Men that are truly virtuous, have a reverence paid them by all that know them. And on the other side, vicious men are despised. Not but that wicked persons may be inwardly honoured, by such as do not know them to be wicked; and on the other side, those that are good, may by others be esteemed and used, as being the rubbish and off-scouring of all things. But this is to be ascribed chiefly to their mistake and ignorance of them, whilst they look upon such persons as being the most dangerous pernicious persons. But the generality of mankind have heretofore, and still do pay a reverence to any person whom they believe to be innocent and virtuous.

2. Religion is the natural cause of Honour and Reputation, so far as such things are capable of any physical efficacy. This I shall endeavour to prove, both from Reason and Experience.

I. By Reason. For the better understanding of this, we are to take notice, that Honour may be considered under a twofold notion.

1. According to the desert and foundation of it, in the person honoured.

2. According to the acknowledgment or attribution of it, in the person honouring.

Now Religion doth by a natural causality influence both these.

1. According to the foundation of it, in the person honoured, which is true virtue and merit. I have shewed before, that the Essence of man may be said to consist in being religious, and consequently this must be the rule and measure of a mans real worth; it must be our excelling in that which makes us men, that must make us better men than others. All other things have some kind of standard, by which the natural goodness of them is to be measured; so is it with men likewise. And this is usually from their suitableness to that chief end they are designed for. Quae conditio rerum, eadem & hominum est; navis bona dicitur, non quae pretiosis coloribus picta est, &c. (saith Seneca) We do not therefore esteem a⁴ Ship to be good, because it is curiously painted and gilded, or carved and inlay’d but because ‘tis fitted for all the purposes of Navigation, which is the proper end of a Ship. Nor do we therefore count a Sword to be good, because it hath a rich Hilt and an embroidered Scabbard but because it is sit for the proper use of a Sword, which is to cut, &c. In homine quoque nihil ad rem pertinet, quantum aret, quantum foeneret, a quàm multis salutetur, sed quàm bonus sit. It should be so likewise in our esteem of men, who are not so much to be valued by the grandeur of their Estates or Titles, as by their inward goodness. The true stamp of Nobility is upon the minds of men, and doth consist in such virtuous habits, as will enable a man for worthy designs and actions; when the image of God, who is the rule of excellency and the fountain of honour, is in any measure restored upon it.

Every man is endowed with a natural principle, inclining him to a state of happiness, and hath in some measure both an ability to judg of, and a freedom and liberty for applying himself unto, those duties which are the proper means for the promoting of this end: Nor is he upon any other account to be justly praised or blamed, but according to the right or wrong use of this natural liberty. And therefore as such a man doth find either in himself or others, a constant and firm resolution to make a right use of this, so should he proportion his esteem accordingly, preferring this inward greatness, this rectitude of mind, whereby a man is resolved in every condition, to do that which shall appear to be his duty, before any kind of external greatness whatsoever.

There is a respect and honour due to all kind of virtues whatsoever, as rendering men amiable and lovely. But amongst the rest, there are two, which are by general consent esteemed venerable, and such as do greatly advance the reputation of those who are endowed with them; namely, Wisdom, Courage.

Because they have a more intrinsick rise, and do less depend upon external advantages, but seem rather to be rooted in the inward frame and temper of our minds; and withall are most beneficial both to our selves and others: The former signifying a man to have those inteltellectual abilities which are proper to his kind, whereby the humane nature is to be distinguished from other things: The other, because it argues a rectitude in the will, and a power to subdue the passion of fear, which is most natural to our present state of infirmity; and withall doth support a man against difficulties, and enable him for those two great services, of doing and suffering as he ought. And for this reason, the vices that are opposite to these, are amongst all others counted the most shameful; there being no greater reproach to be cast upon any one, than to be esteemed a Fool or a Coward.

Now a man that is irreligious cannot justly pretend to either of these virtues.

1. For Wisdom. This is so essential to Religion, that in the Scripture-phrase they both go under the same name. And there is very good reason, why it should be so; because there is such an intimate agreement between the natures of them. The Philosopher doth define Wisdom to consist in an ability and inclination, to make choice of right means in the prosecution of our true end. And nothing can enable a man for this but Religion, both as to the subordinate end of temporal happiness in this world, and chiefly with respect to that great and supreme end of eternal happiness in the world to come.

