Notes

1. Στέργειν, στοργή are not found in Homer, but are in good Attic use, and, though not of such common occurrence as, say φιλεῖν, φιλία, yet remain in constant employment throughout the whole history of the language, and apparently survive in modern Greek. N. Contopoulos in his “Modern Greek and English Dictionary,” at least, lists both, with the definitions, for στέργω, of “to consent, to agree, to comply, to answer; to embrace with natural affection; to love”; and for στοργή, “tenderness, affection.” Its etymology seems to be obscure. W. Prellwitz, “Etym. Wörterb2.,” 1905, records only Keltic analogies, with a reference to Stokes, BB. 23. 58.

2. “Synonymik der griechischen Sprache,” iii, 1879, p. 480 (136. § 4).

3. Plutarch, “Pericles,” 24 (ed. B. Perrin, pp. 70–71).

4. “The Greek Anthology,” v, 180 (ed. W. R. Paton, I, p. 216). Other instances of the use of στέργειν, στοργή of illicit love are found in v, 8 (p. 132); v, 166 (p. 206); v, 191 (p. 222); vii, 476 (v. ii, p. 258). In v, 180 (p. 216) we have also an instance of the use of στέργει with object of thing in the sense of yearning: “And yearns for anger like the waves.”

5. Xenophon, “Symposium,” viii, 14: cf. 21.

6. v

7. Euripides, “Medea,” 80–88 (A. S. Way’s translation).

8. As cited, pp. 489–490.

9. Page 754 B. (Jowett’s translation of the Dialogues, 1874 v. iv, p. 276): καθάπερ παῖς … στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησάντων.

10. For the note of necessity in στέργειν see Schmidt, as cited, p. 482. Schmidt even says that with στέργειν it is often not a matter of pleasure at all, and never a matter of sensuous pleasure: it often conveys the meaning of yielding quickly and with constant mind to the inevitable. He cites such passages as Sophocles, “Phil.,” 538: I think that no other man would endure to look on such a sight, “but I have learned by hard necessity to στέργειν ills”—that is, to acquiesce in them, accept them, take them as belonging to me; so “Lys.,” 33.4: it was necessary to στέργειν this fortune. This sense of toleration—“to put up with”—is shared by it with αἰνεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν.

11. Line 543.

12. “Trach.,” line 486.

13. “Anabasis,” ii, 6. 23.

14. “Eq.,” line 769 (al. 715 or 748).

15. 12. D (Otto, p. 56).

16. “Apol.,” i, 15.

17. Aristotle, “Nic. Ethics,” viii. 4, discusses what happens to the lover and his mistress (ἐραστῇν καὶ ἐρωμένῳ) when the grounds on which their love (φιλία) is built fall away. Sometimes the love (φιλία) passes away too. Sometimes—if the two are alike in their natures —custom has inspired them with an abiding affection and it holds (ἑὰν ἐκ τῇ συνηθείας τὰ στέρξωσιν ὁμοήθεις ὄντες). Their love is thought of as στοργή only when they are conceived as constituting together a unity by reason of their similar natures.

18. “Frogs,” line 229.

19. Æschylus, “Eumenides,” line 912. The passage is a difficult one. We have followed Verrall. E. H. Plumptre renders thus: “For I, like gardener shepherding his plants, This race of just men, freed from sorrow, love.”

20. C. 2: “Eusebius Werke,” ed. I. A. Heikel, v. 1, 1902, p. 155 (τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον στοργὴν ἔμφυτον).

21. C. 25: as above, p. 192 (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοῦς ἀνθρώπους στοργήν).

22. The derivation of the word is uncertain. It is ordinarily referred to the primitive Aryan root RA (see for example Skeat, “Etymolog. Dict. of the English Language,” no. 289; cf. LAS, no. 324 which is an expansion of RA), which is given the senses of “to rest, to be delighted, to love.” W. Prellwitz connects with the Old-Indian aris, with the meaning of trustworthy; but notes that Uhlenbeck, “Kurzgef. etym. Wörterb. d. altind. Sprache” connects aris with Gothic aljam, Old High German ellen, with the sense of “ardor.”

23. Page 475 (136. 2).

24. I. 11. ii, ed. E. M. Cope, 1877, v. i, p. 209; Cope, however, explains the passage as saying that lovers take pleasure in busying themselves with the beloved object in his absence, talking about him and sketching his features, and doing everything they can think of to recall him to their memories.

