and estates, yet will they decline as to that awful love and reverence whereby they should sway over the hearts and affections of men.

The Philosopher in the fifth Book of his Politicks, doth lay it down as a rule8 for Magistrates, That they must be careful to give publick testimonies of their being religious and devout; for which he gives this double reason: Because the people will be less subject to entertain any jealousie or suspition of suffering injury, from such whom they believe to be religious: And withal, they will be less subject to attempt the doing of injury against such; as knowing that good Magistrates are after a more especial manner under the divine favour and protection, […], having God to fight with them, and for them.

  1. The want of this will indispose men for the condition of Subjects, and render them loose and unstable in those duties of obedience and submission required to that state. How can it be expected from that man, who dares affront and despise God himself, that he should have any hearty reverence for His Deputies and Vicegerents?

He that is subject only upon the account of wrath, and the power of the sword which is over him, will be no longer so, when he hath an opportunity of escaping or resisting that power. Nor is there any possible way to secure men in their quiet subjection and obedience, but by their being obliged for conscience-sake. And therefore such kind of persons, as (Rom. 13. 5) by their open prophaneness and contempt of Religion, do endeavour to destroy conscience from amongst men, may justly be esteemed as the worst kind of seditious persons, and most pernicious to Civil Government.

That temper of Prophaneness, whereby a man is disposed to contemn and despise all Religion (how slightly soever men may think of it) is much worse than Infidelity, than Fanaticalness, than Idolatry; and of the two, ‘tis much more eligible for a man to be an honest Heathen and a devont Idolater, than a prophane Christian.

Whatever disputes have been raised, concerning the lawfulness of punishing men for their dissenting consciences in matters of Religion; yet never any man questioned the lawfulness of punishing men, for their prophaneness and contempt of all Religion. Such men as renounce conscience, cannot pretend that they suffer for it. And certainly this Vice doth upon many accounts deserve the greatest severity of Laws, as being in its own nature destructive of the very principles of Government, and the peace of all humane Societies: Besides the mischiefs consequent upon it, from Divine vengeance.

‘Tis an observation of Seneca, That9 several Countries do appoint several punishments for the violation of Religion, but every Country appoints some, and it doth not any where escape unpunished. Plato in his Book de Legibus, would have it punished capitally, as10 being a thing of most pernicious consequence to Government. ‘Tis a rule in the Civil Law, that Religio contaminata ad omnium pertinet injuriam; The abuse11 of Religion is to be looked upon as being a common injury, and every man is concerned, to endeavour a vindication of it. And there are some instances in story,12 of Wars that have been undertaken upon this very account, to bring a Nation to punishment for that prophaneness they have expressed towards the Religion they professed and pretended to, as being injurious to mankind, quod orbis viribus (lib. 8) expiari debuit, as Justin the Historian speaks, which the whole world ought to vindicate and expiate by their common forces.

There can be no assurance from loose irreligious persons, that they will be faithful in the ordinary duties belonging to their several ranks and stations. And as for any extraordinary Heroical action, by which the publick welfare is to be promoted, men that are without conscience of Religion, and a sense of Virtue, can never apply themselves to any thing of that kind, as having their minds destitute of all such principles as are sublime and generous, without any the least seed of honour, and piety, and virtue; and therefore they can have no sparks of magnanimity, nor any the least inclination to actions that are truly great and noble.

So that upon all these accounts, it is very evident, That Religion is totum heminis in this first sense, as it refers to the Essence of Man, considered either in his single capacity, or as a member of Society.

  1. ‘Tis so likewise as it refers to the Business and Duty of Man, that which he ought to be most intent upon, and conversant about, as to his employment in this world: that General calling, in which every man of what rank or quality soever, is to be ingaged. Men are distributed under other particular callings, according as their education, abilities, friends, and several opportunities do dispose of them. But the obligation of Religion, being of universal concernment, doth extend to all and every particular, there being none exempted from it. Hoc est omnis homo. Every man is concerned in it. And it is totum hominis likewise; ‘Tis his calling, the chief business about which he is to be employed.