2. And then for Courage. ‘Tis not possible for a man to be truly valiant, unless he be withall truly religious: He may be bold and daring, and able in a fearless manner to rush upon any danger; but then he must stifle his reason from considering what the consequences of things may be, what shall become of him hereafter, if he should miscarry: There being no man whatsoever so totally free from the apprehensions of a future state, but that when he is serious and considerate, he must be startled with doubts and fears concerning it: So that there cannot be any rational, sedate, deliberate courage, but only in such as have good hopes of a better estate in the other world; And ‘tis Religion only that can enable a man for this.

3. Honour considered, according to the acknowledgment or attribution of it in the persons Honouring; which is the external form, or as the body of honour, being much in the power of others. And this may be distinguished into these two kinds, Inward, Outward.

4. Inward, Honouring is properly an act of the understanding, in passing judgment upon the nature of things: When we do in our minds, own and acknowledg the real worth or virtue of a thing or person. And every one who will act rationally, not miscalling good evil, and evil good, must proportion his esteem of things, according to the real value of them. Nor is it in any mans power, so far to offer violence to his own faculties, as to believe any thing against evidence; to esteem that man to be either worthy or unworthy, whom he knows to be otherwise. He may call him and use him as he pleases, and he may be willing to entertain prejudices, either for or against him; And in this sense, Honor est in honorante: But he cannot inwardly think or believe otherwise than according to his evidence. For men of no real worth to expect this inward honour from others, as it is very unequal, requiring brick without straw; and very unlawful, It being as well a mans duty to contemn a vile person, as to honour those that fear the Lord; so neither is it possible, because men must necessarily judge according to the most prevailing evidence; nor can they esteem such a one to be worthy whom they know to be otherwise, any more than they can believe that to be white and streight which they see to be black and crooked.

There are indeed some other things that do commonly go under this name, as the several degrees of Nobility, Titles, and Places of dignity, which are usually called by this name of honour; but these things (as they are abstracted from Magistracy) being wholly extrinsecal, have no more due to them, but a mere external respect: They may challenge from us that we should give them their due Titles, and demean our selves towards them with that observance and ceremony which becomes their quality: But then as for that inward esteem and valuation of our minds belonging to good men; such persons can challenge no greater share of this, than according as their real merit and virtue shall require. The Royal stamp upon any kind of Metal may be sufficient to give it an extrinsick value, and to determine the rate at which it is to pass amongst Coyns; but it cannot give an intrinsick value, or make that which is but Brass to be Gold.

‘Tis true indeed there are some Callings and particular Relations of men, to which an inward veneration is due, though the persons themselves should not be virtuous; namely Magistrates, and Ministers, and Parents, and Benefactors; who having somewhat of a Divine stamp and impress, may therefore challenge from us, that we should demean our selves towards them, both with such an outward respect as becomes their places, and with such an inward respect too, as may be suitable to that image which they bear; to our dependance upon them, and obligations to them. But then we cannot be obliged to think such persons good men, unless we have some evidence to believe them to be so, or at least, not to be otherwise; so that they are beholding to something extrinsecal to their persons, namely to their Callings and Relations, for that honour which is paid to them.

2. Outward Honouring is, when men do by their words or actions testify that esteem and respect which they have for the worth of others. And this indeed may be truely said to be in the power of others, because men have a greater command over their words and actions, than they have over their belief. Now all men that are truely virtuous and religious, will be ready to give unto every one his due honour; and such are the best judges of it. Upon which account Tully defines true honour to be consentiens⁵ laus bonorum, the concurrent approbation of good men; such only being fit to give true praise, who are themselves praise-worthy.

As for vitious and irreligious persons, ‘tis not to be expected that they should be forward to commend that which is opposite to them. But then ‘tis to be considered, that these are no competent judges of such matters: And for a man to resent deeply the contempt of unworthy persons, were overmuch to honour them, as if their esteem could add any thing to his reputation.

And yet, even these persons cannot avoid having an inward veneration for goodness and religion, which is the reason why they are so forward to dissemble it, to disguise themselves under the shew of it. Men do not use to counterfeit common stones and metals, but such as are precious, Jewels and Gold; Nor would any one take the pains to counterfeit being Religious, if he did not think it a matter of some value, and a means to procure esteem from others. And when such men do revile and persecute any one for being religious, yet is there such a natural veneration belonging to the thing it self, as makes them to disguise it under the name of Hypocrisy, Heresy, Superstition, &c. whereby they may justify themselves in their opposing of it.

