After what has been hitherto discours’d, it may be seasonable to consider, what kind of Probation, or what degree of Evidence may reasonably be thought sufficient to make the Christian Religion thought fit to be embrac’d.
Perhaps I shall not need to tell you, that, besides the Demonstrations wont to be treated of in vulgar Logick, there are among Philosophers three distinct, whether kinds or degrees, of Demonstration. For there is a Metaphysical Demonstration, as we may call that, where the Conclusion is manifestly built on those general Metaphysical Axioms that can never be other than true; such as Nihil potest simul esse & non esse; Non Entis nullae sunt Proprietates Reales, &c. There are also Physical Demonstrations, where the Conclusion is evidently deduc’d from Physical Principles; such as are, Ex nihilo nihil fit. Null a substantia in nihilum redigitur, &c. which are not so absolutely certain as the former, because, if there be a God, He may (at least for ought we know) be able to create and annihilate Substances; and yet are held unquestionable by the ancient Naturalists, who still suppose them in their Theories. And lastly, there are Moral Demonstrations, such as those where the Conclusion is built either upon some one such proof cogent in its kind; or some concurrence of Probabilities that it cannot be but allowed, supposing the truth of the most receiv’d Rules of Prudence and Principles of Practical Philosophy.
And this third kind of Probation, though it come behind the two others in certainty, yet it is the surest guide, which the Actions of Men, though not their Contemplations, have regularly allow’d them to follow. And the Conclusions of a Moral Demonstration are the surest that Men aspire to, not only in the conduct of private Mens affairs, but in the Government of States, and ev’n of the greatest Monarchies and Empires. And this is considerable in Moral Demonstrations, that such may consist, and be as it were made up of particulars, that are each of them but probable; of which the Laws establisht by God himself among his own People, as well as the practice of our Courts of Justice here in England, afford us a manifest instance in the case of Murder, and some other Criminal Causes. For, though the Testimony of a single Witness shall not suffice to prove the accus’d party guilty of Murder; yet the Testimony of two Witnesses, though but of equal Credit, that is, a second Testimony added to the first, though of it self never a whit more credible than the former, shall ordinarily suffice to prove a Man guilty; because it is thought reasonable to suppose, that, though each Testimony single be but probable, yet a concurrence of such Probabilities (which ought in Reason to be attributed to the Truth of what they jointly tend to prove) may well amount to a Moral certainty, i. e. such a certainty as may warrant the Judge to proceed to the sentence of death against the Indicted party.
To apply these things now to the Christian Religion: If you consider, with how much approbation from discerning Men that judicious Observation of Aristotle has been entertain’d, where he says, that ‘tis as unskilful and improper a thing to require Mathematical Demonstrations in Moral Affairs, as to take up with Moral Arguments in matters Mathematical; you will not deny, but that those Articles of the Christian Religion that can be prov’d by a Moral, though not by a Metaphysical or Physical, Demonstration, may without any blemish to a Man’s Reason be assented to; and that consequently (by vertue of the foregoing Considerations) those other Articles of the Christian Faith, that are clearly and legitimately deducible from the so demonstrated Truths, may likewise without disparagement be assented to.
We may also here consider further, That the choosing or refusing to embrace the Christian Religion, which is not propos’d to us only as a System of Speculative Doctrines, but also as a Body of Laws, according to which it teaches us, that God commands us to worship Him, and regulate our Lives; the embracing, I say, or not embracing this Religion, is an act of humane choice, and therefore ought to be determin’d according to the dictates of Prudence. Now, though in matters that very much import us, we may wish for and endeavor after such Reasons, whereby to determine our Resolves, as may amount to Moral Demonstrations; yet Prudence will not always require, that we should refuse to act upon Arguments of a less Cogency than Moral Demonstrations. For oftentimes in humane Affairs it so falls out, that divers hazards or other inconveniences will attend whatever resolution we take; and in that case, all that Prudence requires, or can enable us to do, is, to take that resolution which upon the whole matter seems to be preferable to any other; though that which is thus prefer’d, may perhaps be liable to some Objection that cannot be directly answer’d, but only obliquely, by the preponderancy of the Arguments that persuade the choice against which the Objection is made.
But here perhaps you will tell me, that the safest way in a case of such importance, is to suspend an action that is every way attended with difficulties, and to forbear either embracing or rejecting the Christian Religion, till the truth or falseness of it come to appear evident and unquestionable.
