The next Consideration I shall propose, is, That a thing may, if singly or precisely consider’d, appear Unreasonable, which yet may be very Credible, if consider’d as a Part of, or a manifest Consequence from, a Doctrine that is highly so.
Of this I could give you more Instances in several Arts and Sciences, than I think fit to be here specifi’d; and therefore I shall content my self to mention three or four.
When Astronomers tell us that the Sun, which seems not to us a foot broad, nor considerably bigger than the Moon, is above a hundred and threescore times bigger than the whole Globe of the Earth, which yet is forty times greater than the Moon; the thing thus nakedly propos’d, seems very Incredible. But yet, because Astronomers very skilful in their Art, have, by finding the Semidiameter of the Earth, and observing the Parallaxes of the Planets, concluded the proportion of these three Bodies to be such as has been mention’d, or thereabout, ev’n Learn’d and Judicious Men of all sorts, (Philosophers, Divines, and others,) think it not Credulity to admit what they affirm.
So the relations of Earthquakes that have reach’d divers hundreds of miles; of Eruptions of fire, that have at once overflown and burn’d vast Scopes of Land; of the blowing up of Mountains by their own fires; of the Casting up of new Islands in the Sea it self, and other Prodigies of too unquestionable. Truth; (for I know what work Ignorance and Superstition have made about other Prodigies:) If they were attested but by slight and ordinary Witness, they would be judg’d Incredible, but we scruple not to believe them, when the Relations are attested with such Circumstances, as make the Testimony as strong as the things attested are strange.
If ever you have consider’d, what Clavius, and divers other Geometricians teach upon the sixteenth Proposition of the third Book of Euclide, (which contains a Theorem about the Tangent and the Circumference of a Circle,) you cannot but have taken notice, that there are scarce greater Paradoxes deliver’d by Philosophers or Divines, than you will find asserted by Geometricians themselves. And though of late the Learned Jesuit Tacquet, and some rigid Mathematicians, have question’d divers of those things, yet ev’n what some of these severe Examiners confess to be Geometrically demonstrable from that Proposition, contains things so strange, that Philosophers themselves, that are not well acquainted with that Proposition and its Corollaries, can scarce look upon them as other than Incomprehensible, or at least Incredible, things; which yet, as improbable as they are consider’d in themselves, ev’n rigid Demonstrators refuse not to admit, because the[…] are legitimately deducible from an Acknowledg’d truth.
And so also among the Magnetical Phaenomena there are divers things, which being nakedly propos’d must seem altogether unfit to be believ’d, as indeed having nothing like them in all nature; whereas those that are vers’d in Magnetick Philosophy, ev’n before they have made particular Trials of them, will look upon them as credible, because, how great Paradoxes soever they may seem to others, they are consonant and consequent to the Doctrine of Magnetism, whose grand Axioms (from what cause soever Magnetisms are to be deriv’d) are sufficiently manifest; and therefore a Magnetical Philosopher would not, though an ordinary Philosopher would, think it unreasonable to believe, that one part of the same Loadstone should draw a Needle to it, and the other part drive the same Needle from it; and that the Needle in a Seamans Compass, after having been carry’d perhaps many hunder’d Leagues (through differing Climates, and in stormy weather) without varying its Declination, may upon a sudden, without any manifest cause, point at some part of the Horizons several whole degrees distant from that which it pointed to before. To which might here be added divers other scarce credible things, which either others or I have try’d about Magnetical Bodies; but I shall hereafter have occasion to take notice of some of them in a fitter place.
Wherefore, when something deliver’d in or clearly deduc’d from Scripture is objected against, as a thing which it is not reasonable to believe, we must not only consider, whether, if it were not deliver’d in that Book, we should upon its own single Account think it fit or unworthy to be believ’d; but whether or no it is so improbable, that ‘tis more fit to be believ’d, that all the proofs that can be brought for the Authority of the Scripture are to be Rejected, than that this thing which comes manifestly recommended to our belief by that Authority, is worthy to be Admitted: I say, manifestly recommended by that Authority, because that, if the thing be not clearly deliver’d in Scripture, or be not clearly and cogently deduc’d thence, so far as that clearness is wanting, so far the thing it self wants of the full Authority of the Scripture, to impose it on our assent.
[Perhaps it will procure what I have said the better Reception, if I add a couple of Testimonies not of any modern Bigots, no nor of any devout Fathers of the Church; but of two modern Authors of Sects, and who in their kinds have been thought extremely subtle Reasoners, and no less rigid Exacters of Reason in whatever they admitted.