I do not say, that a mans thoughts are always to be taken up about the immediate acts of Religion, any more than a Traveller is always to have his mind actually fixed upon the thought of his journies end. This would be inconsistent with the infirmity of our natures, and the necessity of our conditions in this world. But yet, as he that is upon a journey, doth so order all his particular motions, as may be most conducible to his general end; so should men habitually, though they cannot actually, in every affair have respect to their chief end, so as to observe all the duties of Religion, and never to allow themselves in any thing against the rules of it. And he that hath this care continually upon his mind (though he be but a secular person) may properly be said to make Religion his Business.

The Wise man in the beginning of his (Eccles. 2. 3) Book, had proposed it as his great Question to be discussed, to find out what was that good for the sons of men, which they should do under the Heavens, all the days of their lives. (i. e.) What was the chief employment or business, which they should apply themselves to in this world? And in the conclusion of his discourse, after an induction and refutation of all other particulars, which may seem to have any claim or pretence to this, He asserts it to be the business of Religion, Fearing God, and keeping his commandments: Suitably to that Precept of Moses, Deut. 10. 12. And now, O Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to serve the Lord thy God, and keep his commandments: And the (Acts 24. 16) Practise of St. Paul, who made this his daily exercise, to keep his conscience void of offence, both towards God and towards Man.

To the Reasonableness of this, several of the wisest Heathens have attested. That’s a remarkable passage in Aristotle13 to this purpose, where he states that to be the most desirable proportion of all worldly felicities and enjoyments, which is most consistent with men’s devoting themselves to the business of Religion: And that to be either too much or too little of wealth, or honour, or power, &c. whereby men are hindred in their meditating upon God, or their worshipping of him.

So Epictetus, discoursing concerning14 the work and business he was designed to, hath this excellent passage: If I had been made a Nightingale or a Swan, I should have employed the time of my life in such a way as is suitable to the condition of those Creatures: But being made a Man, capable of serving and worshipping that God, from whom I had my Being, ‘tis but reason that I should apply my self to this, as being my proper work and business: […]: And therefore hereunto will I devote my self, as being the chief employment to which I am designed. I am now as to the condition of my body, lame and old (saith he in the same place) to which he might have added that he was sickly and deformed; and as for his outward quality, he was poor and under servitude, being a slave to Epaphroditus, one of the Roman Courtiers; which are conditions that usually expose men to repining and discontent; and yet he concludes it to be his duty, wholly to devote himself to the praises and worship of that God, who was the Author of his Being. Which upbraids so many professors of Christianity, who have both more advantages of knowing their duty, and greater engagements upon them to exercise themselves in the duties of Religion.

There is another apposite Testimony to this purpose in Antoninus. Every thing (saith he) is designed for some kind15 of work. Beasts and plants, the sun and stars; […]; And what do you conceive your business to be? sensual pleasures? Bethink your self a little better, whether this be suitable to your natural sentiments, to the nobility of your mind, and those excellent faculties with which you are endowed.

Now ‘tis the usual course of men to apply themselves to that as their chief business, by which their interest is most promoted, and which may most conduce to that main end which they propose to themselves. And can any thing be more reasonable, than for that to be the chief business of a man’s life, which is the chief end of his Being?

  1. Religion is totum hominis, with respect to the Happiness and well-being of Man. That is properly said to be the chief end or Happiness of a thing, which doth raise its nature to the utmost perfection of which it is capable, according to its rank and kind. This is the chief end which he ought to propose, that alone wherein his true felicity doth consist, that which doth advance his nature to the utmost perfection it is capable of. The chief good belonging to a Vegetable or Plant, is to grow up to a state of Maturity, to continue to its natural period, and to propagate its kind, which is the utmost perfection that kind of Being is capable of. And whereas sensitive creatures, besides those things which are common to them with Plants, have likewise such faculties, whereby they are able to apprehend external objects, and to receive pain or pleasure from them: Therefore the Happiness proper to them, must consist in the perfection of these faculties, namely, in sensible pleasures, in the enjoyment of such things as may be grateful to their senses. But now Mankind (if we allow it to be a distinct rank of Creatures, superior to Brutes) being endowed with such faculties, whereby ‘tis made capable of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future state after this life; It will hence follow, That the proper happiness of Man must consist in the perfecting of these faculties, namely, in such a state as may reconcile him to the Divine favour, and afford him the best assurance of a blessed immortality hereafter: Which nothing else but Religion can so much as pretend to.