25. 5. 1. 10.–12. We use a version that lies at hand, but have enclosed in square brackets some of the words which have been inserted by the translator to give greater lucidity to the passage, in order that the reader may not be misled with respect to the frequency of the occurrence of ἐρᾶν, or with respect to apparent variations in the term used.

26. Eur., Frag. “Erecht.,” 19 (Dind.) ap. Stob. 79, p. 454. (Teubner’s ed. of Euripides’ Works, ed. by A. Nauck, 1892, v. iii, p. 90, fragment 360).

27. “Brutus,” c. 29.

28. “Hi.,” xi. 11.

29. i. p. 4M.

30. “Phaedr.,” 231 C: τούτους μαλιστά φασι φιλεῖν ὧς ἃν ἐρῶσι: “regard with affection those for whom they have a passion” (Liddell and Scott, 8th ed. 1901); “feel the highest (moral) affections for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion” (E. M. Cope, “The Rhetoric of Aristotle,” 1877, i, p. 293).

31. “Anal. Pr.,” 2.29.1.

32. Apollon., “De Constr.,” p. 292.1 cited by Stephanus, “Thesaurus,” 1829–1863, v. 3, col. 1966.

33. Cope, op. cit., i, 293 describes ἔρως shortly as “the sexual form of ἐπιθυμία or natural appetite,” supporting himself on Plato, “Phaedrus,” 237D: “It is evident to all that ἔρως is an ἐπιθυμία,” and “Timaeus,” 42A: “Love is a mixture of pleasure and pain,” which, he adds, is “the characteristic of ἐπιθυμία.” This applies to ἔρως, however, only in one of its uses.

34. “Lysis,” 221D, 222A (Jowett, i, p. 63).

35. “The Christian Platonists of Alexandria2,” 1913, p. 7.

36. “De Praem. et Poen.,” (Mangey, ii, 421).

37. “De Profugis,” §11 (Mangey, i 554–555). Cf. the remarks of W. Lütgert, “Die Liebe im Neuen Testament,” 1905, p. 48.

38. Ch. vii.

39. The two sides of the question have been well stated and argued respectively by J. B. Lightfoot in his comment on the passage (“My (earthly) passion has been crucified”: he actually renders it in his version of the letter, “My lust has been crucified”), and by Charles Bigg in the preface to his Bampton Lectures on “The Christian Platonists of Alexandria” (“My (divine) Love has been crucified”). There is a third possible view: “My preference (for death) has been crucified.”

40. “Prologue to the Song of Songs,” Lommatzsch, xiv, pp. 299, 301, 302.

41. Cited with other mystical writers by Lightfoot, as above.

42. “Dial.,” viii. 1.

43. “Cohort.,” 71.

44. “In Joann.,” I. 14. (11): ed. Preuschen, p. 14, line 29.

45. “Strom.,” vi. 9. (72).

46. As cited, p. 475.

47. “Eth. Nic.,” ix. 10; 1171A. 12: ἐρᾶν … ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας. But as he is thinking of ἐρᾶν in its sensual application, he adds: τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἔνα.

48. The Andover Review, August, 1885, p. 167.

49. The etymology of φιλεῖν is not very clear. G. Heine, “Synonymik des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch,” 1898, p. 154, suggests for φίλος (after Vaniček): “one’s own, that to which one is accustomed, and on which he depends, dear, worthy.”

50. Pp. 476–477.

51. “Phaedr.,” 231C.

52. “Il.,” ix, 450.

53. “Odyss.,” xviii, 325.

54. W. Lütgert, “Die Liebe im N.T.,” 1905, p. 37: he sends us to E. Curtius, “Altertum und Gegenwart,” i, p. 183ff. for the matter. Consult also the remarks of Paul Kleinert, “Th. S. K.,” 86 (1913) i, pp. 16f.

55. “Supplement to Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament” Greek 1886, p. 593 (sub voc. Ἀγάπη).

56. E. g., “Eth. Nic,” viii, 2. 1: “For it appears that not everything is loved (φιλεῖσθαι) but [only] τὸ φιλητόν: this is good (ἀγαθόν) or pleasant (ἡδύ) or useful (χρήσιμον).”

57. “Magna Moralia,” II. 11: p. 1208 B. The translation of St. George Stock is used.

58. “Magna Moralia,” p. 1210 A.

59. “Magna Moralia,” p. 1210 A: “It is evident then that friendship (φιλία) based on utility occurs among things the most opposite.”

60. “Ethica Eudemia,” vii, 3 (p. 1238b). J. Solomon’s version is used.