To which I answer, that indeed in matters of bare Speculation, about which our Vnderstandings only need to be conversant, the suspension of Assent is not only practicable, but usually the safest way; but Des-Cartes himself, who has been the greatest Example and Inculcator of this Suspension, declares, that he would have it practis’d onely about humane Speculations, not about humane Actions; Sed haec interim dubitatio ad solam contemplationem veritatis restringenda; non quantum ad usum vitae: quia persaepe rerum agendarum occasio praeteriret, antequam nos dubiis nostris exolvere possemus. Non raro quod tantum est verisimile cogimur amplecti, vel etiam interdum, etsi è duobus unum altero verisimiliùs non appareat, alterutrum tamen eligere. And in some of his other writings he speaks so much to shew, that ‘tis unreasonable to expect in matters, where embracing or rejecting a course that requires practice is necessary, such a certainty as he judges necessary to make a true Philosopher acquiesce in reference to Propositions about speculative matters, that I find by one of his Letters, that he was vehemently accus’d for having taught, that Men need not have as sure grounds for choosing vertuous and avoiding vitious courses, as for determining about things meerly Notional.
And here let me observe to you the difference, that I take notice of in the cases where we are put upon deliberating, whether we will choose or refuse a thing propos’d. For it may be propounded to us, either as a proffer on whose acceptance an advantage may be hop’d, or as a duty, which, besides the advantage it promises to the performance, has a Penalty annex’d to the non-performance, or as an onely expedient to avoid a great mischief, or obtain a great good.
Thus when in the Theatrum Chymicum some of its chief Authors, as Lully, Geber, Artephius, who pretend to have been Adepti, i. e. Possessors of the Elixir, very earnestly exhort their Readers to apply themselves to so noble and useful a study as Alchymy (by the help of which, the last nam’d Artephius is said to have liv’d a 1000 years,) they make but a Proposition of the first sort. For though a prosperous attempt to make the Philosophers stone (supposing there be such a thing) would possess a Man of an inestimable Treasure; yet, if he either refuse to believe these Writers, or, if he do believe them, refuses to take the pains requir’d of him that would follow their counsel, he can only miss of the wealth, &c. they would make him hope for, but is really never a whit the poorer, or in a worse condition than if they had not endeavour’d to engage him.
But if an absolute Sovereign commands something to be done by his Subjects; and to enforce his Command, does not only propose great Recompenses to those that shall perform what is prescrib’d, but threatens heavy penalties to the disobedient; this will belong to the second sort of Cases above mention’d, in which, as ‘tis evident, a Man has not the same latitude allow’d him as in the first.
But if we suppose, that a Man by a translation of very peccant Matter has got a spreading Gangrene in his Arm, and a skilful Chirurgion tell him, that, if he will part with his Arm, he may be recover’d, and save his life, which else he will certainly lose: This Case will belong to the last sort above mention’d; the Patients parting with his Arm being the onely remedy of the Gangrene, and expedient to save his life, and recover his health. And here also ‘tis manifest, that there are far stronger Motives, than those mention’d in the first Case, to make a positive and timely Resolution.
To bring this home to our Subject, I need but mind you, that the Christian Doctrine does not only promise a Heaven to sincere Believers, but threatens no less than a Hell to the Refractory.
The voice of Moses to the Jews is this, Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse; (Deutr. 11.26, 27, 28) a blessing, if ye obey the Commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day; and a curse, if ye will not obey the Commandment of the Lord your God, but turn aside out of the way which I command you this day.
And the Commission that Christ gave his Apostles to preach the Gospel, runs thus: Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature, i. e. to all Mankind; (Mark 16.15, 16) he that believeth, and is baptiz’d shall be sav’d; but he that believeth not, shall be damn’d.
By this you may perceive, that as far as there is either truth or probability in the Christian Religion, so far forth he that refuses to become a Disciple to it, runs a venture, not only to lose the greatest blessings that Men can hope but to fall eternally into the greatest miseries that they can fear. And indeed our Case in reference to the Christian Religion may not only be refer’d to the second sort of Cases lately mention’d, but to the third sort too. For as the language of the Author of the Christian Religion was to his Auditors, If ye believe not that I am He (the Messias) ye shall dye in your sins; (John 8.24) so of the two greatest Heralds of it, the one tells the Jews that neither is there salvation in any other: For, there is no other Name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved: (Acts 4.12) And the other tells the Thessalonians, That the Lord Jesus shall be reveal’d from heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; (2 Thess. 1. 7, 8, 9) who shall be punish’d with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.
