46. The objections raised by Faustus against Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy have their consistency, first, in the presupposition which he makes that the doctrines of reconciliation and justification point to a relation between God and man that is apprehended in an exclusively forensic sense. From this point of view he thought he could discover a contradiction between the ideas of Christ’s satisfaction and the imputation of that satisfaction in faith, and also between the recognition of that thought and the duty of moral life. But the assumption itself is erroneous. The historical connexion is, that the Reformers by means of the thought of the imputation of Christ’s obedience, sought to attain the religious regulation of the moral self-consciousness in a way that should be at once individually true, and also in conformity with the conditions of Christian fellowship. The idea of justification has, in relation to faith, moreover, only the appearance of a forensic idea; for the circumstances under which it is always maintained that the unrighteous is pronounced to be righteous quite exclude the juridical standard of judgment. But as the moral obedience of Christ, which as moral obedience, as merit, is graciously imputed to the believer unto righteousness, is at the same time as satisfaction set over against the retributive justice of God, the doctrine of atonement is developed in the line of the legal relation between God and men. Thus the doctrine of justification, which in its highest sense is religious and moral in its intention, is only led up to by the doctrine of the propitiation of God’s justice, which, in the strict sense, is juridical. Such is the fact in Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, which has not been recognised by Faustus, and by means of which his two last arguments are proved to be wrong.

Secondly, his other objections proceed upon an idea of God which, while it is diametrically opposed to the idea of God maintained by the orthodox party, exhibits the opposite defect. From the premisses assumed by orthodox divines, even when they need considerable correction, certain features of the doctrine of satisfaction do not appear to be so very absurd as Faustus represents them to be. In particular, the assertion of Christ’s twofold satisfaction to the law (which at a later period was combated by Piscator also on the same ground) is quite correct, on the assumption that the strict forensic position in relation to God had to be done away with by Christ, not merely so far as sinners were concerned, but for men in general; not merely for the past, but also for the future. And, in general, if the problem is to understand Christ as the Bearer and Mediator of a public relation between God and men, the Socinian way of resolving that into merely private relations between God and individual men is undeniably at a disadvantage as compared with the tendency of orthodox theology. This shows itself all the more clearly in that John Crell was not able to avoid limiting in a very important respect his assertion of the potestas Dei by means of the idea of honestas universa, and in that the exception he makes from this in favour of God’s full power to forgive sin cannot escape the charge of arbitrariness.⁷⁶ But if the arbitrary freedom of God, which the Socinians assert upon this point is regarded as form without contents, it cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the orthodox assertions of the inevitable necessity of His penal justice to God in no way harmonizes with the formal conditions of the will; and thus on this point subjects the idea of God to an appearance of natural necessity.⁷⁷ The want of dialectic skill in establishing the superior principle, is manifestly equally great on both sides. But the evil consequences of this deficiency appear to be greater in their effect upon orthodoxy, inasmuch as the scientific problem it had to solve surpassed in difficulty that of the Socinians, and inasmuch as the latter had the advantage of being assailants while the former had the disadvantage of being put upon the defensive. The unfortunate complication of the orthodox principle shows itself in the following circumstance. The juridical construction of the idea of Christ’s satisfaction was originally intended only as a condition for the religious and moral certainty of justification in Christ; while the Reformers recognised the providence, or grace, or love of God, as the leading resort of the entire religious consciousness, and His justice, to which satisfaction is required to be given, as the subordinate principle in accordance with which the bestowal of grace through Christ had to be procured. In the theology of the period subsequent to them, this view of the relative value of the two ideas involuntarily underwent a change. The contemplation of God’s habitual justice gained the preponderance over the view of His active grace. As God’s saving purpose became limited to the narrower idea of grace towards sinners, and was not extended to that of help to men—to the idea of a dominant providence towards the creatures who were destined to become the image of God—His law-giving and law-maintaining justice came to assert to itself the first place in the idea of His character; and if grace towards sinners was not to appear as an exception opposed to the law, some scheme must have been devised such as that which is laid down in the doctrine of satisfaction. Thus the juridical condition of the doctrine of justification changed itself into the dominant principle of that doctrine. In the logically sound development of this principle in its application to the entire material of the doctrine, Reformed theologians have even been able to represent justification, not so much as an act of grace, but rather as an act of God’s justice (see above, p. 278). We cannot therefore take it amiss in Faustus that, under the impression caused by this circumstance, he found the ultimate aim of the orthodox doctrine (which lay beyond the juridical train of thought) to be unintelligible, and inconsistent with the premisses. With this prominence given to the juridical idea of God’s justice, the doctrine of election undergoes no change at all. Even in its supralapsarian form, election has its full force, inasmuch as sinful man is regarded as its object; the election of grace, regarded also as eternal, always regards man in the quality which, by the justice of God, is viewed as contrary to the law. The Lutheran doctrine, moreover, assumes nothing else but what Reformed theologians denote by the term fœdus operum,—that men originally were set over against the law as independent persons with legal rights; that their fulfilment of the law by their deeds had the promise of the reward of eternal life, and that a plan of grace on God’s part was occasioned only by sin. All this denotes justice, in the juridical sense, as the fundamental idea of God, which unfortunately leaves unanswered only the question wherein it is that man’s legally privileged independence finds its explanation; for creation by God presupposes the thought of man’s dependence even in so far as he is a moral power, or one endowed with free will. It is natural that all these difficulties should not have been solved at the outset by the Reformers. On the contrary, it was they who made the difficulties which their successors could not solve; but at the same time the latter, as so often is the case, were unable to apprehend or to appreciate the theological conceptions in which the high religious tact of the Reformers reveals itself. I refer, in the case before us, to the logical subordination of the thought of God’s retributive justice to those of His love and of His providence. In this way it was that Faustus Socinus, in his true biblical idea of God’s justice, which he brought up in opposition to the orthodox theologians of his time, had none other than Luther for his pattern (p. 202).

