These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, First, that ’tis no cause of Admiration that God should do Things whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his Being, because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend Why or How they are done; for seeing I now know that my Nature is very Weak and Finite, and that the Nature of God is Immense, Incomprehensible, Infinite; from hence I must fully, understand, that he can do numberless things, the Causes whereof lie hidden to Me. Upon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End (viz. Final Causes) as of no use in Natural Philosophy, for I cannot without Rashness Think my self able to Discover Gods Designes.

I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the Works of God are perfect, we must not Respect any one kind of Creature singly, but the Whole Universe of Beings; for perhaps what (if considered alone) may Deservedly seem Imperfect, yet (as it is a part of the World) is most perfect; and tho since I have doubted of all things, I have discover’d nothing certainly to Exist, but my self, and God, yet since I have Consider’d the Omnipotency of God, I cannot deny, but that many other things are made (or at least, may be made) by him, so that I my self may be a part of this Universe.

Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these Errors of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my Imperfection) * I find them to depend on two concurring Causes, on my faculty of Knowing, and on my faculty of Choosing or Freedome of my Will, that is to say, from my Understanding, and my Will together. For by my Understanding alone I only perceive Ideas, whereon I make Judgments, wherein (precisely so taken) there can be no Error, properly so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things, whose Ideas I have not in Me, yet I am not properly to be said Deprived of them, but only negatively wanting them; and I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of Knowing. And tho I understand him to be a skilful Workman, yet I cannot Think, that he ought to have put all those perfections in each Work of his singly, with which he might have endowed some of them.

Neither can I complain that God has not given me a Will, or Freedom of Choise, large and perfect enough; for I have experienced that ’tis Circumscribed by no Bounds.

And ’tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so perfect and so Great, but I Understand that there may be Perfecter and Greater, for if (for Example) I consider the Faculty of Understanding, I presently perceive that in me ’tis very small and Finite, and also at the same time I form to my self an Idea of an other Understanding not only much Greater, but the Greatest and Infinite, which I perceive to belong to God. In the same manner if I enquire into memory or imagination or any other faculties, I find them in my self Weak and Circumscribed, but in God I Understand them to be Infinite, there is therefore only my Will or Freedome of Choice, which I find to be so Great, that I cannot frame to my self an Idea of One Greater, so that ’tis by this chiefly by which I Understand my self to Bear the likeness and Image of God. For tho the Will in God be without comparison Greater then Mine, both as to the Knowledge and Power which are Joyn’d therewith, which make it more strong and Effective, and also as to the Object thereof, for God can apply himself to more things then I can. Yet being taken Formally and Precisely Gods Will seems no greater then Mine. For the Freedome of Will consists only in this, that we can Do, or not Do such a Thing (that is, affirm or deny, prosecute or avoid) or rather in this Only, that we are so carried to a Thing which is proposed by Our Intellect to Affirm or Deny, Prosecute or Shun, that we are sensible, that we are not Determin’d to the Choice or Aversion thereof, by any outward Force.

Neither is it Requisite to make one Free that he should have an Inclination to both sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more strongly I am inclined to one side (whether it be that I evidently perceive therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that God has so disposed my Inward Thoughts) By so much the more Free am I in my Choice.

Neither truly do Gods Grace or Natural Knowledge take away from my Liberty, but rather encrease and strengthen it. For that indifference which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me more to one side, then to the other, is the meanest sort of Liberty, and is so far from being a sign of perfection, that it only argues a defect or negation of Knowledge; for if I should always Clearly see what were True and Good I should never deliberate in my Judgement or Choice, and Consequently, tho I were perfectly Free, yet I should never be Indifferent.

From all which, I perceive that neither the Power of Willing precisely so taken, which I have from God, is the Cause of my Errors, it being most full and perfect in its kind; Neither also the Power of Understanding, for whatever I Understand (since ’tis from God that I Understand it) I understand aright, nor can I be therein Deceived.