61. “Il.,” vi, 15.

62. “Odyss.,” xiv, 128.

63. “Il.,” iii, 207.

64. As cited, p. 477.

65. Herodotus, Xenophon and Attic writers generally.

66. E. A. Sophocles says (“Bibliotheca Sacra,” July 1889, p. 525): “As to the modern φιλῶ, it retains only the meaning, to kiss.”

67. It is the sense of all the instances in which ἀγαπᾶν or ἀγαπάζειν occurs in Homer, except one—“Odyss.,” xxi, 289, where it means “to acquiesce in,” “be content with.” Cf. Cope, as cited, p. 295.

68. “Odyss.,” xxiii, 214.

69. Andover Review, August 1885, p. 167.

70. “Odyss.,” xvi, 17.

71. “Odyss.,” vii, 33.

72. “Odyss.,” xxi, 224.

73. “Pyth.,” iv, 241.

74. John U. Powell in his edition of the “Phoenissae,” 1911, p. 206. The passages are “Phoeniss.,” 1327; “Suppl.,” 764; Helen.,” 937. Cf. also Woolsey, as cited, p. 167.

75. “Cyrop.,” vii, v. 50: ed. Holden, 1890, p. 74.

76. “Pericles,” 1.

77. “Johannine Vocabulary,” 1905, p. 261, note (1744, iv, b).

78. Lightfoot in loc. comments: “ ‘welcomed, embraced.’ The word here refers to external tokens of affection, according to its original meaning.”

79. “Acta Pauli et Thec.,” 18: καταφιλοῦσης his chains: Tertullian, “Ad. Uxor.,” ii, 4, osculanda the martyr’s chains.

80. See Zahn, “Ignatius von Antiochien,” 1873, p. 415, and also his comment on the passage itself.

81. “Otium Novicense,” Pars Tertia, 1881., ad loc.

82. See [J. Hastings], Expository Times, xviii, 99 (Hastings generalizes: “In any case the word is that word for loving which means manifesting love in action”); Edwin A. Abbott, “Johannine Vocabulary,” 1905, pp. 257 ff.; J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, “The Vocabulary of the New Testament,” i, 1914, p. 12, sub voc. ἀγαπᾶν.

83. Swete, for example, rejects it decisively.

84. It would be easy to reply, it is true, that both might be given an internal meaning, and perhaps the usage of ὑπεραοπάζεται encourages this view.

85. J. B. Lightfoot argues for the originality of the external sense in an article published in the Cambridge Journal of Classical Philology, v. iii (1857), no. 7, p. 92; and again in his note on Ignatius “ad Polyc.,” 2, where he states the case with his accustomed compressed force. “The word,” he says, “seems originally to have referred to the outward demonstration of affection.… This original sense appears still more strongly in ἀγαπάζω. The application of the term to the inward feeling of love is a later development, and the earlier meaning still appears occasionally.” But after all it is difficult to believe that the word began with this external sense, and Homer does not record an absolutely primitive usage. E. M. Cope, op. cit., pp. 295–296 properly therefore rejects this reading of the history of the word. Liddell and Scott’s article on ἀγαπάω exaggerates the externality of the term and might even give the impression that the internal affection of love scarcely falls within its range at all.

86. Cf. “The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language,” sub voc. “Love, subst.,” no. 6 (p. 464 med.): “the animal instinct between the sexes and its gratification.” Maurice Hewlett, “The Fool Errant,” 1905, p. 247: “We ate frugally, drank a little wine and water, loved temperately, and slept profoundly.”

87. Cf. on this subject the excellent remarks of R. C. Trench, “On the Study of Words,” ed. N. Y. 1855, pp. 50 ff.

88. Lucian, “Jup. Trag.,” 2: Hera accused Zeus of having a love-affair (ἐρωτικόν) on hand and, plagued by love (ἔρωτος), of thinking of falling through some roof into the lap of his ἀγαπωμένης. So, “Vera Hist.,” ii, 25: Cinyres had fallen in love (ἤρα) with Helen, and she was plainly also enamoured (ἀγαπῶσα) with him; so, driven by love and despair (ὑπʼ ἔρωτος καὶ ἀμηχανίας). they ran off. A hundred years before Lucian, Plutarch has the usage: cf. the passages cited by Thayer under φιλέω.

89. J. S. Watson translates: “Who could find pleasure in the company of such a man, who, he would be aware, felt more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots to that of his fellows?” This sense of “to be satisfied with,” is a not infrequent one for ἀγαπᾶν.