By all this it appears, that the Christian Religion is not propos’d barely as a proffer of Heaven in case Men embrace it, but as a Law that Men should embrace it upon the greatest penalty, and as the onely expedient and remedy to attain eternal happiness, and escape endless misery; so that the forbearing to submit our necks to the yoke of Christ, being as well a ruinous course, as to reject it, that which Reason here puts us upon, is, not so much to consider, whether or no the Arguments for the Christian Religion be Demonstrations, and will enable a Man to answer directly all Objections and Scruples; (for there are divers courses that Prudence may enjoin a Man to steer, whilst Philosophy suggests speculative doubts about the grounds of such Resolutions;) but whether it be more likely to be true, than not to be true, or rather, whether it be not more adviseable to perform the conditions it requires upon a probable expectation of obtaining the blessings it promises, than by refusing it to run a probable hazard of incurring such great and endless miseries as it peremptorily threatens.
It will perhaps be said, that this is a hard Case. But that is an Allegation I am not here to consider; since it properly belongs to the Doctrine about the Providence of God, who being the only Author and absolute Lord of the Creatures, who can receive neither Laws nor Benefits from them, that can oblige him to them; has a right to prescribe them what Laws he thinks fit, that are not impossible for them to obey, and to punish their disobedience to such Laws; and much more has a right to annex what conditions he pleases to that inestimable Felicity he holds forth; the proffer of it upon any terms being a free act of his meer goodness, and the value of it incomparably surpassing whatever we Men can do or suffer to obtain it; especially considering, that, as he might ensorce his Commands, as Sovereigns commonly do by threatning Penalties to the disobedient, without proposing Rewards to the performers; so he has given Men such probable Arguments to ground their expectations on, that they will be self-condemn’d, if they reject the Religion he proposes, and yet maintain it to be decent (if I may so speak) for him to crown their Faith with unvaluable blessings. But, as I was saying, the direct and full Answer to this Allegation belongs not to this place, where it may suffice to say, that whether the Case be hard or no, yet this is the Case. And therefore though the proofs of the Christian Religion did not amount (which yet I do not grant) to Moral Demonstrations, a Man may act rationally in embracing that Religion, if, all things consider’d, it appear more likely to be true, than not to be true.
And I shall by and by shew you, that this is not the onely Case, where Prudence puts us upon making resolutions notwithstanding contrary doubts.
I know the harshness of the Case is by most Men made to consist in this, That for a Religion, whereof the truth suppos’d in its promises and threats is not demonstratively prov’d, we must resign up our pleasures, and sometimes undergo considerable hardships and losses, and consequently we must quit what is certain, for what is uncertain. I have in another Paper had occasion to say something else to this Objection, than what (to avoid repetition) shall make up my present Answer, which consists of two parts.
The first whereof is, That what we are to give up to become Christians, is not really so valuable in itself as the Objecters think, and that ‘tis of scarce any value at all, if compar’d to the goods we may acquire by parting with them. For alas! what is it that Christianity requires us to forego, but small petty enjoyments? which those, that have had the most of, have found them, and pronounced them unsatisfactory whilst they possest them, and which manifest experience shews to be no less transitory, than they have been declar’d empty, since a thousand Accidents may take them from us, and Death will infallibly after a short time (which can be but a moment compar’d to Eternity) take us from them. And if it be said, that these Enjoyments, such as they are, are at least the only happiness that we can make our selves sure of, I must freely profess, that I think it therefore the more reasonable to part with them, if it be necessary upon the hopes that Christian Religion gives us. For (especially if a Man behold those things not only with a Philosophical eye that can look through them, but with a Christian eye that can look beyond them,) if there be no greater happiness, I do not think so poor a thing as Men call Happiness worth being greedily desir’d; and if there be such a transcendent happiness as Christianity holds forth, I am sure, that deserves to be the object of my Ambition. So that either the Meanness of worldly happiness will make me think it no great misery to want it, or the Excellency of heavenly Felicity will make me think it great wisdom to part with earthly for it.
And now, in the second part of my Answer, I must invite you to consider with me, that Christian Religion requires not of us actions more imprudent, than divers others, that are generally look’d upon as complying with the dictates of Prudence, and some of them practis’d by great Politicians themselves in the weighty affairs of State.
You know what a common practice it is in great storms at Sea, for the Merchants themselves to throw over-board their Goods, and perhaps too their Victuals (as in Paul’s case) though they be sure to lose what they cast away, and are not certain either that this loss will save the ship, or that the ship may not be sav’d without it. The wisest, and ev’n the worldliest Men, whether Princes or private persons, think themselves never more so, than when they toyl and lay out their care and time, and usually deny themselves many things to provide advantagiously for Children which they have but a Womans word for, and consequently a bare Moral probability to assure them to be theirs.
