I Expect you should here urge on your Friends behalf, That the study of Physicks has one Prerogative, (above that of Divinity,) which, as it is otherwise a great Excellency, so does much add to the Delightfulness of it. I mean, the Certainty, and Clearness, and the thence resulting Satisfactoriness of our Knowledge of Physical, in comparison of any we can have of Theological matters, whose being Dark and Uncertain, the Nature of the things themselves, and the numerous Controversies of differing Sects about them, sufficiently manifest.
But upon this Subject, divers things are to be consider’d.
For first, as to the Fundamental and Necessary Articles of Religion, I do not admit the Allegation, but take those Articles to be both Evident, and capable of a Moral Demonstration. And if there be any Articles of Religion, for which a Rational and Cogent Proof cannot be brought, I shall for that very reason conclude, that such Articles are not absolutely Necessary to be believ’d; since it seems no way reasonable to imagine, that God having been pleased to send not onely his Prophets and his Apostles, but his onely Son into the World, to promulgate to Mankind the Christian Religion, and both to cause it to be consign’d to writing, that it may be known, and to alter the course of Nature by numerous Miracles, that it might be believ’d; it seems not reasonable, I say, to imagine, that he should not propose those Truths, which he in so wonderful and so solemn a manner recommended, with at least so much Clearness, as that studious and well-dispos’d Readers may certainly understand such as are necessary for them to believe.
- Though I will not here engage my self in a Disquisition of the several kinds, or, if you please, Degrees, of Demonstration, (which yet is a Subject that I judge far more considerable than cultivated,) yet I must tell you, that as a Moral certainty (such as we may attain about the Fundamentals of Religion) is enough in many cases for a wise man, and even a Philopher to acquiesce in; so that Physical Certainty, which is pretended for the Truths demonstrated by Naturalists, is, even where ‘tis rightfully claim’d, but an inferiour kind or degree of certainty, as Moral certainty also is. For even Physical Demonstrations can beget but a Physical Certainty, (that is, a Certainty upon supposition that the Principles of Physick be true,) not a Metaphysical Certainty, (wherein ‘tis absolutely impossible, that the thing believ’d should be other than true.) For instance, All the Physical Demonstrations of the Antients about the causes of particular Phaenomena of Bodies, suppose, that ex nihilo nihil fit; and this may readily be admitted in a Physical sense, because according to the course of Nature, no Body can be produc’d out of Nothing, but speaking universally it may be false, as Christians generally, and even the Cartesian Naturalists, asserting the Creation of the World, must believe, that, de facto, it is. And so whereas Epicurus does, I remember, prove, that a Body once dead cannot be made alive again, by reason of the dissipation and dispersion of the Atoms, ‘twas, when alive, compos’d of; though all men will allow this assertion to be Physically demonstrable, yet the contrary may be true, if God’s Omnipotence intervenes, as all the Philosophers that acknowledge the Authority of the New Testament, where Lazarus and others are recorded to have been raised from the dead, must believe, that it actually did appear, and even all unprejudic’d Reasoners must allow it to be Possible, there being no Contradiction impli’d in the Nature of the thing. But now to affirm, that such things as are indeed Contradictories cannot be both true, or, that factum infectum reddi non potest, are Metaphysical Truths, which cannot possibly be other than true, and consequently beget a Metaphysical and absolute Certainty. And your Master Cartesius was so sensible of a dependance of Physical Demonstrations upon Metaphysical Truths, that he would not allow any certainty not onely to them, but even to Geometrical Demonstrations, till he had evinc’d, that there is a God, and that he cannot deceive men that make use of their Faculties aright.
To which I may add, that even in many things that are look’d upon as Physical Demonstrations, there is really but a Moral Certainty. For when, for instance, Des-Cartes and other Modern Philosophers, take upon them to demonstrate, That there are divers Comets that are not Meteors, because they have a Parallax lesser than that of the Moon, and are of such a bigness, and some of them move in such a Line, &c. ‘tis plain, that divers of these Learned men had never the opportunity to observe a Comet in their Lives, but take these Circumstances upon the credit of those Astronomers that had such Opportunities. And though the Inferences, as such, may have a Demonstrable Certainty; yet the Premisses they are drawn from having but an Historical one, the presumed Physico-Mathematical Demonstration can produce in a wary mind but a Moral Certainty, and not the greatest neither of that kind that is possible to be attain’d; as he will not scruple to acknowledge, that knows by experience, how much more difficult it is, than most men imagine, to make Observations about such nice Subjects, with the exactness that is requisite for the building of an undoubted Theory upon them. And there are I know not how many things in Physicks, that men presume they believe upon Physical and Cogent Arguments, wherein they really have but a Moral assurance; which is a Truth heeded by so few, that I have been invited to take the more particular notice of them in other Papers, written purposely to show the doubtfulness and incompleatness of Natural Philosophy; of which Discourse, since you may command a sight, I shall not scruple to refer you thither for the Reasons of my affirming here, that the most even of the modern Virtuosi are wont to fancy more of Clearness and Certainty in their Physical Theories, than a Critical Examiner will find. Onely that you may not look upon this as a put off, rather than a reference, I will here touch upon a couple of Subjects, which men are wont to believe to be, and which indeed ought to be, the most throughly understood; I mean the Nature of Body in general, and the Nature of Sensation.