90. Cope, as cited, p. 296: “In Plato’s “Symposium,” 180 B, it takes the place of ἐρᾶν in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά.”

91. According to T. D. Woolsey, as cited, the indices record ἀγαπάω, ἀγαπητός, ἀγαπητῶς for Demosthenes twenty-two times; for Plato eighteen; for Lysias and Isocrates, each three times. These figures are, however, misleading: in Isoerates, for example, the words are of much more frequent occurrence.

92. Cf. Lobeck on Phrynicus, p. 352, and Stephanus sub voc. Thayer sub voc. ἀγάπη, seems to intimate that the word appears first in Aristotle: Liddell and Scott, in Plato.

93. The facts are carefully stated by Moulton and Milligan, as cited, sub voc.

94. On this etymology see Cope, as cited, p. 294, also p. 296. Other etymological suggestions are made. Cremer, in his third edition, finds the fundamental notion to be, “to find one’s satisfaction in something”; but in his tenth edition reverts to the simple suggestion of a connection with ἄγαμαι in the sense of admiring. W. Prellwitz traces the word back to an Old-Aryan root Pō (Old-Indian Pā) bearing the sense of “protecting”; hence ἀγα-πός, “protecting,” and the denominative ἀγαπάω, “entertain,” or, as in Homer, “welcome.” This view of the etymology favors the external sense of the word as original.

95. Cope, as cited, p. 294, remarks that, whatever be the true derivation of the word, “this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. “Mem.,” ii. 7.9 is decisive on this point.” On p. 295 he surveys the copious material in Aristotle’s “Nicomachaean Ethics” and concludes that in every instance the word may, and in many instances it must, carry the implication of esteem. It is the worth of the object of preference which underlies the affection expressed by it.

96. So e.g., Schmidt.

97. So e.g., Gildersleeve. Woolsey, as cited, p. 182, with Trench in his mind, says very appositely: “We naturally avoid or distrust attaching this quality of coldness to ἀγαπάω or ἀγάπη; and while we ascribe to these words the consent of the will and benevolent regard, we do not strip them of feeling.”

98. These sentences stand in all the editions from the third (1883) to the tenth (1915). Under ἀγάπη he says (ed. 10, p. 14): “It designates the love which chooses its object with decisive will.”

99. It may be worth noting that Liddell and Scott, in explaining the distinction between ἐρᾶν and φιλεῖν, say it is that between amare and diligere; and in explaining the distinction between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν, say that this is that between amare and diligere. That is to say, φιλεῖν appears now as diligere and now as amare to meet the needs of the case.

100. There is no philological reason for supposing that the peculiarity of ἀγαπᾶν among the terms for loving was that it suggested that love is a voluntary emotion. There is also no trace of such a distinction having been made in usage by the Greeks. In arguing for it we are arguing without regard to the Greek consciousness. We have had occasion to observe Xenophon insisting that ἐρᾶν expresses a voluntary act. But it was not ἐρᾶν distinctively that he had in mind: what he was really arguing was that love as such, under any designation, is a voluntary act. It was a psychological, not a philological, question in which he was interested.

101. “The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living,” ch. IV, sec. 3 (p. 21 of v. ii, of the Temple Classics edition).

102. As cited, p. 482.

103. I. 11. 17.

104. Trench and Cope hold much the same view.

105. Cope, as cited, v. i, p. 214, paraphrases Aristotle’s phrase thus: “And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one’s own sake and for nothing else.” He remarks: “It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by esteem.” We probably get Aristotle’s whole meaning when we say that when we are loved, there is implied in that that we are valued for our own sake.

106. “Memorabilia,” II, vii. 9 and 12. We give the text of the passage in the translation of J. A. Watson. Fourteen free women—his relatives—had been introduced into Aristarchus’ house as dependents. Socrates’ comment and advice was this: “Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you neither feel attached (φιλεῖν) to your relatives nor they to you, for you find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed with their company. For such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly inclination may be diminished. But if you take them under your direction so that they may be employed, you will love (φιλήσεις) them, when you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow attached to you (ἀγαπήσουσιν) when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society; and remembering past services with greater pleasure, you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and consequently grow more attached and better disposed toward each other.” Aristarchus took this advice and the result was: “they loved (ἐφίλον) Aristarchus as their protector, and he loved (ἠγάπα) them as being of use to him.”