The objections of Faustus, in the third place, against the juridical references of the doctrine of satisfaction proceed from the forensic and ethical ideas which are generally acknowledged. In this field lies his strength, and with respect to these arguments he has not been confuted by the orthodox. Most incisive is the assertion that obligation to punishment cannot be cancelled for the man who has made himself personally liable to it—that men, indeed, can indirectly be sharers in the punishment of another person as such, but only under condition of a measure of companionship in guilt with the punishable act of another; so that if an altogether innocent person suffers from the evil results of other men’s sins, he cannot regard his suffering as punishment, the personal consciousness of guilt being absent. It is astonishing that the orthodox theologians attempted to evade the force of this objection to their doctrine, by diminishing the distance between the two modes of viewing the matter in the light of civil law and criminal law, when, with reference to the idea of sin, they did not know how to give sufficient emphasis to this distance. Sin must not be compared to a pecuniary debt, or to a private injury to honour, which one may overlook if one chooses, but is violation of public law, comparable to crime, which the legal authorities must punish. But the same Abraham Calovius, who judges in this way, consoles himself with the idea that if a pecuniary debt admits of being discharged by some other person than the debtor, such a possibility in civil law offers an analogy whereby the penal satisfaction of Christ may be explained.⁷⁸ The idea also of the surety, which is current with Reformed theologians,⁷⁹ as an expression of the mutual relation that subsists between Christ and the elect, does not serve at all to explain the possibility of the transference of personal punishment from the client to the surety, since it has its place in relations that are regulated by civil law. Bold also, but not convincing, is the assertion of Reformed theologians, that the vicarious fulfilment of the law in suffering of punishment and in action is not in contradiction with the law itself, for this way of fulfilling the law is not forbidden by the law. It is not therefore to be wondered at that even the orthodox side ultimately became convinced of the irrationality of this main point of the doctrine of satisfaction. In this sense the half-orthodox Cartesian Velthuysen declares, that only positive revelation in Holy Scripture establishes the truth of Christ’s penal satisfaction, and it is only with the courage of theological despair that Hollatz supports the authority of Holy Scripture in this regard by saying that what were unjust in men, if they were to punish the innocent, is exactly the reverse in God—a proof of His justice. And even then it was not possible to meet the further objection that, in Christ’s suffering and death, the objective equivalent to the eternal death of all sinners is not found. If the difference in respect of quantity between the two things compared was undeniable, then the infinite value of Christ’s Godhead had to supplement the quantitative limitation of His suffering and death, so as to bring it up to an equality with the infinitude of the guilt and of the eternal punishment of all sinners. I may here call to mind that these lines of thought taken by Protestant orthodoxy, while they surpass in certainty similar assertions of Thomas, turn just as much as the latter upon a play with the negative word “infinite,” the fruitlessness of which had already been pointed out by Duns (p. 60). For, that we do not penetrate to the full compass of the Divine will, its ends, its ways, and its means, and that we are not able to conceive the extent of sin and the infinity of punishment, does not serve to make Christ’s divinity and the punishment of sin comparable and, much less, equivalent quantities. However much therefore the orthodox of both schools are confident that Christ’s penal suffering corresponds to the strictest justice,—in the case of many, such as Amesius and Maresius, the Scotist word acceptatio occurs as an indication of an involuntary impression that God, by an act of equity rather than strict justice, must constitute the equivalence, demanded by the premisses, between Christ’s satisfaction and the law’s demand for punishment. The objection, on the other hand, raised by Faustus against the satisfactory value of Christ’s active obedience, to the effect that it represents only Christ’s inalienable duty, could be admitted within the circle of Reformed theology without disparagement to the substitutionary value of that prestation. This was possible in accordance with the view that Christ is the Head of those for whom He acted. Faustus, indeed, at the outset rejected this thought on the ground that such a title was not applicable to Christ before His exaltation.⁸⁰ At the same time, leaving out of view the biblico-theological controversy on this point, it must be admitted that Faustus exhibits with regard to it the method (which has been censured by previous critics) of linking on data one to another in an external way while no inward connexion is discernible between them. What in this respect is least satisfactory is the distance expressed by him between the merely human individual personality of Jesus, which is equally removed from all men, and His position gained by His resurrection as Head of humanity invested with Divine honours. If the Reformed position is not to be at the outset rejected, then the value of Christ’s dutiful action, as available for the Church that was to be founded thereby, and His representation of the church before God cannot be denied; especially as in their application to His active obedience, either the ideas of satisfaction and merit are but vaguely distinguished, or the former demands to be so supplemented by the latter that the legal estimate of the matter passes over into the moral. Still the prospect of successfully overcoming Socinian criticism on this point is connected with the position of a new problem, which did not present itself to the older theologians in the form which it must necessarily assume, and therefore had not been at the outset solved by them.

47. “The Socinian doctrine,” says Baur (p. 414), “presents such a contrast with the church doctrine as of itself must have elicited a mediating theory;” and, according to him, such a theory is to be found in the tract of Hugo Grotius Defensio fidei catholicæ de satisfactione Christi (1617). But the real course of theological knowledge on this point is not so compliant with the claims of Hegelian dialectic as this announcement would lead us to expect. Not only had Grotius no intention of mediating between those opposing views, or of discovering their higher logical unity; he had rather the intention of vindicating the church doctrine against Socinian criticism. Why he was unsuccessful in this, why for the idea of penal satisfaction for past sins he substituted that of a penal example for the prevention of future sins, will be seen in the mistake in virtue of which Grotius made the transition from the orthodox premisses to those of Socinianism. His purpose is to confute the statement of Faustus that there is a contradiction between the thought of the remission of sin and the vicarious satisfaction for sin as the condition of that remission; and he wishes to show how the two are in harmony with each other. For this purpose Grotius lays it down (cap. 2) that God assumes towards men the position of the Head of a moral fellowship analogous to the family or the state. For only there has the thought of punishment and the remission of punishment any place. Hereby is excluded the double assumption upon which the Socinian solution of the problem proceeds. We are to proceed neither according to the scheme of private law, nor according to the idea of the dominium absolutum. For on these two analogies Faustus bases his representation of God as personally insulted by sin; so that He is able without further condition to forgive it, as a creditor remits a debt, and as an absolute Master who is bound by no law can disregard an act of disobedience to his personal authority. As the Head of a moral and legally ordered Commonwealth God is distinguished from the dominus absolutus, insomuch that He would be unrighteous were He, like an arbitrary master, to remit the punishment of the impenitent. If, however, in this respect the position of God is similar to that of a judge, His position is not in all respects identical with that office, for a judge is subject to the law. But God is not so, insomuch that for the common weal He may remit punishment or partially dispense from the obligations of the law; and this does not belong to a judge as such.

If now the presuppositions of the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction are in all essential points accurately laid down in this representation,⁸¹ the following elucidation of the case to be accounted for (cap. 3) at once departs from the line of orthodoxy. Satisfaction, regarded as the punishment of one, in order that the others may be suffered to pass unpunished, is to be considered (according to Grotius) firstly, in the light of the law that every sinner ought to undergo the punishment of eternal death; but secondly, in the light of the fact that this law has merely a positive character, is not grounded on the very nature of God, but is a mere manifestation of His will. If now in accordance with this a remission of that punishment for believers be granted on condition of satisfaction, then there is not any abolition at all of the law in this, for it still remains in force for unbelievers. But all laws are capable of relaxation in so far as the opposite of what they require is not in itself something unbecoming or unjust. But this is not the case when the guilty are not punished. From the nature of sin it follows only that one deserves punishment, but not that it should be carried out upon him. If now God had for dispensing with that law the important end of maintaining religion thereby, and showing forth His own goodness, He committed no unrighteousness in doing away with eternal death as the punishment of sin. In this train of thought Grotius falls into an error. I do not lay any weight, to begin with, upon the circumstance that he abandons the orthodox view of God’s penal justice, regarding as he does the eternal condemnation of the sinner, not as a necessary consequence of that function, but merely as a chance product of the will of God. But the proposition that the guilty are not punished, which is laid down as in opposition to that law, and yet as an arrangement that is not unjust in itself, but elicited by God’s goodness and regard to the maintenance of religion, contains something quite different from what we are prepared for by the previous more limited exception from the law. In the last mentioned case, it is only asked whether the law which threatens all sinners with eternal death can be abolished for some, so that these last get off unpunished, and under the condition that their punishment should be transferred to an innocent person. As Grotius hastens past this question to the far more comprehensive declaration, that in no case is it unrighteous to leave merited punishment unexacted, he enters upon the Socinian mode of view which on this ground affirms vicarious penal satisfaction to be superfluous in order to the remission of sins.

On this account also he deflects the treatment of Christ’s death as penal into a course which is foreign to the supposition which has hitherto been accepted. By means of examples taken from the Old Testament (cap. 4) it is shown that God has punished relatively innocent persons together with the guilty. The guilty person indeed in these cases does not remain unpunished; but Grotius concludes that if, according to Faustus, it is not unjust to let a guilty person go unpunished and not unjust to punish any one for other people’s sins, the two together cannot be unjust either,—namely to lay upon Christ the punishment of other people’s sins, and, at the same time, let the guilty go free of punishment. For by this argument nothing more can be got than this sameness of time; and thus already the traditional idea of satisfaction, which points to a causal connexion between the two data, is abandoned. Grotius next brings forward, after the Reformed fashion, as a condition for the transference of the punishment of others to the innocent, that both must be parties in a natural or definite moral fellowship. The transition to his peculiar view he makes by means of the principle that in the essence of punishment it is of necessity implied that it should follow upon a crime, but not that it should fall upon the guilty person alone, or overtake precisely him; just as in the case with rewards or with vengeance. Moreover, all appearance of injustice disappears in the case of Christ, for He consented to take upon Himself the punishment of others. Finally, we cannot point to any inevitable necessity for God’s having ordained this arrangement (cap. 5). The only question is whether God had sufficient ground for it. Such a reason Grotius finds in the thought, quod tot et tanta peccata sine insigni exemplo Deus transmittere noluit. For, on the one hand, God is benevolently disposed towards men, and therefore inclined to remit the punishment of sinners. On the other hand complete exemption from punishment would bring with it a contempt of sin; and fear of punishment is the best deterrent from sinning. Both these considerations are duly respected in the punishment of Christ, which expresses God’s hatred of sin, while the punishment of sinners is remitted.