And for the first of these, since we can turn our selves no way, but we are every where environ’d, and incessantly touch’d by Corporeal Substances, one would think that so familiar an Object, that does so assiduously, and so many ways affect our Senses, and for the knowledge of which we need not inquire into the distinct Nature of particular Bodies, nor the properties of any one of them, should be very perfectly known unto us. And yet the Notion of Body in general, or what it is that makes a thing to be a Corporeal Substance, and discriminates it from all other things, has been very hotly disputed of, even among the modern Philosophers, & adhuc sub judice lis est. And though your Favourite Des-Cartes, in making the nature of a Body to consist in Extension every way, has a notion of it, which ‘tis more easie to find fault with, than to substitute a better; yet I fear, ‘twill appear to be attended, not onely with this Inconvenience, That God cannot, within the compass of this World, wherein if any Body vanish into Nothing, the place or space left behind it must have the three Dimensions, and so be a true Body, annihilate the least particle of Matter, at least without, at the same instant and place, creating as much, (which agrees very ill with that necessary and continual dependance, which he asserts Matter it self to have on God for its very Being;) but with such other inconveniences, that some Friends of yours, otherwise very inclinable to the Cartesian Philosophy, know not how to acquiesce in it: and yet I need not tell you, how Fundamental a Notion the deviser of it asserts it to be. Neither do I see, how this Notion of a Corporeal Substance will any more, than any of the formerly received Definitions of it, extricate us out of the Difficulties of that no less perplexed, than famous Controversie, de Compositione Continui. And though some ingenious men, who perhaps perceive better than others, how intricate it is, have of late endeavoured to shew, that men need not be sollicitous to determine this Controversie, it not being rightly propos’d by the Schoolmen that have started it; and though I perhaps think, that Natural Philosophy may be daily advanc’d without the decision of it, because there is a multitude of considerable things to be discover’d and perform’d in Nature, without so much as dreaming of this Controversie; yet still, as I would propose the Question, the Difficulties, till removed, will spread a thick night over the Notion of Body in general. For, either a Corporeal and extended Substance is (either really or mentally) divisible into parts endow’d with Extension, and each of these parts is divisible also into other Corporeal parts, lesser and lesser, in infinitum; or else this subdivision must stop somewhere, (for there is no mean between the two members of the Distinction;) and in either case the Opinion pitch’d upon will be liable to those Inconveniences, not to say Absurdities, that are rationally urg’d against it by the maintainers of the Opposite; the Objections on both sides being so strong, that some of the more Candid, even of the Modern Metaphysicians, after having tir’d themselves and their Readers with arguing Pro and Con, have confess’d the Objections on both sides to be insoluble.
But though we do not clearly understand the Nature of Body in general; yet sure we cannot but be perfectly acquainted with what passes within our selves in reference to the particular Bodies we daily See, and Hear, and Smell, and Taste, and Touch. But alas, though we know but little, save by the Informations of our senses; yet we know very little of the manner by which our Senses informs us. And to avoid prolixity, I will at present suppose with you, that the Ingenious Des Cartes and his followers have given the fairest account of Sensation, that is yet extant. Now according to him, a Man’s Body being but a well organiz’d Statue, that which is truly called Sensation is not perform’d by the Organ, but by the Mind, which perceives the motion produc’d in the Organ; (for which reason he will not allow Brutes to have Sense properly so call’d;) so that if you ask a Cartesian, how it comes to pass that the Soul of Man, which he justly asserts to be an immaterial Substance, comes to be wrought upon, and that in such various manners, by those external Bodies that are the objects of our Senses, he will tell you, that by their Impressions on the Sensories, they variously move the Fibres or Threds of the Nerves, wherewith those parts are endow’d, and by which the Motion is propagated to that little Kernel in the Brain, call’d by many Writers the Conarion, where these differing motions being perceiv’d by the there residing Soul, become Sensations, because of the intimate union, and, as it were, Permistion (as Cartesius himself expresses it) of the Soul with the Body.