In the Small Pox many Physitians are for Bleeding, and others (as most of our English Practitioners) are very much against it. Supposing then (which is no very rare Case) that a person invaded by that disease, be told by one of his Physitians, that unless Nature be eas’d of part of her burden by Phlebotomy, she will never be able to overcome the disease; and on the contrary, the other assures him, that, if by exhausting the treasure of life (the Blood) he further weakens Nature which is but too weak already, the disease must needs overcome her: What can a prudent Man do in this Case, where he can take no resolution, against which probable Arguments, that are not directly and fully to be answer’d, may not be oppos’d, and where yet the suspension of his resolution may be as ruinous, as the venturing to take either of those he is invited to?
And in the formerly mentioned Case, of a Man that has a spreading Gangrene in his Arm, if he consents that it be cut off, which Prudence often requires that he should do, he is certain to lose one of his usefullest limbs, and is not certain but that he may save his life without that loss, nor that he shall save it by that loss.
And to give you an Instance or two of a more publick nature: How many Examples does History afford us of famous Generals and other great Commanders, who have ventur’d their Forces and their Lives to seize upon places promis’d to be betray’d to them by those they had corrupted with money; though the ground, upon which they run this hazard, be the engagement of some, who, if they were not Traytors that could falsifie their faith, would never have been brib’d to make so criminal and ignominious an engagement? How often have the greatest Politicians either resolv’d to enter into a War, or taken courses that they foresee will end in a War, upon the informations they receive from those they have corrupted in other Princes Councils; though, to believe such Intelligencers, those who venture so much upon their informations, must suppose them faithless and perfidious Men?
It were not difficult, to add other Instances to the same purpose, by which join’d with what has been above discours’d, it may appear, that a Man need not renounce or lay aside his Reason to resolve to fulfill the conditions of the Gospel, though the Arguments for it were none of them demonstrative ones. For so much as a Probability of attaining by it such inestimable blessings, as it proposes, and little more than a bare Probability of incurring, by rejecting it, such unspeakable miseries as it threatens, may rationally induce a Man to resolve upon fulfilling its reasonable conditions, and his Prudence may very well be justifi’d if it do but appear, that (1) It is more probable that some Religion should be true, than that so many well attested Miracles alledg’d by the ancient Christians should be false; and that God who is the Author of the World, and of Men, (for so much, I think, may be Physically prov’d) should leave Man whom he has so fitted, and by benefits and internal Laws obliged to worship him, without any express direction how to do it: And that (2) If there be any true Religion, the Christian is the most likely to be that, in regard not only of the excellency of its Doctrine and Promises, but of the Prophecies and Miracles that bare witness to it, the Records of which were made by honest plain Men, who taught and practised the strictest virtue, and who knew their Religion condemn’d Lying, freely join’d their Doctrine and Narratives with their blood: the truth of which was so manifest in the times when they were said to be done, that the evidence seem’d abundantly sufficient to convert whole Nations, and among them many considerable and prudent persons, who had great opportunity as well as concern to examine the truth of them, and who were by their interest and education so indispos’d to embrace Christianity, that, to make a sincere profession of it, they must necessarily relinquish both their former Religion, and their former Vices, and venturously expose for it not only their Fortunes, but their Lives.
If it be here objected, that it is very harsh, if not unreasonable, to exact upon so great penalty as Damnation so firm an assent, as is requisite to Faith, to such Doctrines as are either obscurely delivered, or have not their truth demonstratively made out: I answer, that whatever others may think, I don’t believe, that there is any degree of Faith absolutely necessary to salvation, that is not sutable to the evidence that Men may have of it, if they be not wanting to themselves through Laziness, Prejudices, Vice, Passion, Interest, or some other culpable defect. For considering that God is just, and gracious, and has been pleas’d to promulgate the Gospel, that Men whom it supposes to act as such (that is, as rational Creatures) should be brought to salvation by it; I see no just cause to think, that he intends to make any thing absolutely necessary to salvation, that they may not so far clearly understand as they are commanded distinctly and explicitely to believe it; and what is not so deliver’d, I should, for that very Reason, unwillingly admit to be necessary to salvation: And you may here remember, that I formerly told you, I was far from thinking all the Tenents either of the Schools, or of particular Churches, to be so much as Christian Verities, and therefore am very unlike to allow them here to be fundamental and necessary ones; and I take it to be almost as great as common a mistake, that all the Doctrines that concern fundamental Articles, must be fundamental too; as if because the Head is a noble part of the Body, and essential to life, therefore all the hair that grows upon it, must be thought such too. But then as to the absolute firmness of Assent, that is supposed to