John Crell⁸² had little trouble in proving the baselessness of this hypothesis, and vindicating against it the doctrine of Faustus. Particularly he shows it to be unjust to punish an altogether innocent person, and unthinkable that such a person should regard the evil imposed upon him in the light of punishment. The cases taken from the Old Testament show that God indeed punishes many even for the transgression of others, but always only inasmuch as these have some sort of active share in the action of the actually guilty, be it by counsel or by consent. Or, if God, in order to make an example, visits a family or a people for the crime of the head, and in doing so smites even innocent children, the evil in the case of these is afflictio but not pœna. For also a reward that accrues to those who have not deserved it is in their case not præmium but only simplex emolumentum. In fine, the weakness of the whole view of Grotius discloses itself when he tries, by a rule of Roman law, to justify his own view against the thesis of Faustus, that forgiveness of sins and penal satisfaction are mutually exclusive (cap. 6). He subsumes Christ’s punishment under the case that deliverance ought to result antecedente solutione aliqua ipso facto non liberante, where accordingly non solum solvit alius, sed etiam aliud quam quod est in obligatione. This manner of meeting an existing obligation by the prestation of another person, who does not lie under obligation, and by the payment of some other value than the stipulated one, of course demands the concurrence of him who possesses the claim. With reference to Christ this is urged as applicable on the presupposition of the approval of the head of the commonwealth. But all this argumentation is idle, for it applies only to relations that are regulated by private law, while Grotius at the outset repudiates the consideration of God’s attitude to men in the light of this standard. Finally it is only an unproved assertion, and one that does not admit of proof, that such a rule is valid also for the transference of corporal chastisement.

It is quite clear that this hypothesis arrives at quite another conclusion from that which Grotius originally appeared to be aiming at. The orthodox doctrine, which he bound himself to defend, treats Christ’s penal suffering as the equivalent for past sins; Grotius refers it to new future offences. If the death of Christ be thus regarded as a penal example, as a deterrent warning, this interpretation of it is analogous to the Socinian one, that the death of Christ has saving value as an attractive example of moral earnestness and fidelity to duty sustained to the end. Even Baur (p. 431) acknowledges this fact, affirming (p. 442), “that the church theory and the Socinian theory still remain unreconciled by the theory of Grotius, however natural it is that some mediating view should fall in between their antitheses.” On the other hand he holds that the theory which reconciles these two views, and occupies a middle position, was brought to its adequate expression by the companions of Grotius,—the Arminians, Stephen Curcellæus and Philip van Limborch.⁸³ I shall show that this middle theory does not overcome their mutual opposition, and thus is as little in correspondence with the assertions of the Hegelian theory of the development of ideas in the history of theology as is the theory of Grotius.

For the idea of God, which is propounded by these theologians, is hardly distinguishable from that of the Socinians.⁸⁴ In particular the necessity of penal justice in God is denied. For the independence of God is held to make it possible for Him to renounce His rights without prejudice to His justice, especially if a strict exercise of the Divine rights is against the interest of the other party. Since, then, the natural attitude of God toward men is one of reasonable indulgence, He can therefore, if He will, forgive their sins without exacting satisfaction as a condition. The giving of the law by Christ is distinguished from that of Moses precisely by the fact that it is not accompanied by a strict demand of its fulfilment, but by the promise of forgiveness of sins and of eternal life. As this view of the essence of Christianity coincides with that of Socinus, both Arminians substantially repeat the arguments of Faustus against the idea of satisfaction. On this account the death of Christ is in the first instance subsumed under the prophetic office, as a guarantee of the truth of His doctrine and as a motive to a law-abiding life; this last inasmuch as it is at once the highest proof of God’s love and the most brilliant example of moral character. To this is added what is likewise a Socinian thesis, that the death of Christ has the effect of making his resurrection possible, by which He opened heaven to His followers; hereby the death of Christ is marked out as a means or condition of His kingly office. The Arminians, however, break off from their companionship with the Socinians, in so far as by their recognition of the sacrificial value of Christ’s death, they attach themselves to the view of the universal church. This divergence from the Socinians is more strongly marked in Limborch than in the older Curcellæus. The latter follows the Socinian interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, discerning the sacrificial act in the High Priestly intercession of the exalted Christ, so that His death, as the analogue of the slaughter of the sacrifice, is the preparation for His “appearing before God.” If then the New Testament usus loquendi places the fact of Christ’s death in immediate connexion with redemption, this arises from the consideration that in Christ’s passion is manifested the difficulty of His priestly activity. The expiation of sin by loving self-surrender to death and by the intercession of the exalted One is designed (of course assuming our resipiscentia) ne unquam propter peccata nostra severum Dei judicium subire cogeremur (v. 19. 14). But the death of Christ considered in itself has for Curcellæus no other meaning than it has for Grotius—namely, ut ostenderet Deus quantopere peccatum odisset, et nos efficacius ab eo in posterum deterreret. For inasmuch as the sacrificial character of Christ must be judged after the analogy of the sacrifices of the Old Testament, Curcellæus declares (sec. 15) that the thought of penal satisfaction has nothing in common with the idea of sacrifice. Pecudes quæ mactabantur pro peccatoribus non luebant pœnas quas erant commeriti,—sed erant tantum oblationes, quibus studebant flectere Deum ad misericordiam, et obtinere ab eo remissionem admissorum.

Limborch, on the other hand, who in a special chapter (iii. 20) combats the Socinian view of the High Priesthood of Christ, removes himself in the same degree from his own predecessor. Curcellæus too is hit by Limborch’s observation that the priestly function of Christ, if it is only exhibited in His intercession in His exaltation, is absorbed in His Kingship, and that the mere presence of Christ before God has no value toward that appeasing of His wrath on account of our sins, which is the Priest’s function. In directer agreement with the orthodox view, Limborch affirms, with regard to the sin-offerings of the Old Testament, that their meaning was, ut, in ipsas quasi ira Dei derivata, homo ea liberaretur, hoc est ut ipsis infligeretur mors violenta, cujus intuitu hominem peccato suo mortem meritum in gratiam reciperet.—Unde mors a Christo suscepta rationem habet gravis mali Christo impositi, quo pœnam peccatis nostris commeritam quasi in se transtulit, et hac sua passione Deum placavit (sec. 5). But not merely by the repeated use of the word quasi is this view distinguished from the orthodox one; it is so also by all the other statements of Limborch. This kind of penal satisfaction, which God in the plenitude of His power could impose upon Christ, has not the value of a prestation made to God’s strict justice, which is utterly denied, but to His will, which is at once just and merciful (cap. xxii. 2), that is, to His reasonableness; and it has decisive value towards this inclination of God in virtue of the divine dignity of Christ’s person. But the value of merit in Thomas’s sense (that is, in the sense of legal equivalence), is denied to this prestation (sect. 3), and is assigned to it in Duns’s sense, inasmuch as God sanguinem illum tanquam plenariam persolutionem pro peccatis nostris acceptavit, illoque se moveri passus est ad plenam nobis peccatorum remissionem dandam (cap. xix. 2). On the contrary, Thomas’s view is echoed when we are told that the infliction of death on Christ is ratio homines ad salutem perducendi convenientissima, utpote ad gloriæ Dei illustrationem et homines a peccatis ad sanctimoniæ studium convertendos maxime accommodata (xviii. 5).