But now, Sir, give me leave to take notice, that this Union of an Incorporeal with a Corporeal Substance, (and that without a Medium) is a thing so unexampled in Nature, and so difficult to comprehend, that I somewhat question, whether the profound Secrets of Theology, not to say the adorable Mystery it self of the Incarnation, be more abstruse than this. For how can I conceive, that a Substance purely immaterial, should be united without a Physical Medium, (for in this case there can be none,) with the Body, which cannot possibly lay hold on It, and which It can pervade and flie away from at pleasure, as Des-Cartes must confess the Soul actually does in Death. And ‘tis almost as difficult to conceive, how any part of the Body, without excepting the Animal Spirits, or the Conarion, (for these are as truly Corporeal as other parts of the Humane Statue,) can make Impressions upon a Substance perfectly Incorporeal, and which is not immediately affected by the motions of any other parts, besides the Genus Nervosum. Nor is it a small difficulty to a meer Naturalist (who, as such, does not in Physical matters take notice of Revelations about Angels,) to conceive how a finite Spirit can either move, or, which is much the same thing, regulate and determine the motion of a Body. But that which I would on this occasion invite you to consider, is, that supposing the Soul does in the Brain perceive the differing motions communicated to the outward Senses; yet this, however it may give some account of Sensation in general, will not at all show us a satisfactory Reason of particular and distinct Sensations. For if I demand, why, for Instance, when I look upon a Bell that is ringing, such a motion or impression in the Conarion produces in the mind that peculiar sort of perception, Seeing, and not Hearing; and another motion, though coming from the same Bell at the same time, produces that quite differing sort of perception that we call Sound, but not Vision; what can be answered, but that it was the good pleasure of the Author of Humane Nature to have it so? And if the question be ask’d about the differing Objects of any one particular Sense; as, Why the great plenty of unperturbed Light that is reflected from Snow, Milk, &c, does produce a Sensation of whiteness, rather than redness or yellowness? Or why the smell of Castor, or Assa foetida, produces in most persons that which they call a Stink, rather than a Perfume? (especially since we know some Hysterical Women, that think it not onely a wholesome, but a pleasing smell.) And if also you further ask, why Melody and sweet things do generally delight us? and discords and bitter things do generally displease us? Nay, why a little more than enough of some Objects that produce pleasure, will produce pain? (as may be exemplifi’d in a cold hand, as it happens to be held out at a just, or at too near a distance from the fire:) If, I say, these, and a thousand other questions of the like kind, be ask’d, the Answer will be but the general one, that is already given, that such is the nature of Man. For to say, that moderate Motions are agreeable to the nature of the Sensory they are excited in, but violent and disorderly ones, (as j[…]ring Sounds, and scorching Heat) do put it into too violent a motion for its Texture; will by no means satisfie. For, besides that this Answer gives no account of the variety of Sensations of the same kind, as of differing Colours, Tastes, &c. but reaches onely to Pleasure and Pain; even as to these, it will reach but a very little way; unless the Givers of it can show, how an Immaterial Substance should be more harm’d by the brisker motion of a Body, than by the more languid.
And as you and your Friend think, you may justly smile at the Aristotelians, for imagining that they have given a tolerable account of the Qualities of Bodies, when they have told us, that they spring from certain substantial Forms, though when they are ask’d particular Questions about these Incomprehensible Forms, they do in effect but tell us in general, that they have such and such Faculties, or Effects, because Nature, or the Author of Nature, endow’d them therewith; so I hope you will give me leave to think, that it may keep us from boasting of the Clearness and Certainty of our knowledge about the Operations of sensible Objects, whilst, as the Aristotelians cannot particularly show, how their Qualities are produc’d, so we cannot particularly explicate, how they are perceiv’d; the principal thing that we can say, being, in substance, this, that our Sensations depend upon such an union or permistion of the Soul and Body, as we can give no Example of in all Nature, nor no more distinct account of, than that it pleased God so to couple them together. But I beg your pardon for having detain’d you so long upon one Subject, though perhaps it will not prove time mis-spent, if it have made you take notice, that in spight of the clearness and certainty, for which your Friend so much prefers Physicks before Theology, we are Yet to seek, (I say Yet, because I know not what Time may Hereafter discover) both for the Definition of a Corporeal Substance, and a satisfactory account of the manner of Sensation: though without the true Notion of a Body we cannot understand that Object of Physicks in general, and without knowing the Nature of Sensation, we cannot know That, from whence we derive almost all that we know of any Body in particular.
