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If the Poles of two Magnetick Needles do both of them regard the North, another Philosopher would conclude them to have a Sympathy, at least to be unlikely to disagree; and yet, if he bring these Extremes of the same Denomination within the reach of one another, one will presently drive away the other as if there were a powerful Antipathy between them.

A somewhat long Needle being plac’d horizontally, and exactly poiz’d upon the point of a Pin, if you gently touch one end with the Pole of a vigorous Magnet, that end shall manifestly dip or stoop, though you often take it off the Pin, and put it on again. And this inclination of the Needle will continue many years, and yet there is not only no other sensible change made in the Metal by the Contact of the Loadstone; but one end has requir’d a durable Preponderancy, though the other be not lighter, nor the whole Needle heavier than before. And the Inclination of the Magnetick Needle may be by another touch of the Loadstone taken away without lessning the weight of the part that is depriv’d of it.

The Operation that in a trice the Loadstone has on a Mariners Needle, though it makes no sensible change in it, or weakens the Loadstone it self, will not be lost, though you carry it as far as the Southern Hemisphere; but it will not be the same in all places, but in some the Magnetick Needle will point directly at the North, in others ‘twill deviate or decline some degrees towards the East or the West: And, which seems yet more strange, the same Needle in the same place will not always regard the same point of the Compass, but, lookt on at distant times, may vary from the true Meridian, sometimes to the West, and afterwards to the East.

All the communicable virtues of the Magnet may be imparted to Iron, without any actual Contact of the two Bodies, but barely by approaching in a convenient way the Iron to the Loadstone for a few moments. And the Metal may likewise be depriv’d of those virtues in a trice, without any immediate Contact by the same or another Loadstone.

If you mark one end of a Rod, or other oblong piece of Iron, that never came near a Magnet, and hold it perpendicularly, you may at pleasure, and in the hundreth part of a minute, make it become the North or South Pole of a Magnetical Body. For if, when ‘tis held upright, you apply to the bottom of it the North-extreme of an excited and well-poiz’d Needle, the lower end of the Iron will drive away that Extreme, which yet will be drawn by the upper end of the same Iron. And if by inverting you make this lower end the uppermost, it will not attract, but repel the same Lilly or North-point of the Needle, just under which it is to be perpendicularly held.

Though, vis unita fortior, be a receiv’d Rule among Naturalists; yet oftentimes, if a Magnet be cut into pieces, these will take up and sustain much more Iron than the intire stone was able to do.

If of two good Loadstones the former be much bigger, and on that account stronger than the other, the greater will draw a piece of Iron, and retain it much more strongly than the lesser; and yet, when the Iron sticks fast to the greater and stronger Loadstone, the lesser and weaker may draw the Iron from it, and take it quite away.

These Phaenomena, (to mention now no more,) are so repugnant to the common sentiments of Naturalists, and the ordinary course of things, that, if antecedently to any Testimony of experience these Magnetical Properties had been propos’d to Aristotle himself, he would probably have judg’d them fictitious things, as repugnant to the Laws of Nature: Nevertheless, though it seems incredible, that the bare touch of a Loadstone should impart to the Mariners Needle a Property, which, (as far as we know,) nothing in the whole World that is not Magnetical can communicate or possess; and should operate (as Men suppose) upon it at three or four thousand Leagues distance; yet this is believ’d by the Peripateticks themselves upon the Testimony of those Navigators that have sail’d to the East and West-Indies; and divers even of the more rigid of the modern Philosophers believe more than this, upon the Testimony of Gilbert, Cabaeus, Kircherus, and other Learned Magnetical Writers, who have affirmed these things; most of which I can also averr to you upon my own knowledge.

Thus the Habitableness of the Torrid Zone, though (as I lately noted) upon probable grounds deny’d by Aristotle, and the generality of Philosophers for many Ages; yet not only that, but its Populousness is now confidently believed by the Peripatetick Schoolmen themselves, who never were there.