Although Thomas’s sphere of vision is abandoned, when Limborch explains the last-mentioned thought in accordance with the view of Faustus and of Grotius, by means of the purpose of making a penal example, and by means of that view to eternal life, which Christ by His resurrection from the dead has opened up, the mediæval colouring of this representation is still betrayed by Limborch in the following respects. First, and decidedly, in the character of the idea of God. As has been shown in another place,⁸⁵ the Reformers in their doctrine of predestination so applied the mediæval idea of the dominium absolutum of God, that they set aside as invalid the compromise between divine and human freedom, which was made in the doctrine of merit. The greater stress laid upon the doctrine of predestination by the successors of Calvin implied in itself an accentuation of the divine arbitrariness which was prejudicial to the religious interest. For the religious interest demands that in some form or other it should be possible to presuppose a real fellowship with God. Accordingly Arminius and his successors modified the fundamental idea of the dominium absolutum Dei in creaturas by the mark of that æquitas whereby God arranges the moral order of the world from regard at once to His own dignity and to the natural constitution and position of man. Thus at once is the arbitrary freedom of God upheld against the conditions which Reformation theology deduced from God’s justice, and a claim on the part of man to freedom as against God is established, a claim which mediæval theology recognised in the idea of merit. Now, although Limborch waves away the idea of merit as invalid, yet, secondly, his own doctrine of justification, as well as that of Curcellæus,⁸⁶ really amounts to the Catholic conception (lib. vi. cap. 4), Limborch admitting in pontificiorum sententia multa esse non improbanda. With Limborch justification means God’s gracious sentence in which He looks upon him who believes in Christ,—i.e. who obeys Him with respect to His prophetic priestly and kingly offices, who, therefore, is in a state of penitence and is bringing forth good works, as if this presently inherent though imperfect righteousness were perfect. This view so far shares the Protestant tendency in that justification, according to it, is fitted to awaken the confidence towards God which is forbidden to Catholic Christians. But it is in agreement with the Catholic view inasmuch as it connects and refers the sentence of justification to the faith that manifests itself in works, and thus to the inherent righteousness of the believer. Limborch guards himself merely against the materialistic representation of habitus infusus. But the rejection which he at the same time makes of the idea of merit really extends only to the Thomist interpretation of it. It exactly corresponds, on the other hand, to the definition of Duns, that God justitiam, quam imperfectam judicat, gratiose accipit ac si perfecta esset (sect. 41). And this assumption is a necessary consequence of æquitas regarded as the general attitude of God towards men; and is a proof of the place that it has in the mediation between God and men by Christ. In the difference between this doctrine, however, and that of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians, one interest is perceptible which, although it is operative in the modern evangelical theology, is not brought to any definite examination. The positive expression of justification borrowed from Paul was always used at the Reformation and in subsequent orthodoxy as synonymous with the negative expression of forgiveness of sins; and for this reason it was that the attainment of such a result by means of good works was utterly rejected. But then the original relation of that idea in the Bible is the relation to works. If justification includes blessedness in itself, and thus positively guarantees that final state of salvation which cannot be thought of apart from works, the natural relationship of these ideas asserts itself, and there results a style of doctrine such as the Arminians offer. It will thus be of importance for every system of dogmatics to decide whether by that idea the negative or the positive meaning is intended to be expressed.

The way in which, as Baur says, the theory of the two Arminians has fallen into a middle place between the strong contrast of churchly and Socinian theology, thus becomes clearer than as it is represented by Baur. For he points out that they in their doctrine of reconciliation approximated to the Church theology, while in their doctrine of justification they followed the Socinians. Of course such a proceeding is very far from attaining to a higher unity of the contradictories; but neither can one venture to call it a “mediating” position on any other field than on that of dispute upon the basis of private law. In the sphere of scientific knowledge, Arminianism would offer a lamentable middle course if no other sense could be derived from the actual state of the Arminian doctrine which has been thus interpreted by Baur. Now, the thought of justification, as it has been defined by Limborch, is specifically distinguished from the Socinian view, because it is regarded as taking place only in virtue of the worth of the general reconciliation accomplished by Christ’s sacrificial offering. Herein Arminian theology, as it is set forth by Limborch, maintains the churchly character of its view of Christianity. But then, as it does not matter so much in theory that the Arminian interpretation of the death of Christ approximated orthodox Protestantism, as that it coincides with the mediæval interpretation, Arminianism has in both doctrines a unity of character, inasmuch as in both it goes back to the patterns of mediæval theology. Along with this, indeed, in the case of the Arminians, is coupled a protest, all the more marked, against the hierarchical and sacramental apparatus of Catholicism. But if we confine our attention to the two closely connected doctrines of reconciliation and justification, then, in the theory of Arminian divines, it becomes plain that, as they found no higher mediation between the orthodox and Socinian doctrine, the attempted middle course has led them to a connexion of thoughts which is not new but old—which does not lie in advance of the Reformation but behind it, and which at the same time is instructive, in so far as it very thoroughly refutes any expectation that every contradiction that emerges in the history of theology must forthwith find its solution in a logically higher unity.

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Footnotes

1. Compare my Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott; Art. iii. (Jahrb. für deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 280-283.) ↩

2. Corpus Reformatorum, xxvi. p. 193. ↩

3. L. c. p. 157. ↩

4. If a single glance informs us that the Articles of Torgau, which were first discovered and published by Förstemann (in the Urkundenbuch zu der Gesch. des Reichstages zu Augsburg im Jahre 1530, 1ster Band. 1833), are almost word for word the basis of the second part of the Augsburg Confession; a glance also is sufficient to satisfy us that the formula in the seventh article is drawn from the same source, and not from the Articles of Schwabach, which are followed in all other respects in the first part of the Augsburg Confession. Thus it is only fair to explain that formula according to the connexion in which it occurs in the article of Torgau. ↩

5. Compare my dissertation upon Die Begründung des Kirchenrechtes im evangelischen Begriff von der Kirche (Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht von Dove und Friedberg, viii. (1869) pp. 220-279). ↩

6. Walch’s edition, xvi. p. 2803. ↩

7. Decl. de vera Dei invocatione, C. R. xi. p. 660: Precatio propria discernit ecclesiam ab omnibus gentibus. Disp. de invocatione Dei, xii. p. 529, cf. p. 8. ↩

8. Corpus Reformatorum, xxi. p. 825 sq.: A similar definition of the Church is given in the Examen ordinandorum, C. R. xxiii. p. 38 sq., and in the Repetitio confessionis Augustanæ (Conf. Saxonica), C. R. xxviii. p. 407 sq. ↩

9. L. c. p. 835: Concedendum est, ecclesiam esse coetum visibilem, neque tamen esse regnum pontificum, sed coetum similem scholastico coetui.—Erit aliquis visibilis coetus ecclesia Dei, sed ut coetus scholasticus. Est ordo, est discrimen inter docentes et auditores.—P. 837: Non contemnamus docentem ecclesiam, et tamen judicem esse sciamus ipsum verbum Dei.—C. R. xii. p. 367: Conspicitur ecclesia ut honesta aristocratia seu pius coetus docentium et discentium christianam κατήχησιν, qui dispersus eandem tamen verae doctrinæ et piæ invocationis vocem sonat. ↩

10. Walch, xvi. pp. 2663, 2785. ↩

11. C. R. xi. p. 272 sq., 598 sq., 703 sq., 758 sq., 775 sq., xii. p. 365 sq. ↩

12. Decl. de Luthero et ætatibus ecclesiæ, C. R. xi. p. 784: Ludit hoc modo diabolus non in ecclesia tantum, sed etiam in artibus. Ut cum philosophia recte constituta esset in doctrina Aristotelis et Theophrasti, postea pravæ naturæ studio novitatis petulanter quæsiverunt novas opiniones et quasi a media et regia via aberrantes, contrarios errores amplexæ sunt.—Nec accusanda hic tantum vanitas humanorum ingeniorum, sed etiam dæmonum malitia, quibus voluptati est, odio Dei veritatem involvere tenebris. ↩

13. Loci Theol., C. R. xxi. p. 836: Quis igitur erit judex, quando de scripturæ sententia dissensio oritur, cum tunc opus sit voce dirimentis controversiam? Respondeo: Ipsum verbum Dei est judex, et accedit confessio verae ecclesiæ.—Et cum major pars hunc verum judicem et hanc veram confessionem non audit, Deus ecclesiæ judex tandem dirimit controversiam, delens blasphemos. Declamatio de judiciis ecclesiæ, C. R. xii. p. 138 sq., p. 142: Deus ipse defensor est veritatis, et tandem delet impias sectas. ↩

14. See above, p. 177.—In this case, however, which touched himself so nearly, he had the impression that there was no need for a speedy settlement of the controversy. On the 15th of April 1537 he writes to Cordatus with the view of getting rid of the controverted question: Si controversiæ, quæ in ecclesia motæ sunt, adeo tibi videntur faciles, ut subito eas assequaris, gratulor tibi hoc acumen. Ego fatebor, etiamsi hebes dicar, mihi videri valde difficiles, ac animadverti, plerasque disputationes a multis parum dextere intelligi (C. R. iii. pp. 343, 344). Unfortunately Melanchthon was not able to impart this insight to his disciples, who threw themselves into the doctrinal controversies that arose, and rent the Church, with the greatest nonchalance. ↩

