§ 37. Etymology and Accepted Use of the Word
The plan of a Theological Encyclopedia does not admit an exposition of the principles of the “doctrine of science”; but neither will it do to describe the nature of Theology as a science, until the conception of “science” is determined. In view of the very prevalent confusion with reference to this conception, the writer of a Theological Encyclopedia should clearly define what he understands by it.
Etymologically it is fairly certain that to know1 as an intellectual conception is derived from the sensual conception to see; and more particularly from seeing something one was looking for in the sense of finding. This may the more fully be emphasized, because not only the Indo-Germanic but also the Semitic family of languages point to this origin of the conception to know. The Sanscrit has vid, to know; vindami, to find; the Greek ϝιδ in εἶδον, to see, alongside of οἶδα, to know; the Latin vid-ere, to see, alongside of viso, to visit; the Gothic vait, to know, alongside of vit-an, to keep what one has found; and the Old Slavic vid-e-ti, to see, alongside of ved-e-ti, to know. This development of the conception runs almost parallel with that of the Semitic root vada’ (וָדַע) which, just as in the so-called Pelasgic vid stands alongside of id, shows the double form of vada’ and iada’ (יָדַע). This vada’ or iada’ also is the common word for to know, but with the root-meaning of to see. In 1 Sam. x. 11 and in Job xxviii. 13 the LXX translated it by the word ἰδεῖν, to see. Alongside of שמע (to hear) as perception through the ear, stands ידע (to see) as perception through the eye. ראה שלום in Gen. xxxvii. 14 and ידע שלום in Esther ii. 11 are in meaning one. The entirely different meaning attributed to ידע by Fürst and others in Ezek. xxxviii. 14, as if the idea to separate, split or disband were prominent, might yet originally have coincided with the meaning of the verb to see, even as cernere in its connection with κρίνειν. But if on this ground the connection between the conceptions to know and to see can scarcely be denied, the verb to know cannot be said to be of the same origin with all the forms of the idea to see. To see is a finely differentiated conception. Ὁρᾶν, βλέπειν, ὄψομαι, θεάομαι, δεδορκέναι, -spicere, σκεπ- (in σκέπτεσθαι), etc., all express a certain perception through the eye, but in different ways. An object can present itself to us in such a way, that we perceive it and thus see it, while our eye did not look for it. At another time our eyes may look without desiring to discover any one object. And lastly there is a looking, by which we employ our powers of vision in seeking and investigating a definite object, until we find and understand it. The conception of the verb to see, included in the root of the verb to know, is definitely this last kind of seeing: premeditatively to look for something, in order to find it. Herein lies of itself the transition to the conceptions of investigation and of trying to know, as result of which we have the seeing or knowing. Revelation in holy Scripture throws further light upon this relation by placing before us the γνῶσις as a lower form of knowing, and as a βλέπεσθαι but only in part, in a glass darkly, and over against this making the completed γνῶσις to appear as a θεᾶσθαι, a seeing close at hand, in full reality, πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον (1 Cor. xiii. 8—12).
If in the second place we consult the accepted use of the word, we find the conceptions of knowing and understanding separated from each other by a clearly perceptible boundary. The accepted use of the word to know has both a general and a limited sense. In the question, Do you know that the mail-boat has suffered shipwreck? is only meant, Have you heard it? Is this fact taken up into your consciousness? If, on the other hand, I say, Do you know that it is so? then to know is taken in a stricter sense, and means: Can you vouch for it? In both cases, however, there lies in this knowing not so much the thought of an analysis of the content of an affair or fact, as the thought of the existence of it; viz. the antithesis between its being and not being. Understanding, on the other hand, does not refer to the being or not being, but assumes it as a fact, and analyzes it for the sake of introducing it into the world of our conceptions. To have knowledge of a thing is almost synonymous with having certainty of it, which of itself implies that such a presentation of the matter or fact has been obtained that it can be taken up into our consciousness. And further it is knowledge only when besides this presentation in my consciousness I also have the sense that this representation corresponds to existing reality; which is entirely different from understanding, by which I investigate this representation, in order to comprehend it in its nature and necessity.