Sir,
- I Can neither admire nor blame the Curiosity you express, to receive some Satisfaction about the important Distinction that is made use of, in defence of some Mysteries of the Christian Religion; namely, that they are indeed above Reason, but not against Reason. For though divers Learned Men have, especially of late, employed it; yet I perceive you and your Friends N. N. think, that they have not done it so clearly, as both to prevent the Exceptions of Infidels, or render them more groundless; and at least, to obviate the Surmises of those others, who have been persuaded to look upon this Distinction, but as a fine Evasion, whereby to elude some Objections that cannot otherwise be answered. And indeed, as far as I can discern by the Authors wherein I have met with it, (for I pretend not to judge of any others,) there are divers that employ this Distinction, few that have attempted to explain it, (and that I fear, not sufficiently) and none that has taken care to justifie it.
II. In order to the removal of the Difficulties that you take notice of, I shall endeavour to do these Two things: 1. To declare in what sense I think our Distinction is to be understood. And, 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or Illusory Distinction, but grounded upon the Nature of Things.
Though I do not desire to impose my Sentiments on any Man, much less on You; yet because I, as well as others, have had some occasions to make use of the Distinction we are considering; I think myself obliged, before I go any further, to acquaint you in what sense I understand it.
III. By such things then in Theology, as may be said to be above Reason, I conceive such Notions and Propositions, as mere Reason, that is, Reason unassisted by supernatural Revelation, would never have discover’d to us: Whether those things be to our finite Capacities, clearly comprehensible or not. And by things contrary to Reason, I understand such Conceptions and Propositions, as are not only undiscoverable by mere Reason, but also, when we understand them, do evidently and truly appear to be repugnant to some Principle, or to some Conclusion, of Right Reason.
IV. To illustrate this Matter a little, I shall propound to you a Comparison drawn from that Sense, which is allow’d to have the greatest Cognation with the Understanding, which I presume you will readily guess to be the Sight. Suppose then, that on a deep Sea, a Diver should bid you tell him, What you can see there; That which you would answer, would be, that you can see into a Sea-green Liquor, to the depth of some Yards, and no further: So that if he should farther ask you, Whether you see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea, you would return him a Negative Answer. If afterwards the Diver letting himself down to the Bottom, should thence bring up and shew you Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them; you would easily acknowledge, both that they lay beyond the reach of your Sight, and consequently argued an Imperfection in it; thô but such an Imperfection, as is not Personal but Common to you with other Men, and that the Pearls have the genuin Colour and Lustre, that naturally belongs to such Gems. But if this Diver should pretend, that each of these Pearls he shews you, is as large as a Tennis-Ball, or some of them bigger than the Shells they were inclos’d in, and that they are not round but cubical, and their colour not White or Orient, but Black or Scarlet; you would doubtless judge what he asserts, to be not only (or not so properly,) undiscernable by your Eyes, but contrary to the Informations of them, and therefore would deny what he affirms. Because, that to admit it, would not only argue your Sight to be Imperfect, but False and Delusory; thô the Organ be rightly qualified, and duly applied to its proper Objects.
V. This Illustration may give you some superficial Notion of the Difference betwixt a thing’s being above Reason, and its being contrary to it. But this may better appear, if we consider the Matter more distinctly. And to offer something in order to this, I shall beg leave to say, that, in my Opinion, the things that may be said to be above Reason, are not all of One sort, but may be distinguish’d into Two kinds, differing enough from each other.
VI. For it seems to me, that there are some Things, that Reason by its own Light cannot Discover; and others, that, when propos’d, it cannot Comprehend.
VII. And First, there are divers Truths in the Christian Religion, that Reason left to itself, would never have been able to find out, nor perhaps to have so much as dream’d of: Such as are most of Those that depend upon the Free Will and Ordination of God, as, That the World was made in six Days, That Christ should be Born of a Virgin, and That in his Person there should be united Two such infinitely distant Natures as the Divine and Human; and That the Bodies of Good Men shall be rais’d from Death, and so advantageously chang’d, that the Glorified Persons shall be like, or equal to, the Angels.