15. Conf. Saxonica, C. R. xxviii. p. 417: Filius Dei vult, hanc publicam sumtionem confessionem esse, qua ostendas, quod doctrinæ genus amplectaris, cui cœtui te adjungas. ↩

16. Schweizer (Reformirte Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 376 sq.) blindly follows him, not to the advantage of the clearness of his own representation. ↩

17. Here the reader must remember the drastic character which Schneckenburger, in his Comparative Dogmatik, makes out to be the prevailing principle of Reformed Christianity, compared with his criticism upon the Socinian system, “which is framed entirely in the interests of morals, and constructed from the practical standpoint.”—Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegr. der kleineren protest. Parteien, p. 60. ↩

18. Zur kirchl. Christologie, pp. 48, 49, repeated from the Theol. Jahrb. 1844, p. 248. Schweizer (Glaubenslehre der ref. Kirche, ii. p. 376) and Zeller (Theologie Zwingli’s, p. 75) have copied this assertion. The meaning of this view of the Reformed doctrine of salvation is that, properly speaking, it follows the type of Abelard, to which indeed, on all essential points, Schleiermacher also recurs. ↩

19. Loci Theol., ed. Cotta, tom. vii. pp. 33, 34. ↩

20. Compare what is said of him by Schweizer in the Theol. Jahrb. vols. xv., xvi. ↩

21. De Christo servatore, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 187. ↩

22. Gerhard’s opinion is confuted also by Henr. Alting: Theol. problematica nova (Groning. 1662), p. 609 sq. Fr. Turretinus: de satisfactione Christi (Lugd. Bat. 1696), p. 7. ↩

23. Compare my geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott. Art. ii. (Jahrb. für deutsche Theol. xiii. (1868), p. 108 sq.) ↩

24. Amyraldus; de jure Dei in creaturas. Comp. Jahrb., as above, p. 120 sq. W. Twisse; vindiciae gratiae, potestatis ac providentiae Dei. Amstelod. 1632, ed. ult. 1648. Compare Gass, Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik, i. p. 472. ↩

25. Voetius: De jure et justitia Dei (Disputationes theol. selectae, i. p. 372). ↩

26. L. c. p. 342, cf. Maccovii Loc. commun. p. 162. It cannot be denied that the application of the idea of God’s arbitrary will to the doctrine of double predestination has been the occasion, in the case of many Reformed theologians, for giving wider scope to the Scotist conception of God. In this sense Polanus (Syntagma theol. lib. ii. cap. 26) distinctly says, quidquid Deus fieri vult, eo ipso, quod vult, justum est. In the same direction Szydlovius (Vindiciae quaestionum aliquot difficilium et controversarum in theologia. Franeq. 1643), in harmony with Duns Scotus, has argued that God might have made the contents of the moral law quite opposite from what they are. (Compare Jahrbücher für deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 115; Voetius, l. c. i. p. 388 sq.) In accordance with the same testimony, Twisse deduced God’s penal justice as flowing with only hypothetical necessity from His decree. Still, as this tendency in Reformed theology is only a subordinate one, the testimony of Voetius vouches in the case of Twisse for the fact that the validity of the doctrine of satisfaction was neither purposely nor accidentally weakened by it. In the same way must we judge also of those expressions in which, as in the case of Zwingli (p. 204), the proposition of Thomas occasionally occurs, to the effect that God might have accomplished redemption in some other way than that which He actually chose. Thus Calvin (In Ev. Joh. cap. 15, v. 13): Poterat nos Deus verbo aut nutu redimere, nisi aliter nostra causa visum fuisset;—Zanchius (De Incarnatione, lib. ii. cap. 3; Opp. tom. viii. p. 45): Servare nos poterat solo suo imperio, peccata simpliciter per solam suam misericordiam condonando;—Peter Martyr Vermilius (Loci communes, ii. 17, 19). The sentence which Schneckenburger quotes (Zur kirchlichen Christologie, p. 49, note) under Alsted’s name, but without mentioning the title of the book, amounts to the same thing: Satisfactio ad procurandam salutem electorum fuit necessaria, non absolute, siquidem deesse nequivit Deo sapientissimo alius servandi modus, sed ex hypothesi beneplaciti Dei. This sentence does not come from Alsted, but from Henry Alting (Theol. didactica, Opp. Heidelbergensia, i. p. 81). Yet Alting himself in his Explic. Catech. Palat. (Opp. iii. p. 215), and elaborately in the Theol. problematica nova: loc. 3. probl. 25; loc. 12, probl. 35, decides against such an admission, representing God’s penal justice as a natural attribute, against the line taken by Twisse. At the same time, it is worthy of notice that, like Voetius, he does not regard as heterodox the divergent view taken by those who hold the hypothetical necessity of the Divine justice, because, with respect to the chief matter, namely, the recognition as matter of fact of the necessity of Christ’s satisfaction in order to the work of redemption, harmony prevailed none the less between the different parties. But the expressions made use of by Calvin, Zanchi, and Peter Martyr cannot be regarded as of greater importance, for they also, with the utmost deliberation and fulness, affirm and support the idea of satisfaction. ↩

27. Voetius: l. c., i. pp. 342, 373. ↩

28. It is an expression of Cocceius (De Fœd. et Testam. Dei, cap. 5, 92) that Schneckenburger quotes: Ita mysterium illud maximum (pactum æternum inter Patrem et Filium) patescit, quomodo in Deo justificemur et salvemur, quomodo Deus sit et qui judicat et qui spondet atque ita judicatur, qui absolvit,et qui intercedit, qui mittit et qui mittitur. Item hoc, quomodo Deus sibimet ipse satisfecerit suo sanguine. ↩

29. Not having had access to his Theses theol. (Herborn. 1618), I draw for materials upon Gerhard: Loci theologici, tom. vii. p. 61 sqq; Anton. Walaeus: L. c. (opp. i. p. 398 sq.); and Baur: Geschichte der Versöhnungslehre, p. 352 sqq. ↩

30. Schneckenburger (p. 65) conversely cites Ursinus as a witness for the fact that, even previous to Piscator, the satisfactory value of Christ’s active obedience had been recognised by the Reformed theologians. But the expressions cited by Schneckenburger from Ursinus are separated from their connexion. When that is taken into account it becomes plain enough that Ursinus regards active obedience only as a preliminary to the penal satisfaction, and comprehends the status humiliationis under the idea of His passion. Compare Explic. catech. opp. i. pp. 93, 231, 232. ↩

31. Gerhard, p. 69. At p. 260 he appeals to Weinrich and to Balduin. To a like effect Bucanus; Institutiones Theol. 1604: and previous to him George Sohnius (ob. 1588); Methodus Theologiae and Exegesis Aug. Confessionis (opp. ed. 3. 1609). ↩

32. Explicatio catechetica ad qu. 16: Quatuor modis Christus homo perfecte fuit justus seu legem implevit—(1) sua ipsius justitia; solus enim perfectam obedientiam, qualem lex requirebat, praestitit; (2) solvendo poenam sufficientem pro peccatis nostris.—Prior vocatur impletio legis per obedientiam, qua ipse fuit conformis legi; posterior impletio legis per poenam, quam pro nobis dependit: (3) in nobis implet legem suo spiritu, dum videlicet per spiritum sanctum nos regenerat, et per legem informat ad obedientiam internam et externam quam lex a nobis requirit, et quam in hac vita inchoamus, integram vero praestabimus in vita æterna; (4) implet legem Christus docendo et repurgando eam ab erroribus et corruptelis (opp. i. p. 93). In his Theses de Persona et Officio unici Mediatoris Jesu Christi (l. c. p. 744 sq.) also, Ursinus gives clear expression only to the satisfactory value of Christ’s passive obedience. ↩

33. Amesius: Medulla i. 21, 24: Quamvis hæc obedientia legalis a Christo jam homine facto jure creationis exigebatur, quoniam tamen non pro se ipso, sed pro nobis factus est, pars fuit humiliationis et satisfactionis et meriti illius. ↩