107. P. 135.

108. As cited, p. 2, sub voc. ἀγαπᾶν.

109. J. H. H. Schmidt, as cited, p. 483, has a full and excellent discussion of the passage, which leaves no doubt of the general distinction that is drawn. Edward M. Cope, as cited, p. 294, pronounces it “decisive” in the matter. Cf. also T. D. Woolsey, as cited, p. 168; and E. A. Abbott, as cited, p. 240.

110. xliv, 48, p. 175.

111. P. 215B (cf. Jowett, p. 54).

112. P. 220D (cf. Jowett, p. 61).

113. “Var. Hist.,” ix, 1 (Tauchnitz ed. p. 124).

114. V. 148; V. 42. We draw these passages from Schmidt (p. 485), who presents them as involving no question of real love, but only of an esteeming or valuing.

115. “De Corona,” p. 263, 7 Reiske.

116. “De Olynth.,” ii, p. 23, 23.

117. “Aristides,” 6.3.

118. How fully these synonyms covered the idea of love in its complete range is illustrated by the opening words of Deutsch’s article on “Love (Jewish)” in Hastings’ ERE. viii, p. 173b. In transcribing what he says we insert the Greek terms at appropriate places. “The dictionaries define love as ‘a feeling of strong personal attachment, induced by that which delights (φιλεῖν) or commands admiration (ἀγαπᾶν).’ The subdivisions of this sentiment comprise the impulses of attachment, due to sexual instinct, or the mutual affections of man and woman (?ἐρᾶν); the impulses which direct the mutual affections of members of one family, parents and children, brothers and other relatives (στέργειν); the attachment that springs from sympathetic sentiments of people with harmonious character, friendship (φιλία); and finally, the various metaphorical usages of the word, as the love for moral and intellectual ideals.” He adds: “To the last class belongs the religious concept of love for God, while the particular Biblical conception of God’s love for Israel is closely related to the idea of paternal affection.” As we shall see when we come to speak of the usage of the Septuagint, these higher religious conceptions were brought under ἀγαπᾶν.

119. Woolsey’s remark (as cited, p. 169): “Such a change … must have come from a higher condition of moral feeling,” is sound in itself although made in a connexion not easily justified.

120. “Biblisch-Theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcität3,” 1883, p. 11, near bottom: E. T., p. 592, bottom. The remark seems to have been omitted from 10th ed., 1915.

121. According to Gesenius, ֹא ֵה בmeans “a friend, loving and beloved, intimate, different from ֵד ַע, a companion”: ֵד ַע, he says, implies less than ֹא ֵה ב. In the text, ἀγαπᾶν represents ֹא ֵה בand φιλεῖν ַד ֵע.

122. But see below page 373.

123. As cited. We are quoting from 10th ed., 1915, but the passage has remained substantially unaltered since the 3d ed., 1883.

124. On these assertions see The Princeton Theological Review, January 1918, pp. 20ff.

125. “Bibliotheca Sacra,” July, 1889, p. 534.

126. Lütgert, “Die Liebe im Neuen Testament,” 1905, p. 35, remarks: “Here the commandment of love comes forward as a law of nature, and that because it ought to be presented as a rational thing.” He is presenting it as an instance of the rationalization of Jewish thought under the influence of Hellenism.

127. As cited, p. 527.

128. The treatise is known from Herculaneum papyri alone, and the reading in question is restored thus: διʼ ἀ[γ]άπης ἐ[ναρ]γοῦς. It is recorded in Crönert’s revision of Passow’s Lexicon, sub voc, who accompanies it with a note, “sicher (?)”; and it is reported from his record by Moulton and Milligan, sub voc. G. A. Deissmann, “Bible Studies,” 1901, p. 200, points out a scholium to Thucydides II. 51, which reads “φιλανθρωπίας καὶ ἀγάπης.” But there is no telling how late this scholium may be, or whether the glossator was a Christian or not.

129. § 229; ed. Wendland, p. 63. Aristeas uses ἀγαπᾶν (§ 123), ἀγάπησις (§§ 44, 265, 270) and ἀγάπη (§ 229); apparently not ἐρᾶν, ἔρως, or στέργειν, στοργή, at all; nor even φιλεῖν, but φιλία, §§ 40, 44, 225, 228, 231, φίλος a half-dozen times and compounds of φιλ- including φιλανθρωπεῖν, φιλανθρωπία, φιλανθροπότερον.

