THere are not many Subjects in the whole compass of Natural Philosophy, that better deserve to be Inquired into by Christian Philosophizers, than That which is Discours’d of in the following Essay. For Certainly it becomes such Men to have Curiosity enough to Try at least, Whether it can be Discover’d, that there are any Knowable Final Causes, to be Consider’d in the Works of Nature. Since, if we neglect this Inquiry, we live in danger of being Ungrateful, in Overlooking those Uses of Things, that may give us Just Cause of Admiring and Thanking the Author of them, and of Losing the Benefits, relating as well to Philosophy as Piety, that the Knowledge of them may afford us. And if there be no such Things, we are more than in danger to Mispend our Labor and Industry, in fruitless Searching for such Things as are not to be Found. And an Inqury of this kind is now the more Seasonable, because two of the Chief Sects of the modern Philosophizers, do both of them, though upon differing Grounds, deny that the Naturalist ought at all to trouble or busie himself about Final Causes. For Epicurus,1 and most of his Followers (for I except some few late ones, especially the Learned Gassendus) Banish the Consideration of the Ends of Things; because the World being, according to them, made by Chance, no Ends of any Thing can be suppos’d to have been intended. And on the contrary,2 Monsieur Des Cartes, and most of his Followers, suppose all the Ends of God in Things Corporeal to be so Sublime, that ‘twere Presumption in Man to think his Reason can extend to Discover them. So that, according to these Opposite Sects, ‘tis either Impertinent for Us to Seek after Final Causes, or Presumptuous to think We may Find Them. Wherefore, I hope I shall be Excus’d, if, having been engag’d by some Sollicitations, (wherewith ‘tis needless to trouble the Reader,) I did not Decline to Try, what the Bare, but Attentive, Consideration of the Subject would Suggest to My Own Thoughts. And, tho’ ‘twas easie to Foresee, by this means my Friend might miss of receiving in my Essay, divers things that occurr’d not to Me; yet I consider’d on the other side, that such things would, notwithstanding my Silence, be found in the Authors that deliver’d them: and ‘twas very possible, that by the Course I took, I might light upon some Thoughts, that I should have miss’d, if I had prepossess’d my Mind with the Opinions of Others; which I was the less Tempted to do, because an easie prospect of my Theme suffic’d to let me see, I was like to have the Epicureans and Cartesians for my Adersaries, not my Assistants. And for the School-Philosophers; the very Slight Account that their Master Aristotle gives of One of my Four Questions, (for of the rest, as far as I remember, He says little or nothing,) gave me small hopes of being Aided by Them; especiaily since in This, as in many Other Questions, they proceed upon Grounds that I cannot Assent to. Anatomists indeed, and some Physicians, have done very laudably upon the Uses of the Parts of the Human Body; which I take this Occasion to Declare, that it may not be Suspected, that I do in the least Undervalue their happy Industry, because I Transcribe not Passages out of their Books: The Reasons of which Omission are, not only, That I had not any one Book of Anatomy at hand, when I was Writing; but, That the Uses of the Parts of Man’s Body related but to a small Part of my Discourse: to make which more Comprehensive, I took in the Consideration of more General Questions, besides that which was controverted between Aristotle and the Ancienter Philosophers, who disputed how Bodies, that were devoid of Knowledg, could Act for Ends.

Those that Relish no Books in Natural Philosophy but such as abound in Experiments, are seasonably Advertis’d, that I do not Invite Them to Read this Treatise; wherein I thought it much more Suitable to the Nature of my Subject and Design, to declare the Works of God, than of Men; and consequently to Deliver rather Observations, than Artificial Experiments. And even of the Former of these, tho’ perhaps most Readers may find in the ensuing Discourse Several that they have not met with in Classic Authors, yet I shall freely acknowledge, that, upon the Review I made of what I writ, I find, tho’ too Late to Repair the Omission, that I have left several Things unmentioned, that would have been very pertinent to my Subject; which may, I hope, be more easily Excus’d, because, the Body of the folfowing Disquisition having been Written many years ago, and Thrown by upon the Death of the3 Gentleman that Press’d me for it; I could not then take notice of those many Discoveries in Anatomy, and other Parts of Physiology, that have since been happily made. But perhaps some will think, I may have more need to Excuse the Largeness of Some Parts of the following Treatise, compar’d with the Others. And I should rather Grant than Answer the Objection, if I could not Alledge, that the Contagious Boldness of some Baptiz’d Epicureans, Engag’d me to dwell much longer on the Third Proposition of the Fourth Section, than I at first Intended. And on the other hand, the Cartesian Opinion having of late made it Requisite to Handle the formerly Difficult Question, about the Consideration of Final Causes, after a New Manner; I thought it Unfit, Lightly to Pass over the Paradox Maintain’d by so Great a Man; and Judg’d it Expedient in Some Places (what I could not do without Enlarging) to Propose Thoughts adjusted to to the Present State of Things in this Affair: in the Management of which, I have had so much more Regard to some Other Things, than to the Symmetry of the Parts whereof this Tract consists, that I will not say, That I fear, I have in It but Thrown together Materials for a Just Discourse on my Subject; since to Do so was the Main Thing I Intended. And if the Materials be Good and Solid, they will easily, in so Learned an Age as This, find an Architect, that will Dispose them in a more Artful Way, than I was either at Leisure or Sollicitous to do.


Contents · An Essay Inquiring Whether and How a Naturalist Should Consider Final Causes →

Footnotes

  1. Illud in his rebus vitum vehementer inesto, Effugere illorumque Errorem praemedit[…]us, Lumina qui faciunt Oculorum clara Craeata Prospicere ut possimus — Lucr. de rer. […]t. lib. IV. sect. 824. ↩

  2. Ita denique nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales, a fine, quem Deus aut Natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, desumemus; qui non tantum nobis debemus arrogare ut ejus consiliorum participes esse putemus. Cartesius Princip. Philosop. Parte prima Artic. 28. ↩

  3. Mr. Henry Oldenburgh, Secretary of the Royal Society. ↩