The first passage I shall alledge, is the Confession of Socinus, who in his second Epistle to Andreas Dudithius, speaks thus: Jam verò ut rem in pauca conferam, quod ad meas aliorúmve opiniones, quae novitatis praese ferunt speciem, attinet, mihi ita videtur; si detur, Scriptur am sacram ejus esse Authoritatis, ut nullo modo ei contradici possit, ao de interpretatione illius omnis duntaxat sit scrupulus, (which he allows) nihil, utut verisimile aut ratione conclusum videatur, afferri contra eas possit quod ullarum sit virium, quotiescunque illae sententiis atque verbis illius Libri aut rationibus liquidò inde deduct is probatae atque assertae fuerint. Which confession of Socinus is surpass’d by that of his Champion Smalcius, to be produc’d elsewhere in this Paper. The other passage I met with in the Excellent Monsieur Des Cartes’s Principles of Philosophy,1 where discoursing of the either Infinite or Indefinite Division of the Particles of Matter, which is necessary to make them fill exactly all the differingly figur’d spaces, through which various motions do sometimes make them pass; he confesses (as he well may,) that the point is exceedingly abstruse, and yet concludes: Et quamvis quomodo fiat indefinita ista Divisio cogitatione comprehendere nequeamus, non ideo tamen debemus dubitare quin fiat, quia clarè percipimus ill am necessario sequi ex natura materiae nobis evidentissimè cognitâ, &c.]
And in this place it may be seasonable as well as pertinent, to take notice of three or four particulars, which, though they be in some measure imply’d in the former general Consideration, yet deserve to be distinctly inculcated here, both for their importance, and because they may as well be deduc’d as Corollaries from the foregoing Discourse, as be confirmed by the proofs I shall add to each of them. Of these the first shall be this, that we must not presently conclude a thing to be contrary to Reason, because Learned Men profess or ev’n complain, that they are not able clearly to comprehend it, provided there be competent proof that it is true, and the thing be Primary or Heteroclite.
For it is not alwayes necessary to the making the belief of a thing Rational, that we have such a Comprehension of the thing believ’d as may be had and justly required in ordinary Cases; since we may be sure of the Truth of a thing, not only by Arguments suggested by the Nature of the thing it self clearly understood by us; but by the external Testimony of such a Witness, as we know will not deceive us, and cannot (at least in our Case) be reasonably suspected to be himself deceiv’d. And therefore it may in some Cases suffice to make our belief Rational, that we clearly discern sufficient Reason to believe that a thing is true, whether that Reason spring from the Evidence and Cogency of the extrinsick Motives we have to believe, or from the Proofs suggested to us by what we know of the Thing believ’d, nay, though there be something in the nature of that Thing, which do’s puzzle and pose our Understanding.
That many things that are very hard, and require a great attention, and a good judgment […] made out, may yet be true, will b[…] manifest from what I shall within a Page or two note about divers Geometrical Demonstrations, which require, besides a good stock of knowledge in those matters, an almost invincible Patience to carry so many things along in ones Mind, and go thorow with them. That also there are other things, which, though they be as manifestly Existent, as those newly mention’d can be demonstratively True, are yet of so abstruse a kind, that it is exceeding difficult to frame clear and satisfactory Notions of their Nature, we might learn, if we were inquisitive enough, ev’n from some of the most obvious things; such as, for instance, Matter and Time: As to the former whereof, (Matter,) though the World and our own Bodies be made of it, yet the Idea’s that are wont to be framed of it ev’n by the greatest Clerks, are incumber’d with too great difficulties (some of which I elsewhere mention) to be easily acquiesc’d in by considering Men. And as for the latter, (Time,) though that justly celebrated saying of Augustine, Si nemo ex me quaerat quid sit Tempus, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio; seem in […] first part of it to own a knowledge […] what Time is, yet by the latter part, (wherein he confesses he cannot declare what it is,) I am not only allow’d to believe that he could not propose an intelligible Idea of it, but invited to think that in the first part of the sentence he only meant, that when he did not attentively consider the Nature of it, he thought he understood it, or that he knew that there is such a thing as Time, though he could not explain what it is.
And indeed, though Time be that, which all Men allow to be, yet, if per impossibile (as the Schools speak) a Man could have no other Notion or Proof of Time and Eternity, (even such Eternity as must be conceded to something,) than what he could collect from the best Descriptions of its Nature and Properties that are wont to be given; I scarce doubt, but he would look upon it as an unintelligible thing, and incumber’d with too many Difficulties to be fit to be admitted into a wise mans Belief. And this perhaps you will grant me, if you have ever put your self to the Penance of perusing those confounding Disputes and Speculations about Time and Eternity, that partly in Aristotle and his Commentators, and partly among the Schoolmen, and others, are to be met with upon these abstruse Subjects. And no wonder, since the Learned Gassendus and his Followers have very plausibly (if not solidly) shewn, that Duration, (and Time is but Duration measur’d) is neither a Substance nor an Accident, which they also hold of Space; about which the Altercations among Philosophers and Schoolmen are but little, if at all, inferiour to those about Time. And I the rather choose to mention these instances of Time and Space, because they agree very well with what I intimated by the expression of Primary or Heteroclite things.