If after all this your Friend shall say, That Des-Cartes’s account of Body, and other things in Physicks, being the best that men can give, if they be not satisfactory, it must be imputed to Humane Nature not to the Cartesian Doctrine, I shall not stay to dispute how far the allegation is true; especially since, though it be admitted, it will not prejudice my Discourse. For, whatsoever the Cause of the imperfection of our Knowledge about Physical matters be, that there is an Imperfection in that Knowledge is manifest; and that ought to be enough to keep us from being puffed up by such an imperfect Knowledge, and from undervaluing upon its account the study of those mysteries of Divinity, which, by reason of the Nobleness and Remoteness of the Objects, may much better than the Nature of Corporeal things, (which we see, and feel, and continually converse with,) have their obscurity attributed to the weakness of our humane Understandings. And if it be a necessary Imperfection of Humane Nature, that, whilst we remain in this mortal condition, the Soul being confin’d to the dark prison of the Body, is capable (as even Aristotle somewhere confesses) but of a dim knowledge; so much the greater value we ought to have for Christian Religion, since by its means (and by no other without it) we may attain a condition, wherein, as our Nature will otherwise be highly blessed and advanced; so our Faculties will be Elevated and Enlarged, and probably made thereby capable of attaining degrees and kinds of knowledge, to which we are here but strangers. In favour of which I will not urge the received Opinion of Divines, that before the Fall (which yet is a less noble condition than is reserved for us in Heaven,) Adam’s knowledge was such, that he was able at first sight of them to give each of the Beasts a name expressive of its Nature; because that in spight of some skill (which my Curiosity for Divinity, not Philosophy, gave me) in the holy Tongue, I could never find, that the Hebrew names of Animals, mention’d in the beginning of Genesis, argued a (much) clearer insight into their Natures, than did the names of the same or some other Animals in Greek, or other Languages; wherefore, (as I said) I will not urge Adam’s knowledge in Paradise for that of the Saints in Heaven, though the notice he took of Eve at his first seeing of her, (if it were not convey’d to him by secret Revelation) may be far more probably urg’d, than his naming of the Beasts: But I will rather mind you, that the Proto-martyr’s sight was strengthened so,1 as to see the heavens open’d, and Jesus standing at the right hand of God; and when the Prophet had pray’d,2 that his Servant’s Eyes might be open’d, he immediately saw the Mountain, where they were, all cover’d with Chariots and Horsemen, which, though mention’d to be of Fire, were altogether invisible to him before. To which, as a higher Argument, I shall onely add a couple of passages of Scripture, which seem to allow us even vast Expectations as to the knowledge our glorifi’d Nature may be advanc’d to. The one is that which St. Paul says to the Corinthians,3 For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face: Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known. And the other, where Christ’s Favourite-Disciple tells Believers, Beloved,4 now we are the Sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know, that when he shall appear, we shall be like him: for we shall see him as he is.
What has hitherto been discours’d, contains the first Consideration, that I told you might be propos’d about the Certainty ascrib’d to the knowledge we are said to have of Natural things; but this is not all I have to represent to you on this Subject. For I consider further, that ‘tis not onely by the Certainty we have of them, that the knowledge of things is endear’d to us, but also by the Worthiness of the Object, the Number of those that are unacquainted with it, the Remoteness of it from common Apprehensions, the Difficulty of acquiring it without peculiar Advantages, the Usefulness of it when attain’d, and other particulars, which ‘tis not here necessary to enumerate. I presume, you doubt not but your Friend does very much prefer the knowledge he has of the Mysteries of Nature (at many of which we have as yet but Ingenious Conjectures) to the knowledge of one that understands the Elements of Arithmetick, though He be Demonstratively sure of the Truth of most of his Rules and Operations. And questionless Copernicus received a much higher satisfaction in his Notion about the Stability of the Sun, and the Motion of the Earth, though it were not so clear but that Tycho, Ricciolus, and other eminent Astronomers have rejected it, than in the knowledge of divers of the Theorems about the Sphere, that have been demonstrated by Euclid, Theodosius, and other Geometricians. Our discovering that some Comets are not, as the Schools would have them, Sublunary Meteors, but Celestial Bodies, and the Conjectural Theory, which is all that hitherto we have been able to attain of them, do much better please both your Friend, and you, and me, than the more certain knowledge we have of the time of the Rising and Setting of the Fixed Stars. And the Estimates we can make, by the help of Parallaxes, of the Heights of those Comets, and of some of the Planets, though they are uncertain enough, (as may appear by