34. Bucanus: Institutiones theol. xxxi. 27: Justitia Christi—aliena non est, quatenus nobis destinata est.—Est etiam nostra illa justitia, quatenus illud ipsum ejus subjectum, nempe Christus, noster est. Polanus: Syntagma vi. 27, p. 781: Secundum quam naturam Christus est nobis a patre datus caput, secundum eandem est mediator inter Deum et nos. Atqui secundum utramque naturam est datus caput. Ergo. Major propositio est certissima, quia mediatorem esse est officium illius, qui a Deo caput constitutus est ipsi ecclesiæ. Amesius: i. 20. 11: Pendet totum hoc mysterium (satisfactionis pro peccatis) ex eo, quod Christus sit constitutus talis mediator, ut sit etiam sponsor et commune principium redimendorum, sicut Adamus fuit creatorum et perditorum. 12: In eadem Christi humiliatione fuit etiam meritum, qua ordinatur ad nostrum commodum. Ostenditur hoc omnibus illis scripturæ locis, quibus dicitur obedientia sua nobis procurasse justitiam. Voetius: Disp. theol. ii. p. 229: Obedientia activa a Christo præstita est pro Christo, quatenus singularis ille homo erat legi divinæ subjectus, pro nobis, quatenus sponsor erat, et omnium salvandorum personam sustinebat (supra: ecclesiam suam repræsentans), ac pro iis omnem justitiam legis implebat, quam illi implere non poterant. —Heidanus: Corp. Theol. Chr. loc. ix. (tom. ii. p. 79): Christus tanquam semen mulieris contriturum semen serpentis, ut sanctificaret reliquum semen, factus est secundus Adam, in quo omnes censemur. Ut quicquid ille ut secundus Adam pro nobis fecit et passus est, id perinde sit, ac si nos id fecissemus et passi essemus. p. 105: Christus hic considerandus venit ut persona conjuncta (juxta 2 Cor. v. 15) ut secundus Adam et caput redimendorum.—Witsius: De Œcon. Fœd. Dei, ii. 5, 11: Christus ut dominus et caput et novus Adamus origo et fons hæreditatis derivandæ in fratres, habet obedientiam universæ legis Dei. Per eam tota multitudo eorum, qui ad ipsum pertinent, justi constituuntur, i.e. censentur jus habere ad vitam æternam, ac si quilibet eorum in propria persona illam obedientiam præstitisset. ↩

35. At the same time, it was because Lutheranism had once failed to take up that idea, and made Christ, considered as man, to appear throughout His earthly life merely as an individual among other individuals, that a praxis of pietism, such as Zinzendorf wrought out in his community, became possible only within the sphere of the religious development of Lutheranism. ↩

36. Compare the testimonies cited above (p. 252). ↩

37. See above, p. 255, a similar observation with reference to Schneckenburger. Compare Gerhard, L. c. p. 71 (against Piscator): Ab onere perfectae et ad vitam aeternam adsequendam praestandae obedientiae Christus perfectissima sua obedientia nos liberavit. ↩

38. How little this thought is allowed by the dogmatic theologians to attain to its full dignity in their systems is shown by the fact that Walaeus and Quenstedt, for example, while expressing themselves as I have indicated regarding the necessity of satisfaction through Christ’s active obedience, at the same time make this distinction—that the passive obedience abolishes our punishment, the active obedience our guilt (culpa)—a distinction which is either utterly unintelligible, or which goes far beyond the limits of orthodox theology. Compare Walaeus, L. c. pp. 397, 399: Quenstedt, P. iii. pp. 282, 284. ↩

39. Rodolf: Catechesis Pal. Illustrata, p. 338: Jus ad vitam pendet ab impletione legis. p. 340 (In Christo) Deus nos justificat imputata ea justitia, quam lex primaria intentione exigit, quæ alia non est, quam perfecta legis impletio. Altera illa, quæ in passiva obedientia sita est, secundario demum et supplendo prioris defectui a lege postulatur. Assertioni nostræ inde fides constat, quia justificatio nostra fit sine legis rescissione, quin potius cum legis stabilitione. Adde, si Deus sola peccatorum remissione nos justificaret censendo, nos nihil omisisse, hactenus solum essemus non injusti. ↩

40. Quenstedt: P. iii. cap. 3, membr. 2 sec. 1 thes. 26: Satisfactio et meritum Christi non sunt ἰσοδυναμοῦντα. Nam 1. illa compensat injuriam Deo illatam, iniquitatem expiat, debitum solvit et a pœnis æternis liberat,—hoc restituit nos in statum benevolentiæ divinæ; mercedem gratuitam seu gratiam remissionis peccatorum, justificationem et vitam æternam peccatoribus acquirit; 2. illa se habet ut causa, hoc ut effectus. Ex satisfactione enim meritum ortum est. Satisfecit Christus pro peccatis nostris et pro pœnis illis debitis et ita promeruit nobis gratiam Dei, remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam; 3. satisfactio facta est Deo unitrino ejusque justitiæ, non nobis, licet pro nobis facta sit. At non ipsi Trinitati, sed nobis Christus aliquid meruit et merito suo acquisivit; 4. actus exinanitionis, ut legis impletio, passio, mors sunt simul satisfactorii et meritorii, actus vero exaltationis, ut resurrectio, ascensio in cœlum, sessio ad dexteram Dei non satisfactorii actus sunt, sed solum meritorii, eo ipso resurrectionem ad vitam nobis promeruit et cœlum reseravit; 5. Satisfactio ex debito oritur, sed meritum opus plane indebitum ac liberum est, cui ex adverso respondet merces. He was anticipated by Feuerborn (Syntagma primum sacrarum disquisitionum: Marburg, 1642), and followed by Hollaz (Examen theol. P. iii. sec. 1, cap. 3, qu. 76):—both imperfectly. Voetius, on the other hand (Disputationes theol. tom. ii. p. 229), repudiates the distinction drawn by Amesius. ↩

41. Cited in Schweizer’s Ref. Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 381. ↩

42. The edition of the lectures of Ursinus upon the Heidelberg Catechism, from which this quotation is taken, is one that was prepared by his hearers, and called forth a corrected edition by Pareus (first published in 1591), which is inserted in the Opera (ed. Quirin. Reuter. Heidelb. 1612); and in this authentic text the expression referred to by Schneckenburger is not to be found. Compare Walch: Bibliotheca theol. selecta, i. p. 520. ↩

43. Cocceius: De Fœdere et Testamento Dei, cap. 5. 93: Posito æterno decreto Patris et Filii, postquam hic ex muliere natus et caro factus est et servi formam accepit, eo ipso factus est sub legem, servus, debitor obedientiæ a nobis præstandæ. Gomarus: In Ep. ad Philipp. (Opp. i. p. 531): Meritum Christi in humilitate et obedientia consistit ratione secundi gradus humilitatis (obedience to the law as contradistinguished from the incarnation) cui soli Paulus opponit exultationem tanquam præmium.—This completely overthrows that point of view from which Schneckenburger regards the Reformed theory of the obedience of Christ. Its subject is not the Logos-God who humbles Himself, but the God-man that exists as the result of the humiliation or incarnation of the Logos. ↩

44. The assumption that the Reformed Christology has at bottom the tendency to reject the idea of satisfaction, and to call into prominence the idea of a living fellowship between men and the God-man, Schneckenburger has attempted to base upon the above quoted (p. 247, note) utterances of Cocceius. I only remark that Cocceius is not prepared for such a consequence as Schneckenburger draws. At least he says (cap. 5. 95): Neque putamus Christum, quatenus secundum Deitatem mediator est, Patri minorem esse, sed sponsionem hanc et adductionem hominis lapsi in eam gratiam in qua stamus, adeo non esse infra eminentiam divinitatis, ut non dubitemus cum Ies. 42. 6-8, eam gloriam et laudem divinitatis omnibus creaturis incommunicabilem asserere.—Gloria Dei est esse justitiam Israelis; hanc gloriam non dat non Deo. ↩