130. Ἀγάπησις is used in a less exalted sense. In § 44 (p. 15), Eleazar writes to Ptolemy that he would endeavor to do all that the king had asked, “for this is a mark of φιλίας and ἀγαπήσως.” Here ἀγάπησις is used of national amity (Done: “confederation and amity”). In § 270 (p. 73) it is said that a king ought to trust men whose loyalty (εὔνοια) towards him is indisputable, “for this is a mark of ἀγαπήσεως rather than of ill-will and timeserving.” For § 265 see note 22. The verb ἀγαπᾶν is used very distinctly in its native sense of valuing in § 123.

131. “Quod Deus sit Immutabilis,” § 14, near the end; ed. Mangey, p. 283; ed. Cohn, v. ii, p. 72: Yonge’s translation is used.

132. On Philo’s independence of the Septuagint in his use of the word, see Deissmann, as cited, p. 199; and Moulton and Milligan, as cited, sub voc.

133. In Gen. 29:20, 1 Sam. 18:3, the clause containing אהבהis omitted in the Septuagint as printed whether by Tischendorf or by Swete; but it is supplied in some MSS.

134. The exceptions to the last statement are ἀγάπη, 2 Sam. 1:26, 13:15, and ἀγάπησις, 2 Sam. 1:26.

135. 1 Macc. 8:1, 12, 17; 10:54; 12:1, 3, 8, 16; 14:18, 22; 15:17; 2 Macc. 4:11; 1 Macc. 12:10, with ἀδελφότητα; 10:20, 23, 26 paralleled with συνθήκη.

136. In this passage ἀγάπησις is printed by both Tischendorf and Swete; ἀγάπη is read by א.

137. As cited, sub voc. ἀγάπη, near end.

138. Naturally the daily use of the word in its lower senses was not inhibited by its acquisition of its higher senses. It has continued up to the present day. Witness the lines of Christopoulos: Εἰς βουνὸν ἐγὼ κιʼ ὁ Ἒρως Κʼ ἡ ἀγάπη μου μαζή …; or those of Zalokostas: Ἀπὸ τὴ μέση μὲ ἃρπαξε, μὲ φίλησε στὸ στόμα Καὶ μοὖπε γιὰ ἀναστεναγμούς, Γιὰ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦς καϋμοὺς Εἶσαι μικρὸς ἀκόμα. When Clement of Alexandria (“Paed.,” III. xi. 257) tells us that love is not to be estimated by kissing, but by kind deeds (ἀγάπη δὲ οὐκ ἐν φιλήματι, ἀλλʼ ἐν εὐνοίᾳ κρίνεται), that involves the understanding that there was an ἀγάπη which expressed itself in kissing; and a similar implication lies in Chrysostom’s declaration (Hom. vii. on Romans) that ἀγάπη does not consist in empty words or mere substantives, but in care and works. Even in the horrible story told by Epiphanius (“Adv. Haer.,” 1. ii. xxvi, 4; Migne 1. 337c) of the Gnostic orgies, where the man bade the woman, “arise, do τὴν ἀγάπην with your brother,” using ἀγάπη, as Sophocles says, κακεμφάτως,—ποιεῖν τὴν ἀγάπην was the standing phrase for celebrating the Ἀγάπη—the current use of ἀγάπη of the sexual act is doubtless implied.

139. Cf. Swete on Mk. 1:11: “Ἀγαπητός in the LXX answers to ( ָיִח ידμονογενής unicus, cf. Hort, “Two Dissertations,” pp. 49f.) in seven instances out of fifteen.” Also Zahn on Mat. 3:17 (ed. 3, 1910, p. 149, note 68). The usage is classical from Homer down: cf. e. g., W. W. Goodwin, “Demosthenes against Midias,” 1906, p. 95; or more fully R. Whiston, “Demosthenes,” 1868, 11, p. 324; and Holden, “Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, iv.iv.5; Fritzsche “Aristotle’s Eth. Eud.,” iii.6, 1233 and in criticism E. M. Cope, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” 1897, p. 150, esp. note.

140. An exception like the Homeric ἀγαπήνωρ only proves the rule.

141. Similarly Aristeas, § 290, ed. Wendland, p. 77, says that Ptolemy’s greatness consisted not in the glory of his power and wealth, but in his ἐπιεικία καὶ φιλανθρωπία, “moderation and graciousness.” Similarly in § 208, φιλάνθρωπος is “humane,” and in § 36, φιλανθρωπότερον is “very graciously.” In § 265, p. 71, on the other hand it is said apparently that the most necessary thing for a king to have is the φιλανθρωπία καὶ ἀγάπησις, “good feeling and affection” of his subjects, “for with these will come an indissoluble bond of loyalty (εὐνοίας).”