And though Ptolomy, and some other eminent Astronomers, did with great care and skill, and by the help of Geometry, as well as Observations, frame a Theory of the Planets so plausibly contriv’d, that most of the succeeding Mathematicians for 12 or 14 Ages acquiesc’d in it; yet almost all the modern Philosophers and Astronomers, that have search’d into these matters with a readiness to believe their Eyes, and allow their Reason to act freely, have been forc’d, if not to reject the whole Theory, yet at least to alter it quite, as to the Number and Order of the Planets, though these last nam’d Innovations are sometimes solely, and always mainly built upon the Phaenomena discover’d to us by two or three pieces of glass plac’d in a long hollow Cane, and honour’d with the name of a Telescope.

The last of the two things I invited you to consider with me, is this, That when we are to judge, which of two disagreeing Opinions is most Rational, i.e. to be judg’d most agreeable to right Reason, we ought to give sentence, not for that which the Faculty, furnish’d only with such and such Notions, whether vulgar or borrow’d from this or that Sect of Philosophers, would prefer, but that which is prefer’d by the Faculty furnish’d either with all the Evidence requisite or advantagious to make it give a right Judgment in the case lying before it; or, when that cannot be had, with the best and fullest Informations that it can procure.

This is so evident by its own light, that your Friend might look upon it as an affront to his Judgment, if I should go about solicitously to prove it. And therefore I shall only advertise you, that, provided the Information be such as a man has just cause to believe, and perceives that he clearly understands, it will not alter the case, whether he have it by Reason, as that is taken for the Faculty furnish’d but with its inbred Notions and the more common Observations, or by some Philosophical Theory, or by Experiments purposely devis’d, or by Testimony Humane or Divine, which last we call Revelation. For all these are but differing ways of informing the Understanding, and of signifying to it the same thing; as the Sight and the Touch may assure a Man, that a Body is smooth or rough, or in motion or at rest; (and in some other instances several senses discover to us the same Object, which is therefore call’d Objectum Commune;) and provided these Informations have the conditions lately intimated, which way soever the Understanding receives them, it may safely reason and build Opinions upon them.

Astronomers have within these 100 years observ’d, that a Star hath appeared among the Fix’d ones for some time, and having afterwards disappear’d, has yet some years after that, shew’d it self again. And though, as to this surprising Phaenomenon, our Experimental Philosophers could have contributed nothing to the producing it, and though ‘tis quite out of all the received Systems of the Heavens that Astronomers have hitherto deliver’d; yet the Star it self may be a true Celestial light, and may allow us to Philosophize upon it, and draw Inferences from the Discoveries it makes us; as well as we can from the Phaenomena of those Stars that are not extraordinary, and of those Falling Stars that are within our own Ken and Region.

That the Supernatural things, said to be perform’d by Witches and Evil Spirits, might, if true, supply us with Hypotheses and Mediums whereby to constitute and prove Theories, as well as the Phaenomena of meer nature, seems tacitely indeed, but yet sufficiently, to be acknowledg’d, by those modern Naturalists, that care not to take any other way to decline the Consequences that may be drawn from such Relations, than sollicitously to shew, that the Relations themselves are all (as I fear most of them are) false, and occasion’d by the Credulity or Imposture of Men.

But not to do any more than glance at these matters, let us proceed upon what is more unquestionable, and consider, that, since ev’n our most Critical Philosophers do admit many of the astonishing Attributes of Magnetick Bodies, which themselves never had occasion to see, upon the Testimony of Gilbert, and others, who never were able to give the true causes of them; because they look upon those Relators as honest Men, and judicious enough not to be impos’d upon as to the matter of Fact: Since (I say) such amazing things are believ’d by such severe Naturalists, upon the Authority of Men who did not know the intimate nature of Magnetick Bodies; and since these strange Phaenomena are not only assented to as true by the Philosophers we speak of, but many Philosophical consequences are without haesitancy deduc’d from them, without any blemish to the judgment of those that give their Assent both to the Things and the Inferences; why should it be contrary to Reason to believe the Testimony of God either about his Nature, which He can best, and He alone can fully know, or about the things which either he himself has done, as the Creation of the World and of Man; or which he means to do, as the destroying the World, (whether the whole World, or our great Vortex only, I dispute not,) and the raising both of good and bad Men to life again, to receive Rewards and Punishments, according to their Demerits. For methinks that Apostle argues very well, who says, If we receive the testimony of men,2 the testimony of God is greater; especially about such things concerning his own Nature, Will, and Purposes, as ‘tis evident that Reason, by its own unassisted light, cannot give us the knowledge of.