To which may be referr’d some of those things, that are call’d Spiritual or Supernatural, about which the same Considerations may have place, especially by Reason of this Affinity between them, that when we treat of either, some Proofs may in certain Cases be sufficient, in spite of such Objections, as in other (and more ordinary Cases) would invalidate Arguments seemingly as strong as those Proofs.
If it be here objected, That I am too bold in venturing without the Precedence or Authority of Learned Men, to introduce so great a difference betwixt other things and those which I call Primary and Heteroclite: I answer, That I shall not solicitously enquire, whether any others have had the same thoughts that I propos’d; since, whether they be new or no, they ought not to be rejected, if they be Rational.
And I have this inducement to suppose, that there ought to be in some cases a great difference between them and other things, and consequently between the judgments we make of the ways of arguing about them, and about other things; so that they are exceeding difficult to be clearly conceiv’d and explicated by our imperfect Faculties, and by that difficulty apt to make what Men say of them, though true, to be less satisfactory and acquiesced in, than things not more true or rational, suggested upon enquiries about Subjects more familiar, or which are at least more proportionate to our Faculties: For, those abstruse things, of which we have been speaking, being such, as either have no proper and clear Genus, by the help of which they may be comprehended, or have not any thing in Nature, that is (sufficiently) like them, by a resemblance to which we may conceive them; or being perhaps both Primary and Heteroclite too, as not being deriv’d from the common Physical Causes of other things, and having a Nature widely differing from the rest of things; ‘tis no wonder, that our limited and imperfect Understandings should not be able to reach to a full and clear Comprehension of them; but should be swallow’d up with the Scruples and Difficulties that may be suggested by a bold and nice enquiry into things, to which there seems to belong, in some respect or other, a kind of Infinity.
Upon these, and other Considerations of kin to them, I count it not irrational, to think that things Primary and Heteroclite, as also by a parity of Reason, some things Immaterial and Supernatural, may be sufficiently prov’d in their kind, if there be such a positive proof of them as would be competent and satisfactory, in case there were no considerable Objections made against the thing prov’d (especially supposing that the asserted Doctrine be not incumbred with much greater inconveniencies than the contrary Doctrine, or than any other, propos’d concerning that Subject:) Nay, I know not, why we may not, in judging of Primary and of Immaterial things, safely enough prefer that Opinion, which has the more Cogent Positive Proofs, though it seem liable to somewhat the greater inconveniencies; because in such cases our understanding is gratify’d with what it most requires in all cases, that is competent Positive Inducements to assent; and it is not confounded by the Objections, because a disability to answer them directly and fully may very well proceed either from the too abstruse Nature of the thing, or the limitedness and weakness of our humane Intellects.
And thus we may render a Reason, why, when we discourse of such uncommon Matters, we may sometimes reasonably acquiesce in proofs in spight of such Objections as in ordinary cases would be prevailing ones. For the things, about which these proofs are conversant, being Primary or Heteroclite, or of as abstruse a Nature as if they were so, it too often happens, that, what Opinion soever we choose about them, we must admit something that is incumbred with great difficulties, and therefore will be liable to great Objections, that perhaps will never be directly and satisfactorily answer’d. And since it may fare thus with us, where two opposite Opinions are contradictory, we may conclude, that those difficulties will not cogently evince the falsity of a Theological Opinion, which are but such, that the same, or as great, may be objected against another, that either is manifestly or confessedly a Truth, or which must necessarily be admitted to be one, if the contrary Theological Tenet be suppos’d not to be one.