the vastly different distances that are assigned to those Bodies by eminent Astronomers;) yet these uncertain measures of such Elevated and Celestial Lights do far more please us, than that we can by the help of a Geometrical Quadrant, or some such Instrument, take with far greater Certainty the height of a Tower or a Steeple. And so a Mathematician, when he probably conjectures at the compass of the Terrestrial Globe, and divides, though but unaccurately, its Surface, first, into proportions of Sea and Land, and then into Regions of such Extents and Bounds, and, in a word, skilfully plays the Cosmographer; thinks himself much more nobly and pleasantly imploy’d, than when, being reduc’d to play the Surveyor, he does with far more certainty measure how many Acres a Field contains, and set out with what Hedges and Ditches it is bounded. Now, that the knowledge of God, and of those Mysteries of Theology, that are ignor’d by far the greatest part of Mankind, has more sublime and excellent Objects, and is unattain’d to by much the greatest part even of Learned men, and nevertheless is of unvaluable Importance, and of no less Advantage towards the purifying and improving of us here, and the making us perfect and happy hereafter, the past Discourse has very much miscarried if it have not evinc’d. Wherefore, as to be admitted into the P[…]ivy-Council of some Great Monarch, and thereby be enabled to give a probable ghess at those thoughts and designs of his, that Govern Kingdoms, and make the Fates of Nations, is judged preferrable to that clearer knowledge that a Notary can have of the dying thoughts and intentions of an ordinary Person whose Will he makes: And as the knowledge of a skilful Physician, whose Art is yet conjectural, is preferrable to that of a Cutler that makes his Dissecting Knives, though this man can more certainly perform what he designs in his own profession, than the Physician can in his: And (in fine) as the skill of a Jeweller, that is conversant about Diamonds, Rubies, Saphires, and some other sorts of small Stones, which being for the most part brought us out of the Indies, we must take many things about them upon report, is, because of the Nobleness of the Object, preferr’d to that of a Mason that deals in whole Quarries of common Stones, and may be sure upon his own Experience of divers things concerning them, which as to Jewels we are allowed to know but upon Tradition: So a more dimm and imperfect knowledge of God, and the Mysteries of Religion, may be more desirable, and upon that account more delightful, than a clearer knowledge of those Inferior Truths that Physicks are wont to teach.
I must now mention one particular more, which may well be added to those that peculiarly indear Physicks to the Divine that is studious of them. For, as he contemplates the works of Nature not barely for themselves, but to be the better qualified and excited to admire and praise the Author of Nature; so his Contemplations are delightful to him, not barely as they afford a pleasing Exercise to his Reason, but as they procure him a more welcome approbation from his Conscience, these distinct satisfactions being not at all inconsistent. And questionless, though Esau did at length miss of his aim, yet, while he was hunting Venison for the good old Patriark that desired it of him, besides the pleasure he was us’d to take in pursuing the Deer he chas’d,5 he took a great one in considering, that now he hunted to please his Father, and in order to obtain of him an inestimable Blessing. So, when David imployd his skilful Hand and Voice in praising God with Vocal and Instrumental Musick, he receiv’d in one Act a double satisfaction, by exercising his Skill and his Devotion; and was no less pleas’d with those melodious sounds, as they were Hymns, than as they were Songs. And this Example prompts me to add, that as the devout Student of Nature we were speaking of, does Intentionally refer the knowledge he seeks of the Creatures to the glory of the Creator; so in his Discoveries, that which most contents him, is, that the Wonders he observes in Nature, heighten that Admiration he would fain raise to a less disproportion to the Wisdom of God; and furnish him with a nobler Holocaust for those Sacrifices of Praise he is justly ambitious to offer up to the Deity. And as there is no doubt to be made, but that, when David invented (as the Scripture intimates that he did) new Instruments of Musick,6 there was nothing in that Invention that pleas’d him so much, as that they could assist him to praise God the more melodiously; go the pious Student of Nature finds nothing more welcome in the Discoveries he makes of her Wonders, than the Rises and Helps they may afford him, the more worthily to celebrate and glorifie the Divine Attributes adumbrated in the Creatures. And as a Huntsman or a Fowler, if he meets with some strange Bird or Beast, or other Natural Rarity, thinks himself much the more fortunate if it happen to be near the Court, where he may have the King to present it to, than if he were to keep it but for himself or some of his Companions; So our Devout Naturalist has his Discoveries of Natures Wonders indear’d to him, by having the Deity to present them to, in the Veneration they excite in the Finder, and which they inable him to ingage others to joyn in.
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