So that we Christians in assenting to Doctrines upon the account of Revelation, need not, nor do not, reject the Authority of Reason, but only appeal from Reason to it self, i. e. from Reason, as it is more slightly, to its Dictates, as ‘tis more fully inform’d. Of which two sorts of Dictates there is nothing more rational, than to prefer the latter to the former.

And for my part I am apt to think, that, if what has been represented in this Section were duly consider’d, this alone would very much contribute to prevent or answer most of the Objections, that make such of the Questioners of Religion, as are not resolutely vitious, entertain such hard thoughts of some Articles of the Christian Faith, as if they were directly repugnant to Reason. For, (as we were observing) that is not to be look’d on as the judgment of Reason, that is pronounc’d ev’n by a rational Man according to a Set of Notions, though the Inferences from these would be rational, in case there were nothing else fit to be taken into consideration by him that judges; but that is rather to be look’d upon as the judgment of Reason, which takes in the most Information procurable, that is pertinent to the things under consideration. And therefore Men, though otherwise learn’d and witty, shew themselves not equal Estimators of the case of those that believe the Articles we speak of, when they pronounce them to assent Irrationally, because the things they assent to cannot be demonstrated or maintain’d by meer natural Reason, and would probably be rejected by Democritus, Epicurus, Aristotle, or any other of the ancient Philosophers, to whom they should be nakedly propos’d, and whose judgment should be desir’d about them. For, although this Allegation would signifie much, if we pretended to prove what we believe only by Arguments drawn from the nature of the thing assented to; yet it will not signifie much in our case, wherein we pretend to prove what we believe, chiefly by Divine Testimony, and therefore ought not to be concluded guilty of an Irrational Assent, unless it can be shewn, either that Divine Testimony is not duly challeng’d by us for the main of our Religion; or that in the particular Articles we father something on that Testimony which is not contain’d in it, or rightly deducible from it. And to put us upon the proving our particular Articles of Faith, sufficiently deliver’d in the Scriptures, and not knowable without Revelation, by Arguments meerly natural, without taking notice of those we can bring for the proof of that Revelation on whose account we embrace those Articles, is to challenge a Man to a Duel, upon condition he shall make no use of his best weapons; and is as unreasonable, as if a Schoolman should challenge your Friend to prove, that the Torrid Zone is inhabited, against the Reasons that the Aristotelians are wont to give to prove it uninhabitable, without allowing him to make use of the testimony of Navigators, who assure us of the constant Brises that daily ventilate the Air, and qualifie that heat which otherwise would not be supported, and who furnish us with those other circumstances whereon to build our proofs, which we, that were never there, can have but by Relation.

And indeed, the limitations, that Christian Religion puts to some of the dictates of Philosophy, which were wont to be admitted in a more general and unrestrained Sense, and the Doctrines about God and the Soul, &c. that it superadds to those which the light of Nature might lead Men to about the same Subjects; though to some they may seem injurious to Philosophy and Reason, are as little unkind to either, as is the Gardener to a Crab-stock, or some such other wild Plant, when by cutting off some of the Branches, and by making a slit in the Bark, that he may graft on it a Pare-main, or some other choice Apples, by this seemingly hard usage he brings it to bear much nobler fruit, than, if left to its own natural condition, it ever would have done.

I know not, whether to all that hath been said in this Section. I may not add thus much further, that it sometimes happens, that those very things, which at first were propos’d to the understanding, and believ’d upon the score of Revelation, are afterward assented to by it upon the account of meer Reason. To which purpose I consider, that not any of the ancient Philosophers, nay (as far as I have read) ev’n of those that believ’d God to be the Author of the World, dream’d, that He created Matter of nothing, but only form’d the World out of praeexistent Matter, whereas Christian Divines usually teach as an Article of Faith, That, besides what they call a mediate Creation, as when Fishes were made out of the water, or Adam’s body was made out of the earth, there was an immediate Production of Matter it self out of nothing.


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Footnotes

  1. In his little Tract de Magnetis Proprietatibus. p. m. 350. ↩

  2. 1 John. v. 9. ↩

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