45. Polanus, p. 753: Secundus fructus resurrectionis Christi est justificatio nostri coram Deo … est actualis ejus absolutio a peccatis nostris, pro quibus mortuus est. Excitando eum a morte ipso facto eum absolvit Pater a peccatis nostris ei imputatis et nos etiam absolvit in eo. Amesius, p. 101: Finis resurrectionis fuit (4) ut se et justificatum et alios justificantem ostenderet. P. 123: Sententia justificationis (2) fuit in Christo capite nostro e mortuis jam resurgente pronunciata. Mastricht, Theol. theoretico-practica, p. 703, repeats word for word these sentences along with their context from Amesius. Witsius, iii. 8. 4. Compare Schneckenburger as above, p. 99. ↩

46. Köstlin, ii. p. 423. ↩

47. F. C. p. 684: Justitia illa, quæ coram Deo credentibus imputatur, est obedientia, passio et resurrectio Christi, quibus ille legi nostra causa satisfecit et peccata nostra expiavit. ↩

48. Medulla, i. 27. 9 (p. 123): Sententia justificationis (3.) virtualiter pronunciatur ex prima illa relatione, quæ ex fide ingenerata exsurgit. This is explained by the following sentences from cap. 26 (p. 119): Ratione receptionis Christi vocatio dicitur conversio, regeneratio.—Passiva receptio Christi est, qua spirituale principium gratiæ ingeneratur hominis voluntati.—Hæc enim gratia est fundamentum relationis illius, qua homo cum Christo unitur. —Receptio activa est elicitus actus fidei, qua vocatus in Christum recumbit ut suum servatorem. This line of thought is not found in Calvin, who, agreeably to the Reformation character of his contemplation of the consciousness of justification, expressly limits justification to Ames’s fourth step. ↩

49. It is true that justification, which on God’s side is a single act, manifests itself in subjective experience as a plurality of acts. Non est indivisus actus a parte nostri et ratione sensus, qui fit per varios et iteratos actus, prout sensu; iste potest interrumpi vel augeri vel minui ratione peccatorum intercurrentium (Turret. Comp. p. 453). Compare Schneckenburger, ii. p. 73. ↩

50. Kirchl. Christologie, p. 55 sq. Compar. Dogmatik, ii. p. 12 sq. ↩

51. In the article Sündenvergebung in Herzog’s Real-Encykl. xv. p. 238. ↩

52. Professor of Philosophy in Lausanne; wrote de fide Catholica (1587). (Compare Schweizer: Centraldogmen, i. p. 521-526.) His principle is—justitia nostra coram Deo qualitas patibilis in nobis inhærens, coniunctione cum Christo effecta, et vitiosæ qualitati originali opposita. ↩

53. I have not been able to gain access to the Systema controversiarum theo- logicarum of Anthony Hulsius, from which Schneckenburger (ii. p. 16) quotes the following sentences in support of his assertion: Certum est, cum justificatur, eum non esse peccatorem in statu peccati, sed fidelem et consequenter justum justitia inhærente. From the proofs of inaccuracy in quoting, which on this occasion I have discovered in both Würtemberg theologians, I shall wait to see whether any one will contradict me when I assert that the statement by Hulsius has no reference to the present question of the condition of the sinner’s justification through Christ, but to the case of the acquittal of the righteous person (touched on by Witsius, p. 274), which is called by Braun (Doctrina Fœderum, iii. 9, 21) justificatio secunda: Secunda est inhærens, imperfecta et mutabilis, fitque non tantum fide, sed operibus, et quidem per sanctificationem ad obtinendum testimonium sanctitatis, ut absolveremur ab hypocrisi— in so far, that is, as the devil accuses the just as he accused Job. ↩

54. Schneckenburger (Comp. Dogm., ii. p. 12) thinks that it is impossible for a Lutheran to say what is natural to a Reformed divine: justificatio sequitur fidem ut ejus effectus. But Baier and Gerhard say:—Finis et effectus fidei proximus est justificatio. According to p. 13 it is only the later and pietistically inclined Lutherans who, after the Reformed manner, understand by regeneration the donatio fidei. But this is not merely the opinion of Quenstedt and Baier; it is also that of Gerhard, who has no locus de regeneratione, but places that de pœnitentia before that de justificatione, comp. his Loc. 17, cap. 3, sec. 3. ↩

55. Arminius was the first who from Eph. i. 4 pressed the doctrine of election in Christ. With regard to the meaning of the phrase, he expressed himself variously, designating Christ in virtue of His passion at one time as causa meritoria, qua gratia et gloria est parata; at another time as causa meritoria eorum bonorum, quæ decreto electionis fidelibus destinata sunt (Compare Twisse: Vindiciæ gratiæ, potestatis ac providentiæ Dei, p. 36). The former interpretation was adopted by his followers (Schweizer: Centraldogmen, ii. p. 91); the second was insisted upon by his opponents as against the other (for it was no longer possible to avoid that passage from St. Paul). It is the interpretation given in the decision of the Synod of Dort (cap. i. 7): Certam quorundam hominum multitudinem elegit in Christo, quem etiam ab æterno mediatorem et omnium electorum caput, salutisque fundamentum constituit. Should this not be held to be sufficiently clear, then Gomarus may be consulted (Loc. Comm., v. p. 63): Medium electionis est donatio Christi servatoris… . . Apparet, electionem Christi aliorum ad salutem destinationem ordine non præcedere, sed ut medium ei fini subordinatum succedere. H. Alting (Loc. Comm., iv. p. 66): Primum summumque mediorum omnium ad salutem præparatorum est Christus. Sumus igitur electi in Christo ut mediatore, ut capite, cujus satisfactione interveniente fieret reconciliatio inter Deum et homines. This orthodox Calvinist view thus coincides with the Arminian, in so far as both contemplate Christ in connexion with the subject of election, in His quality as the Giver of satisfaction for sinners; but they differ from one another inasmuch as God’s plan of satisfaction through Christ is regarded by the Arminians as the ground, and by the Calvinists as the consequence, of the elective decree. Now the Lutherans, having adopted the Arminians’ unlimited conception of freedom (Schweizer ii. p. 209), have also accepted the Arminian assertion that Christ is the causa meritoria electionis. On the other side, in one circle of Reformed divines the view has been developed that election in Christ is valid for all those who in connexion with Him as their Head shall attain to final salvation. In fact, both by the rule ultimum in exsecutione est primum in intentione, and also by consideration of the circumstance that Christ’s satisfaction does not establish but presuppose His dignity as Head of the Church that is to be redeemed,; Amesius teaches (Medulla, i. cap. 25, sect. 27): Electio unica fuit in Deo respectu totius Christi mystici, Christi et eorum, qui sunt in Christo, sicut creatio una fuit totius generis humani; prout tamen secundum rationem distinctio quædam concipi potest, Christus primo fuit electus ut caput, ac deinde homines quidam ut membra in ipso. Witsius (De Œconomia Fœd. Dei, iii. 4. 2): Electi sunt in Christo ut mediatore et propterea electo, qui uno eodemque actu sic ipsis datus est in caput et dominum, ut illi simul ei data sint in membra et peculium, servandi ejus merito et efficacia, et in communione cum ipso. Heidegger (Corp. Theol. Chr., loc. v. 28): Electionis consilium ab æterno dispositum est per modum voluntatis, qua Deus in Christo hæredes justitiæ et regni sui apud se ipsum definivit. 29: Ad eligendum quosdam Deum in universum impulit amor gloriæ suæ… . In specie autem amor personarum S. Trinitatis electionis intra Deum causa est. 30: In æterno illo testamento scriptus principalis hæres est Jesus Christus partim ut hæres omnium, partim ut hæreditatis sibi datæ vindex et assertor… . Unde liquet hæreditatem filii esse homines quosdam sibi datos, ut per eum salvati gloriæ ejus consortes fierent… . Elegit nos in ipso, Christo, in hærede principali cohæredes, in principe salutis nostræ salvandos, in capite corpus. By this view of election, the tradition that descends from Luther and Calvin is, properly speaking, departed from. If the elect be represented a priori as a whole in Christ, they are then no longer the many individuals with whom the reprobi in the other act of God’s will are to be co-ordinated. This deduction, however, has not been clearly brought out. Still I find that such a change of the idea of election, while it withdraws from Calvin, approaches the line inaugurated by Zwingli (Compare Jahrb. für deutsche Theol., xiii. p. 94). I believe also that these theologians have rightly apprehended the meaning of the apostle Paul. ↩