142. See some apposite remarks on the general matter in A. Thumb, “Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus,” 1901, pp. 182 f. and 185. On the affinity of the Greek of Philo and Biblical Greek, cf. H. A. A. Kennedy, “Sources of New Testament Greek,” 1895, p. 67.

143. φιλαδελφία, φιλανθρωπία, φιλάνθρωπος, φιλαργυρεῶ, φιλαργυρία, φιλάργυρος, φιλοδέσποτος, φιλόζωος, φιλονεικία, φιλόνεικος, φιλοξενία, φιλόξενος, φιλοπονεῖν, φιλόσοφος, φιλοστοργία, φιλότεκνος, φιλοτιμία, φιλόϋλος: eighteen.

144. Ἀγαπητός is found only in I Clement (18 times), Ignatius (6), and the Martyrium of Polycarp, Hermas, and the Didache (each once). Ἀγαπητοί is almost a peculium of I Clement (15 times to Ignatius’ 2).

145. See Jude 12 and 2 Peter 2:13, and compare Lightfoot’s note on the passage.

146. It contains besides only φιλανθρώπως, 27:3.

147. E. F. Gelpke, “Theolog. Studien und Kritiken,” 1849, pp. 646f., gives the following account of these words as they came to the hands of the writers of the New Testament. “The older profane writers know only the verb and adjective, not, however, the noun, precisely in which it was that the Christian writers found the abstract expression, recurring on every page, of the sentiment which bound all believers together. The verb, moreover, is found already with profane writers in the purer sense of reverential love, although it was later interchanged also, when conceived sensuously, with φιλεῖν, amare, the expression for personal affection. This usage is not only recognized in the LXX, where the word, it must be confessed, is used even more sensuously, and nevertheless also of the more sacred affection (Gen. 22:2); and again in the New Testament; but also it receives, first in this connection, its full content, as this follows of itself from the most Christian of all Christian declarations, 1 John 4:8, ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν (the abstract term is used, with the sense that God is the personal Love, presenting Himself personally), and from the religion of the spirit freed from all particularism and all sensuous elements. The word acquired, however, an entirely new, peculiarly Christian, sense, still further in the new demonstration of love conditioned by the deepened sentiment of love. Accordingly the word is used (1) of the love of God for Jesus and of Jesus for God, and of the love of both for men, and then again of the love of men for God and Christ, derived from the love of God and Christ, and of the love of men for one another inseparable from this as its vital basis; and then (2) of the actual, powerfully arising manifestation of love, the loving conduct in word and deed, 1 John 3:1, cf. James 4:8.”

148. “Bibliotheca Sacra,” July 1889, p. 533.

149. Schmidt remarks (p. 479): “Even when applied to things, φιλεῖν retains its ordinary meaning and designates therefore the satisfaction in things which are pleasing (φιλία) to us, the possession of which, or contact with which, is pleasant to us. Even evil or contemptible things are included, Aristotle, “Eth. Nic.,” 8.2.1: ‘For it appears that not everything is loved, but τὸ φιλητόν, and this is the good, or the pleasant, or the useful.’ ”

150. Lk. 11:43, Jno. 3:19, 12:43, 2 Thess. 2:16, 1 Pet. 3:10, 2 Pet. 2:15, 1 Jno. 2:15, Rev. 12:11, 15.

151. Cf. Swete in loc: “ὁ φιλῶν goes deeper than ὁ ποιῶν; he who loves falsehood is in his nature akin to it, and has through his love of it proved his affinity to Satan, who is ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ (Jno. 8:44).”

152. Cf. Swete in loc: φιλῶ (Bengel: Philadelphiensem ἠγάπησεν, Laodicensem φιλεῖ) is perhaps deliberately preferred to the less emotional and less human ἀγαπῶ (1:5, 3:9) notwithstanding the use of the latter in Prov. 3:12 (LXX. ὃν γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ Κύριος ἐλέγχει), which supplies the groundwork of the thought.”