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Another Corollary that may be drawn from the Discourse that afforded us the former, may be this; That it may not be unreasonable to believe a thing, though its Proof be very difficult to be understood. To manifest this, I shall need no other Argument, than what may be afforded by divers Geometrical and other Mathematical Demonstrations; some of which are fetch’d by intermediate Conclusions from Principles so very remote, and require so long a series of Mediums to be employ’d about them, that not only a Man that were of Pilate’s temper, who having ask’d Him that could best tell him, What is Truth, would not stay awhile to be satisfi’d about his Inquiry, would before he reaches half way to the End of the Demonstration, or perhaps of the Lemma’s, be quite discourag’d from proceeding any further; but ev’n sedulous and heedful Perusers do find themselves oftentimes unable to carry along such a chain of Inferences in their minds, as clearly to discern whether the whole Ratiocination be coherent, and all the particulars have their due strength and connection. And if you please to make a Tryal upon some of the Demonstrations of Vitellio, or ev’n of Clavius, that I can direct you to, I doubt they will put you to the full Exercise of your Patience, and quite tire your Attention: And though the modern Algebrists by their Excellent way of expressing Quantities by Symbols, have so abridg’d Geometrical and Arithmetical Demonstrations, that by the help of species ‘tis sometimes easie to Demonstrate that in a Line, which in the ordinary way would require a whole Page, (as our most Learned Friend Dr. Ward has ingeniously shewn, by giving the Demonstrations of about twenty of Mr. Hobbs’s Theorems in less than so many Lines;) yet some Demonstrable Truths are so abstruse, that ev’n in the Symbolical way Men need more attention to discern them, than most Men would employ in any Speculation whatsoever. And Des-Cartes himself, as famous and expert a Master as he was in this way, confesses in a Letter to one of his Friends, that the Solution of a Problem in Pappus cost him no less than six weeks study; though now, most Mathematical Demonstrations do indeed seem far shorter than they are, because that Euclid’s Elements being generally receiv’d among Mathematicians, all his Propositions are so many Lemmata, which need be but refer’d to in the Margin, being known and demonstrated already. By all which it may appear, that, granting some Theological Truths to be complain’d of by many as things so mysterious and abstruse, that they cannot readily discern the force of those Proofs, that Des-Cartes, and other subtile Speculators have propos’d to evince them; yet if other Learned Men that are competent Estimators, and are accustomed to bring much Patience and Attention to the discernment of difficult and important Truths, profess themselves satisfi’d with them, the Probations may yet be cogent, notwithstanding the difficulty to have their strength apprehended. For if such a difficulty ought to pass for a mark that a Ratiocination is not valid, no Reasonings will be found fitter to be rejected or distrusted, than many of those whose Cogency has procur’d such a Repute to Mathematical Demonstrations.
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It may also be deduc’d from the foregoing discourse, That ‘tis not always against Reason to embrace an Opinion which may be incumbred with a great Difficulty, or liable to an Objection not easie to be solv’d; especially if the Subject be such, that other Opinions about it avoid not either the same Inconveniencies, or as great ones. The first part of what is said in this Consideration, will often follow from the Supposition made in the precedent Discourse. For those things that render a Doctrine or Assertion difficult to be conceiv’d and explain’d, will easily supply the Adversaries of it with Objections against it.
And as for the latter, viz. the Clause which takes notice that the Consideration, to which ‘tis annex’d, will chiefly take place in that sort of Opinions that are specifi’d in it; it will need but little of distinct Proof.
For ‘tis manifest enough, that if the Subject or Object, about which the Opinion propos’d is conversant, be such, that not only the contradictory Opinion, but others also, are obnoxious either to the same Inconveniencies, or to others that are equal or greater; the difficulties that are urg’d against a Theological Doctrine, may (as hath been shewn already in the first Corollary) be rationally enough attributed, not to the unreasonableness of the Opinion, but to somewhat else.
The last Consectary, that (as I intimated) may be deduc’d from the precedent Discourse, is, That ‘tis not always Unreasonable to believe something Theological for a Truth, which (I do not say is truly inconsistent with, but) we do not clearly discern to comport very well with something else that we also take for a Truth, or perhaps that is one indeed; if the Theological Tenet be sufficiently prov’d in its kind, and be of that sort of things that we have been of late and are yet discoursing of.
The generality of our Philosophers, as well as Divines, believe, That God has a foreknowledge of all future Contingencies; and yet how a certain Prescience can consist with the Free-will of Man, (which yet is generally granted him, in things meerly Moral or Civil,) is so difficult to discern, that the Socinians are wont to deny such things, as depend upon the will of free Agents, to be the proper Objects of Omniscience; and the Head of the Remonstrants, though a very subtle Writer, confesses that he knows not, how clearly to make out the consistency of Gods Prescience and Mans freedom; both which he yet confesses to be Truths, being compell’d to acknowledge the former, (for the latter is evident,) as well by the Infiniteness that must be ascrib’d to Gods Perfections, as by the Prophetick Predictions, whereby such contingent Events have been actually foretold. And the reconcilement of these Truths is not a difficulty peculiar to the Christian Religion, but concerns speculative Men in all Religions, who acknowledge the Deity to be infinitely perfect, and allow Man, as they do, to be a free Agent.
[But I have made this Section so prolix already, that I must not enlarge on this third particular. And therefore I shall shut it up with an acknowledgment of Des-Cartes, which may be apply’d not only to it, but to almost all that has been discours’d in this Section, and indeed to a great part of this Letter. He then in an Epistle, that came not forth till some years after the Writers death, speaks thus to the Philosophical Adversary to whom ‘tis addressed: As I have often said, when the Question is about things that relate to God, or to what is Infinite, we must not consider what we can comprehend of them,2 (since we know that they ought not to be comprehended by us) but only what we can conceive of them, or can attain to by any certain Reason or Argument.
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