From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors? To which, I answer, that they proceed from hence only, that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Understanding, I keep it not within the same bounds with my Understanding, but often extend it to those things which I Understand not, to which things it being Indifferent, it easily Declines from what is True and Good; and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth Exist, and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly Understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly, by how much the less indifferent I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks, but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature, and it so happens that I doubt, whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature, or Whether they are both the same: but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways, and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either, or to Judge nothing of either; But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them; for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side, yet the Knowing that they are only Conjectures, and not indubitable reasons, is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced, when I supposed all those things (which formerly I assented to as most True) as very False, for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner.

If I abstain from passing my Judgment, when I do not clearly and distinctly enough perceive what is Truth, ’tis evident that I do well, and that I am not deceived: But if I affirm or deny, then ’tis that I abuse the freedome of my will, and if I turn my self to that part which is false, I am deceived; but if I embrace the contrary Part, ’tis but by chance that I light on the Truth, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by the light of Nature that the Perception of the Understanding ought to preceed the Determination of the Will. And ’tis in this abuse of Free-Will that That Privation consists, which Constitutes Error; I say there is a Privation in the Action as it proceeds from Me, but not in the Faculty which I have received from God; nor in the Action as it depends on him.

Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a larger Intellective Faculty, or more Natural Light, for ’tis a necessary Incident to a finite Understanding that it should not Understand All things, and ’tis Incident to a Created Understanding to be Finite: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has bestowed upon me (tho he owed me nothing) then to think my self Robbed by him of those things which he never gave me.

Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a Will larger then my Understanding: for seeing the Will Consists in one thing only, and as it were in an Indivisible (viz. to Will, or not to Will) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be less then ’tis; and certainly by how much the Greater it is, so much the more Thankful I ought to be to him; that Gave it me.

Neither can I Complain that God concurrs with me in the Production of those Voluntary Actions or Judgements in which I am deceived: for those Acts as they depend on God are altogether True and Good; and I am in some measure more perfect in that I can so Act, then if I could not: for that Privation, in which the Ratio Formalis of Falshood and Sin consists, wants not the Concourse of God; For it is not A Thing, and having respect to him as its Cause, ought not to be called Privation, but Negation; for certainly ’tis no Imperfection in God, that he has given me a freedome of Assenting or not Assenting to some things, the clear and distinct Knowledge whereof he has not Imparted to my Understanding; but certainly ’tis an Imperfection in me, that I abuse this liberty, and pass my Judgement on those things which I do not Rightly Understand.

Yet I see that ’tis Possible with God to effect that (tho I should remain Free, and of a Finite Knowledge) I should never Err, that is, if he had endowed my Understanding with a clear and distinct Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an Occasion of deliberating; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand; Either of which things had God done, I easily perceive that I (as consider’d in my self) should be more perfect then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there may be a greater perfection in the whole Universe of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to Errors, and some not, then if they were all alike. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should Act on the Stage of this World a Part not the chief and most perfect of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from Error in the first way above specifi’d, which depends upon the Evident Knowledge of those things whereof I deliberate; Yet that I may abstain from Error by the other means abovemention’d, which depends only on this, That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident. For tho I have experienced in my self this Infirmity, that I cannot always be intent upon one and the same Knowledge, yet I may by a continued and often repeated Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as I have use of this Rule I may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an habit of not erring.

In which thing seeing, the greatest and chief perfection of Man consists, I repute my self to have gain’d much by this days Meditation, for that therein I have discover’d the Cause of Error, and Falshood; which certainly can be no other then what I have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, I bridle my Will so that it extend it self only to those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive, it is impossible that I can Err. For doubtless All clear and distinct Perception is something, and therefore cannot proceed from Nothing, but must necessarily have God for its Author (God, I say, Who is infinitely Perfect, and who cannot Deceive) and therefore it Must be True.

Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must beware off that I be not deceived, but also what I must Do to Discover Truth, for That I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things only, which I perfectly understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but confusedly and obscurely; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.

---

← Meditation 3. Of GOD, and that there is a God · Contents · Meditation 5. Of the Essence of Things Material. And herein Again of God. And →