153. A fresh study of ἀγαπᾶν and φιλεῖν, especially in John, by Sally Neil Roach taking its point of departure from G. B. Stevens, “Johannine Theology,” Ch. 11.; is printed in The Review and Expositor, 1913, x. pp. 531ff. Her discrimination of terms is as follows (p. 533): “Ἀγαπᾷν (and the same is true of the noun, ἀγάπη) carries with it invariably the idea of the rights or the good of the object, sought at the cost of the subject, while φιλεῖν as uniformly suggests the pleasure of the subject as associated with and derived from the object.” She speaks of this as looking upon ἀγαπᾶν as the altruistic, and φιλεῖν as the egoistic term for love. Perhaps the same general idea might be better expressed by distinguishing the two as the love of benevolence and the love of complacency; and perhaps better still as the love of regard and the love of delight. All the Johannine passages in which φιλεῖν occurs are examined with a view to validating the suggested distinction.

154. Cf. Karl Horn, “Abfassung, Geschichtlichkeit und Zweck vom Evang. des Johannes, Kap. 21,” 1904, p. 170: “In 15:19, it is said very significantly: ‘If ye were of the world, ὁ κόσμος would love its own’; therefore natural inclination (Zuneigung) to that which is of kindred nature and has sprung from the same root is what is expressed.”

155. This is excellently shown by Horn, as above.

156. So Westcott in loc.: cf. what Woolsey says, Andover Review, August 1885, p. 166.

157. As cited, p. 167.

158. E. A. Abbott, “Johannine Vocabulary,” p. 241, bottom (1728 p.).

159. As cited, p. 167.

160. P. 177.

161. Meyer, E. T., ii, p. 367, says: “With ἐφίλει the recollection speaks with more feeling.” What he means is apparently that John, recording the events in his Gospel, was at this point suffused with deeper feeling than he ordinarily felt as the recollection rushed over him of the personal affection which Jesus showed toward him “in the days of His flesh”; and this expressed itself in ἐφίλει.

162. Westcott’s actual phraseology is that ἐφίλει here “marks a personal affection.”

163. “Justin Martyr,” 1877, p. 135. Among later writers of the same mind, cf. W. G. Ballantine, “Bibliotheca Sacra,” July 1889, pp. 524 ff.; John A. Cross, The Expositor, 1893, iv, vii, pp. 312 ff.; Max Eberhardt, “Ev. Joh. c. 21: ein exegetischer Versuch,” 1897, p. 52; cf. also G. B. Stevens, “The Johannine Theology,” ch. xi.

164. As cited, p. 2.

165. Roach, as cited, p. 544, on her principle, paraphrases ἀγαπᾶν here, not inaptly: “Do you love Me so that you can surrender your life to My interests?”; and φιλεῖν, in Peter’s response: “Yes, Lord, Thou knowest that my heart goes out to Thee and my pleasure is found in Thee.” This is, clearly, what was really meant by the terms—however we arrive at it.

166. So Trench: so also Henry Burton, The Expositor, v, i. p. 462 (1895), who paraphrases ἀγαπᾶν here, as the broader and weaker word of the two, by, “Do you care for me?” and represents it as “too cold, too distant for Peter’s passionate soul,” who asserts that he does not merely “care for” but loves His Lord.

167. So rightly Woolsey, as cited, p. 182.

168. P. 684.

169. Cf. A. Klöpper. Zeitschrift für wiss. Theologie, 1899, 42, p. 363, who supposes the contrast to be between the expression of a natural human inclination (φιλεῖν) and the efflux of such a love as might be expressed in Pauline phrase as ἀγάπη ἐν πνεύματι (Col. 1:8). In general he finds the distinction drawn by Schmidt from the classical writers valid for John also. Ἀγαπᾶν is, however, he says, almost always used in the higher, spiritual sense, 3:35, 10:17, 14:21 (of God); 13:1, 23, 19:26, 11:5 (of Christ); 8:42, 13:34, 14:15, 21 (of the disciples).

170. Cf. Horn, as cited, p. 170: Φιλεῖν stands very suitably at 5:20: ‘The Father loves the Son and shows Him all that He Himself does.’ For here the more intimate relation of the filial relation of the Son to the Father is suggested, and at the same time, it is thought of as one wholly natural, resting on elective affinity. The Son ‘can’ nothing of Himself.”

171. As cited, p. 170.

172. This is in effect the love of benevolence in distinction from the love of complacency. Compare note 154.

173. Add to those mentioned in the text: φιλάγαθος, φιλαργυρία, φιλάργυρος, φιλήδονος, φιλονεικία, φιλόνεικος, φιλοπρωτεύω, φιλοσοφία, φιλόσοφος, φιλοτιμέομαι, φιλοφρόνως, φιλόφρων.

174. Consult on φιλόστοργος in the New Testament, E. Hoehne, Zeitschrift f. k. Wissenschaft und k. Leben, 1882 (III.) p. 6.