be exacted by Christianity to the Articles it delivers, I am not sure that ‘tis so necessary in all cases to true and saving Faith, as very many take it to be. For first the Scripture itself tells us, that some of the Truths it reveals, are unfathomable Mysteries, and some other Points are […], hard to be understood; and ‘tis unreasonable to suppose, that the highest firmness of Assent is to be given to such Articles, or to those parts of them, as their obscurity keeps us from having so much reason to think that we clearly understand them, as we have to suppose we understand those that are far more plainly reveal’d. And (secondly) to speak more generally, ‘tis harsh to say, that the same degree of Faith is necessary to all Persons, since Mens natural capacities and dispositions, and their education, and the opportunities they have had of being informed, do very much, yet perhaps not culpably, dispose some more than others to be diffident, and apt to haesitate, and frame doubts. And the same Arguments may appear evident enough to one Man to make it his duty to believe firmly what they persuade, which in another, naturally more sceptical, or better acquainted with the difficulties and objections urged by the opposite Party, may leave some doubts and scruples excusable enough. And when either the Doctrine itself is not clearly deliver’d, or the Proofs of it, that a Man could yet meet with, are not fully cogent; for that Man, not to give such Truths the same degree of Assent that Demonstration may produce, is not, as many interpret it, an affront to the Veracity of God, since he may be heartily disposed and ready to believe all that shall appear to him to be revealed by God, and only doubts, whether the thing proposed be indeed revealed by him, or whether the diffident Party rightly understands the sense of these words wherein the Revelation is contain’d; which is not to distrust God, but himself: And that in some cases, a degree of Faith not exempt from doubts, may, through Gods goodness, be accepted, we may learn from hence, that the Apostles themselves, who were so much in Christs favour, made it their Prayer to him, That he would encrease their Faith: And he that beg’d, that if he could do any thing for his son, and cryed out, Lord I believe, help thou my unbelief, was so far accepted by that merciful High Priest, who is apt to be toucht with the sense of our infirmities, that his Request was granted, though it could not be so but by having a Miracle done in his favor. The Disciples distrest by a storm, and crying to their Master, as thinking themselves upon the very point of perishing, were saved by him at the same time when he gave them the Epithet of men of little faith: And at another time, Peter walking upon the Sea, though he had lost a degree of that Faith that made him first engage upon that adventure, and was reproved for it by Christ, was yet rescued from that sinking condition which both he and his Faith were in. And we are told, in the Gospel, of a Faith, which, though no bigger than a grain of Mustard-seed, may enable a Man to remove Mountains: And though this passage speaks not primarily of justifying Faith, yet still it may serve to shew, that degrees of Assent, far short of the greatest, may be so far accepted by God, as to be owned by miraculous Exertions of his Power. For the Faith then that is made a necessary condition under the Gospel, as the genuine fruit and scope of it is Obedience; so ‘tis not indispensably such a Faith as excludes doubts, but refusals. And though the Assent be not so strong as may be produced by a Demonstration; yet it may be graciously accepted, if it be but strong enough to produce Obedience; and accordingly whereas Paul in one place declares, that in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but faith operative through love; we may learn his meaning from a parallel place, where varying the words, and not the sense, of the latter part of the sentence, he says, that in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision but the keeping of the Commandments of God. I readily grant, that attainment of a higher degree of Faith is always a blessing, and cannot be sufficiently prized, without being sincerely aimed at; but there are in some Virtues and Graces degrees, which though to reach be a great happiness, yet ‘tis but the endeavoring after them that is an indispensible Duty. Likewise ‘tis true, that the firmness of assent to Divine Verities, does, in some regard, bring much honour to God; as ‘tis said of the Father of the Faithful, (who in reference to the promise made him of Isaac, did not consider his own age, nor Sarahs long barrenness, so as to entertain any diffidence of what God had told him,) that being mighty in faith, he gave glory to God: But ‘tis true too, that in another respect a practical assent built upon a less undoubted evidence, may have its preheminence; for when Christ now risen from the dead, had said to the distrustful Didimus, Thomas, Because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed; he immediately adds, But blessed (that is, peculiarly and preferably blessed) are those that have not seen, and yet have believed; and indeed he does not a little honour God, (in that sense wherein Mortals may be said to honour him) who is so willing to obey and serve him, and so ambitious to be in an estate where he may always do so, that upon what he yet discerns to be but a probability of the Christian Religions being the most acceptable to God, he embraces it with all its difficulties and dangers, and upon this score venturously resolves to submit, if need be, to a present and actual dereliction of all his Sins and Lusts, and perhaps his Interest and his Life too, upon a comparatively uncertain expectation of living with him hereafter.