To handle the Third Question,1 It will be necessary for us to clear the grand Difficulty that has, ever since Aristotles time, and even before that, Perplex’d those that allow in Natural ral Philosophy, the Consideration of Final Causes. The Difficulty is obvious enough: For, much the greater part of Bodies being void of Knowledge, and most of them (as all Inanimate Bodies) of Life it self, it seems not conceivable, how they should act constantly for Ends, they are not capable of predesigning; and appositely imploy Means that they have no Knowledge wherewith to make choice of.
Aristotle, who expresly teaches, that Nature does nothing in vain, and rightly judg’d, that the Actions of Natural Agents tended to certain Ends,2 takes notice of this Difficulty; but seems rather to Shift it off than Resolve it; The Solution he frames regarding so peculiarly the Words wherein he has express’d the Objection, that I much doubt, whether it would signifie much to clear the same Difficulty propos’d in other Terms. And to me he seems to speak so darkly, not only in his Translators Latine, but in his own Greek, that, if he have given a good Solution of the Difficulty, I must ingenuously confess my Dullness, in not being able to understand it.
But, to consider the Difficulty it self, there are two Accounts, on which the Actions of natural Agents may be said to tend to a certain End: One, when the Agent has a Knowledge of that End, and acts with an Intention to obtain it; as, when a man shoots an Arrow to hit a mark: The Other is, when the Action of the Proximate Agent, is indeed so directed as it ought to be to obtain an End, and yet that End is neither Known nor Intended by the Proximate Agent, but by a Remoter Agent that is Intelligent. In the former of these Senses, I cannot admit that (not now to Examine whether any Living, but not Rational, Works of Nature May) any Inanimate Bodies Can, act for an End; for, to do so, presupposes, that the Agent both Knows the End he is to attain, and Purposes to attain it; which are things whereof Inanimate Bodies are uncapable. And to fancy with some, that they may have a Knowledge sui generis (as they speak,) which, tho’ confin’d to the actions proper to this or that particular kind of Body, is yet sufficient to determine to those Actions; is to offend against that rational and receiv’d Rule of Philosophizing, Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, and to introduce a sort of Knowledge, which I fear the Proposers do not well conceive; or at least, I am sure I do not.
It remains then, that I embrace the second Sense, in which we formerly said, that Natural things may be said to to work for an End; tho’ indeed in this Case, we must speak somewhat improperly: For, by him that Considers, the Action will be oftentimes more justly attributed to the Intelligent, but Remoter, than to the Immediate, Agent, which is but, as it were, the Instrument of the other. But how this is possible to done, appears difficult to be explain’d. To me it seems, it may be thus conceiv’d: The most Wise and Powerful Author of Nature, whose peircing sight is able to penetrate the whole Universe, & survey all the parts of it at once, did at the Beginning of Things, Frame things Corporeal into such a System, and Settled among them such Laws of Motion, as he judg’d sutable to the Ends he propos’d to Himself, in making the World. And as by vertue of his vast and boundless Intellect that he at first imploy’d, he was able not only to See the Present State of things he had made, but to Foresee all the Effects, that particular Bodies so and so qualify’d, and acting according to the Laws of Motion by him establish’d, could in such and such circumstances, have on one another: So by the same Omniscient Power, he was able to contrive the whole Fabrick, and all the parts of it, in such manner, that, whilst his general Concourse maintain’d the Order of Nature, each Part of this great Engine, the World, should without either Intention or Knowledge, as regularly and constantly Act towards the attainment of the respective Ends which he design’d them for, as if themselves really understood, and industriously prosecuted, those Ends. Just as in a well made Clock, the Spring, the Wheels, the Ballance, and the other parts, tho’ each of them Act according to the Impulses it receives, and the Determination that is given it, by the other pieces of the Engine, without knowing what the Neighbouring Parts, or what themselves do; yet their Tendencies are so Determin’d, and sometimes Overrul’d, and their Motions so Quickn’d, by the structure of the Clock, that they would not move more conveniently, nor better perform the Functions of a Clock, if they knew that they were to make the Index truly mark the Hours, and intended to make it do so. ‘Tis true, that ‘tis not easie to conceive how One Agent should, by so sim plean Instrument as Local motion, be able to Direct a Multitude of Agents, as numerous as the Bodies that make up a World, to Act as regularly, as if each of them Acted upon its own particular Design, and yet all of them Conspir’d to obey the Laws of Nature. But if we consider, that ‘tis to God, that is an Omniseient and Almighty Agent, that this Great Work is ascrib’d, we shall not think it incredible; especially if we consider, that, whereas ‘tis manifest enough, that a Multitude of Bodies Act, as we have suppos’d; if we will not ascribe the Direction and Superintendence of the Motions, that are manifestly fitted for the attainment of Ends, unto God, we must do it to Nature; which will not Lessen but Increase the Difficulty: And when I have seen, as sometimes I have with pleasure, a great Engine, wherein the Works of I know not how many Trades, and a great many other Motions, were performed by little Puppets, that manag’d the Tools of the Artifficers; and all these were set a work by one Spring, which communicated Motions that were regulated and determined by the particular structure of the little Statues and other Bodies: when, I say, I consider such things as these, I cannot think it impossible that the Divine and Great Δημιουργὸς,3 as both Philosophers and sacred Writers have styl’d the Worlds Creator; should be able by the Motions and Structures of Matter, to set a work very many Partial and Subordinate Engines. For ‘twill not, I hope, be deny’d, that the Multitude of These does not any thing near so much surpass the number of Those, which I saw in the hand of an illiterate Tradesman, as the Narrow Knowledge of that Artifficer is surpass’d by the Boundless Understanding of an Omniscient Artist. And ‘tis more, in the making so many and so various Bodys act according to their particular Designations, & yet all of them Conspire to the General Ends of the Universe, that Gods Wisdom, and (if I may so speak) his Skill is display’d, than barely in the making Bodies Act Appositely for Ends to themselves Unknown. For, if Moving Bodies be duly display’d, and have a sufficient connection, ‘tis not difficult to Direct a few of them to the attainment of an End propos’d by an Understanding Agent, tho’ Unknown to the Immediate Agents: As anciently among the Jewish Husband-men, (and at this day in some parts of the East) the Ox, that intended no such matter, did by Treading the Corn as well Separate the Grain from the Straw, as our Plowmen do, when they thresh it purposely to make that Separation: And a Horse or an Ass in a Mill, may as well by his going round Grind the Corn, as the Miller himself could do.