56. If such a Reformed theologian, as, for example, Witsius (Lib. iii. 8. 59, 60), represents the objective justification of the individual in foro cœli as taking place at the moment when the regenerate person attains to faith, he, at all events, distinguishes from this the insinuatio sententiæ Dei per spiritum sanctum. Conversely, Maresius (Syst. Theol. loc. 11. 57, 58), like the Lutherans, teaches that God’s sentence and the consciousness of it coincide in time; but to make up for this he represents the dispositive acts of striving after righteousness, which fall within the justification of the individual, as proceeding from God; and these, as they proceed from faith and presuppose the general sentence of justification passed upon the elect, betray the Reformed type of doctrine which quite excludes the idea that God’s objective sentence and the subjective consciousness thereof should coincide in time and in experience. ↩

57. The Autobiography of Albert Knapp serves as a proof. ↩

58. Zur kirchl. Christologie, p. 141. ↩

59. I do not mean to affirm that the Church development of Calvinism has has been so normal that no similar aberrations have occurred within its sphere. The phenomena of Independency (analogous to pietism) have manifested themselves even much more extensively in it, but they connect themselves with other points of doctrine and with special historical occasions. ↩

60. Seidemann: Th. Münzer, p. 120. Erbkam: Protest. Secten, p. 502 sq. ↩

61. Heberle: Johann Denk und sein Büchlein vom Gesetz; Stud. u. Krit. 1851, pp. 156, 168. ↩

62. Heberle: Johann Denk und die Ausbreitung seiner Lehre; Stud. u. Krit. 1855, pp. 841, 849, 854. Keim: Ludwig Hetzer; Jahrb. für Deutsche Theol. 1856, p. 267 sqq. ↩

63. Nippold: David Joris von Delft; Zeitschr. für histor. Theologie, 1868. Heft 4, p. 513. ↩

64. Weingarten: Revolutionskirchen Englands, p. 359. ↩

65. As above: pp. 208, 375 sq., 381 sq. ↩

66. Compare Erbkam: as above, pp. 431-443, 456 sq. Baur: Versöhnungslehre, p. 460 sq. ↩

67. The coincidence between Schwenkfeld and Andreas Osiander upon this point is clear, and obviously betokens a common origin. Yet the view of Osiander the theologian is practically conditioned and limited by his connexion with the Church, in a very different way from the view of the anti-churchly sectary. ↩

68. I do not enter upon the analogous trains of thought of the Theosophers, Valentin Weigel, and Jacob Böhme, for these pursue merely theoretical interests, and not those of religious fellowship. The biblical colouring of doctrines which are at once dualistic and pantheistic surely does not oblige us to incorporate them in a history of theology, for theology must always have as its characteristic feature the purpose of serving the religious community, however that may be represented. Neither do the protests against the idea of imputation, and the allegorizing interpretation which seeks the appeasing of God’s wrath in individual experiences, which these men put forward each on his own behalf possess any critical value for the treatment of the orthodox form of the doctrine of reconciliation. ↩

69. Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott. (Art. iii., Jahrb. für deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 268 sq., 283 sq.) ↩

70. Bibliotheca fratrum Polonorum, i. p. 323 sq. ↩

71. The idea introduced into the common practice of the Lutherans by Melanchthon (p. 238) coincides almost entirely with this view. The editor of the Racovian Catechism, Oeder, Dean of Feuchtwangen (1739), declares himself to be in agreement with the definitions cited above, only stipulating that the Church consists of men, and therefore sana doctrina ad pascendam regendamque ecclesiam summe necessaria is to be regarded not as the essence but as the mark of the Church. But in so far as the Lutherans seek their orthodoxy in the affirmation that pure theological doctrine is the chief mark of the Church, they approximate most closely, by their attachment to Melanchthon, to the Socinians. ↩

72. I do not in this deny that the doctrine of the Trinity, which the Reformers adopted, and the doctrine of reconciliation to which they and their disciples gave a new shape, admit of improvement both in respect of matter and of form, or that they demand it both exegetically and dialectically; but I do deny that the significance of these doctrines for the Church character of the Reformation can be understood only when one imagines the purpose of the Reformation to have been fulfilled in the shelving of its problems by the Socinians. ↩

73. Fock, Socinianismus, p. 704 sq, ↩

74. De Christo Servatore, Lib. iv. 5. Prælectiones theologicæ, cap. 18 sq.; in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum. I think it right to indicate the arguments only in their main points, and refer to the full statement in Fock: Socinianismus, 615 sq. ↩

75. De Christo Servatore, iv. 2 (p. 216): Si pro ipso solutum est, ut acceptum illi feratur, nihil est opus.—Acceptum ferre significat pro soluto habere, licet vero solutum non sit. Accepti latio est per-sola-verba-obligationis liberatio.—Quodsi vel ipse vel alius pro eo revera solvat, accepti lationi nullus est locus. It is incredible, but a fact, that the expression acceptilatio is used by almost every one as synonymous with acceptatio, as if it came from a verb accepti-lare. For example, Schneckenburger (Lehrbegriffe der kl. prot. Kirchenparteien, p. 18) speaks of acceptilation of Christ’s merit in Duns Scotus. So already H. Alting (Theol. probl. nova, p. 726) in judicio forensi absolutio a reatu prior est acceptilatione personæ et imputatione justitiæ, where the forensic term is quite unsuitable, and only acceptatio personæ in gratiam would be appropriate. The relation of the two ideas is also wrongly explained by Strauss: Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 315. ↩

76. Compare the analysis of Crell’s tract de Deo ejusque attributis in my Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott. (Art. iii., Jahrb. für deutsche Theol., xiii. p. 259 sq.) ↩

77. Compare in the above cited article, p. 291 sqq., the account of the attempts made by John Hoornbeek in his Socinianismus confutatus, and by Lambert Velthuysen in his treatise De pœna divina et humana, to reconcile the orthodox assertion with the claims of the idea of the freedom of the will. ↩

78. Scripta Antisociniana, ii. p. 597: Satisfactio in pœna pecuniaria, si debitor eandem persolvat, est propria; si alius quispiam nocentis nomine, est vicaria.—Per similitudinem vel analogiam accommodari possunt satisfactioni pœnali, quæ in civili proprie reperiuntur. P. 605: Nihil obstat, quominus analogice et per quandam similitudinem explicetur satisfactio Christi natura civilis satisfactionis. ↩

79. Heidegger: Corpus Theol. Christ. Loc. xxii. 31. Sicut debitor æs quidem alienum expungere tenetur, sed non ita, ut nonnisi ex peculio suo illud expungere teneatur et non per sponsorem seu vadem expungere possit—ita peccator omnino Deo solutionem debet, et justitiam præstare tenetur, sed non ita ex peculio suo, ut alienâ sponsoris satisfactio et justitia peccatori in judicio Dei imputata non sufficiat. ↩

80. Here the difference between Duns and Thomas reappears between Faustus and the Reformed divines (pp. 66-7). ↩

81. The orthodox theologians do not distinguish so clearly as Grotius does between the characteristics of the dominus absolutus and those of the rector. Sin as a transgression of the law of God is yet at the same time regarded as a personal offence against God, just as in the Middle Ages. And therefore they continue to assign to sin an infinite value merely in respect of that rule for measuring the different degrees of injuries, the gravity of which is judged according to the value of the person injured, so that the gravity of a sin committed against an infinite person is itself infinite. ↩

82. Responsio ad librum H. Grotii quem de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem scripsit (1623): Bibl. Frat. Pol., vol. vi. ↩

83. Curcellæi Institutio Religionis Christianæ (unfinished), Lib. v. capp. 8, 18, 19. Op. theol., Amstel. 1675. Limborch: Theologia Christiana, Amstel. 1686. ed. iv. 1715, Lib. iii. capp. 16-22. ↩

84. The Arminian doctrine of God is fashioned after the model of the treatment given to it by the Socinian Crell, through Episcopius (Institutiones theologicæ). Compare my Geschichtl. Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott. (Art. iii., Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie, xiii. p. 267 sq.) ↩

85. Jahrb. für deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 116 sq. 124 sq. ↩

86. Diss. de hominis per fidem et per opera justificatione. Opp. Theol. pp. 933-942. ↩