Yet it may well be doubted, (says Eugenius) whether the Reverence and Submission we owe to Senates, or Princes, extend to our very Reasons, and our inward Thoughts: For the Right, and the Skil to Govern, are two very distinct things; nor does the one confer the other: A Crown, how pretious soever, adorns but the outside of the Head, without enriching the inside; and its Splendour will scarce dazle a VVise beholders Eyes, though it but too often does theirs that wear it: No, the Tribunal of reason has a Jurisdiction that reaches to Thrones themselves, and what you well observed just now concerning the difficulty of avoiding faults in Government, will, I presume, make you think it excusable, if I confess that I think, Soveraigns do now and then do what you confess ‘tis so hard for them to avoid doing; Nor is it more a Breach of Loyalty, not to think a weak Governour a Prudent one, than not to think him Tall, or Streight, or Sharp-sighted, if Nature have made him Low, or Crooked, or Purblind. A Senate or a Monarch may indeed command my Life and Fortune; but as for my Opinions, whether of Persons, or things, I cannot in most cases command them my self, but must suffer them to be such as the Nature of the things I judge of requires; and therefore, the thinking all things done with VVisdome that are done by Men in Power, is too great an Impossibility to be a Duty; and besides, it would lessen the Merit of Obedience, which otherwise would not appear to be paid to the Authority of the Magistrate, since we readily obey the Injunction of Lawyers and Physitians, as long as we think them Prudently fram’d for our good, though we acknowledge not these Persons to have any right to Command us.
But though (continues Eugenius) I take Reason to be so supream a thing, that as even the greatest Princes Actions should be regulated by it, so they may be judg’d by it; yet I allow lawfull Authority a Jurisdiction over my Actions, that I deny it over my Opinions; and though I can obey the Orders that have the Impresses of VVisdome, as well as the stamp of Authority, with more hope and alacrity, yet I can obey those wherein I think Power is unguided by Prudence, with no less Punctualness and Fidelity: I would not resist a Magistrate when I cannot esteem him; and though I dare discern Folly even in the greatest Princes, yet I can reverence Authority in the weakest.
I know Eugenius too well (says Lindamor) not to believe him: But though I confess, that to do what you say, is to do much, and to do that which I fear is not usually done, yet me-thinks it were well if we did somewhat more; for whereas most humane Actions, especially about Matters political, are attended with great variety of Circumstances, according to some or other of which, they may be differingly considered, and estimated, as ‘tis not very difficult to make many, if not most Actions appear politick or unwise, according as they are Cloathed with those of their Circumstances, that may be applied to excuse them, or with those that are fit to discommend them; so I would take a care to put the favourablest Constructions on those publick Counsels, that are capable of more Constructions than one, and use the Parents of my Country, as Noah’s two dutifull Children did their distemper’d Father, whose Nakedness when they had once discovered, they covered too; and that in such a way, as shewed they were unwilling to see more of it than was necessary to enable them to hide it. And I say this, (continues Lindamor) with Relation to Eugenius, and such as he; for as to the Vulgar, who yet make up the far greatest and loudest part of those that would intrude themselves into State-affairs, upon the pretence of their being ill managed by their Superiours; I cannot but think, that whatever the course of Affairs be, these cannot but be incompetent Judges of their being Politick, or the contrary: For to judge of things barely by success, were somewhat to forget that there is a supream and absolute disposer of Events, and has been a practice always rejected by the Wise, as both discouraging Wisdome and affronting it; And as for the Counsels, by which indeed the Prudence or Imprudence of publick Actions is to be estimated, the Vulgar is rarely admitted to have such a Prospect into the true State of Affairs, as is requisite to enable them to judge of the Expedience or unadvisedness of them, being unacquainted with the frame and Motives of the Prince’s Counsels and Designs: Ordinary Men may often think that Imprudent, whil’st they consider it only in it self, which its congruity to the rest of the Prince’s designs may make Politick enough, and a private Whisper, or the Intimation from an unsuspected Spy, or an intercepted Letter, or divers other things unperceiv’d, and perhaps undreamt of, by those that are not of the State-Cabal, may make it wise to do several things, which to those that look only at the Actions, without knowing the Motives, may appear Unpolitick, and would indeed be so, were it not for these Reasons, which yet ought to be as little Divulged as Disobey’d: So that the Peoples forwardness, to quarrel with the Transactions of their Prince, is usually compounded of Pride and Ignorance, and is most incident to those, that do not sufficiently understand either State-affairs or themselves; and whil’st they judge upon incompetent Information, even when their Superiours are in the fault, they may be so, for censuring them.
