In the next place, I think we ought to distinguish between Reason consider’d in it self, and Reason consider’d in the Exercise of it, by this or that Philosopher, or by this or that Man, or by this or that Company or Society of Men, whether all of one Sect, or of more.
If you will allow me to borrow a School-phrase, I shall express this more shortly by saying, I distinguish between Reason in Abstracto, and in Concreto. To clear this matter, we may consider, That whatever you make the Faculty of Reason to be in it self, yet the Ratiocinations it produces are made by Men, either singly reasoning, or concurring in the same Ratiocinations and Opinions; and consequently, if these Men do not make the best use of their Reasoning Faculty, it will not be necessary, that what thwarts their Ratiocinations, must likewise thwart the Principles or the Dictates of right Reason. For, Man having a Will and Affections as well as an Intellect, though our Dijudications and Tenents ought indeed (in matters speculative) to be made and pitch’d upon by our unbiass’d Understandings; yet really our Intellectual Weaknesses, or our Prejudices, or Prepossession by Custom, Education, &c. our Interest, Passions, Vices, and I know not how many other things, have so great and swaying an Influence on them, that there are very few Conclusions that we make, or Opinions that we espouse, that are so much the pure Results of our Reason, that no personal Disability, Prejudice, or Fault, has any Interest in them.
This I have elsewhere more amply discours’d of on another occasion;1 wherefore I shall now add but this, That the distinction, I have been proposing, does (if I mistake not) reach a great deal further than you may be aware of. For not only whole Sects, whether in Religion or Philosophy, are in many cases subject to Prepossessions, Envy, Ambition, Interest, and other misleading things, as well as single Persons; but, which is more considerable to our present purpose, the very Body of Mankind may be embued with Prejudices, and Errors, and that from their Childhood, and some also ev’n from their Birth, by which means they continue undiscern’d and consequently unreform’d.
This you will think an Accusation as bold as high; but to let you see, that the Philosophers, you most respect, have made the same Observation, though not apply’d to the same case, I must put you in mind, that Monsieur Des Cartes begins his Principles of Philosophy with taking notice, That, because we are born Children, we make divers unright Judgments of things, which afterwards are wont to continue with us all our Lives, and prove radicated Prejudices, that mislead our Judgments on so many occasions, that he elsewhere tells us, he found no other way to secure himself from their Influence, but once in his Life solemnly to doubt of the Truth of all that he had till then believ’d, in order to the re-examining of his former Dijudications. But I remember, our illustrious Verulam warrants a yet further Prejudice against many things that are wont to be look’d on as the suggestions of Reason. For having told us, That the Mind of Man is besieg’d with four differing kinds of Idols or Phantasms, when he comes to enumerate them, he teaches, that there are not only such as Men get by Conversation and Discourse one with another, and such as proceed from the divers Hypotheses or Theories and Opinions of Philosophers, and from the perverse ways of Demonstration, and likewise such as are personal to this or that Man, proceeding from his Education, Temperament, Studies, &c. but such as he calls Idola tribus, because they are founded in humane Nature it self, and in the very Tribe or Nation of Mankind; and of these he particularly discourses of seven or eight; As that the Intellect of Man has an innate Propensity to suppose in things a greater order and equality than it finds, and that being unable to rest or acquiesce, it does alwayes tend further and further; to which he adds divers other innate prejudices of Mankind, which he sollicitously as well as judiciously endeavors to remove.
Now, if not only single Philosophers, and particular Sects, but the whole body of Mankind be subject to be sway’d by innate and unheeded Prejudices and Proclivities to Errors about matters that are neither Divine, nor Moral, nor Political, but Physical, where the attainment of Truth is exceeding pleasant to humane Nature, and is not attended with consequences distasteful to it: Why may not we justly suspect not only this or that Philosopher or particular Sect; but the generality of Men, of having some secret propensities to err about Divine things, and indispositions to admit Truths, which not only detect the weaknesses of our Nature, and our personal disabilities, and thereby offend or mortifie our Pride and our Ambition, but shine into the Mind with so clear as well as pure and chaste a light, as is proper both to discover to our selves and others our Vices and Faults, and oftentimes to cross our Designs and Interests?
And to this purpose we may take notice, that divers of those very Idols, which my Lord Bacon observes to besiege or pervert Mens Judgments in reference to things Natural, may probably have the same kind of influence (and that much stronger) on the minds of Men in reference to Supernatural things. Thus he takes notice, that, if some things have once pleas’d the Understanding, ‘tis apt to draw all others to comport with, and give Suffrage, to them, though perhaps the Inducements to the contrary belief be either more numerous or more weighty. He observes also, that Man is apt to look upon his senses and other perceptions as the measures of things, and also, that the understanding of Man is not sincerely dispos’d to receive the light of Truth, but receives an infusion as it were of adventitious Colours (that disguise the light) from the Will and Affections, which makes him sooner believe those things that he is desirous should be true, and reject many others upon Accounts that do no way infer their being false. Now if we apply these things to Divine Truths (to which ‘twere well they were less justly applicable) and consider, that in our Youth we generally converse but with things Corporeal, and are sway’d by Affections that have them for their Objects, we shall not much wonder, that Men should be very prone, either to frame such Notions of Divine things as they were wont to have about others of a far different and meaner nature; or else to reject them for not being Analogous to those things which they have been us’d to employ for the measures of truth and falsity. And if we consider the inbred pride of man, which is such, that if we will believe the Sacred story, ev’n Adam in Paradise affected to be like God knowing good and evil, we shall not so much marvel, that almost every man in particular makes the Notions he has entertain’d already, and his Senses, his Inclinations and his Interests, the Standards by which he estimates and judges of all other things, whether natural or reveal’d. And as Heraclitus justly complain’d, that every man sought the knowledge of natural things in the Microcosm, that is, himself, and not in the Macrocosm, the World; so we may justly complain, that men seek all the knowledge, they care to find, or will admit, either in these little worlds themselves, or from that great World, the Universe; but not from the Omniscient Author of them both. And lastly, if ev’n in purely Physical things, where one would not think it likely, that rational Beings should seek Truth with any other designs than of finding and enjoying it, our Understandings are so universally byass’d, and impos’d upon by our Wills and Affections; how can we admire, especially if we admit the fall of our first Parents, that our Passions and Interests, and oftentimes our Vices should pervert our Intellects about those reveal’d Truths; divers of which we discern to be above our comprehensions, and more of which we find to be directly contrary to our Inclinations,
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Footnotes
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About the Diversity of Religions. ↩