II. But this is only general discourse, and in the notion. The best argument to this purpose would be from Experience; by which I mean that practical knowledg, which every man may attain by his own observation of the usual course of things in the world. And by this it will appear, that no kind of persons have been more highly reverenced in the hearts and consciences of others, than those that have been most eminent for their virtue and religion; which hath been always true, both with respect to publick communities, and private persons.

1. For Nations. If we consult the Histories of former times, we shall find that saying of Solomon constantly verifyed, That Righteousness doth exalt a nation, (Prov. 14. 34) but sin doth prove a reproach to it. And more especially the sin of Irreligiousness and Prophaneness; As this doth increase in any nation, so must the honour and Reputation of that nation decrease. The Roman Empire was then at the highest, as to its name and greatness, when it was so as to its virtue; when they were most punctual in observing the Rites of their Religion (though that were a false way of worship) most Heroical in their Justice, courage, fidelity, gratitude; then it was that they deserved to govern the world, and to be had in greatest honour above all other nations. And not only Cicero, and Polybius, two Heathen Writers, who, upon that account, might be thought more partial; But St. Austin also and Lactantius, two of the Fathers, do ascribe the flourishing of that Empire, when it was at its height, to the Religion and Piety and virtue of those times; and as they did afterwards degenerate from this, so did they decline likewise in their greatness and honour.

2. Thus also hath it been with particular persons; Amongst the Heathen, what Elogies do we find in the honour of Socrates, Aristides, Cato, Epictetus? The last of whom, though but a poor slave, had yet such a veneration paid to his memory, that his earthen lamp by which he was wont to study, was, after his death, sold for Three thousand Drachms.

Nor was it otherwise amongst the Christians; The Apostles were but poor Fishermen, illiterate Mechanicks; many of the Martyrs were but of mean condition, much opposed and persecuted in the world; and yet these men, during the time of their lives, were highly reverenced amongst those that knew them; and since their deaths, what can be more glorious than that renown which they have amongst men, when the greatest Kings and Princes will not mention their names without reverence, when whole Nations are willing to set apart, and to observe solemn days and Festivals in honour of their memories?

And as it hath always been thus formerly, so I appeal to every man’s breast, whether it be not so now. Let them but examine what their inclinations are towards such persons whom they believe to be truly virtuous; not only to such among them, as are their particular acquaintance and friends; but likewise to strangers, nay to very enemies, whether they do not esteem and love them and will-well to them.

It cannot be denyed, but that there are too many in the world, who propose to themselves such ways and courses for the promoting of their honour and reputation, as are quite opposite to that which I have now been discoursing of; namely, prophaneness and contempt of Religion, despising that which other men stand in awe of; by which they think to get the reputation of Wit and Courage; of Wit, by pretending to penetrate more deeply into the nature of things, and to understand them better than others do; not to be so easily imposed upon, as other credulous people are: Of Courage, by not being so easily scared at the apprehension of danger at a distance.

But the plain truth is, such persons do hereby prove themselves to be both Fools and Cowards.

Fools; In mistaking their great interest, in making choice of such means, as can never promote the end they design. There being no kind of men that are more exposed (whatsoever they themselves may think of it) than those that seek for credit by despising of Religion. Fools, in venturing their future estates and their souls upon such hazards, as all mankind would cry-out-upon, for the most palpable folly and madness, if they should do the like towards their Temporal estates, or their Bodies.

Cowards; In being more afraid of little dangers, because they are present, than of greater, because they are future, and at a distance. As that Souldier, who doth more dread the present danger of fighting, when he is obliged to it, than the future danger of suffering by Martial law for running away, may justly be esteemed a notorious coward; so may that man, who is more afraid of a present inconvenience, by incurring the prejudice and displeasure of his loose companions, to whom he would be acceptable, than of a future mischief from the judgment of God. No man will esteem another to be truely valiant, because he is not afraid to do such vile unworthy things as will expose him to the displeasure and punishment of the Civil Magistrate; much less should he be so accounted, for daring to do such things, as will in the issue expose him to the Divine vengeance.

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Footnotes

1. cap. 12. 26. Deut. 32. 9. Exod. 19. 5. Jer. 12. 7. Psal. 4. 3. ↩

2. Prov. 1. 9. Chap. 4. 8, 9. ↩

3. 1 Sam. 2. 30. Joh. 12. 26. ↩

4. Epist. 76. ↩

5. Tusc. Q. 2. ↩