‘Tis true indeed, the nature of Man, by reason of those other capacities common to him with Plants and Brutes, may stand in need of several other things, to render his condition pleasant and comfortable in this world, as Health, Riches, Reputation, Safety, &c. Now herein is the great advantage of Religion, that besides the principal work which it doth for us, in securing our future estates in the other world, it is likewise the most effectual means to promote our happiness in this world.

In my discourse of this I shall first suggest something more generally, concerning the nature of our chief end; And then descend to those particulars, which are esteemed to be the chief ingredients to a state of Happiness.

Under the first of these I shall speak briefly to these Three things.

  1. There is a necessity that every Man who will act rationally should propose to himself some chief scope and end.

  2. The chief end of every thing must be of such a nature, as may be most fit to promote the perfection of that thing in its rank and kind.

  3. This in rational Beings which are capable of it, must consist in a communion with, and a conformity unto the chief Good, and consequently in being religious.

  4. There is a necessity that every man who will act rationally should propose to himself some chief scope or end. The having of an end, is not so much a moral duty, which supposeth a liberty of acting, as a natural principle, like that of the descent of heavy bodies; men must do so, nor can they do otherwise. Such is the principle of self-preservation in all things; and this of acting for an end, in all rational agents. The most loose and profligate wretches that are, do and must act for an end, even in those very courses, wherein they put the thought of their future state and their last account far from them. The very suppressing and hardening themselves against the thought of their true end, is in order to their present peace and quiet, which they do erroneously substitute in the room of their chief end. That wherein men are commonly defective, is in not exciting the thought of their chief end, and not sufficiently considering and stating in their own minds, the most proper means for the attaining of it. There are too many in the world that do […], live ex tempore, without any particular reference to their chief end, being immersed only in present matters, animalia sine praeterito & futuro, without any regard to what is past or future; like Ships upon the vast Ocean, without any Compass or Pilot, that do rather wander than travel, being carried up and down according as every wind or tide doth drive them. And this the Philosopher doth worthily brand with the name of folly; Vita sine proposito, stultitiae argumentum est; No greater (Seneca) argument of foolishness, than for a man not to be fixed upon some particular design. Proponamus oportet, finem summi boni, ad quem omne factum nostrum16 dictúmve respiciat; veluti navigantibus, ad sidus aliquod dirigendus est cursus, saith the same Author. There ought always to be some particular scope and mark proposed, as the main end and drift of all our actions, as the star by which we are to be guided in our voyage. Non disponet singula, nisi cui jam vitae suae summa proposita est. ‘Twill be a hard matter17 to proportion out particulars, till we know what is the main sum. This is the true ground of the common mistakes amongst men, whilst they deliberate concerning the several parts of their lives, but neglect the stating of what should be the main design of the whole. He that intends to shoot at any thing, must so manage the whole action, in levelling his arrow, and regulating his hands, and exerting his strength so as may be most advantageous for hitting the mark. As the efficient is in natural, so is the end amongst moral causes, of principal efficacy. ‘Tis this which is the chief rule of all our actions. And therefore there is a necessity that some end be proposed and fix’d upon.

  5. The chief end of every thing must be of such a nature, as may be most fit to promote the perfection of that thing in its rank and kind. Any thing that is short of this, may be a means, or a subordinate end; but cannot be the chief and ultimate end, if there be any thing desireable beyond it; […], saith Aristotle; That is truly the chief18 end, which is desired for it self; which being once obtained, we want no more; That which doth satiate and fill up the desires. Haec nihil vacare patitur loci, totum animum tenet, desiderium omnium19 tollit, sola satis est, (saith Seneca). In brief, ‘tis that state, wherein a thing enjoys all that good that ‘tis capable of, and which is most suitable to its nature.