I must not now dispute, (says Eusebius) whether such as you, Gentlemen, whom their Conditions, Parts and Opportunities qualifie to discern the Interests and Designs of Princes, may not be allowed to judge of their Counsels, and see their Errours; As our late Astronomers, being assisted with good Glasses, are allowed to tell us, that they discern Spots even in the Sun it self. But certainly, the Ambition of Pragmatical Inferiours, to make themselves States-men, upon pretence that those that sit at the Helm do not Govern it as wisely as these would do, if they were in the same places, is a fault no less prejudicial to any State, than Epidemical in some of them: For whil’st the Government is thus Decryed, the same disadvantageous Representatations embolden Strangers and Forrainers to attempt the Subversion of a State, and make the dispondent Subjects despair of preserving it, little considering that there are scarce ever any Imprudences in a Government, that can prove any thing near so Prejudicial to the Generality of the Subjects, as would the Subversion of it, whether by Forain Conquest, or by Intestine Jarrs; such changes seldome doing less than entail upon unhappy Countries the fears and mischiefs of Warr. And that though it be granted, that the right of Governing does not confer the Skil, yet ‘tis much better to stick to the former, than oppose or desert it, because it wants the latter: For a right to a Crown, is that, which for the most part manifestly belongs but to one, and is seldome plausibly pretended to by above two or three, whereas the Skil to Govern is so undetermined, and so uncertain a thing, that Mens Innate pride and Self-love would encline almost every Man to claim it for himself, especially, since by challenging that, he might put for no less than Soveraignty: And in a State thus abandoned to the craftiest or the strongest, there would never want disturbing Vicissitude of Governments, as well as Governours, since whoever could get Interest enough in the Souldiery, or the Multitude, would quickly devise and impose such a frame of Government, as may put the Management of Affairs into his and his Parties hands, and give them the Authority that have the Power. But (resumes Eusebius) I must remember, that not Politicks, but Divinity is my Profession, and therefore without enlarging upon the confusion that is inevitable in a State, where the right of Governing being not heeded, or at least not ascertained, every Man would pretend to Counsel or Command, and none would think himself bound to Obey; I shall only mind you, that Magistracy having been instituted by God, for the good of Mankind, we may in obeying our Lawfull Magistrates, though perhaps less Wise than we could wish them, not only participate the Advantages naturally accruing from Obedience to Superiours, but divers peculiar Blessings that God oftentimes vouchsafes to our Obedience to his Vice-gerents, and his Institutions. Let Subjects therefore (says Eusebius) wish for wise Princes, but submit to those the Providence of God, and the Laws of their Country, may have given them: Let us, if by any just way we be called to it, assist a Prince with the wisest Counsels we can; if not, let us assist him to make the best of the unwise Counsels he has taken, without adding our Factiousness, or our Passions to his Misgovernment, remembring that, at least in my Opinion, to the happiness of a Common-wealth, it is not only requisite that the Prince know how to command well, but that the Subjects obey well; and that even weak Counsels, faithfully assisted, and as much as may be rectified or repaired by those that are to Execute them, may less prejudice the publick, than the froward and jarring endeavours of Men, that perhaps would be wiser Rulers if they had a right to be so. It may be (continues Eusebius) that affection and diligence in the publick Service, may, in spight of the Governments miscarriages, prevent, or at least retard and lessen, the Ruine of the State. But however, (concludes he) it will be no small satisfaction to an honest Man, and a loyal Subject, not to be conscious to himself of having contributed to the publick Calamities, either by his own Provocations, or his Factious indignation at the Princes faults; if a Man have done his utmost to hinder the Ruine he comes to be involved in, the publick Calamity will be far lighter to him, being not clogged by private Guilt; and he will support the misfortune of it with far the less trouble, if he be to support nothing else. Nay, since the Service we do to whatever Prince is rightfully set over us, upon the score of his being Gods Vice-gerent, is ultimately directed to that Supream, and as the Scripture calls him, Only Potentate, whose Manificence is as inexhausted as his Treasure; we may safely expect, that whatever prejudice we here sustain upon the account of the Prince’s commands, will hereafter be advantageously considered to us in the reward of our Obedience.
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