  6. This in rational Creatures must consist, in a communion with, and a conformity to the supreme good; and consequently, in being religious. Which is the meaning of those Scripture-expressions, of walking with God, and as becomes the sons of the Most High; being followers of him; holy as he is holy; being made partakers of a divine nature. And to this the Philosophers do likewise consent. This is the meaning of that speech in Pythagoras, […], Every mans chief end should be a resemblance to God, a being made like to the Deity. So Plato and Epictetus will have it to consist in following of God, […]. And another, imitari quem colis, in imitating him whom we worship. So Seneca, Summum bonum est, quod honestum est, & quod magis admirêre, solum bonum20 est quod honestum est. Not only the chief, but the only good doth consist, in what is honest and virtuous. Now the fruition of God cannot consist in any external union or contact of our souls with the Deity, which Spirits are not capable of; nor in any meer speculation, or intellectual gazing upon his excellencies: But in such an influence, whereby he doth communicate to us, such divine qualities, as will exalt our faculties beyond their natural state, and bring them into an assimilation and conformity to the most perfect Idea of Goodness, together with an inward sensation of the effects of this in our selves.

Having thus dispatched what I had to suggest concerning the nature of Happiness in general, I proceed to speak to such particulars, as are esteemed to be the most usual ingredients into such a state, and which do conduce to the compleating of it: whether they concern Our present condition in this world; either our External well-fare; consisting in 1. Health. 2. Liberty, Safety, Quiet. 3. Possessions; with respect either to the sufficiency of them, for answering our necessities; which is called Riches or Profit: Or to 4. The Delight or Satisfaction we receive in these enjoyments, in the use and suitableness of the things we possess; which is called Pleasure. 5. The Esteem which we have amongst good men, whereby we are rendered acceptable and useful to others; styled Honour or Reputation. Internal well-fare, or the happiness of our minds; which doth consist in these two things. 1. The due regulating and exalting of our faculties to their proper function. 2. The Peace, Joy, Contentment, consequent thereupon. The happiness of our future state. This doth consist in such a fruition of the supreme good, as our souls are capable of; and must depend upon such courses, as can afford us the most rational assurance of blessedness and glory hereafter.

Now I shall endeavour to make it out by plain reason, that the Happiness of our condition, in all these respects, doth depend upon Religion. And that not only morally, upon account of that reward, which virtuous actions do entitle a man unto, from a just and wise providence; but naturally also, by reason of that physical efficacy which the duties of Religion have, to procure for us all those things wherein our temporal happiness consists; to promote the well-fare, not only of particular persons, but of publick Communities of Mankind in general, and of the whole Universe.

← Book 1, Chapter 17. Of Passive Obedience, or Patience and Submission to the · Contents · Book 2, Chapter 2. How Religion conduces to our present Happiness in this world →

Footnotes

  1. De Leg. lib. 1. ↩

  2. Jur. sat. 15. ↩

  3. De superstistitione. ↩

  4. Nat. Deor. lib. 2. ↩

  5. Against Colotes. ↩

  6. Nat. Deor. lib. 1. ↩

  7. Lord Bacons Essays. ↩

  8. Cap. 11. ↩

  9. De Benef. lib. 3. c. 6. ↩

  10. lib. 10. ↩

  11. Lib. 4. cap. de Haeret. ↩

  12. Grotius de Jure belli & pacis, l. 2. cap. 20. sect. 51. ↩

  13. Moral. 1. ad Eudem. ↩

  14. Dissert. 1. 6. ↩

  15. Lib. 8. Sect. 19. ↩

  16. Idem Epist. 85. ↩

  17. Epist. 31. ↩

  18. Mag. Moral. lib. 2. cap. 2. ↩

  19. Epist. 74. ↩

  20. Epist. 74. ↩

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